

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES ON ELITES : 1

Series Editor ; T.N. CHATURVEDI

ELITES

PARADIGM AND CHANGE IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Paradigm and Change in Transnational Perspective

Editor

R.N. THAKUR

Co-Editor

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Foreword

The modern world is a 'stupendously disquieting and difficult world to understand'. Our age is one of great 'social dislocation', conflict and transformation. Multi-dimensionality is, perhaps, the only position which can explain this chaotic social world in a thorough, consistent and satisfying manner. A celebrated social scientist, Robert K. Merton says, "we habitually think in social science terms partly because a great variety of sociological terms have drifted into our every day language". One such term which has, over the decades, so frequently come into use is 'elite'. Who these elites are: whether they are 'top people', the position holders, the decision-makers, wielders of power, authority and influence, or merely those whose actions and opinions count most in a body politic, their presence can be felt in most of the socio-cultural and political aspects of our lives.

Elites are prime movers of society. They are an important element of modern life. The crucial significance of elite as a major theme of socio-political analysis has emerged in almost all types of societies, and is emerging once again in especially those societies which are moving from agrarian to industrial economies. The crucial role of elite for those societies which are on road to modernization has been universally acknowledged. The development of modern industrial and post-industrial societies can be depicted as movement from a social hierarchy based upon inheritance of property to one based upon achievement and merit. Ascriptive criteria are largely being supplanted by achievement criteria.


While searching into questions like these, a great number of social scientists do carry out their craft in a quite traditional manner, namely, micro-level empirical research, using survey techniques and interviews, possibly linking the research to middle-range theories. Here is an attempt to make a study through a different craft—that is by generating ideas through correspondence and collection of papers leading to accumulation of a body of knowledge through interpretation of available data and information from experts in their own field.

Within the framework of elites covered in this volume are the professional elite, the academic elite, the political elite, the military elite, the power elite, the administrative elite, the economic elite, etc.,

in the political cultural contexts of societies which are at varying levels of development.

These elites have been analysed on ideological, continental and intercontinental basis representing the Euro-American elite, Afro-Asian elite, etc.

I hope that this volume, which is an important contribution to the study of elite in social science, will stimulate further interest into the dynamic and important area of elite paradigm.



(S. RAMANATHAN)

Director

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
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JANUARY 15, 1988
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Preface

Historically and conceptually, the word elite continues to be enigmatic and tantalising in nature because it is of deep social significance in practical day to day life not only at a point of time but for future too. Despite profound writings over the years of many social thinkers of various hues and complexions, there are sharp differences of opinion about its origin, nature, character, composition, temper, and orientation. It has, however, come to be recognised that elites somehow or the other, denote the repository of power or resources which place them in a singular position to exercise influence in various ways of a positively determining nature in social, economic or political relations of a community.

In some societies, innumerable actions of innumerable men may modify their milieu, and so gradually modify the structure itself. In most other societies, a few men may be so placed within the structure that by their decisions they modify the milieu of many other men; and in fact the structural conditions under which most men live. They are the elites of power. These elites, in all ages and all times, have been largely instrumental in modifying the structure of society.

The history of modern society can be viewed as the extension and centralisation of the means of power—in economic, political, social, bureaucratic and military organisations. The decision-making power may lie so clearly in these organisations that other societal organisations may find themselves relegated to a subordinate position and even largely shaped by them. In almost all societies, whether we view the modern western type or socialist variety or traditional-transitional type, it is evident that the means of power does become somewhat international in scope and similar in form and orientation.

The top of the modern society is increasingly getting unified and coordinated in character; the middle level is much like a drifting set of stalemated forces, unable to connect the bottom with the top; the bottom is politically fragmented, ignorant, weak and increasingly powerless; still the middle level matters because the actions of the middle level powers may have consequence for top level policy, surely at times they hamper these policies. However, the middle level of politics is not, all

the same, the forum for debate of big decisions of national and international consequence. The political authority and administrative elite tend to become the centre of decision, and also the arena within which any conflict of power is generally resolved. Hence, elites as position-holders, power-wielders, decision-makers, and policy and decision-executors have considerably influenced social science thinking all over the world.

The term 'elite' has both historical and ideological connotations. Very often it is used in a pejorative sense. It is considered as parasitic, privileged, exclusive and exploitative in nature. It, thus, becomes anti-democratic and impedes the process of nation-building and national homogeneity, especially in many pluralistic societies. Many others interpret it as carrier of values of merit, excellence and of leadership which tend to give pace-setting tone to the society as a whole. The analytical discussion of the theme in its various dimensions becomes important. In an intensely competitive world of economics and politics and with the expansion of multinationals and other kinds of international organisations and groupings, many are of the opinion that the growth of elites is inevitable for survival of nations and economies. Many question the role of elites in modernisation. Moreover, one has to take note of the repercussions within the country, particularly the classic phenomenon of 'two nations', as we find from the recent turbulent course of events in many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has often been alleged that the very process and programmes of development in many countries are not related to the real needs of the masses or public interest but are the expression of the rationalization of the interests of the self-serving, self-enriching and self-perpetuating elites. While the subject is of academic interest, it is of concern to general public too as they do not want aristocracy to emerge flaunting the flag of elitism.

The question of the mobility versus the rigidity of elites also becomes pertinent. The identification of elites is not always so smooth. It may be either self-projection or may take the form of denigration by those whose claims are not recognised. Dispassionate consideration and objective discussion get caught up in the vortex of controversy. Even in different segments of society, say professional groups or academicians, one can perceive this debate and this dissatisfaction. The ethical aspects of elite behaviour in different contexts in a society, where public awareness is on the increase, also raise ripples of discontent and controversy. The miasma of distrust surrounds the elites, rightly or wrongly. Elitism as a value—which has the temper of excellence as well as equalitarianism in a society, which aims and strives to be open, democratic,

representative, modern, progressive and less and less unequal—merits indepth study and extensive analysis or discussion.

This series precisely seeks to re-emphasise the need for study of the increasing importance and role of elites in community, politics and government. The conservative, the liberal, the pluralist, the modern democratic, and even some marxist thinkers have acknowledged the importance of direct and indirect role of elites in economy, polity and society, and the necessity to incorporate the elite paradigm in social science discussion.

Since Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Lasswell, Hunter, Mills, Dahl, Bottomore, Giddens, the elite paradigm continued to resuscitate itself in social science. There has once again been a further revival of interest in the elite study, from different angles and for various reasons, in recent decades in the developed nations of the world, more particularly the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The idea behind bringing out this volume is to prepare a Social Science Series on Elites in international perspective. The aim is to look at elite studies in a broad and multi-dimensional perspective and provide a theoretical-empirical base for the analysis of elite paradigm in the contemporary social science. This series is mainly intended to provide an intellectual basis for studying, analysing and integrating and synthesizing the divergent views and diverse socio-cultural-political contexts in theoretical-empirical terms. This should facilitate better and more informed comprehension of the issues involved by people in general who have a sense of social responsibility.

The present volume, forming part of the series, has the following five main aims: (1) to develop a conceptual understanding of the elite; (2) to discuss elite in various socio-political contexts; (3) to demonstrate the importance of elite paradigm in the field of social science; (4) to put together on analytical plane the on-going studies on elite in various countries of the world; and (5) to develop a theoretical base for future direction in elite studies. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive but are mutually interacting. They do, however, provide a focus for analytical work of this kind.

The contributors to this volume belong to different nations of the world with varying socio-economic as well as political milieu and belong to various social science disciplines. They deserve our thanks for their warm intellectual response to this social science series. The views and opinions expressed are of the learned authors and one may find sharply differing standpoints and conclusions. But then this is the essence of free intellectual debate so essential for the healthy growth of social sciences. We find gratified to provide a forum for this continuing debate.

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The utility of this volume, as of the series, greatly depends upon the 'acceptance' and 'worth' which are to become the touchstone of any novel idea and endeavour in the field of social science. Dr. R.N. Thakur and Shri M.K. Gaur merit appreciation for their pains in preparing the volume.

T.N. Chaturvedi

(T.N. CHATURVEDI)

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
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Introduction

*"... it has now become a habit among the citizens of states,
not ever to care about equality; all men are seeking for dominion".*

—ARISTOTLE

Right from Plato and Aristotle and Kautilya down to the present times, social thinkers have acknowledged the existence and persistence of some form of dominion in social life. Plato's concept of class of 'the rulers', and Aristotle's concept of the 'rule of the best few' approximate to the concept of men seeking for dominion.

From the conservative, the liberal, the Marxist down to the democratic thinkers, all subscribe, directly and indirectly, to the line of thinking that some individuals or a group of individuals have ever been in possession of certain power and authority. They are the elite. J.B. McKee (1969) mentions that in spite of the emergence of democratic society, with its equalitarian values, there is a persistent idea that the 'political control always rests in the hands of an elite'. The study of elites ever occupied a crucial position in the comparative analysis of politics and government. Plato's theory of the rule of the elite in society whom he called 'rulers' stimulated later aristocratic theory and fascist and 'managerial' philosophers in our own day.

The Marxist thinkers also could not disabuse themselves of the idea of a class which is distinct.

The liberal democratic thinkers have accepted that under the semblance of the majority rule, it is a microscopic minority, that is 'elite', which is involved in real decision-making, and it is that elite minority which rules effectively by its decision-making function. Some pre-war scholars, such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Mannheim, and others displayed a great deal of interest in elite study. It was through the writings of Pareto and Mosca that elite entered into the realm of scientific thought. Again, today, there is noticed a renewed concern with elite studies. The study of elites in developed and developing countries continues to attract attention of scholars and researchers. The study of the social origins, recruitment and role of the elite groups, in the post-war years, has enjoyed a new vogue. The sources of this newer interest in these groups are diffuse. The one important source

seems to be the work of Harold D. Lasswell whose influence in this field has been supplemented by the influence of the pre-war scholars, such as, Pareto, Mosca and Michels. Now, a great amount of attention has been devoted to the various elite groups as found in the political, economic, military, administrative, religious and labour organisations, and their functional significance for the larger society. By and large, an acceptance of the existence of an elite and its rule has been acknowledged in all forms of societies.

CONCEPT OF ELITE

The concept of elite needs to be scientifically viewed. Etymologically speaking, the term 'elite' is a derivation from the Latin term 'eligere', which means to 'choose' or select. Some even use the term 'elect' in place of 'elite'. Both 'elite' and 'elect' came from the Latin 'eligere'. But 'elect' has connotation of either divine appointment or political election. Truly speaking, 'elite' is a French word taken over into the English Language. In German also, the term 'elite' has been used.

Round about the fourteenth century A.D., the term 'elite' came into use in the French language. Elite had the meaning of 'choice'. First and foremost use of elite was made in military terminology in which it came to be applied to 'a choice of persons', . . . "hommes d'elite" and "compagnie d'elite". In the fifteenth century A.D., Froissart applied the term to 'the best of the best', 'meilleurs des meilleurs'. Also, Racine used the term elite while speaking of "patrocle et quel ques chefs, qui marchent a'La Suite de mes Thessaliens vous amenant L 'elite'." In English, Lord Byron, for the first time, made use of this term in his poetic work, *Don Juan* (Canto XIII, LXXX, 1823):

With other countesses of Blank . . . but rank;
At once the lie and the *elite* of crowds;

The current dictionary definitions of 'elite' are somewhat more simple. *The Concise Oxford French Dictionary* explains elite as 'choice', 'pick' (of the army), or 'the cream of the working class'. *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Vol. III, D-E) explains 'elite' as 'that which is chosen'. In Latin, the meaning is . . . 'the choice part of the flower (of society, or of any class of persons)'. Kelly (1848) used it in relation to 'the elite of the Russian nobility'. Gold W. Smith (1880) used this term, 'if we take into consideration . . . the elite of a comparatively civilized generation' (*Atlantic Monthly*).

The term 'elite' is very much in use today in developed as well as developing societies. Superiority, prestige and power are the three

main notions generally linked with it.¹

Rupert Wilkinson sets out to explain elite as a 'distinctive group' holding high status in its community and knit together by a strong group feeling, ethos and style.²

Here 'high status' refers to high status in the eyes of the non-elite and the community as a whole. Elite members feel that they have 'high status' and are in some way 'superior' as a group. In these two senses, (i) 'a distinctive group' and (ii) 'high status', the term is relative. First, 'it is relative to the community'. In an army, a 'crack' regiment will constitute an elite, 'on the factory floor, a guild of skilled workers may constitute an elite'.

Some sociologists have given complex and varied definitions of the term, elite. Often it is said to include the notions of 'social influence' and 'respected attributes or deference'. Gradually there has been a shift from choice to eminence.

The concept of elite made its way into the scientific thought of the nineteenth century, when, perhaps Pareto became one of the first to coin the term elite in his 'Trattato di Sociologia Generale', translated as 'The Mind and Society'. The notions of 'superiority', 'prestige', 'status', 'imitation' came always to be associated with elite.

Nadel introduced a new element—some 'degree of exclusiveness'—into the elite. They have 'pre-eminent position' and form a 'self-conscious unit within society'. Kolabinska stressed 'superiority'; Rothwell emphasised 'holders of high position'. 'Deference' on the part of non-elite for the elite is another element. Deference denotes respect because of superior qualities, knowledge, skill, virtue, possession which receive recognition in social life.

The elite serve as a 'model'. In *The Gita*, the term is 'Shrestha'³ in Sanskrit who serve as a model, as a standard setter to societal values, worthy of emulation. T.E. Lasswell also holds the same view. The elite exert influence in social life, and are 'imitable'. The elite possess power, respect, skill and wealth in combination or singly.

Scholars and researchers from both developed and developing countries of the world have given themselves over to the study of elite with increasing interest.

¹Thom Kerstiens, *The New Elite in Asia and Africa*, London, Frederick A. Praeger, pp, 3 and 6.

Kerstiens examines the rising elite of Indonesia and China who, he concludes, are largely drawn from the middle class, born in the cities under the Western influence.

²Rupert Wilkinson, *Governing Elites*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 13,

³*The Gita*, published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur, India; See Chapter III, Verse no. 21. The Gita forms part of 'Shanti Parva' in the greatest epic *Mahabharata* the authorship of which is ascribed to the great ancient sage, Veda Vyas.

ELITE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES: EUROPE AND AMERICA

There are two lines of thought. One is the Marxist thought which makes political power dependent on the economic power. The other line of thought treats the economy and polity as interrelated systems. According to Bottomore, the classical notion of social class is closely connected with the notion of political power, especially with the concept of a 'ruling class'. In Pareto's sociology, at least in its major concern with 'the governing elite', the terms 'class' and 'elite' are practically synonymous. Elites and classes are a kind of social groups. More recently, sociologists, as Bottomore says, have used the term 'elite' to refer to smaller and more cohesive groups, which may be more or less closely connected with social classes as traditionally conceived. G.D.H. Cole contends, "not all elites rest on a class basis, or are to be regarded as class representatives; but some do and are. . . in modern societies and especially in the older societies which have been developing from aristocracy towards some form of democracy. . . ." Raymond Aron, in his *Social Structure and the Ruling Class*, provides one of the best studies of the relationship between elites and social class. C. Wright Mills in his *Power Elite* makes a brilliant analysis of power in contemporary American society. His power elite is a 'power group', a social category or a class. According to Mills, the elites are those who have "the most of what there is to have. . . money, power, and prestige. . . . But the elites are not simply those who have the most, for they could not have the most, were it not for their positions in the great institutions. . . such institutions are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige".

Mills defines elites in terms of power, wealth, and prestige which emanate from their holding positions in the great institutions. The word elite is generally used in case of a small, cohesive group in terms of authority, position, superiority, wealth, power, influence, prestige and imitation. Some of the later studies of elites have followed in the line of Mosca who by 'elite' meant the 'ruling class', in real sense of the term the 'political elite'. H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, C.E. Rothwell in their comparative *Studies of Elites* (the Hoover Institute Studies on Elites) have devoted themselves especially to the study of the political elite, according to which, "the political elite comprises the power holders of a body politic. The power holders include the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come. . . ."

Lasswell and others distinguished political elite from other elites and reintroduced the idea of 'social formations'. In more recent studies, the term 'elite' is generally applied to mainly occupational and functional groups which have a high status in a society. This use of the term is

broadbased insofar as it encompasses the size of the elites, the number of different elites, their relations with each other, the close or open character of the elites, the nature of the recruitment of the elites and the degree of social mobility. The political elite which implies a smaller group within the political class, includes members of the government and of the high administration, political leaders, economic directors and leaders of the masses.

The concept of elite, which is used to describe certain fundamental features of organised social life, is seemingly hostile to the modern ideals of equality, democracy and socialism. In an age which seems to be marked by a 'striving for equality among all men' on the cultural, political as well as socio-economic levels, the term elite acquires a bad connotation. Behind the modern ideals of equality, the term 'elite' smacks of inequality. All societies, whether primitive or modern, agrarian or industrial, simple or complex, need authorities within and agents without who are also representatives of the common life and embodiments of the values that sustain it. Inequalities in performance and reward support this arrangement. The inequality in the distribution of deference acknowledges the differences in authority, achievement and reward. Elites are those minorities which are set apart from the rest of society by their pre-eminence in one or more of these various distributions.⁴

ELITE IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Elite study has, of late, acquired a great deal of prominence in the Asian and African countries (see Grazie; Deutschmann; Hunter; Singer; Kerstiens; Hennessy; T.K.N. Unnithan, Y. Singh, and N. Singhi; S.K. Lal; R. Ahuja; B.M. Bhatia; S.S. Jha; and R.N. Thakur).

In the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, M.R. Singer finds three types of elites: (i) the traditional elites whose status is ascriptive because they acquire status by birth and not by skill; (ii) the colonial elites who had the greatest degree of power, wealth, skill and respect; and (iii) the new synthesizing elites emerging as a result of the economic development in these countries. This category of elite acquires status primarily as a result of particular skills and expertise. As in many other Asian countries, five different categories of elites are also found in Indian society: (i) traditional elites, such as the Dwija who held elite status by birth and also had land ownership and prestige in social life; (ii) the feudal elites or aristocratic elites, such as, the Raja, the Maharaja, the Nawab, the Zamindars who held the greatest degree of wealth, power, influence and respect, and had aristocratic ways and style of living; (iii) elites who emerged in the wake

⁴*International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. V, pp. 26, 27 and 29.

of the colonial administration and the legacy of British education, who also contributed a great deal to the growth of Indian nationalism and struggle for freedom; (iv) new elite belonging to the rising generation of middle class and upper middle class from which are recruited the occupational, functional elites, such as, the political leaders, administrators, bureaucrats, technocrats, scientists, academicians, business elites, legal elites, etc. They are the product of British pattern of education in India, growing ideals of socialism and democracy, modernism, industry, rationality, notions of Community Development Programme and Panchayati Raj. Merit rather than heredity is generally the criterion of their selection. But at times, there is also a strange blending of heredity and merit as criteria of such elite selection. Elite position is ascribed as in case of party leaders whose sons or daughters are also being recruited as such. But, in general, ascription is being supplanted by achievement criteria; and (v) the newly rising Harijan and tribal elites, who belong to the depressed castes, and are coming up with new ideals of equality, welfare and upliftment in the wake of constitutional safeguards, reservation of quota in the legislature, the services, and educational fields.

Birth and merit are always considerations in forming such an elite. But, in any social system the son of an elite father has better chance of becoming a member of the elite than the son of a non-elite father, unless the selection criteria change.

ELITE IN LIBERAL, PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The notion of an 'elite' is seemingly incompatible with democracy. Democracy implies equality. The very notion of an elite is against equality. "An elite appears indispensable to the welfare state but difficult to co-exist alongside democracy." The notion of an elite appears to suggest something of feudalism, something of aristocratic pretensions, something of the claim of a few to be better than other people. But the conception of democracy as a political system in which the political parties compete for the votes of a mass electorate, implies that the elites are relatively open and are recruited on the basis of merit and election, and that the masses are able to participate (may be, in a remote sense) in ruling society at least, in the sense that it can exercise a choice between the rival elites.⁵ In democracy, there is presumed to be a continuous and extensive circulation of elites. Karl Mannheim views that "the actual shaping of policy is in the hands of elites, but this does not mean that the society is not democratic". In a democracy, although the individual citizens are prevented from taking a direct part in government all the

⁵Tom Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, Penguin Books, 1971, p. 112.

time, they have at least the possibility of making their aspirations felt at certain intervals.⁶ Pareto stressed that the minority elites exercised political power. Michels exhibited the trend towards oligarchic rule. Yet, it would be wrong to presume that these elites can wield power in arbitrary manner, although sometime, they do. In a democracy, these governing elites can always be forced to take decisions in the interest of the larger masses of population.

There is, in true sense, a compatibility between elite rule and democracy insofar as the distance between elites and masses is greatly reduced and the selection of elite (political elite) takes place by merit and choice of the people as they are elected by them. Democracy favours the notion of plurality of elites. Further, description of any democratic system as a competition between political parties serves to reconcile the existence of elite with democracy. The advocates of this view discover a more general system of checks and balances in the plurality of elites which characterizes democratic societies.

In pluralistic societies, all are entitled to form associations, and professional or political organisations for defending their own interests. Government becomes a business of compromises. "Those in power are considerate of the opposition because they themselves have been, and will some day again be in opposition".

Raymond Aron says, "it is quite impossible for the government of a society to be in the hands of any but a few—there is government for the people, there is no government by the people."

Both Pareto and Mosca observed that in societies of the past, there has been a clear distinction between the rulers and the ruled. Michels, Mannheim, and Raymond Aron go to explain that in any complex society, democracy can only be representative.

The elite theory of democracy is objected to on the ground that if there are perpetual opposition and conflict between elites, and a constant circulation of the elite personnel, any form of government can hardly survive for long. However, the government does not fall back upon the political elite alone, there are other support machinery such as the executive, judicial and other career elite.

Both Mannheim and T.S. Eliot have one fear that unlike the democratic societies of earlier ages, modern democracies seem to suffer a loss of homogeneity in the governing elites. "Modern democracies are burdened with far more complex decision problems than those facing early democratic societies with . . . more homogeneous ruling groups".⁷ T.S. Eliot argues that elites requiring a regular circulation of their personnel are unable to ensure social continuity in the way that the ruling classes of

⁶Karl Mannheim, *Essay on the Sociology of Culture*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, pp. 179, 200.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 200.

earlier times could do.⁸ Aron favours integration of elite groups for a successful democratic order. 'In one way—there must be unity of opinion and action on essential points in the elite.'

The social composition of elites in the western societies (where the recruitment of elites takes place mostly from the upper class) is such that this form of unity can be achieved although class barrier is already there. The social composition of elites in the Asian society, especially Indian society, where there are caste, creed, religious, linguistic, regional barriers, stands in the way of achieving elite consensus and integration. Bottomore calls this barrier as "predominance of upper class and middle class individuals as officials." However, it is an accepted principle of the present age that democracy is sustained solely by the competition between elites, as, in the course of competition, these elites balance and limit one another's powers.

ELITE IN SOCIALIST, SOVIET TYPE SOCIETY

In all societies, there are the ministers, political leaders, government officials, business managers, and trade union leaders, but they are not recruited in the same way everywhere. A society of the Soviet type has unified elite structure where all the elites belong to the Communist party. But a society of the western type, as also most of the Asian societies of this age have a divided elite structure.

In socialist system, there is no educational administrative elite of the apparent homogeneity of the French grandes écoles graduates. The Soviet type elite ensures considerable permeability from below. There is little evidence of transmission of political privilege across generations; though there is evidence of transmission of social privilege; children of top leaders go in favour of cushy jobs (cultural intelligentsia, profession, foreign trade mission). Even if, there is a ruling class, it is a class of the democratic rather than the aristocratic type, to use Mosca's terminology.

The Soviet-type elite model presents a confrontational type of image: elites, eligibles and masses. Yet, one strength in elite structure in communist system is its unifying capacity as demonstrated by the stability of USSR as a system.

All sectors of society are mobilized and integrated into a centrally directed system. People at the lower levels are, to a much higher degree than in western societies, involved in a supportive role either by public commitment or by involvement in the implementation of policies. All the same, there is a view that the membership of the Communist party assigns elite status. It may not give much material benefit but defi-

⁸T.S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, London, Faber and Faber, 1948.

nitely has other non-material advantages of increased status, as belonging to an exclusive club with its secrets and rituals associated with powerful institution (Zinoviev 1981).

APPLYING ELITE THEORY TO DIVERSE SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM

Elite theory is difficult to apply to the Soviet-type societies in the same way as to the liberal-democratic states of the western type. Western elite studies of Soviet-type system most of which are based on secondary sources, deal with questions of elite recruitment and maintenance (Armstrong 1959; Ludz 1972; Miller 1977; Hodnett 1978; on the nomenklatura by Harasymi 1984; and Voslensky 1984).

Elite decision-making is much more difficult to study in Soviet type system than elite recruitment.

Although western researchers have greatly succeeded in deriving much useful information from documentary and other sources, yet Nikolov's analysis as presented in this volume seems to be more useful and relevant as it is borne out by empirical evidence.

There is some relevance of the concept of elite theory to some of the fundamental principles of communist politics. Political elite in Soviet type system is discovered in a positional power elite model based on nomenklatura posts.

Milovan Djilas (1957) argued that the party bureaucracy with their privileged life-style were a new class in the Marxist term insofar as they controlled the means of production for their own interest even though the technical ownership remained nominally in collective hands. Burnham (1941) also mentioned, "what matters in modern industrial states is not formal ownership but control of the means of production and the new managerial elite formed a crucial controlling group." Djilas was influenced by Burnham, and Burnham was himself influenced by elite theory (see Rudolf Bahro, 1978). In fact, positional power approach is applied to socialist society as well. A.G. Meyer (1964) adapting C. Wright Mills' 'positional power elite' model argued that the party professionals plus the nomenklatura officials appointed by the party are the power elite. Party professionals, military and police officials, industrial and administrative executives, leading academics constitute the political elite (A. Nove, 1975).

What is needed is more systematic research of elite decision-making in specific policy areas in the soviet type society.

We have thus, two models of elite analysis: (i) one is of the liberal democratic societies, and (ii) the other is of soviet-type societies.

However, the conceptual problem of applying elite theory to communist system raises basic questions about the universal applicability of the elite model.

Yet, if we take a flexible and pragmatic view, the elite approach as a heuristic device definitely illuminates some key principles of communist political system as well.⁹

ELITE AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS

The great value of elite paradigm lies in the role this does, and can play in a society in transition. In such a society, the rival elite groups come into conflict. There are instances where the aristocratic elite was slowly pushed aside by a new elite whose claims to superiority were based on newly acquired wealth. But such a newly emerging group can only be considered an elite when it manages to prove its superiority by setting new standards which are emulated by others. The apparently dynamic character of the elites has received a good deal of attention from social scientists. Pareto labelled this process 'the circulation of elite'. But Pareto's conception of political change through circulation of elite completely ignores the growth of democratic government in modern times. The elite is a mobile group. But, Mannheim says that too rapid growth in the numbers of the elite may make it lose its position as standard-bearers for the whole society, if it may lose its 'exclusiveness' which, he believes, is necessary for its effectiveness. All the same, for the continuity of an elite a certain degree of openness in recruitment is also essential. Openness introduces change. But this presents a problem: 'Whether the outlook of the society and its ideals change because of a change in the elite'; in the post-industrial society, in the new techno-scientific era, has the change been brought about by the new elite of scientists and technicians, or is this group rising in status and becoming an elite because of the increasing technical orientation of the present age?

A similar question may be asked regarding the effect that the western civilization and British administration had on the growth of a new elite in India, and the role that this new elite is playing in bringing about change in the socio-economic and cultural pattern of Indian society.

Because of the impact of pluralists and Marxists on western thought, elite paradigm almost suffered eclipse since its classical antecedent. The central difference revolved round views about the degree of autonomy exercised by elites in decision-making. Now-a-days, there is widespread recognition held by neoelitist scholars that elites are to some extent constrained by external circumstances, such as economic factors or mass opinion. As a result of this widely prevalent notion, the neoeli-

⁹Christopher Binns, "The Study of Soviet and East European Elites", in George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds.), *Research Methods for Elite Studies*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp. 216-231.

tism could not make a bold claim for the central importance of elite in decision-making. The concepts and hypotheses for the elitist perspective, its methods and techniques have been held to severe criticisms (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987). However, there has been a continuous attempt at the revival of interest in elite study for various reasons (Field and Higley, 1980; Marcus, 1983; Burton, 1984).

Bottomore seems to provide a very plausible explanation when he says, "The study of elites came to occupy an important place in sociology over the past few decades for two different reasons. On one side, there has been a growing interest in those elites which are responsible for managing the modern economies, with their extensive state intervention in production and the provision of welfare, or for conceiving and implementing development plans in those countries which are moving from agrarian to industrial economies. On the other side, the dominance of elites, regarded by some sociologists as having taken the place of class domination, has been increasingly attacked, notably through the influence of the new radical movements which emerged in the nineteen sixties."¹⁰ The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a further revival in the popularity of the elite paradigm. With the launching of a new journal, *Power and Elites* (1984) and *Year Book* (Czudnowski, 1982) and starting of new studies in various social contexts (Field and Higley 'Elitism' 1980; John Higley, Desley Deacon and Don Smart, *Elites in Australia* Thakur, *Elite Theory and Administrative System* 1981; Burton and Higley, 1984; Nordlinger, 1981; George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe; 1987),¹¹ the elite paradigm is back on the anvil in the field of Social Science.

This series will make a valuable addition to the field of elite studies.

The idea of this series on Elites arose mainly from my long-standing interest in the diverse ways in which elite studies have been made by social scientists as a response to intellectual curiosity.

But, it has been inspired more immediately by the opportunity provided by the Eleventh World Congress of Sociology held in New Delhi during August 1986; particularly discussions in some of the sessions of the Congress and contact during this period inspired me, and the idea was floated at once through a small circulation in the *Daily News Bulletin* of the International Congress. The first to respond by letter and then later by his visit was Alan Fielding.

I waited eagerly to discuss with Tom Bottomore who made a last hour

¹⁰Tom Bottomore, "Foreword" in R.N. Thakur, *Elite Theory and Administrative System*, New Delhi, Sterling, 1981.

¹¹George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds.), *op. cit.*; See also G. Lowell Field and John Higley, *Elitism*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

cancellation of his visit. I had the benefit of the guidance of French Sociologist, Mattei Dogan and a few others.

Closely following the Congress, I sent letters of invitation to various scholars in different countries for making contributions to the series on Elites in transnational perspective.

The present volume has arisen as a result of the response of the social scientists from different countries of the West and the East which are at varying levels of development. These countries represent the various ideologies—capitalist, communist or socialist, and a mix of both. In terms of the scale and level of development they represent various categories—traditional (aristocratic and feudal)—transitional—modern industrial and post-industrial type. In political terminology, they represent conservative, liberal democratic and socialist egalitarian democratic, and modern democratic type countries.

In sum and substance, the canvass is transnational in ideas and vision, and international in scope. The contributions made here belong individually to a nation but do not restrict themselves to the idea of a nation, they rather create a bridge and connect the chain of ideas into a transnational line of thinking on a very important issue, that is, the Elite in which, of late, there has developed a renewed interest in social science world over.

The remainder of this volume is organised in four sections, each relating to specific within general categories of elites.

Part I is concerned with elites in Europe and America. Alan George Fielding describes in considerable detail how the professional elite, especially the medical and legal elites, are playing their role in the British political system where the privatisation has been the current trend in policy since Thatcher's government. Seymour Martin Lipset, as a quick response and gesture, of generosity, sent his paper which is a reprint of his Lazarsfeld lecture in which he discusses the political behaviour and values of the American academic elite. Based on elaborate secondary sources, S.M. Habibuddin presents a well documented view of the changing pattern of elite in American society. Stephan E. Nikolov makes a comparative analytical study of the elite in two seemingly opposed social and political systems representing the capitalist, plural, liberal democratic type on the one hand, and socialist, democratic, unified, soviet type on the other hand. It is a comparative view of elite in capitalist American system and communist Bulgarian system.

The contributions are all concerned with the legal elites, medical elites, academic elites, military elite, corporate elite, intellectual elite and political elite as power group. The kind of elite personnel, *i.e.*, doctors, lawyers, professors, military officers, business executives, party leaders, ministers and holders of high office are covered as the subject-matter of elite study.

Of equal significance are the other elites which constitute the subject of the second section of this volume: a mix of the political elite and administrative elite.

Thus, in Part II, K.K. Prah discusses the problems and prospects of development in African society in relation to the role of the elite in Africa.

Habibul Haque Khondker, in comparative perspective, discusses the process of elite formation in Bangladesh and Kenya which he terms as 'peripheral societies', the societies which are hitherto least discussed.

An area of great interest in recent times, the recruitment and training of administrative elites in Bangladesh, has been discussed by Habib Mohammad Zafarullah and Mohammad Mohabbat Khan. This part is broadly concerned with political leaders and government officials.

Part III is devoted exclusively to the Indian perspective. S.S. Sharma, while examining the political power elite, views the relationship between social structure and power in a traditional transitional society.

Kamini Adhikari has taken up economic elites, entrepreneurship and class, a relational approach which is less often examined, and has remained generally unresearched in the Indian context. Jaytilak Guha Roy looks at the development perspective in relation to the tribal communities in India where he finds that the objective is development but the approach is elitist; hence, the end result is the incongruity in situation—an area which stimulates and needs further probe.

Part IV is intended to keep the issue moving to the other volumes. R.N. Thakur makes a theoretical discussion in historical context of the changing perspective of elite from Pareto's *Governing Elite* to Bottomore's *Administrative Elite*, and keeps the discussion open for further analysis and scrutiny.

Collectively, we hope all the essays included in this volume will stimulate further interdisciplinary and global discussion of the relevant issues. It is for the readers to see how far this first volume in the series has gone to contribute to the development in elite paradigm. However, the fear of some sociologists that 'development in elite theory is almost nil', and elites, their 'ways, practices, behaviour pattern, intentions' are difficult to scrutinize, may be somewhat mitigated with the appearance of this volume. Elite in transnational perspective is an effort to give widespread acceptance to the multidimensional study of elite as a contribution to the modern social scientific knowledge.

Sociology, or social science, according to C.W. Mills, is about 'human variety' which consists of all the social worlds in which men have lived, are living, and might live.

From North America to Western Europe; from the dark continent of Africa to the less developed countries of Asia, like Bangladesh;

and transitional societies of India—all the world's elite—capitalist, socialist, democratic, traditional, transitional and modern; from the modern West to the traditional transitional societies of the East; the mixed plurality of elite mutually interacting, herein lie before us open to our scrutiny.

R.N. THAKUR

I. Elites in Europe and America

Professional Elites and the State in Privatising Britain

ALAN FIELDING

Since Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative government came to office in 1979, a change has occurred in the relationship between professions and the state. The government's desires to reduce public expenditure and give consumers more choice in many areas of the economy, including professional service, have had the effect of changing the nature and extent of state mediation. In theory, this movement towards 'privatisation' of the economy should have been of overall benefit to the professions. This paper will examine the pattern of the state's actions in relation to professional service, the net result of which has been to increase the state's heteronomy, and consequently to decrease the autonomy of the professions. The professions which have been affected the most have been those which, in the twentieth century Welfare State phase of Britain's development, have provided a service to a 'public' clientele. This means that effects have been felt even by the 'ideal-type' professions of medicine and law, *i.e.*, the ones usually thought to possess the greatest autonomy in relation to their practice in the British context. Indeed, the elites of these two professions in particular are an integral part of the dominant elites in Britain. The paper will first outline that part of the literature of the sociology of the professions germane to the profession-state relationship. This will be followed by an examination of the changes affecting this relationship which have occurred since 1979. The last part of the paper will attempt to draw conclusions at the theoretical level for the process of professionalisation within the context of Britain in the late twentieth century.

RECENT APPROACHES TO THE PROCESS OF PROFESSIONALISATION

Until the publication of Johnson, the only approach to professionalisation had been what he calls 'trait-mongering',¹ which tries to identify lists of occupational characteristics possessed by professions

¹T.J. Johnson, *Professions and Power*, BSA, Macmillan, 1972, p. 23.

and not by non-professions.² Johnson³ argues that the underlying problem of the trait approach is the articulation of the theoretical relationship between items or occupational characteristics, *e.g.*, between knowledge and status of a particular profession—the approach assumes that such items are inherent and *ipso facto* need only to be recognised not explained. Further, the approach does not place the process of professionalisation in a historical context; the emphasis is on self-validation by the ‘profession’ itself, *i.e.*, the existence of traits autonomously makes and confirms the claim to professional status. Thus, Johnson thought that the approach was based on discrete and reified characteristics with little recognition of the social processes involved in their identification. From this critique, Johnson developed an alternative approach to professionalisation. Instead of attempting to identify characteristics of ‘professions’, he examined the relationship between the producer and the consumer of a service in different types of socio-historical context. These relationships gave rise to different types of occupational control. In eighteenth century Britain, this took the form of patronage, *i.g.*, where the usually aristocratic consumer largely defined the role of the ‘learned professions’ of Physics, Divinity and Law.⁴ This type of control is not only historic, but may be seen today in ‘oligarchic’ and ‘corporate’ forms. A change in the power position of the aristocracy following industrialisation meant that, by the nineteenth century, the situation had been radically altered. The professional producers were able to define both the needs of a body of consumers which was no longer mainly confined to the aristocracy—the growing bourgeoisie—and the manner in which these needs were met. Johnson called this relationship ‘professionalism’ which was typified by ‘collegiate’ control, *i.e.*, by professional peers by way of a legally-empowered professional association, *e.g.*, the Law Society for solicitors.

The third form of control is called mediation and occurs when a third party enters the relationship between producer and consumer, and affects both the content and the recipient of the service. Historically, the third party had been the mediaeval church but today it is the state, *i.e.*, the central government either directly or indirectly. State ‘mediation’ has meant that the consumer was assured of service at a reasonable cost and that the producer gained status and income by means of the provision of a ‘guaranteed’ clientele.

In his later writings, Johnson has concentrated increasingly on the

²D.J. Hickson and M.V. Thomas, “Professionalization in Britain”, *Sociology*, 3, 1, January 1969, pp. 37-53.

³This approach was still used after Johnson (1972)—see S. Kerr, M.A. Von Glinow and J. Schriesheim, “Issues in the Study of ‘Professionals’,” in *Organizations, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, Vol. 18, 1977, pp. 329-345.

⁴See W.J. Reader, *Professional Men*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966,

relationship between professions and the state. He felt that his earlier emphasis on the division of labour had been inadequate and placed the process of professionalisation within the wider context of capitalism and class relations. Also, his previous nebulous reference to ideology became explicit and central. He concluded, "professionalism...can arise only where the ideological and political processes sustaining indeterminacy (*i.e.*, those aspects of the professional organisation of knowledge which function as barriers to external authority, such as mystique and professional ideals) coincide with the requirements of capital."⁵ Johnson later drew theoretical conclusions from two case studies of the relationship between the state and the legal profession in England in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the expansion and consolidation of the British imperial state in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶ He concludes that professionalisation can only refer to partial autonomy, and that it is indicative of a particular form of articulation between the state and those occupations which have been of particular significance in the state's historical transformation. Further, the areas of partial autonomy enjoyed by the professions change and are refocussed over time. Therefore, it is difficult to derive from history which forms of autonomy are primary since professionalisation is not a given end-state, since the form of the state itself is in flux. Thus, the profession-state relationship is an interdependent one and is likely to vary from society to society.

Johnson argues that development of the British liberal-bourgeois and imperial states had peculiar consequences for both state and professional formations. This paper will in a later section contend that the subsequent phases of the development of the British state associated successively with the growth of the Welfare State, post-1945 decolonisation and relative economic decline together with an ageing population have also had consequences for contemporary state and professional formations.

Others have elaborated the concept of mediation at a slightly less macro-sociological level. The notion of 'bureaucratic profession' was revived to help to explain the different profession-state relationships which had developed in twentieth century Britain.⁷ Noting that different professions relied to differing extents on the state for provision of workplace, clientele and licence to practise, they outlined a typology of public,

⁵T.J. Johnson, "Professions in the Class Structure" in Scase R. (ed.), *Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1977, p. 106.

⁶T.J. Johnson, "The State and the Professions: Peculiarities of the British" in A. Giddens and G. Mackenzie, *Social Class and the Division of Labour*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 186-208.

⁷D. Portwood and A.G. Fielding, "Privilege and the Professions," *Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 4, November, 1981, pp. 749-773.

semi-public, semi-private and private bureaucratic professions, *i.e.*, those professions which had achieved a formal, working relationship between the general, ideologically-based goals of the state, which aims to provide services efficiently, *i.e.*, cost-effectively, and the more specific value-based goals⁸ of the profession which stress idealism and the unique ability to perform a particular personal service. This 'achievement' has been manifested in a variety of formal administrative relationships with the state at central, regional and local levels. Plainly, the pivotal feature of these relationships is the form and status of service to the 'client'. On the one hand, the state guarantees the profession a 'public' clientele, both in terms of provision and subsequent payment for services rendered, and the profession, on the other hand, accepts limitations on its professional autonomy in relation to its public clientele.

EXTENSION OF STATE HETERONOMY SINCE 1979: CONTROL OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

The coming to power of the present Conservative government in 1979 has changed the character of state mediation in terms of both the direction and extent of state heteronomy. At least until Halmos,⁹ it was contended within and perhaps even beyond academic circles that professional regulation of economic activity was morally superior to commercial regulation—credat emptor as against caveat emptor. The election of the present government changed the ideological base of the British state. In the general election campaign, Mrs. Thatcher's speeches made it clear that, if elected, she intended to reverse the policies of governments since 1945. These have had two effects. The first was to increase the size of the public sector and, thus, the burden of taxation to finance it. Second, and not unrelated to the first, the public sector contained a large number of monopolies which removed the choice of individual citizens over the selection of a wide range of goods and services from electricity and gas to optical appliances. The Conservative Party won the general election and the government began immediately to use the power of the state to change the balance between public and private sectors of the economy in the direction of the latter. In relation to manufacturing monopolies, public utilities and transport, the policy of the government was and is to privatise the state-owned concerns.

When the present government came to power, a variety of relationships already existed between professionals supplying public welfare and state agencies legally responsible for the bureaucratic organisation and/or administration of the service. Rowbottom discusses the forms of

⁸R.L. Satow, "Value-Rational Authority and Professional Organizations: Weber's Missing Type", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June 20, 1975, pp. 526-531.

⁹P. Halmos, *The Personal Service Society*, London, Constable, 1970.

ex-external management of professional work which are appropriate or possible, given the empirical fact that most professionals no longer work in private practice. He analyses the extent to which doctors, nurses, social workers, engineers can be 'managed', *i.e.*, controlled by their employers. The definition he uses of the term 'professional' is relevant to the line of argument of this paper, namely:

a person capable of applying special theoretical knowledge or insight in cases where objective and impartial judgement of both needs and appropriate responses is called for.¹⁰

Thus, his definition emphasises the autonomy which is associated with professionalisation and, which at the level of the daily 'human' handling of clients or patients, is not inhibited by bureaucratic controls.

He outlines three types of relationships between professions and their employing authority—although unfortunately he does not cite any specific examples of each. As Chart 1 shows, they are:


1. where a distinct profession/occupational group is integrated into a pre-existing managerial hierarchy;
2. where a distinct profession/occupation has a separate managerial hierarchy; and
3. where there are distinct professionals in private practice.

This paper will now cite specific professions to exemplify each of these relationships, and argue that the changes, which have occurred in these relationships since 1979, have increased the state's heteronomy in each case, even if the state has exercised different forms of control in respect of each profession.

Rowbottom's first relationship appears to fit the situation of social workers in Britain who have the following characteristics. The development of this occupation, particularly since World War II, owes much to state initiative or 'sponsorship'. The terms of the Childrens Act 1948 meant that a person might be seen by the Children's Department, the Welfare Department and, from that the Health Department of the local authority. The Seeborn Report 1969 recognised that a client could be in all the three agencies and recommended one agency instead, the local authority Social Services Department. The subsequent Children and Young Persons Act 1970 implemented the report and social workers who were specialist probation officers became, in effect, the social workers of the courts. In order to carry out the other aspects of their role, social

¹⁰R. Rowbottom, "Professionals in Health and Social Service Organizations", in E. Jaques (ed.), *Health Services*, 1978, pp. 69-96.

CHART 1



1. Distinct professional or occupational group integrated into pre-existing managerial hierarchy.
2. Distinct professional or occupational group as separate managerial hierarchy.
3. Distinct professional or occupational group with independent practice.

— District professional or occupational group.

SOURCE: R. Rowbottom, "Professionals in Health and Social Service Organisations" in E. Jaques (ed.), *Health Services*, 1978, p. 79.

workers were firmly integrated into the state bureaucratic machinery at the local level. They have their caseload determined and controlled by the social service department's social work supervisor. In Rowbottom's terms, they are in situation (1.) (Chart 1). State control is further enhanced by the fact that the occupation (or would-be profession) is not a closed one. Given the current government's tax-saving priority since 1979, state heteronomy has manifested itself in the closing of some social work training courses, *e.g.*, at the Polytechnic, Wolverhampton. In consequence, some local authorities employ unqualified social workers at a lower salary.

In contrast, doctors and nurses practising within the state's comprehensive medical insurance scheme (National Health Service) appear to be in Rowbottom's situation (2) in Chart 1. The doctor—or 'qualified medical practitioner'—works under contract subject to both the discipline of the British Medical Association (BMA) and the Executive Committee of the Family Practitioner Services of the National Health Service (NHS). Since the latter organisation legally controls the personal health services of the NHS, it was administratively simple for Mrs. Thatcher's government to extend state heteronomy by way of it. Thus, in December 1984 (operative in April 1985), the Secretary-of-State, Norman Fowler, used the authority delegated to him under the National Health Service Act 1946 to make a Ministerial Order banning the prescription of over 1700 brand-named, and therefore expensive, drugs by general practitioners (GPs) to their NHS patients. Although doctors are still free to prescribe these drugs to private patients, the sociological point is that this was the first time that the state had extended its heteronomy as far as controlling the form of treatment a doctor might prescribe for patients. Previously, doctors had possessed complete clinical freedom in respect of the treatment of all patients.

Clearly, the present government's concern to limit the sums of public money spent on state medical services has been the basic reason for the extension of state control into areas previously thought to be those of professional freedom—and indeed licence. By 1981, the net ingredients cost of the Pharmaceutical Services of the NHS was £834.3m and proprietary drugs made up 90.5 per cent of this. By 1985, proprietary drugs cost £1,700m, some 11 per cent of the total cost of the NHS. When he announced the measure in November 1984, Norman Fowler told Parliament that the ban on 1,700 named drugs was to save £100m of NHS expenditure.¹¹ As well as controlling the clinical freedom of general practitioners, state heteronomy is also affecting doctors who practise in the NHS at consultant level. Under changes made in 1980, whole-time NHS consultants are no longer barred from private practice, but are

¹¹*Guardian*, November 9, 1984, p. 6.

able to earn up to 10 per cent of their NHS salary from private work. If they exceed that for three years, they have to become part-time—usually a “maximum part-time” with a contract that is ten-elevenths of a whole-time contract. In September 1985, according to Department of Health and Social Security figures, 48 per cent of consultants in England and Wales were full-timers. Both the British Medical Association and the provident associations estimate that 85 per cent of all consultants now do some private work, *i.e.*, two-thirds of the whole-time consultants. Such doctors have to sign an annual declaration on whether they have earned more than 10 per cent of their salary from private practice, and ‘exceptionally’ health authorities can ask for audited accounts.¹² This move to check the level of private practice carried out by NHS consultants is not unconnected with the publication of the Griffiths Report on Health Service Management in October 1983. The Report suggests the appointment of a general manager for state health services, *i.e.*, the lay control of professional services. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Social Services Committee on the Griffiths Report,¹³ Anthony Graham of the British Medical Association said that doctors would defy instructions given to them by health service general managers if patient care was threatened. This attempt to impose a formal pattern of administrative control of professionals within the NHS has also affected the vast majority of nurses who practise in the NHS. In January 1986, the Royal College of Nursing conducted a campaign of full-page newspaper advertisements¹⁴ which argue for inclusion of an appointed nursing officer on the management team of every health unit. These advertisements complain that more and more Health Authorities are appointing executives and at the same time allowing nurses only an advisory role in patient care. Thus, in terms of Chart 1, nurses are saying that their profession is being progressively integrated into an existing managerial hierarchy, *i.e.*, into Rowbottom’s situation (1.) in Chart 1. At present (June 1986), approximately 3 per cent of management team posts have gone to nurses. Most of health authorities have argued that most of nurses lack ‘appropriate management background’.

State Heteronomy and the Legal Profession—Growth of Legal Aid

Since the introduction of Legal Aid in criminal cases by the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1974, both parts of the British legal profession have been affected by the increasing state funding of many of their clients’ cases. Meanwhile, the vast majority of barristers and solicitors have continued to operate from private premises. In terms of Chart 1 they are in situation (3.) Nevertheless, since 1979, state heteronomy has affected them

¹² *Times*, April 29, 1985, p. 3.

¹³ *Times*, January 19, 1984, p. 2.

¹⁴ See, *e.g.*, *Guardian*, January 13, 1986, p. 7; and January 15, 1986, p. 5.

increasingly. Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor, has said¹⁵ that since 1979 spending on legal aid has doubled in real terms.

Table 1 substantiates this claim and indicates that extension of Legal Aid to criminal cases and the increase in civil divorce cases have both been responsible. In February 1986, Lord Hailsham announced the first cut in the scope of the scheme since its inception by way of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. His decision to increase the professional fees to both types of lawyers by only 5 per cent (the rate of inflation) angered the Law Society and the Bar Council and led them both to take the Lord Chancellor to court. In a recent article defending this decision,¹⁶ the Chairman of the Bar acknowledges the increasing dependence of barristers on criminal work when he says that "over 2000 barristers—a third of a small profession—are materially dependent on criminal law practice." He further recognises the position of the state as a monopoly employer when he states, "Since almost all such work is publicly-funded, few of these barristers can supplement their income with private fees." Thus, in the case of the legal profession, state heteronomy has taken the form of financial control via the capping of fees for legal aid work on which an increasing number of barristers in particular have become dependent.

State Heteronomy and Professional Monopolies

State heteronomy has also increased in Britain since 1979 in another manner. The *Sunday Times* said that Mrs. Thatcher had persuaded her colleagues (in the Cabinet) that closed shops in the professions were as insidious as closed shops in factories, and that competition must be the priority of her second administration.¹⁷ In February 1984, Leon Brittan, then Home Secretary, told an Institute of Directors convention: "Competition must apply irrespective of vested interests in the private and the public sectors alike in whatever form best serves the customers' interests."¹⁸ The changing ideological base of the state, thus, meant the members of the public were to be given more choice of the goods and services available to them. In relation to professional services, this has meant so far (June 1986) an attack on professional monopolies and encouragement for professions to advertise their services. One professional monopoly has so far been removed and another is about to be.

¹⁵*Times*, February 18, 1986, p. 2.

¹⁶*Times*, February 15, 1986, p. 8. By their action, lawyers had achieved by July 1986 an increase of 11.5 per cent in legal aid fees but barristers had to immediately agree to two de-manning reforms enabling barristers to appear without solicitors, and QCs without juniors. See F. Gibb, "Legal Aid: Now for the Reckoning", *Times*, July 22, 1986, p. 12.

¹⁷*Sunday Times*, February 19, 1984, p. 1.

¹⁸*Times*, February 22, 1984, p. 8.

TABLE 1 LEGAL AID 1950-85

Date	1951	1960	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Cost	£426,634	£4.4m	£10.0m	£29.1m	£78.3m	£108.3m	£135.4m	£178.2m	£194.7m	£225.0m
Civil Legal Aid	—	—	—	£12.1m	£25.3m	£35.3m	£87.4m	£121.9m	£132.4m	£155.9m
Criminal Legal Aid	—	—	—	£9.0m	£29.3m	£40.8m	£47.9m	£56.3m	£62.3m	£69.1m

SOURCES: Annual Legal Aid Reports, Lord Chancellor's Office, HMSO.

NOTE: Civil Legal Aid is controlled by Area Committees of Law Society; and Criminal Legal Aid is at the discretion of court.

In December 1984, ophthalmic and dispensing opticians lost the legally-based monopoly they had enjoyed over supply of spectacles and other optical appliances since the passing of the Opticians Act 1958 (operative June 1961). The government felt that the monopoly was against public interest, *i.e.*, it caused unnecessarily expensive spectacles. Opticians have been criticised for taking financial advantage of this from the varying perspectives of patients, the mass media, and profit-making optical companies.

The Prices Commission in 1976 reported a price range from £23 to £64 on an identical prescription dispensed by several opticians. In 1980, Mrs. Thatcher's government initiated a similar investigation into opticians' prices by the Office of Fair Trading. Its report in January 1983 called for an end to the ban on opticians' advertising and estimated that ready-made reading glasses would cost only £5 if the opticians' legal monopoly was removed. Originally, the Secretary-of-State for Social Services, Norman Fowler, intended to introduce a Bill to effect this but eventually a simpler, quicker and cheaper procedure was adopted. The minister used his delegated authority on December 10, 1984 to make the Sale of Optical Appliances Order which had immediate effect in removing the opticians' monopoly.

The other monopoly about to be removed is that of solicitors in respect of conveyancing. The Administration of Justice Act received the Royal Assent on October 30, 1985 and one of the clauses enabled a state-created profession of licensed conveyancers to compete with solicitors, thus ending the monopoly solicitors have enjoyed for 180 years. The removal of these two professional monopolies and the possibility of a threat to others, *e.g.*, patent agents in 1984¹⁹ has resulted in several professional associations reconsidering their attitude to advertising. The Law Society voted in June 1984 to relax its restriction on advertising and its members have been able to advertise in the press and on radio since October 1, 1984, but without price or other comparisons with other solicitors. They are, however, now free to spend what they choose on advertising. Since December 1984 and the removal of their monopoly over dispensing, the competitors of opticians, *e.g.*, department stores, and city jewellers have begun to advertise. Shortly after the removal of government subsidies on spectacles on April 1, 1985, *the Times* undertook a random survey which claimed that the prices of spectacles from opticians had become competitive since the abolition of their monopoly.²⁰

Bureaucratic professions, which have retained their legally-based monopoly, however, have responded more tardily. A working party of

¹⁹*Guardian*, January 2, 1984, p. 10.

²⁰*Times*, April 3, 1985, p. 5.

the Royal College of General Practitioners presented a report to the College in September 1984 arguing that patients should be given more details of special services family doctors provide, e.g., family planning, home deliveries, ante-natal clinics and child-care clinics. The General Medical Council, whilst agreeing that patients should be given more information, is opposed to drawing attention to more specialised services, e.g., psychotherapy or hypnosis.²¹ In November 1985, the General Dental Council went only as far as allowing its members to advertise a price for an initial consultation to determine the cost of private treatment. This was the Council's response to the present NHS charging system, where patients pay the first £17, and 40 per cent of the remainder, up to a maximum of £115, which it describes as "extremely complicated and almost incomprehensible to patients"²²

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The central theme of this paper has been changes that have occurred in the profession-state relationship since Mrs. Thatcher's government came to office in 1979. This government has attempted to reverse the collectivist trend of all governments since 1945. The dominant ideological emphasis has been to alter the mix of the public and private sectors of the economy in the direction of the latter. With their traditional preference for self-employment and private practice, professions in theory should have benefited from any movement towards privatisation in relation to professional services. However, given the government's two basic goals of keeping down public expenditure and increasing public choice of goods and services, many professions have not benefited, and the financial benefits to some have had to be achieved within the overall context of increasing state heteronomy.

In general, it is possible to divide professions in Britain in the period, since 1979, into three broad groups, namely, those whose autonomy, whatever its extent in 1979, has remained virtually unaltered by the actions of the state; those all or some of whose members are already integrated into wider 'state' management structures; and those who have been subject to increasing state heteronomy. The first category spans a disparate group stretching from the ordained clergy of all churches (including those of the 'established' Church of England), through chemists (who have always had to compete in the commercial part of their role with chains of chemists' shops, e.g., Boots), veterinary surgeons (three-quarters of whom practise privately), actuaries (a small profession but with an almost guaranteed clientele by way of the commercial insurance

²¹*Times*, June 23, 1985, p. 3.

²²*Times*, November 23, 1985, p. 4.

companies), even to a segment of the barristers' profession, *i.e.*, those who do not rely for all or part of their income on legal Aid.

The second category consists of those professions a majority of whose members are integrated into pre-existing management hierarchies of the state at local level. Examples of such professions are accountancy, architecture, civil engineering and surveying. Minority segments of these professions engage in corporate or private practice. The majority segments of professions in this group are already in a formal administrative situation wherein their employers (local authorities) could control them—in terms of Chart 1 they were and are in situations (1.) or (2.). Since 1979, such professions have been principally affected by the central government's desire to control public expenditure at the local authority level via rate-capping, *i.e.*, placing of an absolute limit on the Rate Support Grant the Central government would give. Professions, such as architecture and engineering, have been affected by reductions in council-house building programmes and cutbacks in public works and road maintenance. In respect of this group, state heteronomy has not changed its form but given the changing ideological base since 1979, the central government has exercised essentially financial control over local authorities and their employees, including the professional ones, within their overall hierarchies.

A further occupation, which might meaningfully be included in this second category, is that of school-teaching. The occupation calls itself the 'teaching profession'; indeed many individuals and the mass media commonly use this term. In fact, the vast majority of the occupation's members are employed by local educational authorities in state schools, the occupation has no tradition of private practice, no professional association²³ and was not a closed occupation until as recently as 1973, when unqualified teachers could no longer be employed in secondary schools. Even this absolute bar had to be removed in 1980, since when graduates in science, mathematics and computing have been able to enter teaching without undergoing a teacher training course. Although school-teaching has not professionalised to the point of being completely closed or being self-governing, it has been included in this second category because the vast majority of the occupation's members, like the other professions in this category, are integrated into pre-existing managerial hierarchies of the state at local level—they are contracted employees of the 125 local educational authorities (LEAs) in the British Isles and in terms of Chart 1 they are in situation (1.).

Consequently, since 1979, approximately half a million school teachers,

²³N. Parry and J. Parry, "The Teachers and Professionalism: the Failure of an Occupational Strategy", in M. Flude and J. Ahier, *Educability, Schools and Ideology*, London, Croom Helm, 1974.

whose salaries account for 60 per cent of the total costs of the LEAs, have found it increasingly difficult to obtain annual salary increases large enough to maintain the level of their real income. By the time the teachers' 1985 claim was being negotiated, an increase of more than 30 per cent was necessary to restore the value of their salaries to the level which resulted from the Houghton Award of 1975 (a 25-30 per cent increase). To press their demand, the teachers' unions refused to allow their members to perform duties outside normal school hours. This pressure was maintained until March 1986, when the then Secretary of State for Education and Science, Sir Keith Joseph, was obliged to award a total increase of 8.2 per cent, having failed to force the teachers' unions to accept the link between a salary increase and inclusion of 'goodwill' duties, such as meeting parents outside school hours as part of their normal contract of employment. Clearly, the power struggle between this occupation, or self-described 'profession', has not ended and, given the government's desire to control public expenditure, will continue against a backdrop of a falling birth rate, with its consequences in terms of falling school rolls.

It is the third category of professions with, which this paper has been mainly concerned, *i.e.*, those in relation to which the form and extent of state heteronomy has changed and increased since 1979. Professions in this group are doctors, lawyers and opticians (of both types in both cases) and nurses. Each of them has been affected because of the government's basic desires to control public expenditure and give individuals more choice of professional services. However, the methods and areas of state control have differed in each case and Table 2 attempts to set out these varying dimensions of state heteronomy.

Table 2 indicates the following points. First, the professions in this category are ones whose members are involved in the provision of publicly funded welfare services. Secondly, the changes in control represent the government's attempts to respond to complaints from taxpayers that these services are unnecessarily expensive, *e.g.*, the cost of drugs and spectacles. Both taxpayers and consumers attributed these costs to the legally-based monopolies which solicitors had achieved in relation to conveyancing and ophthalmic and dispensing opticians to the dispensing of optical appliances.²⁴ Thirdly, the changes in control since 1979 also reflect the government's desire to increase the cost-effectiveness of publicly-funded services. Page 2 of the NHS Managements Enquiry (the Griffiths Report 1983) states quite explicitly, "We believe that a small, strong general management body is necessary at the centre (and it is almost all that is necessary at the centre of the management of NHS) to

²⁴Ophthalmic medical practitioners, *i.e.*, doctors who specialise in testing eyesight are also able to conduct eye-examinations under the Opticians Act 1958,

TABLE 2 STATE HETERONOMY SINCE 1979

<i>Profession</i>	<i>Type of State Control</i>	<i>Area of State Control</i>
Doctors	Administrative and indirectly financial—use of delegated authority patients	Restriction on form of treatment of 'public' patients
Law—barristers	Direct financial control—fee-capping by Lord Chancellor	Control of fees and eligibility for Legal Aid
Solicitors	Legal—Administration of Justice Act 1985, Section 11	Loss of conveyancing monopoly
Nursing	Administrative—Griffiths Report October 1983 on Effective Use of Manpower and Resources in NHS	Lay control of profession within NHS
Ophthalmic and Dispensing Opticians	Administrative—use of delegated authority (Sale of Optical Appliances Order December 1984)	Loss of dispensing monopoly

ensure that responsibility is pushed as far down the line as possible, *i.e.*, to the point where action can be taken effectively." On page 18 the Report also says that units of management (particularly the major hospitals) provide the bedrock of the whole management process. Nurses were especially alarmed at what they saw as their exclusion from the management structure and negotiations are currently (June 1986) still continuing. From this point, it is, fourthly, very clear that the form of control exercised by the government since 1979 has partly depended on the nature of the formal relationship previously negotiated between profession and state. The medical profession has been involved in the partial state health insurance scheme since 1911 and in the comprehensive NHS since 1948. The entry of doctors into the NHS scheme has given the state's Secretary-of-State for Social Services powers delegated to him by the National Health Service Act 1946. Such powers enabled Norman Fowler in 1984 to ban NHS general practitioners from prescribing some 1700 drugs to their NHS patients. The negotiation of similar powers to the Secretary-of-State in relation to optical welfare schemes in the Opticians Act 1958 enabled the same man to remove the monopoly over the dispensing of optical appliances enjoyed by ophthalmic and dispensing opticians since 1961, simply by making a ministerial Order-in-Council in December 1984. The representatives of both doctors and opticians had negotiated their members into the position of a semi-private bureaucratic profession²⁵ and, given the changed ideological base of the state,

²⁵A.G. Fielding and D. Portwood, "Professions and the State—Towards a Typology of Bureaucratic Professions", *Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, Feb. 1, 1980, pp. 23-53.

made it possible for the relevant Secretary-of-State to exercise simple, cheap and quick administrative control over the two professions, thus decreasing their autonomy. However, in relation to the two parts of the legal profession—one part of which (the solicitors) Fielding and Portwood described as a private bureaucratic profession and the other part of which has since increasingly become one—the profession-state relationship is different and, accordingly, state heteronomy has taken a different form since 1979. In relation to the first basic desire of the state, *i.e.*, to control public expenditure, the state has used its position as a monopoly employer in respect of criminal legal work—especially since the extension of Legal Aid to it in 1974—to directly financially control those barristers and solicitors who, although in private premises, are reliant on this type of professional work. The Lord Chancellor has effected this in two ways—by trying to limit Legal Aid fee increases and by reducing the allowances which can be set against income when a person's eligibility for Legal Aid is assessed.²⁶ In relation to its other basic desire—giving individuals more choice over goods and services—the state since 1979 had had to increase its heteronomy over the solicitor's branch of the legal profession by methods other than the use of delegated authority. Since the solicitor's monopoly over conveyancing was established by statute law—most recently by section 22 of the Solicitors Act 1974—it had to be similarly removed by section 11(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1985.

The nature of these changes affecting the professions in this third category enable certain comments at the theoretical level. Weber²⁷ discussed the concept of rational-legality in the context of the German Empire of 1870 in terms of the legally-based separation and division of powers between the empire's states and the federal government. In matters of education and religion, member states were autocephalous, *i.e.*, the chief and his staff acted by authority of the autonomous order of the member state but in the (political) sphere of authority of the Reich member states were heterocephalous, *i.e.*, subject to the authority of the outside authority of the federal government.

In contemporary Britain, professions are increasingly subject to legally-based financial control which does not inhibit the manner in which they can use their skills but rather the manner in which or whether or not they can serve their clients or patients, *i.e.*, financial and economic rather than political heteronomy. In a parliamentary system and given the ideological basis of the state, heteronomy vis-a-vis the professions involved in public-funded welfare services, has been progressive in the sense that

²⁶See *Times*, February 18, 1986, p. 2.

²⁷M. Weber, *Theories of Economic and Social Organisation*, Free Press, 1964, p. 140.

the state control areas previously autonomous in terms of Weber's analysis.

Examples have been the fees paid to solicitors and barristers when they serve public clients by way of Legal Aid, and even the type of treatment doctors may give to 'public' NHS patients. A third example of this progressive heteronomy has been the proposals announced by Norman Fowler on April 21, 1986.²⁸ Although the Secretary-of-State emphasised that the document was intended to 'stimulate debate rather than set down definite intentions', the parts of it relating to the introduction of a maximum retirement age of 70 for NHS GPs and the expectation that doctors should give more information about their services, and that nurses should have a bigger share in the doctor's workload, including the right to prescribe certain medicines, are all movements in the direction of heteronomy. These suggested changes emanate from the present government's desire to make Britain's 29,000 GPs face greater consumer choice—along with the control of public expenditure the second prong of the government's two-pronged effort to change the ideological basis of the state. The changes confirm several of Johnson's recent statements about the relationship between the state and professions in Britain. Firstly, the changes, especially in respect of the funding of Legal Aid work and the removal of the solicitors' monopoly over conveyancing, clearly exemplify his claim that 'professionalisation can only refer to a process towards partial autonomy' and that 'the areas of partial autonomy enjoyed by the professions themselves change and are re-focussed.' Further, these changes also exemplify the difficulty he finds in determining which forms of autonomy are primary. Certainly, complete freedom in the handling of their clientele had commonly been assumed to be a primary aspect of professional autonomy. However, control over the treatment of NHS patients by general practitioners indicates that this aspect is not primary within the context of the privatising state. An ideological preference for the support of private, as opposed to public expenditure, is one thing but the operationalisation of such a preference within the concurrent context of relative economic decline and an ageing population is another. There is indeed an irony and a paradox in this difference between ideological preference and political practice as expressed lucidly by Gamble²⁹ when he states that Mrs. Thatcher's government's problem "is that its own diagnosis constantly impels it towards state intervention" and argues that the results of Thatcherism have been highly contradictory. Although he does not refer specifically to professions, perhaps he would agree that the state's actions

²⁸*Sunday Times*, April 20, 1986, p. 9.

²⁹A. Gamble, "Smashing the State—Thatcher's Radical Crusade," *Marxism Today*, June 1985, pp. 21-26; and in *The Times*, May 27, 1985, p. 10.

since 1979 have had the net effect of making those professions, who serve a public, guaranteed clientele more tightly controlled 'servants'³⁰ in what Gamble describes as the 'cycle of decline'.

³⁰L. Baritz, "Servants of Power" in J. Douglas (ed.), *The Impact of Sociology*, New York, Plenum, 1970. Reprinted in G. Esland, G. Salaman and M. Speakman (eds.), *People and Work*, Holmes, McDougall, Open University Press, 1975.

Appendix

PROFESSIONS IN EXPANDING ECONOMY

In Third World societies, the process of professionalisation is related to the expansion of the economy—which provides a market for professional services—and the education system—which has consequences in terms of the competence of professionals.

Industrialisation is the target of the development of many Third World societies but occupational change and development do not cease once a society has industrialised. Britain was the world's first industrial society. Currently, some of the structural characteristics and social processes which affect its professions are:

1. Its ageing population which increases the need for medical expenditure, and changes in its marriage pattern and property ownership (62 per cent of houses are now owner-occupied) increase and change in demand for legal services.
2. Its relative economic decline—in 1985 adverse comparisons in terms of comparative level of GNP were made with Italy. This is not unrelated to the rise of Thatcherite concerns with the level of public expenditure across the board, and her government's desire to control it while at the same time encouraging private expenditure on as many services as possible.
3. The increasing importance of the state in relation to professional work has not stopped the phenomena of interprofessional and interoccupational conflict, *e.g.*, between solicitors and barristers, between doctors and nurses, or of commercial and professional conflict, *e.g.*, the loss of opticians' monopoly over dispensing in 1984.
4. Changes are taking place in relation to the social origins of British professionals which are only partly explained by the macro-sociological political and ideological changes since 1979, *e.g.*:
 - (a) All professional draw the majority of their recruits from middle class groups.
 - (b) Medicine has attempted to recruit equally by gender since 1977. The increase in opportunity for women in the legal profession has been less than in medicine and lower still in architecture, accountancy and veterinary science.
 - (c) Recruits from the ethnic minority groups are hardly represented yet but large scale immigration has occurred only over the last generation and such groups differ in their cultural

capital (Bourdieu) and, accordingly, attitude to education and credentialism.

Finally, the following theoretical assumptions have been made in this paper about professions. Firstly, that they are occupations forming, declining and constantly negotiating with the state (federal or unitary) at the central, regional and local level as appropriate, and secondly, that they are occupations competing for a share of the market for the services they offer.

The Academic Mind at the Top: The Political Behaviour and Values of Faculty Elites

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

Paul Lazarsfeld, who taught me almost everything I know about formulating research problems and analysing empirical data, was the initiator of serious sociological study of the politics of academe, a topic that became the focus of renewed interest following the crisis of the university in the sixties and early seventies. His work on the subject came as a response to an earlier political crisis that affected the campus, attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy and others on the integrity and loyalty of the professoriate in characteristic fashion. Paul Lazarsfeld dropped his other activities in order to analyse how McCarthyism was affecting academic freedom. His major book on the topic (with Wagner Thielens, Jr.), *The Academic Mind*, published in 1958, greatly influenced my own work in the field, as attested to by the kind of quantitative evidence of which he would have approved; in *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*, written by Everett Ladd and myself, he is by far the most cited author.

My interest in the politics of intellectuals, particularly in their role as agents of change, began with studies of the political behaviour of students and faculty which I published in the form of articles between 1957 and 1964.¹

These were elaborated on during the 1970s in various writings² and

¹Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Fuss About Eggheads", *Encounter*, April 8, 1957, pp. 21-22; "The Surprising Effect of McCarthyism on the Academic Mind", *Columbia University Forum*, Vol. 2 (Fall), 1958, p. 25 and 29; "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status", *Daedalus*, Vol. 88 (Summer), 1959, pp. 460-86; "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries", *Minerva*, Vol. 3, Autumn, 1964 pp. 15-56.

²Seymour Martin Lipset and Asoke Basu, "Intellectual Types and Political Roles", in Lewis Coser (ed.), *The Idea of Social Structure*, Papers in Honour of Robert K. Merton, New York, Harcourt, 1975, pp. 433-70; Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: with Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union", *Daedalus*, Vol. 101, Summer, 1972, pp. 137-198; *Rebellion in the University*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976.

in collaborative research with Everett Ladd.³

POLITICS OF THE PROFESSORiate

In looking at the politics of the professoriate, a number of characteristics stand out; faculty members have been disproportionately critical of society, and more disposed than other strata to support forces that reject the *status quo*. A number of surveys of American professorial opinion, taken since World War II, have shown that, as a group, academics are more likely than any other occupational group, including manual workers, to identify their views as left or liberal, to support a wide variety of egalitarian, social and economic policies, and to back small leftist third parties and/or vote Democratic. In American presidential elections of the last 30 years, for which data on faculty opinion exist, the Democrats and left third parties received support from 63 per cent of the professoriate, compared to 54.5 per cent from the second most Democratic occupational stratum, the manual workers.⁴

Within the universities, two variables stand as most predictive of faculty political orientation: discipline and status. Faculty in the liberal arts are more liberal politically than those in most professional schools. Professors in the social sciences and humanities stand to the left, followed by those in the biological and physical sciences. Business, engineering and agricultural school faculties form the conservative end of the profession. Status is also a powerful variable differentiating political views. Whatever indicator of academic position is employed—position of one's school in the pecking order of higher education, receipt of honours or research grants, or the number of publications to the academic's credit—the higher the achievement, the more liberal faculty members are politically.

Given the counterintuitive character of the finding that the more successful and privileged within academe hold the most liberal political views—a relationship that contradicts some of the most cherished views of those on the left and on the right—I would like to explore this association further by introducing preliminary results of a survey Ladd and I conducted among the academic elite, the elected members of the

³Everett Carl Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset, "...And what Professors Think", *Psychology Today*, Vol. 4 (November), 1970, pp. 49-51; "The Divided Professoriate", *Change*, Vol. 3, May-June 1971, pp. 54-60; "Professors, Unions and American Higher Education", Berkeley, CA., Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973; Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd, "Jewish Academics in the United States: Their Achievements, Culture and Politics", in *The American Jewish Year Book*, New York, the American Jewish Committee, Vol. 72, 1971, pp. 89-128; "The Politics of American Sociologists", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78, July, 1972, pp. 67-104.

⁴No surveys of academic opinion deal with the way faculty voted in 1960 and 1980.

honorific societies. Before doing so, however, a summary of earlier research and efforts at theoretical explanation of the political orientations of faculty is in order.

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In their 1955 national survey of reactions of social scientists to issues raised by McCarthyism, Lazarsfeld and Thielens found clear relationships between highly scholarly achievement, liberal-left leanings, and activist politics. Those who ranked highest on various measures of accomplishment—such as rate of publication or office in professional associations—were more supportive of the civil liberties of Communists and other political minorities than the less prestigious professors. They also proved to be more inclined to activism, had a more liberal voting history, and were more likely to describe themselves as among the more liberal in academe.⁵

The findings presented in *The Academic Mind* were reiterated for all faculty in a 1966 study by Edward Noll and Peter Rossi⁶, who found professors at major universities to be more liberal than their counterparts at institutions of lower scholarly standing. Their results were supported by four national surveys of faculty opinions taken in 1969 by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, and in 1972, 1975, and 1977 by Everett Ladd and myself. Using a variety of indicators, these surveys also demonstrated that the more research-involved and high-achieving faculty were the most disposed to liberal left views.⁷

The findings that the most successful are the most left-inclined may

⁵Although the Lazarsfeld and Thielens data were the first to demonstrate a relationship between academic achievements and political views and activities, earlier studies of faculty of religious beliefs, conducted in 1913-14 and again in 1933 by psychologist James Leuba—among members of the American Sociological Society and the American Psychological Association, along with physicists and biologists—revealed that the more distinguished professors, in both natural and social sciences, were much more irreligious than their less eminent colleagues. Not only did this relationship hold among broad categories, but when Leuba sought to separate out variations in opinion between the eminent and the tiny groups of the most eminent, he found even greater differences than between the eminent and the less prestigious scholars. In 1933, 5 per cent of the most eminent were believers, compared to 20 per cent of the eminent (Leuba, 1921, 1934, 1950); Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958, pp. 16-17, 144-45, 161-63.

⁶C. Edward Noll and Peter H. Rossi, *General Social and Economic Attitudes of College and University Faculty Members*, Chicago, National Opinion Research Centre, University of Chicago, 1966.

⁷*The Decided Academy: Professors and Politics*, New York, Norton, 1976: Ladd and I presented reports on our 1975 and 1977 national faculty surveys in two series in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 35 articles, published weekly between September 15, 1975 and May 24, 1976, and seven published monthly between October 3, 1977 and April 24, 1979.

seem even more counterintuitive when placed in the context of consulting activities and social origins. Lazarsfeld and Thielens⁹ reported that the most liberal scholars "furnished . . . the most men and women called in as consultants to business." Ladd and I⁹ found a similar pattern among faculty at large with respect to consulting for government. Ironically, the more prestigious scholars, consulted because of their academic status, are also the most liberal. And their roles as consultants do not appear to affect their liberal views.

The more successful and more liberal academics also come from more privileged social backgrounds. Lazarsfeld and Thielens¹⁰ reported that research "productivity and social origin are related . . . professors who came from professional and managerial families were somewhat more successful than those who came from a lower economic and social stratum." Subsequent studies conducted by Ladd and myself¹¹ revealed similar patterns 20 years later.

The relationships between scholarly status and political orientations reported by Lazarsfeld, Noll and Rossi, Ladd and myself, and Basu¹² within a comparative context and in sharp contrast to the assumptions of many radical critics of academe, both within and outside of the university, that a class theory of politics is as relevant for academe as it is for the larger society, where the successful and powerful are also the more conservative.

Intellectuality and Political Orientation

The data support an alternative theory of the politics of intellectuals, namely, that emphasis on creativity and originality is a concomitant of a reformist or radical approach to the established order. The function of the intellectual, as Carl Becker¹³ noted, "is to increase rather than preserve knowledge, to undermine rather than to stabilize custom and social authority". Or, as Joseph Schumpeter¹⁴ put it in commenting on the critical role of the humanists, "they quickly expanded into the fields of manners, politics, religion and philosophy. . . from the criticism of a

⁹Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁹Ladd and Lipset, *The Decided Academy: Professors and Politics*, New York, Norton, pp. 142-43.

¹⁰Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

¹¹Lipset and Ladd, "The Changing Social Origins of American Academics", pp. 319-38 in Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, and Peter H. Rossi (eds.), *Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research* (Papers in Honour of Paul F. Lazarsfeld), New York, The Free Press, 1979, pp. 324-25.

¹²Lazarsfeld, "A Reply to Lang", in Serge Lang (ed.), *The File*, New York, Springer-verlag, 1981, pp. 18-30; Noll and Rossi, *op. cit.*; Asoke Basu, *Culture, Politics and Critical Academics*, Meerut, Archana Publications, 1981.

¹³Carl Becker, *Progress and Power*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1936.

¹⁴Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947.

text to the criticism of a society, the way is shorter than it seems." According to Thorstein Veblen:¹⁵

The first requisite for constructive work in modern science, and indeed for any work of inquiry that shall bring enduring results, is a skeptical frame of mind. The enterprising skeptic alone can be counted on to further the increase of knowledge in any substantial fashion. . . (and) the skepticism that goes to make him an effectual factor in the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men involves a loss of that peace of mind that is birthright of the safe and sane quietist.

More recently, C.P. Snow¹⁶ has stressed the criterion of innovation in distinguishing between natural sciences and engineering as follows:

The engineers. . . the people who made the hardware, who used existing knowledge to make something go, were in nine cases out of ten, conservatives in politics. . . interested in making their machine work, indifferent to long-term social guesses. . . . Whereas, physicists, whose whole intellectual life was spent in seeking new truths found it uncongenial to stop seeking when they had a look at society. They were rebellious, protestant, curious for the future and unstable to resist shaping it. The engineers buckled to their jobs and gave no trouble, in America in Russia, in Germany, it was not from them but from the scientists, that came heretics, forerunners, martyrs, traitors.

A comparable thesis was put forth by Lazarsfeld and Thielens¹⁷ in their effort to explain why faculty at high quality American schools hold the most liberal and left wing views. Pointing out that such institutions house the more distinguished scholars, they said: "The original and creative minority among them will often have analytical minds which do not automatically accept current beliefs, minds willing to entertain unorthodox ideas as to how a modern society can best function."

Although conservatives, in particular the academics among them, should be reluctant to accept the existence of an association between intellectual creativity and a liberal-to-left political orientation, one leading conservative, F.A. Hayek,¹⁸ noted that "the more active, intelligent and original men among (American) intellectuals...most frequently incline toward socialism, while its opponents are often of an inferior calibre..."

In seeking to explain the phenomenon, Hayek understandably rejected the hypothesis that the more creative and more intelligent are disposed to

¹⁵Thorstein Veblen, *Essays on Our Changing Order*, New York, Viking, 1934.

¹⁶C.P. Snow, *The New Men*, London, Macmillan, 1934.

¹⁷Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-63.

¹⁸F.A. Hayek, "The Intellectuals and Socialism," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 16, Spring, 1949, pp. 417-33.

be leftists. Instead, he suggested that the more intelligent among the young who support the *status quo* seek out non-intellectual occupations, while the 'disaffected and dissatisfied' reject positions linked to the business system and are more inclined to find a career in the intellectual realm.

These hypotheses, advanced to account for the link between intellectual achievement and the propensity to "disturb the peace" of society, are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Both Veblen and Hayek suggest that attributes of the mind that lead people to reject the established order are closely tied to those that foster scholarly or artistic activity.¹⁹

Some, who find the assertion of a relationship between intellectual achievement and liberal political views disturbing, have questioned the methodology of the research on faculty politics. Such critics have pointed out that national samples of academics or other occupational groups do not contain enough cases to permit an analysis of the elite of the profession, the small number at the very top who tend to be regarded by the media and by other elite groups as the spokespersons for their fields. Proponents of this argument suggest that such elite groups are part of the establishment and, therefore, more conservative than lower rank academics, that the correlation between academic achievement and political orientation is not linear but forms an inverted 'J' curve in which the relationship is reversed at the upper levels. Ladd and I decided to deal directly with this question by surveying the opinions of the academic elite.

THE ACADEMIES

The existence of major honorific societies—the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the National Academy of Education—provides an identifiable population of about 2,500 people, recognized as the intellectual leaders of academe. The study of the members of these groups was conducted in 1979, two years after our last general faculty survey.²⁰

¹⁹Veblen, *op. cit.*; and Hayek, *op. cit.* It is doubtful, however, that the relationship between academic creativity and critical social views is solely a function of self-selection. Such a hypothesis cannot explain why the more conservative scholars are less successful than the more liberal ones.

²⁰For reasons, the details of which are not relevant, Ladd and I were forced to postpone the study of members of the academies until 1979, two years after our sampling of a national cross section of faculty. The 158 schools in the 1977 Ladd-Lipset survey were selected systematically from a list of 2,406 institutions of higher education. Individuals who were then sampled randomly within them received mail questionnaires. The response rate was 51.7 per cent. The 1979 questionnaire was distributed

(Continued on next page)

The professorial members of the academies are distinguishable from their colleagues in higher education generally, as well as from those in the most prestigious Tier 1 institutions that emphasize research and graduate training, along the same lines that differentiated the more achieving from the less achieving faculty in previous surveys.²¹ They are more liberal on broad social and political issues, and more conservative on intramural issues. Those elected to the academies have also been much more involved than other faculty in the research culture, and have published a great deal more than professors in Tier 1 institutions.²²

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to a random sample of the members of the five honorific societies. The response rate was 50 per cent of those in the adjusted sample.

The fact that the response rate to questionnaire surveys of faculty has been around 50 per cent constitutes an obvious limitation. To estimate the bias, we held telephone interviews with a sample of 500, selected randomly from those who had not responded to the questionnaire in the 1975 study. To our surprise and pleasure, there was almost no difference between the replies of those who filled out the long questionnaires and the 95 per cent of the sample of non-respondents who answered a few queries on the telephone (Ladd and Lipset, 1981; 27). But we cannot be certain that the same pattern held true for the 1977 sample or for the members of the honorific societies in 1979).

²¹An index of institutional status was created for the schools from data drawn from the American Council of Education's 1973 Institutional Data File. The index encompasses three separate variables: selectivity—the average SAT scores of incoming freshmen; affluence—total institutional revenue adjusted to a per student basis; and research—expenditure for research, also adjusted for the number of students. Each college or university received a rating between 1 and 9 on the three individual items. The raw score scale running from 3 to 27 was then collapsed for data analysis into four tiers, running from Tier 1 (highest) to Tier 4 (lowest).

²²One-fourth of faculty in the academies (26 per cent) say their interests lie "very heavily in research," 52 per cent report an interest in both, but "leaning toward research", while only 10 per cent state, "in both, but leaning toward teaching". Only 16 per cent of Tier 1 faculty state that their interests are "very heavily in research," although 45 per cent are concerned with both, but lean towards research. Six per cent report their primary concern as "very heavily in teaching". These relationships hold up when age and discipline groups are held constant. (The data for both groups are for ages 36-69.)

Two-thirds (67 per cent) of the academic elite have written more than 50 articles over their total careers, the comparable figure for Tier 1 faculty is 24 per cent. Forty-four per cent of the members of the academies have over a hundred articles to their credit while 16 per cent can list over 200.

The demonstrated linkage between quantity of publication and perceived quality (Cole and Cole, 1973: 92, 110-16, Cole, 1979: 115-30) is sustained by the relationship between self-reports on scholarly status provided by the members of the academies and their publication record. These self-descriptions correlate strongly with scholarly output. Among those who report that they are regarded as among the "few top-ranking people" in their fields, 56 per cent had over 100 articles in print, compared to 44 per cent of those who saw themselves as "far above average", and 28 per cent of those who report a lesser status. The same pattern holds for number of writings

(Continued on next page)

Their background indicates a continuation of the relationship, found among faculty generally between scholarly status and higher social origins.²³

The assumption of the radical critics that the achievers in academe are involved with the political and economic establishments is borne out by the data. They have participated much more than other professors in the decision-making levels of society—advising policy makers in national government and major corporations. One-fourth (25 per cent) of the academic elite report having advised either the president or cabinet and sub-cabinet officers or both. Our two-thirds (72 %) of the members of the honorific societies, under 70 years of age, have served as consultants to federal government agencies. Close to half of them (47 per cent) have advised large national corporations (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 CONSULTATION RECORD*

	<i>Faculty in the Academies</i>	<i>Tier 1 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 2 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 3-4 Faculty</i>
National corporations	47%	26%	21%	16%
Federal Government	72	35	24	17
Local business	16	17	18	21
Local Government	11	14	16	18
(N)	(375)	(737)	(795)	(867)

*36-69 years of age.

THE POLITICS OF THE ACADEMIC ELITE

A comparison of the politics of members of the academies and Tier 1 Professors, based on five indicators of political orientation included in the 1979 and the 1977 surveys, indicates that the elite scholars are more

(Continued from previous page)

accepted for publication during the previous two years. Only 34 per cent of the self-described least prestigious had five or more accepted, compared to 55 per cent of the "far above average" and 70 per cent of the "few top ranking people". The higher the recognition the members of the academies feel they receive from others in their "field of scholarship or scientific research", the more likely they are to say they expect to make yet greater contributions in the future. This relationship holds up within age categories, even among those 60 or more years of age.

²³Controlling for age, members of the academies are of higher class origins, more likely to be of professional family background, and less prone to be of national worker origin than the 1977 faculty in Tier 1 schools. Faculty offspring do best of all. Among the members of the academies, aged 36 to 69, 9 per cent had college teacher fathers, compared to 6 per cent among Tier 1 faculty of corresponding age.

liberal than others in the university world.²⁴ The members of the academies are more likely than Tier 1 faculty to identify themselves as left or liberal, to describe themselves as Democrats, to have voted for McGovern and Carter or left third-party candidates in 1972 and 1976, and to disagree with the statement: "the private business system in the United States works better than any other system devised for advanced industrial societies". The relationships hold up when age is held constant (see Table 2).

TABLE 2 THE POLITICS OF THE PROFESSORIATE

Political Indicators	Faculty in the Academies			Tier 1 Faculty		
	Age			Age		
	36-49	50-59	60-69	36-49	50-49	60-69
Liberal or left	56%	49%	46%	51%	41%	42%
Democrat	74.5	76	70.5	61	59	56
McGovern or left candidate 1972	67	67	61	59	50	45.5
Carter or left candidate 1976	76	73	68	61	60	54
Disagree: "The private business system in the U.S. works better than any other system devised for advanced industrial society."	26	27	17	20	13	7
Average liberal response (N)	60 (58)	58 (143)	52.5 (158)	50 (500)	45 (225)	41 (121)

These differences are congruent with the earlier evidence of a relationship between academic accomplishment and liberal political views. The findings do not yield comfort to those who argue that academics in the

²⁴When comparing findings from the two samples, the data are restricted to those 36-69 years of age. None of the members younger than 36, while 19 per cent of the faculty sampled in 1977 are under 34. Conversely, 24 per cent of those in the honorific societies are over 70, while almost none of the 1977 faculty are. The 30 per cent of those in the academies who do not teach at universities are not included in the analysis:

- (a) "Would you describe your overall political inclinations as (seven choices from "far left" to "far right"). Liberal or left are those who responded "for left", "very liberal", or "somewhat liberal".
- (b) One of the options was "Left third party candidate",

establishment are more conservative than the rest of the profession, that for the tiny group at the very top the relationship between intellectual achievement and political orientation is inverted because of their direct ties to those who run the economy and polity of the country.

The academic elite is liberal rather than radical, although it includes a larger proportion of people than in the general population willing to identify themselves as left of centre or to entertain radical proposals. Those in the academies are much more likely to describe their political ideology as 'left' or 'liberal' than adult Americans generally.²⁵

Sixteen per cent of the faculty members of the academies agreed with the statement: "The United States would be better off if it moved toward socialism".

Perhaps the strongest evidence of a linear correlation between scholarly accomplishments and political opinion is the finding that the relationship holds true within the small group of scholars who have been elected to the academies. A comparison based on varying self-perceptions of scholarly recognition reveals that 47 per cent of those who see their status as among the 'few top-ranking people' or as 'far above average' are liberals, as opposed to 37 per cent of the members of the academies with lower self-evaluation, 'above average' or 'average'. The latter group also includes a much larger proportion of people than the self-perceived more prestigious, who voted for Nixon in 1972 or Ford in 1976. The relationship between academic status and liberal views also holds when recent publication record is taken as the indicator of achievement. The percentage of self-identified conservatives declines from 27, among those who have had less than five writings accepted for publication in the last two years, to 18, for those who have had five or more prospective or actual publications in this period.

An examination of the political views of those who consult for national corporations and the federal government is in line with earlier findings. As a group, they are liberals rather than conservatives, and Democrats rather than Republicans. Among those who voted in 1972 and 1976, the majority were for McGovern, Carter, or a left third-party candidate. The small group (7 per cent), that only consulted for national

²⁵Forty-five per cent of the faculty members of the academies classified themselves as left or liberal. Surveys of the general population conducted about the same time by Gallup and NORC and other polling agencies reported percentages in high teens identifying themselves as left, very liberal, or liberal.

The comparison between the members of the honorific societies and Americans generally reduces the differences between them, since those in the academies are much older on average than a sample of adults, and other faculty tends to be more conservative than younger. As indicated in Table 2, 56 per cent of members of the academies under 50 years of age identify their political orientation as left or liberal, a proportion that is about three times as great as among those of the same age in the population at large.

corporations, includes the same proportion of conservatives as liberals (33 per cent). Yet even these voted overwhelmingly for McGovern and for Carter rather than for Nixon and Ford, respectively (see Table 3).

It is impossible to tell from these data precisely how links to business or government affect the basic political orientations of scholars involved with them. Perhaps the more conservative faculty choose to work with business, while the more liberal opt for government, or refuse to become involved with either institution. In any case, business largely draws for advice upon those in fields whose members are more conservative.²⁶ Fully 69 per cent of those who only consult for national corporations come from engineering, business schools, and the natural sciences. Conversely, 76 per cent of members of the academies, who only advise the federal government, are in the humanities and the social and life sciences. Not surprisingly, humanists are the least likely by far to serve as consultant to either institution.

The perception that academe leans to the left is not only a function of the most distinguished faculty being the most liberal. Those who identify themselves as left-of-centre are more likely than other scholars to try to influence public policy. Thus, among the scholarly elite, 54 per cent of the self-identified liberals, 43 per cent of the moderates, and 33 per cent of the conservatives responded 'yes' to the question "Have there been occasions when you have sought, as an 'outsider', to influence, some aspect of public policy, rather than your being sought out for advice and counsel?"

ISSUES OF SELF-INTEREST

Although the top-ranked scholars are more liberal than other faculty on questions of political ideology, party identification, voting record, and attitudes toward business, their privileged and successful status affects their opinions in a conservative direction on issues that touch on their own self-interest both outside of and within the university. Those in the academies are less likely than faculty in Tier 1 schools (20 to 29 per cent) to agree with the statement: "There should be a top limit on incomes so that no one can earn very much more than others." The same tendency holds for answers to a question which asks respondents to rank themselves on a seven-point scale running from "Equality of

²⁶Discipline is a major factor differentiating the political views of the academic elite as well as those of the faculty generally. A comparison of the responses to the five political indicators, presented in Table 3, indicates that the variations correspond to those reported in the various faculty surveys. The rank order running from most liberal to most conservative has been: the social sciences, the humanities, the life sciences, including medicine, the physical science, and lastly, engineering and business, who are the most conservative by far. Ladd and I (1976a: 55-124) have discussed the relationship between discipline and politics in some detail.

TABLE 3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL VIEWS AND CONSULTANT ACTIVITIES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ACADEMIES*

Political Views	Consultant to			Neither
	Federal Govern- ment and National Cor- poration	National Corpora- tion only	Federal Government only	
<i>Political inclinations</i>				
Liberal or left	40%	33%	48%	46%
Moderate	27.5	28	21	23
Conservative	24	33	21	13
<i>Party identification</i>				
Democrat	61	58	66	60
Republican	22	22	16	14
<i>1972 Vote</i>				
McGovern	55	58	63	54
Nixon	30	28	19	15
<i>1976 Vote</i>				
Carter	63	61	67.5	61
Ford	27	31	19	14
"The private business system in the US works better than any other system yet devised for advanced societies".				
Strongly agree	32	33	20	16
Disagree	17	8	28	21
"The U.S. would be better off if it moved toward socialism".				
Agree	14	17	24	17
Strongly disagree	47	56	29	24
"Overall, there is too much government regulation in the US of private business".				
Strongly agree	24	25	14	10
Strongly disagree	2	3	12	10
(N)	(182)	(36)	(154)	(119)

*All members of the academies who report faculty positions.

opportunity; giving each person an equal chance for a good education to develop his or her ability" at one end, to "Equality of Results: giving each person a relatively equal share of income and status regardless of education and ability" at the other. Those, who have reached the

top in the race for intellectual prestige, are more likely than Tier 1 professors to opt for the extreme end point of equality of opportunity (35 to 30 per cent).

This pattern of greater conservatism of the academic elite on questions that deal with income inequality also shows up in their reactions to campus unionism. Earlier research on faculty attitudes and behaviour indicated that although a left-liberal political orientation is strongly related to support for campus unionism, status in academe is more decisive on such matters. Faculty at the less prestigious schools, those with the highest teaching loads, have been most disposed to support unions, while scholars at major centres of research have opposed collective bargaining with its potential limitations on their ability to bargain individually.²⁷ Given this background, it is not surprising that faculty elected to the academies are more opposed to unionism on campus than Tier 1 professors.²⁸

A direct comparison between attitudes toward intramural and extramural issues is made possible by questions on government regulation of academic and business institutions. Since most regulations have been designed to foster liberal social objectives—affirmative action for women and minorities, job safety, elimination of pollution—while limiting the freedom of those who dominate major institutions, the debate over the utility of these social policies has tended to divide liberals from conservatives. Higher education has not only been subject to many of the same regulations that effect business, it has also been exposed to a variety of rules bearing on research activities and has been required to devote considerable resources to ensure that it is conforming to government policies. These requirements have occasioned a great deal of criticism from within the university. Researchers have been particularly sensitive to, and critical of, regulations that they feel limit their freedom.

The academic elite opposes regulations both within and outside the

²⁷Ladd and Lipset, *Professors, Unions and American Higher Education*, Berkeley, CA, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973; "The Growth of Faculty Unionism," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, January 26, 1976, p. 11; "Faculty Unions Find Greatest Support of most Conservative Campuses," *op. cit.*, February 2, 1976, p. 14; "How Faculty Unions Rate with Professors," *op. cit.*, February 9, 1976, p. 8; "Faculty Support for Unionism," *op. cit.*, February 13, 1978, p. 14; and "The Big Differences Among Faculty Unions," *op. cit.*, March 13, 1978, p. 14.

²⁸Among respondents 36-69 years of age, 30 per cent of the members of the academies feel that "collective bargaining by faculty" has a place in a college or university," compared to 46 per cent of Tier 1 faculty and 55 per cent of those in Tier 3 and 4 institutions. Thirty-two per cent of the scholarly elite agree that "union grievance procedures serve to protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administration officials," as contrasted to 55 per cent of Tier 1 professors and 67 per cent of those in Tier 3 and 4. Within each levels of academe, the more liberal are more disposed to give pro-union answers than the more conservative. (For a discussion of the factor associated with support of campus unionism, see Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

university (Table 4). But, as expected, there are many more who endorse government control of business than favour regulation of the universities. The only item in the survey to elicit a majority favourable to regulation was "Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection achieve social benefits that outweigh their financial cost."

Ideology linked to academic status has a strong influence on the way members of the academies react to regulation. The liberal and more achieving tend disproportionately to favour regulation of business while opposing government controls of the university. Just under two-thirds (66 per cent) of those who take this position classify themselves as

TABLE 4 ATTITUDES OF MEMBERS OF THE ACADEMIES
TOWARD GOVERNMENT REGULATION

		(N=491)	
<i>Attitudes</i>		<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
<i>I. Toward business</i>			
1.	"Overall, there is too much government regulation in the US of private business."	52	36
2.	"Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection achieves social benefits that outweigh their financial costs."	56	31
3.	"Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection imposes an excessive burden on consumers."	40.5	41
<i>II. Toward universities</i>			
4.	"Overall, there is too much government regulation in the US of higher education."	67	21
5.	"Current federal regulations (dealing with the university) make positive contributions toward legitimate social goals, i.e., they produce real social benefits through regulation of research."	20	51
6.	"The costs of the current federal regulations—in terms of the financial burden on institutions of higher education, harm to education itself, or harm to academic research—are outweighed by the social benefits which are produced (by regulation of research)."	16	56
7.	"Independent of any financial burden they may produce, current federal regulations are harming the educational process of colleges and universities, or are harming academic research (through regulation of research)."	55	18
8.	"The cost, in terms of dollars and man-hours, of current federal regulations constitutes a burden on institutions of higher education (due to regulation of research)."	67	8.5

liberals. Liberals also figure heavily among persons who favour regulation of both institutions (72 per cent). Conversely, moderates and conservatives constitute a considerable majority among the large group that opposes regulation of both (64 per cent), or the small one that supports regulation of the university, but not of business (69 per cent).

The upper range of academe may be the most liberal when it comes to opinions about social institutions generally, but as with other groups in the population, ideology has its limitations when it affects self-interest. As Clark Kerr once noted: "Few institutions are so conservative as the universities about their own affairs while their members are so liberal about the affairs of others..."²⁹

Ressentiment in Academe

Although faculty at lower levels of academe are more conservative in their reactions to extramural political issues than those at higher status institutions, the less achieving faculty exhibit a great deal of *ressentiment* toward scholars who have been more successful than themselves. Those who are much more involved in teaching than research, who have published less, and who earn less, are more prone to explain success within their profession in invidious terms, to see the cards stacked unfairly in favour of those at the top.

Both the 1979 survey of members of the academies and the 1977 study of a national cross section of faculty posed a series of questions dealing with the reasons why "top people in my field are successful".

Among the faculty at large, the higher the status of their institution and the more they have published, the more likely they are to accept non-invidious explanations of academic achievement. The 'top people', those elected to the academies, are disposed to see their success primarily as a function of intellectual ability (see Table 5). They are much less likely than other faculty to identify high scholarly status with being "more effective operators" or "more effective promoters of their careers". Conversely, they are more prone to see the academically successful as being "brighter than most others" and having "done more important research."

In spite of the correlations between status and attitudes toward sources of success, there is a considerable degree of consensus in the responses to most of the items. An overwhelming number of those in the lower tier institutions accept the proposition that "the top people are successful" because "they are brighter" and "have done more important research." And a large majority of the scholarly elite recognise the importance of sponsorship and effective career promotion in attaining high academic status.

²⁹Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, New York, Harper and Row, 1966, p. 99.

TABLE 5 REASONS FOR SUCCESS IN ACADEME*

<i>The Top People in My Field Are Successful Because</i>	<i>Agree with Statement</i>			
	<i>Faculty in the Academies</i>	<i>Tier 1 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 2 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 3-4 Faculty</i>
"They are more effective 'Operators' than others	43.5%	60%	65%	68%
'They have had many advantages,'	49	49	53	58
'They are brighter than most others.'	87	75	68	57
'They are more effective promoters of their careers.'	71	88	88	90
'They have done more important research.'	91	78	69	60
'They have had sponsors who helped them.'	64	72	71	74
(N)	(375)	(846)	(988)	(1186)

*36-49 years of age,

But the *ressentiment* of the nonelite against the successful, evident in their responses to the "effective 'operators'" item, shows up even more dramatically in the answers to three questions dealing with the system of awarding research grants. The less achieving tend to attribute their own lack of success to a system of research grants in which the rich get richer and the poor stay poor. The relationship between academic status and opinion is among the highest in these data. Only 12 per cent of members of the academies agree that the "peer review system...is unfair", that it "favours members of the 'old boy' network," compared to 42.5 per cent of those at Tier 1 universities and 70 per cent of faculty at Tier 3 and 4 schools. A similar small proportion of elite scholars (11 per cent) feel that "past work" should not count in evaluating applications for funds, a position taken by 30 per cent of Tier 1 faculty and 57 per cent of those in the two bottom tiers (see Table 6).³⁰

The only surprising aspect of the association between academic status and attitudes toward the equity of the research granting system is its strength. Even more startling is the finding that similar relationships hold up among the members of the honorific societies. Those lower in

³⁰Three researchers, who evaluated the National Science Foundation's peer review system, through an examination of the outcomes of research proposals, report that because "proposal from eminent scientists do not have substantially higher probabilities of reviewing favourable ratings than proposals from scientists, who are not eminent, we concluded that the peer review system employed by NSF was essentially free of systematic bias", (Cole, *et. al.*, 1981, 881).

TABLE 6 ATTITUDES TO RESEARCH GRANTING SYSTEM*

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Faculty in the Acade- mies</i>	<i>Tier 1 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 2 Faculty</i>	<i>Tier 3-4 Faculty</i>
1. "Eminent scientists and scholars are more likely to receive research grants than others who submit proposals of about the same quality."				
Strongly agree	34%	53%	64%	68%
Agree with reservations	47	36.5	28	24.5
Disagree with reservations	9	6	3	2
Strongly disagree	2	2	0.4	0.7
2. "The past work ('track of record') of scholars and scientists should not count in appraising their applications for funds, only the quality of the proposals should be considered."				
Strongly agree	1	12	19	27
Agree with reservations	10	18	24	30
Disagree with reservations	33	39	38	29
Strongly disagree	50	29	15	9
3. "The 'peer review' system of evaluating proposals for research grants is, by and large, unfair; it greatly favours members of the 'old boy' network."				
Strongly agree	2	12.5	21	29
Agree with reservations	10	30	39	41
Disagree with reservations	34	34	28	20
Strongly disagree	46	21	8	5
(N)	(375)	(846)	(988)	(1,186)

*36-39 years of age.

in productivity are more likely to think the system is unfair. Fortyone per cent of those, who have published less than 100 articles, strongly agree that eminent scientists are more likely to get research grants for applications of comparable quality, only 30 per cent of the academic elite who have published more agree to this. And 49 per cent of scholars, high in article output, strongly disagree that the 'peer review' system is unfair, that it "favours members of the 'old boy' network," while 38 per cent of these, who have less than 100 articles in print, feel this way.³¹ These patterns also hold up with respect to variations in

³¹Publication record differentiates attitudes on these items within each level as well. Within each tier, the more faculty have published, the more they perceive the granting system to be equitable. And the lower the tier, the more critical the response among those with similar rates of scholarly output.

grant-obtaining record.³²

Nuclear Power Issues

The reactions of the members of the academies to nuclear power permit a case study of the way in which political values affect opinions on a controversial science-based policy issue. To examine how scholars react to an issue in which the scientific consensus differs from the liberal consensus, the survey of the academic elite included questions on nuclear power. Scientific research appears to conclude that nuclear reactors are safe, while liberal fears about the dangers let loose on the world by splitting the atom, have fostered a strong suspicion of, if not antagonism toward, efforts to use nuclear energy for any purpose.

The controversy over the effects of low-level ionizing has brought biologists, chemists, engineers, and other scientists directly into the nuclear regulatory process. The antinuclear power movement has charged that nuclear power plants are inherently dangerous; that societal risks of a nuclear catastrophe, such as a meltdown, outweigh any potential energy gains from the use of nuclear reactors. The list of charges against nuclear power plants is nearly endless and encompasses the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to storage/disposal of post-fission waste products.

The National Academy of Sciences accepts the assumption that there are no safe dose levels. But its reports have concluded that the dangers of low-level radiation have been exaggerated by opponents of nuclear power (Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Reactions, 1980).³³ A 1978 American Physical Society study indicates that safe and efficient methods of storing and/or disposing of waste products are technically feasible.³⁴

The 1979 survey posed two questions relating to the possible risks of nuclear reactors and their value as an energy source:

1. The risk of nuclear accidents outweighs the potential advantage

³²Scholars in the academies, who have received grants from federal agencies, are less likely (32 per cent) than those who have never secured government funding (41.5 per cent) to strongly agree that the eminent have a better chance than others to receive research grants for proposals of comparable quantity.

Similarly, 45 per cent of those, with federal funding, strongly disagree that the peer review system is unfair, compared to 19.5 per cent among those in the academies elite who have not received government grant.

³³Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, *The Effects on Populations of Exposures to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation*, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1980.

³⁴Charles Hebel, "Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Groups on Nuclear Fuel, Cycles and Waste Management", *Review of Modern Physics*, Vol. 50(1), II, S1-S12.

- to be gained from building nuclear power plants.
2. Building nuclear power plants is the best means of increasing US energy resources.

The members of the academies overwhelmingly disagreed with the first statement; only 22 per cent accepted the view that the risk outweighs the gains from nuclear power, while 67.5 per cent rejected it. They were more divided as to whether nuclear power is the best way to secure more energy resources: 49 per cent thought so, compared to 41 per cent opposed.

One would expect opinions on nuclear power plants to be related to political inclinations and subject area. On the basis of survey data and the body of literature relating political ideology to environmental concerns among the general public, it should follow that the more liberal the scholar, the greater his or her opposition to nuclear power. The assumption holds up among the scholarly elite generally. Just under three quarters (73 per cent) of the conservatives believe that nuclear power is the best available source of increased energy, compared to 46.5 per cent of the liberals. More liberals than conservatives (33 to 13.5 per cent) say that the risks outweigh the potential gains.

Because of the more direct working knowledge they possess, natural scientists and engineers are better able than social scientists and humanists to draw reliable and valid inferences from the available evidence in this sphere. Ideology, therefore, should have less effect on their judgements than on the opinions of those working in the latter disciplines.³⁵ Given the scientific consensus in favour of nuclear power, one would expect that the more committed scholars are to research rather than to teaching, the greater the likelihood that their views will reflect the judgment of the research community.

The differences in the views of the discipline groups correspond to the hypotheses that those more linked to scientific inquiry and committed to research will be more supportive of nuclear power (see Table 7).

³⁵The assumptions that the researchers' values on their work differ by the 'hardness' or 'softness' of the disciplines is borne out by the reports of faculty themselves. Social scientists, at every level of academe, are much more likely to agree with the statement "My choice of research problems has been strongly affected by my social values" than are natural scientists' replies of "definitely no," compared to 76 per cent of physical scientists, 69 per cent of life scientist and 47 per cent of engineers. Scholars in every discipline are less disposed to agree that "my research findings have been strongly affected by me social values." But even this statement finds a sizable minority of social scientists (34 per cent) and of humanists (20 per cent) in partial or full agreement that their values affect their results. The corresponding percentages for physical scientists are 4; for life scientists, 5.5; and for engineers, 16. It is noteworthy that 53-54 per cent of the humanists did not answer these questions, while no answers constituted 5 per cent or less for the other discipline categories.

There is, however, some variation with respect to the degree of endorsement to the two questions. Social scientists resemble natural scientists in overwhelmingly rejecting the statement that the risks involved in nuclear power outweigh the advantages. The social scientists appear much more disposed than the humanists to accept what appears to be scientific consensus.

TABLE 7 DISCIPLINE GROUPS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
NUCLEAR POWER*

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Engi- neering</i>	<i>Physical Sciences</i>	<i>Life Sciences</i>	<i>Social Sciences</i>	<i>Humani- ties</i>
1. The risk of nuclear accidents outweighs the potential advantage to be gained from building nuclear power plants."					
Agree	14	14	23	18	45
Disagree	82.5	76	69	73	43
2. "Building nuclear power plants is the best means of increasing U.S. energy resources."					
Agree	75	59	57	38	24
Disagree	21	32	35	52	62
(N)	(57)	(105)	(108)	(71)	(76)

*All members of the academies who report faculty positions.

The second statement, however, which notes that building nuclear plants is the best way to increase energy resources, has much less publicised scientific prestige behind it. Some feel nuclear power is reasonably, but not absolutely, safe, and therefore favour increasing alternative energy sources: solar, windmills, coal, etc. On this issue, social scientists, though still more favourable to nuclear power than humanists, are much closer to the latter in their response patterns, while the life scientists are nearer to the physical scientists.

Among the members of the academies, regardless of discipline, the greater the commitment to research, the more favourable the attitude toward nuclear power on both questions. Even within the sciences and engineering, those who report a strong preference for research rather than teaching are more pronuclear than individuals with greater teaching interests.

Ideological orientation correlates with opinion on these issues much more highly among those in the life and social sciences and the humanities than it does for those in the physical sciences and engineering. On the whole, political inclinations account for much less of variance in attitudes toward nuclear power than does academic

discipline. Those who have first-hand familiarity with the topic—engineers or physical scientists—are most supportive. Those with the least familiarity—humanists and social scientists—are least positive, more disposed to reflect their general ideological orientations. The life sciences fall between the two clusters.

CONCLUSION

In a letter to the New Left at the beginning of the 1960s, C. Wright Mills³⁶ emphasized the role of the intellectuals as agents of radical change. Lionel Trilling³⁷ also called attention to their 'adversary' role, to the effort of the modern intellectual "to judge and condemn, and perhaps revise, the culture that has produced him." The emphasis on intellectual creativity as a source of anti-establishment views, stressed in this paper, does not, of course, completely account for the disproportionate number of intellectuals in most western countries, who are on the left politically. Some students of the subject have suggested that there is an inherent conflict between the market values of the business classes and the emphasis placed by intellectuals on meeting the standards of their fields. Others point to a concern by scholars over the discrepancy between their professional self-esteem and the economic rewards they secure, which are significantly smaller than those received by persons in the upper levels of business.³⁸

The antagonism to business may help to explain why, as Richard Hofstadter³⁹ noted, the political weight of American intellectuals, including leading academics, had been disproportionately on the progressive and liberal side for almost all of the preceding 75 years. And although leftist radical parties have not secured more than 2 per cent of the vote since 1920, or more than one per cent since 1932, professors have been much more likely than other occupational groups to support them. Even today, sociologist Bogdan Denitch, a leader of the largest socialist group in the United States, the Democratic Socialists, reports that about a sixth of the membership of his organization are college professors, including one Nobel Prize Winner in economics, three former presidents of the American Political Science Association, and three former heads of the American Sociological Association. Two of the three social scientists at the Institute for Advanced Study are socialists. In economics, the

³⁶C. Wright Mills, "Power, Politics, and People", I.L. Horowitz, (ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 259.

³⁷Lionel Trilling, *Beyond Culture*, New York, Viking, 1965, pp. xii-xiii.

³⁸Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13; Lipoelt. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, New York, Doubleday, (1981 Expanded edition), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960.

³⁹Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, New York, Knopf, 1963, p. 39.

most conservative field within the social sciences, the Union of Radical Political Economists reports 2,000 members, which is equivalent to 10 per cent of the membership of the American Economic Association. And though most faculty are not socialist, a highly disproportionate number of them continue to figure among the left-of-centre forces, largely liberal Democrats, who are the equivalent, within the American political spectrum, of the European social democratic or socialist parties.

The focus here on the presence of reformist orientations, among faculty, does not mean that they reject the norms of American society. Rather, as I have emphasized in various writings, the dominant national values are liberal rather than conservative.⁴⁰ American socialist intellectual Leon Samson (1933) and Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski⁴¹ have even argued that the basic assumptions of Americanism, economic relationships apart, are highly similar to those of socialism: the stress on the inherent dignity and the right to respect of all individuals regardless of class position and the belief in equality of opportunity. Michael Harrington,⁴² the leader of the Democratic Socialists, who agrees with Samson that Americanism as an ideology is a surrogate socialism, has pointed out that in the United States "equality, and even classlessness, the creation of wealth for all and political liberty were extolled in the public schools."

The academic elite and the professoriate in general are strongly committed to this constellation of values. However, there is an inherent tension within academia between the commitment to a society's values and the role of the intellectual as social conscience and social critic. While professing support for equality of opportunity, academics have been highly critical of the distribution of power, authority, and status in the United States.

The political behaviour of the American academic elite is in harmony with the expectations of Veblen, Hayek, Lazarsfeld, Snow, Schumpeter, and others, that the most distinguished scholars should be more socially critical than those of lesser achievement. At the same time, however, the highly successful professors behave like most other people when it comes to issues of immediate self-interest (although even on these, the more liberal are least likely to do so).

How does this pattern, one may rightfully ask, fit in with the fact that some well-known professors have become neo-conservatives and that a number of important academics give support and advice to the Reagan

⁴⁰Lipset, *The First New Nation The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, New York, Norton, 1979, pp. 74-90, and 96-98.

⁴¹Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, New York, The Free Press Samson, 1963.

⁴²Michael Harrington, *Socialism*, New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972.

Administration.⁴³

Milton Friedman, an unabashed conservative (classical liberal) and advocate of *laissez faire* free market economics, has proposed an explanation for the seeming growth of conservatism within the academic elite that does not challenge the underlying argument presented here. He suggests that New Deal Liberalism, or in his own field of economics Keynesian theory, became the conventional wisdom of the intellectuals, the establishment position, following World War II. Friedman contends that given the assumption, with which he agrees, that the more creative scholars tend to reject dominant views, the innovators in contemporary America should be conservatives, opponents of the welfare-planning state.⁴⁴

Although in line with Friedman's assumptions, many of the most influential younger scholars in his own discipline, economics, are supporters of varying forms of antistatist free-market doctrines, there is no quantitative evidence to demonstrate that there are more conservatives among prominent scholars today than there were in the past. Leftist critics of an assumed right-wing trend within the professoriate have suggested that it is a function of recent threat to the self-interests of academe, particularly of its elite, such as the challenge to authority and status by student radicals and younger leftist faculty, the impact of the regulatory state on the freedom to do research, the threat posed by affirmative action programmes to the position of white males and of Jews, and the growth of faculty unionism, which could be used to constraint the power of senior professors.

Those scholars who have moved in a more conservative direction, on the other hand, see their behaviour as a response to larger social and political developments that undermined their faith in traditional left doctrines. These include a concern with the way turmoil on the campus in the sixties and early seventies appeared to challenge democratic norms and academic values, the failure of the economy to conform to Keynesian expectations, and the apparent malfunction of statist interventionist policies in democratic welfare societies.

These varying interpretations are, of course, linked to ideology. It is doubtful that the political shift to the right they purport to explain actually has occurred, except among a small number of intellectuals whose activities are highly publicized. The same can be said for asser-

⁴³Lipset, "The Limits of Social Science," *Public Opinion*, Vol. 4, October-November, 1981, pp. 2-9.

⁴⁴Scholars have contributed disproportionately to the ranks of the opposition to socialism in countries, such as Israel and Sweden, governed until recently by Social Democrats, as well as in various Communist nations. In pre-Nazi Germany, many professors and university students supported the extreme right.

tions about growth of conservatism among Jews.⁴⁵ Both academics and Jews, like most groups, move right and left in tandem with fluctuations in the population generally. But opinion surveys have consistently shown that Jews are more liberal than any other white ethnic groups. A disproportionate number of those who are labelled neo-conservative are intellectuals and Jews, but this is also true for New and old Leftists. And among both the faculty generally and the scholarly elite, Jews show up much more than non-Jews on the left side of the spectrum. Similarly, recent studies of faculty, including of their elite, reveal they have remained much more left-of-centre than other occupational strata.

Whatever the sources of the anti-establishment views of intellectuals, the academic community in America and in most other developed democratic societies has been on the left.⁴⁶ And both in the American university world generally, and for the members of the elite honorific societies in particular, the relationship between scholarly productivity and recognition and liberal-left political positions is linear. Older professors may be more conservative than younger ones, but the relationship between achievement and liberal opinions holds within each age category.

The persistence of a left-liberal orientation among American intellectuals and professors suggests that we may be dealing with a cultural trait, the understanding of which requires a more comprehensive analysis than exists at present. Andrew Greeley⁴⁷ has proposed that intellectuals be viewed as a minority ethnic group, one which has a fully developed subculture and which sees itself as different from, and somewhat at odds with, the dominant society.

Paul Lazarsfeld once discussed this phenomenon. In a conversation we had in 1955, he commented on a visit he had just made to a minor state university in the mountain states. He had been surprised to find that the general political atmosphere was quite similar to that of Columbia University. I suggested that this was less extraordinary than appears at first sight, if one regarded the campus in the same light as the East European Jewish *shtetl*. Before World War I, one could travel over a thousand miles from a *shtetl* in Galicia to one in the Ukraine and still be in the same place. Similarly, it is possible to go from university to university across the American continent and take up the same conversation with an interchangeable group of colleagues, although the atmosphere would be somewhat more conservative at the less prestigious

⁴⁵Alan M. Fisher, "Jewish Political Shift? Erosion, Yes; Conversion, No," in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), *Party Coalitions in the 1980s*, San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981, pp. 327-40.

⁴⁶Basu, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷Andrew W. Greeley, "Intellectuals as an Ethnic Group", *Times Magazine*, July 21, 1970, pp. 22-32,

institutions. But moving a half mile away from the *shtetl* or the campus brings the traveller to a totally different world.

The *shtetl* and the campus are complex differentiated societies. But each has a basic culture that does not change easily. To understand fully the nature of academic society we need to articulate its internal structure and values, its relations with external forces, the ways newcomers are recruited and socialized, and the varying mechanisms which enable the culture to persist while adjusting to changes in its environment.

Paul Lazarsfeld engaged in this type of analysis as well. He and Thielens⁴⁸ noted that "professors...seem to consider themselves as an occupational minority toward which significant sectors of the community hold relatively contemptuous attitudes". They⁴⁹ reported that the "main social contacts (of most faculty) are confined to the university." And they⁵⁰ went on to describe the process by which "a competent teacher" or a "productive research scholar", outside of "the original and creative minority", comes to be more liberal than those outside of academe. "Even if he might be by nature more amenable to the general currents of public opinion, he is more directly in communication with the leaders of his profession, and his thinking is shaped by the process of mutual interaction.... Thus, he too will add to a...liberal climate."

As Ladd and I wrote in the dedication to our book—*The Divided Academy*—"Paul F. Lazarsfeld... showed the way in studying the academic mind."

⁴⁸Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 163.

Changing Pattern of Elite in Contemporary American Society

S.M. HABIBUDDIN

In recent years social scientists and particularly sociologists began studies of elite. In the history of sociological thought, the concept of elite has been bound with the theory circulation of elites which was based on the controlling assumption of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. They had in turn been inspired by Karl Marx and Loria. American history embodied great deal of instances of evolution and changing pattern of elite. American elite since the colonial times has undergone great transformation. The decadence of one class of elite paved the way for the emergence of new elite which made social and humanitarian reform as their main gospel to reinvigorate itself with reinforcement from the lower class. Political and business elite also emerged with gradual social and cultural development. Formation of elite at each stage of social transformation of the United States of America is the main theme of the present research work because a comprehensive picture of American elite during the contemporary period cannot emerge without analysing the origin of various forms of this class. Two major sociological perspectives have emerged during recent years, the elitist and pluralist. There are two sub-types of elite perspective—the conservative and radical. The conservative elite theory was advocated by Pareto, Mosca and Robert Michels. The radical elite theory was propounded by C. Wright Mills and others.¹ The Pluralists have been led by Raymond Aron, Robert Dahl and S. Keller. However, sociologists have been concerned exclusively with attitudes and social background of American elites. The present appraisal is based on multiple framework of theoretical, empirical and historical reorientation of analysis of elite. The assessment of elites is confined to the

¹Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, New York, 1935; Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York, 1939; William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation*, New York, 1970; *Max Weber from Max Weber: Essay in Sociology*, New York, 1946; T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, New York, 1971, pp. 8-10, 114-116.

principles of classifications and selection already evolved by sociologists in recent years.²

American society from the colonial times developed as a democratic society. Absence of feudalism and lack of tradition ensured growth of an egalitarian social structure and prevented dominance of a few over many. The men and women who grew up in America came to believe that courage, industry and perseverance would ensure success in life. The growth of political power and wealth subsequently led to the emergence of families which became representatives of upper class. This class was represented by merchants of New England and Pennsylvania, land owners of New York and the planters of Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina and New York. Landed aristocracy, prosperous merchants and influential lawyers made up ruling elite in many of the colonies. Religious elite belonging to different churches and denominations, like Anglicans, puritans, Congregationalists, Baptists, Presbyterians and Quakers became part of social structure and earned reputation as social elite.³

The American Revolution sought to resolve the conflict between the traditional elite and new elite as well as the conflict between aristocratic and democratic attitudes. Socially, the Revolution weakened the old elite and laid the basis for adjustment of classes. Land holdings were disrupted by confiscation and new laws of inheritance. New opportunities were opened for merchants and speculators. Ideals and institutions associated with old elite were widely challenged.⁴ With the overthrow of the aristocratic principles, America was to become wholly middle class.⁵ Rapid growth of industries and transport produced a new class of business elite in the North and the East. A powerful business community made up of new class of entrepreneurs consisting of bankers, insurance men, merchants and industrialists were pushing, aggressive and competitive. They were untrammelled by any feudal or aristocratic heritage and inspired by environment rather than heredity. The emergence of business elite threatened the position of traditional elite based on land tenure and wealth.⁶ Besides the westward movement, the

²Richard G. Braungart, "Political Sociology: A Proposed Agendum for Theory Construction", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 2, Spring, 1974, pp. 2-19; Lowell G. Field and John Higley, "Elites and Non-Elites: The Possibilities of Their Side Effects", *Module-19*, Andover Mass, 1973.

³T.C. Hall, *Religious Background of American Culture*, Boston, 1930, pp. 50-59.

⁴Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and American Revolution", *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 19, January 1962, pp. 10-12.

⁵V.L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, New York, Vol. II, 1954, p. xiii.

⁶Edward Pressen, "The Occupation of the Antebellum Rich: A Misleading Clue to Their Sources and Extent of Their Wealth, *Historical Method Newsletter*, Vol. 5, March 1971, pp. 19-54.

frontier promoted liberalism, individualism and mobility in American society. These trends weakened the forces of tradition and hold of elite on institutions and social values.⁷ The democrats appreciated these changes for creating a new and better society, the conservatives pointed with alarm the loss of high standard of culture and social discipline because of individualism, materialism and violence.⁸ The French Sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville recorded his American experience in his book *Democracy in America* published in 1836 after visiting the new World. The absence of class barriers of distinction and rank and of prescribed identities was what he meant by "the general equality of condition among the people". He feared that equality might be endangered by dominance of new business elite.⁹ He also observed that American elite was no longer a male oriented concept because American women began to assert their claims as equal partners in progress by obtaining education, joining profession and by participating in social activities and reforms.¹⁰ The Seneca Fall Convention held in 1848 was a symbol of growing consciousness among women but they were yet to assume social status to disturb the equilibrium of American elite. However, the rise of intellectual elite during the period before the Civil War proved to be a formidable factor in the changing pattern of elite. The growth of education and romantic nationalism provided a new impetus to the intellectual elite. The intellectuals of New York, New England and the South developed as a class with some variation in their attitude to social problems.¹¹ A recent study by E. Digby Baltzell has shown that Boston produced a long traditional elite, which came to be known as Boston Brahmin, but Philadelphia could not do so. This analysis of the nineteenth century elite demonstrated that Boston had leadership superiority principle, pride and intellectual values but elite of Philadelphia sought materialistic progress and wealth. Baltzell presented two models—Oliver Wendell Holmes of Boston and Governor Johnson of Philadelphia, the former got fame and the latter wealth.¹² The American elite was stirred by the arrival of thousands of immigrants—like the Germans, the Irish, the Italians, the Catholics and the Jews—because this phenomenon disturbed the Anglo-Saxon and protestant

⁷Henry Steele Commager, *The American Mind*, New Haven, 1964, pp. 2-14; Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, New York, 1948, pp. 2-38.

⁸F.O. Gottle, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 82, June 1967, pp. 235-52.

⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York, Vol. I, 1949, pp. 50-63.

¹⁰Carol Smith Rosenberg, "The Militant Woman in Jacksonian America", *American Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, October 1971, pp. 562-84.

¹¹Nelson Man Fred Blake, *A History of American Life and Thought*, New York, 1963, pp. 243-61.

¹²E. Digby Baltzell, *Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia*, New York, 1980, pp. 60-75, 86-92, 105-36.

cultural heritage of American elite.¹³ The ruling elite of early days of the Republic also witnessed rapid transformation. The Federalists of New England and Virginia, who ruled the New Nation, were soon replaced by Jeffersonian Republicans and Jackson Democrats. The whigs were overshadowed by the new Republican party. The ruling elite of this period was a powerful group and a class with power, prestige and wealth even in the age of common man.¹⁴

The dominance of business and political elites of the emerging nation made the traditional elite apprehensive of new changes. Humanitarian impulse was inspired by Federalist response to declining social status. They tried to regain their lost position of leadership by mobilising reforms in society. They were men who tried to restore traditional social values. They were out in a society led by a commercial class. They were an elite without function, a displaced class in American society. The dominance of the old Federalists-Calvinists was the main feature of the age of reform between 1820 to 1860. The tone and temper of crusade for reform were inspired by social elite because the cause offered a chance for moral leadership and reassertion of traditional values. Such a pattern was visible in the North and particularly in New England. The South developed a rigid class structure based on the superiority of social elite and their feudal and aristocratic tendencies. The agrarian elite of the South and the business elite of the North soon came in conflict which eventually disrupted national unity and led to the Civil War. It was a war of different social ideals, aristocratic South against democratic North. As a result of the Civil War, economic and social structure of the South was destroyed. The ruling elite of the South lost both power and prestige.¹⁵

The period, after the Civil War, witnessed a great upsurge of big business, corporation and capitalism. Business leaders like J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie became symbol of new business elite. Managerial and technological innovations consolidated the organised power of this class and they began to dominate political

¹³Perry L. Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics*, New York, 1973, pp. 25-65, 101-156; David R. Segol, "Status Inconsistency, Cross Pressure and American Political Behaviour", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 34, April 1969, pp. 352-59.

¹⁴J.H. Silbey (ed.), *Political Ideology and Behaviour in the Age of Jackson*, Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1973, pp. 1980-82; B.W. Folsom, "The Politics of Elites", *Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 39, August 1973, pp. 359-78.

¹⁵Rollin Osterwei, *Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South*, New Haven, 1949, pp. 132-40, 150-54; William R. Taylor, *Cavalier and Yankee*, New York, 1961, pp. 60-98; Harny Jaffa, "Conflict within the Ideology of Liberal Tradition", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 5, April 1968, pp. 276-77.

and economic life of the country.¹⁶ The American business elite, as product of the new phenomenon, boasted of their humble origin and their ability to have made it on their own without influence or patronage, even without formal education. The 'Horatio Alter Image' became a new trend in the changing pattern of American elite imbued with the impulsive ideal of American dream. It has continued to influence American social behaviour down to the present-time. C. Wright Mills in his study of "American Business Elite: A Collective Patriot" based on men included in the *Dictionary of American Biography* has shown that in the generation born between 1820-1840, 43 per cent of the business elite came from the lower middle class. The subsequent generation born during 1850-1879 showed that only about 30 per cent of business elite emerged from the low social status. The great capitalists like Andrew Carnegie, Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, Jim Fiske, Jay Cooke and James J. Hill were proud of their humble origin and declared that their riches and power were the results of hard work and special talents. The business interest influenced both domestic and foreign policy and promoted the politics of expansion and imperialism. According to a recent study by David J. Rothman, the politicians of the late nineteenth century, responded more to the demands of business than those of agriculture and labour because the business interests were more effectively organised.¹⁷

The growth of big business and corporate power led to the dominance of the wealthy class in American society and politics. According to one survey during the early twentieth century, there were one hundred and twenty men in the United States, each of whom was over ten million dollar worth. U.S. Census Bureau estimated in 1902 that nine per cent of families of the nation owned seventy one per cent of wealth. There was cleavage between those who were rich and those who were getting rich. The question of dominance of big business has attracted the attention of social scientists. Gabriel Kalko insisted that big business—having failed to exclude new competitors through such means as polls, trusts, holding companies and mergers and becoming less efficient than many small enterprises—engineered progressive federal regulation in

¹⁶William Mills, "The Recruitment of American Business Elite", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 1950, pp. 242-45, 250-53; Paul Blumberg, *Inequality in an Age of Decline*, New York, 1980, pp. 50-65, 100-105.

¹⁷C. Wright Mills, "The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait", *Journal of Economic History*, Supplement Issue, 1945, pp. 20-44; William Miller (ed.), *Men in Business*, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 193-211; Samuel P. Hays, *The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914*, New York, 1967; La Faber, *The New Empire*, Ithaca, New York, 1963; William A. William (ed.), *From Colony to Empire*, New York, 1972; David J. Rothman, *Politics and Power: The United States Senate 1869-1901*, Cambridge, Mass, 1966,

order to ensure their control over economy. Big business was successful in its attempt to maintain existing social and power relations in a new economic context. The strategy and tactics of corporate capitalists promoted regulation and led to strengthening of their power. The struggle between big business and small business resulted in the triumph of conservatism, Robert Wiebe stressed similar trend in different perspective than Kalko. The farmers and working class, in spite of their organised power, failed to restrain the trend of growth of the corporate power and partnership between political elite and business elite. This tendency led to American entry into the World War I as a result of the efforts of bankers, capitalists and industrialists.¹⁸

The politicians, reformers, men of Mugump type, who resented loss of their power because of political bosses and big business elite, launched campaign for changes. There was tendency among the members of upper class aristocracy and gentry to take the lead in reforming the very system that seemed to threaten their position and privileges. They came from New England, New York, Indianapolis, and Chicago and belonged to protestant Anglo-Saxon class.¹⁹ In South and the West the traditional social elite attacked the big business because the emerging capitalist class had usurped the power and position of this class. The emerging middle class, which had risen from thirty three per cent in 1870 to Sixty three per cent in 1910 shared a common hostility against business elite.²⁰

The intellectuals also joined this crusade for reform. They exposed corruption in political and social life and developed the idea of social criticism and social gospel.²¹ The rise of educated professional class and professors found expression in the establishment of the American Association of University Professor in 1915.²² The legal profession organised Bar Associations. The Lawyers as emerging intellectual elite became a great social force by the beginning of the twentieth century. They also resented loss of status because of tremendous growth of corporations. They joined the crusade of reform and became part of

¹⁸Gabriel Kalko, *The Triumph of Conservatism*, Chicago, 1963, pp. 50-58, 290-300; Robert Wiebe, *Businessmen and Reform*, New York, 1962, pp. 70-90; Sidney Rutner, *American Taxation*, New York, 1942, pp. 136-275; C.L. Merwin, "American Studies of the Distribution of Wealth and Income by Size", *Studies in Income and Wealth*, New York, Vol. III, 1939, pp. 3-84; Paul Blumberg, *Inequality in an Age of Decline*, New York, 1980, pp. 195-230; Don Clawson, *Bureaucracy and Labour Process Transformation 1860-1920*, New York, 1980, pp. 202-45.

¹⁹Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, New York, 1955, pp. 135-45, 180.

²⁰Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Status and Social Structure", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, June 1951, pp. 230-35.

²¹Lewis Corney, "The Middle Class", *Antioch Review*, Spring 1945, Quoted in Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, op. cit., p. 218.

²²John Braeman, "Seven Progressives", *Business History Review*, Vol. 35, Winter 1961, pp. 581-92.

new intellectual elite.²³ The religious elite were, however, influenced by ideas of social Christianity and social Gospel. The clergy were hard hit in their capacity as moral and intellectual leaders by the considerable secularisation that took place in American society and intellectual life. They were also offended by the rich men in their congregation. They were replaced in the institution of higher education by businessmen, bankers and lawyers on boards of trustees. They also, therefore, turned to the movement for reform and social criticism.²⁴ Women leaders, known as social feminists, also joined new protest movement. Jane Addams, Porkin Gilman, Alice Paul, Margaret Dreier Robin and many others demanded reform and political rights, including right to vote which they got in 1919 by the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution.²⁵ Some recent studies showed tension between groups that were rising in the social scale and those that were falling. This explained the support to reform ideologies by intellectuals who seemed to be superseded by the business elite.²⁶ The intellectuals of the populist and progressive era accepted capitalism but distrusted large scale institutions like Corporation. The new radicals wanted improvement of the quality of American culture in moral terms. Christopher Lasch concluded that intellectuals were a class, not yet absorbed into the cultural consensus.²⁷ Richard Rovene wrote that the intellectuals proposed quick and drastic remedy for social injustices.²⁸

The 'Red Hysteria' of the twenties, the growing intolerance of alien and radicals, the identification of loyalty with conformity, the stress on Americanism and emergence of tremendous power of Corporate business dismayed and disillusioned the intellectual elite.²⁹ Harold Stearns, in his *Civilization in the United States* (1922), attacked American life and reflected pessimism. Those who shared his views found refuge in

²³Woodrow Wilson, "The Lawyer and the Community", *North American Review*, Vol. CXCH, November 1910, pp. 604-22; David Riesman, "Towards an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LVII, September 1951, pp. 130-31.

²⁴*The Literary Digest*, Vol. XCV, July 21, 1920, p. 985.

²⁵Andrew Sinclair, *The Better Half: The Emancipation of American Women*, New York, 1965, pp. 50-85, 90-110.

²⁶Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (ed.), *Class, Status and Power*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, pp. 480-91; Joseph Berger, B.P. Cohen and Morris Zelditch Jr., "Status Characteristics and Social Interaction", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37, No. 3, June, 1972, pp. 241-55.

²⁷Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963*, New York, 1965, pp. 147-50, 254-56; H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, 1958, pp. 180-94.

²⁸Richard H. Rovene, *The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions and Speculations*, New York, 1962, p. 57.

²⁹Stanley Cohen, "A Study of Nativism: The American Red Score of 1919-1920", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 79, March 1964, pp. 52-75.

Greenwich Village, New York and numerous such imitators.³⁰ Henry L. Menchon, editor of the *American Mercury*, showed anti-middle class and anti-democratic, shallow hypocrisies of business men, the crude illiteracy of politicians and rabble rousing absurdities of evangelical clergy.³¹ Outstanding novelists, poets and writers exhibited the same spirit. But many American historians wrote works of enduring merit.³² Sociologists and psychologists emphasised behaviorism, environment rather than heredity, value and pattern of life in rural areas. Anthropologists threw light on folkways of primitive man. Thus, social scientists presented an evidence of strong and vigorous life unlike literacy figures who displayed a pessimistic note. The expansion of higher education, research centres for advancement of science and technology gave new prestige to scientists in the society as social elite.³³ The fragmentation of intellectual elite ensured the triumph of business elite.

The triumph of the business elite since 1920 exhibited a new pattern which was based on continuity rather than change in the corporate business enterprise. By 1925, about one thousand trade associations of business and industries ensured profits through price agreements, standardized products and restricted output. A classic study by A.A. Berle and G.C. Means in *Modern Corporations and Private Property* showed that half of the American economy in 1930 was controlled by two hundred giant non-banking corporations that they managed by less than two hundred men. The American economy was now controlled by managers rather than owners. This rise of bureaucracy in business altered the pattern of business elite. Of the eight 'lords of creation', on the eve of the depression, Charles E. Mitchell of the National City Bank served on thirty two boards of directors and Samuel Insul of the utilities magnate served on eighty boards. The Dueponts family representatives were on the boards of General Motors and many banks. Thomas W. Lamont of J.P. Morgon banking group had directorship in railroad, coal, farm equipment, banks and publishing companies. The chairman of the Chase National Bank, Albert H. Wiggin, was director of fifty corporations. The business elite served as the high priest of the nation. The control over economic and public policies by business elite enforced the assumption of political and economic alliance between politicians and the capitalists. Jean Hoff Wilson has, however, shown that business opinion was divided along occupational, sectional,

³⁰Frederick J. Hoffman, *The Twenties American Writings in the Postwar Decade*, New York, 1955, pp. 15-36.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 304-14.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 388-91.

³³Presidents Research Committee, *Recent Trends in the United States*, Vol. I, New York, 1933, pp. 150-51, 339-40.

political and organisational lines on major foreign policy issues. The business groups, thus, influenced making of foreign policy in their own ways. The rise of business civilization was resented by radicals and intellectuals but they failed to check the trend. The organised business groups through the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers demonstrated their power and prestige through propaganda. They promoted philanthropy to demonstrate the paternalistic aspect of American capitalism and wielded great power through an alliance with Republican Party thereby becoming part of power elite but they could not save the nation from the great crush.³⁴

During the New Deal period, they opposed regulation of economy by the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt though this programme of reform was intended to save capitalism from collapse. Under the New Deal, government investment was meant as helping hand to business. It was interpreted by business as a threatening gesture. Business did not want intervention by government into its citadel of power. The emergence of broker state during the New Deal was symbol of the union of capitalism and democracy. Ferdinand Lundberg showed that sixty American families in 1937 exercised influence through their ability to appoint and control those who actually occupied high offices in business, church, university and administration. Thus, wealth ruled the nation. The growth of the executive branch of the government with its agencies that regulate the complex economy meant not only the enlargement of government but it also meant the ascendancy of the corporate power.³⁵ The process was accelerated during the contemporary period. The New Deal era also saw the growing influence of intellectuals of Harvard, Yale and Columbia with the administration and it marked a new phase in the changing pattern of American elite. The Brain Trust of Franklin D. Roosevelt frightened the members of the Congress who objected to the loss of power to the intellectuals whom the President had brought into the government. This phenomenon gave rise to a new intellectual administrative class. The New Deal also marked a change from Republican ascendancy, based on class alliance between government and business, to a Democratic coalition. It showed not only the shift of

³⁴Harry J. Carman, Harold C. Syrett and Bernard W. Wishy, *A History of the American People*, Vol. II, New York, 1967, pp. 530-36; John D. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, New York, 1960, pp. 50-53, 233-37, 279; Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933*, Lexington, Ky., 1971, Passim.

³⁵Basil Rauch, *The History of the New Deal 1933-1938*, New York, 1963; Archur M. Johnson, "Continuity and Change in Government Business Relations" in John Braeman et. al., edited, *Change and Continuity in Twentieth Century America*, Columbus, Ohio, 1964, pp. 219-23; Joseph Pusateri, "A Study in Misunderstanding: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Business Community", *Social Studies*, Vol. 60, October 1969, pp. 204-11.

normal majority status from one party to another but also emergence of interest groups of farmers, industrial workers and ethnic groups which had largely remained outside the power complex. The New Deal era also saw rise of women as force in society and politics in organised form. The New Deal built up, what subsequently came to be described as countervailing power of unorganised groups by John Galbraith and others.³⁶ The New Deal era witnessed a growing conflict between the radicals and conservative elites. The radicals or old left called the New Deal disappointing and insisted that its performance would have been better. The conservative called it socialist and condemned it for going too far. The American Liberty League, the Committee for Constitutional Government, Shilver Shirts, the Black Legion and the Christian Americans launched united opposition to the New Deal. The conflict enabled Roosevelt to follow a middle of the road policy. A recent study by Charles G. Alexander held that American people were betrayed by a selfish and irresponsible elite. They supported democracy but did not evolve a new economic strategy.³⁷

Thus, by the time of the World War II, various patterns of elite emerged in American Society. Intellectual elite developed repeatedly their own approach to social and political problems at each stage of the development of American culture. The trend partly confirmed the theory of circulation of elite advocated by Vilfredo Pareto. The revitalisation of elite during the decades following the World War II was based on continuity rather than radical change. During the early period, political and economic elite constituted the ruling elite. Now the Corporate men and military are in top position because of decline of professional politician and absence of a cohesive and integrated bureaucracy. In order to understand the new dimension of American elite, let us first look at the new trend of intellectual elite.

INTELLECTUAL ELITE

No institution in the world can escape constant appraisal of intellectuals. American social and political institutions have been objects of constant comment by the intellectuals. According to Charles Kadushin, a sociologist of Columbia University, the intellectuals are seldom in control of anything, but they are influential since their writings affect the thinking of those who are in authority. The American elites are united not by common origin but by powerful consciousness of kind. Their

³⁶Willion E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932-1940*, New York, 1963, pp. 64, 253-54, 347.

³⁷Otes Graham Jr. (ed.), *The New Deal: The Critical Issues*, Boston 1971, pp. 190-200; Charles G. Alexander, *Nationalism in Economic Thought, 1930-1945*, Chicago, 1969.

spiritual ancestors are the same, they have attended the same universities and they know one another through personal contacts at upper level of the group and through reading approved journals and newspapers at the lower level. They shared same values and are inspired by a sense of righteousness. The most basic value is the conviction that the articulation of ideas is the most dignified form of human activity, and closely related is the notion that those whose role it is in society to articulate ideas, are not only the most superior members of that society but the only ones qualified to run it. They have the capacity to make factual analysis of issues facing the nation and arouse the concern over anomalies and discrimination. In order to remove injustice and inequality, they rally against the system or power elite or the establishment. Like all ethnic groups, the intellectual elite realises that to some extent it is separated from and threatened by the rest of the society. Intellectuals are found in occupations, such as teaching, journalism, law and religion.³⁸ Their concern for ideas and dedication to certain basic commitments in recent period revealed the working of the same process as had been evident during the early period. The decades following the World War II saw bitter conflict between the radicals and conservative intellectuals. The basic features of American liberal democracy and social structure have been under heavy attack both from the left and the right.

The fifties witnessed rise of wave of conformity and conservatism led by Joseph R. McCarthy. His campaign of 'Red Hunting' reminded the people of the 'Red Hysteria' of the twenties and anti-intellectual tradition of the earlier decades. The radical right opposed liberalism, internationalism and welfare programmes. The conservatives of the South resisted school desegregation and supported the white citizens council organised to oppose the decisions of the Supreme Court against racial discrimination and violation of the Civil Liberties. Conservative intellectuals helped in inflating the records of McCarthy appeal and all that he represented. Historians stressed consensus and continuity of American development and brushed aside conflict and divisive ideologies. Political scientists and sociologists emphasised a broad elite consensus on cold war foreign policies, which was based on shared perception of conservatives and liberals.³⁹ Great majority of intellectuals supported Korean war. Sociologists like Seymour Lipset, Raymond Aron, Edward Shils, and Daniel Bell announced the end of conflict between capitalism

³⁸Charles Kadushin, "How and Where to find the Intellectual Elite in the United States", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 35, Spring 1971, pp. 1-18; Andrew M. Greeley, "Intellectuals as an Ethnic Group", *New York Times Magazine*, July 12, 1970.

³⁹Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy*, New York, 1967; Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression*, New York, 1971, pp. 55-70, 92-97; Thomas J. Conway, "Intellectuals and Foreign Policy During the Cold war" in Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite*, Boston, 1974, pp. 97-120.

and socialism and emergence of the concept of mixed economy. Talcott Parsons proclaimed the rise of welfare capitalism as symbol of new distribution of power in American society. On the other hand, Irving Horowitz, Alvin W. Gouldner, Kenneth Kenistan, Stephen Rousseas and James Farganis challenged the concept of end of ideology.⁴⁰ A few radicals, however, attacked the denial of civil liberties and trend towards conformity. They also opposed war and launched peace movement. Though in minority, they offered a viable intellectual alternative to American foreign policy of the time. The attack of conservative groups, like American Legion, Daughters of American Revolution and press, forced the pacifist to retreat.⁴¹ The Sixties, again, saw a new pattern of resurgence of radical and conservative elite. The New Left, as the radicals of the period came to be called, were not just manifestation of the earlier decade. They stood in opposition not to particular injustice but against the whole sweep of American experience, including its moral cores, liberal democracy and political procedure. They emphasised non-economic issues, supported movement for civil liberties for minority groups and women, opposed Vietnam war and displayed hostility to new power elite. Their endeavours aimed at social change and revolution.⁴² The New Left from its birth began to inquire into the nature of society. Building its base on non-violent techniques of civil rights movement, developing in the Mississippi Summer Project of 1964 and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, the New Left gathered great momentum in its opposition to the Vietnam War. Soon New Left was in the vanguard of social discontent.⁴³ Social scientists belonging to the New Left began to provide a radical interpretation of American history, culture, society and political system. They emphasised conflict rather than consensus and described American life from economic point of view. The radical economists attacked poverty, pollution, monopoly, inflation and irrational resource allocation.⁴⁴ Intellectual elite led attack on Vietnam

⁴⁰Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, New York, 1960, pp. 20-36; Edward Shils, "The End of Ideology", *Encounter*, Vol. 5, November 1955, pp. 52-58; Raymond Aron, *The End of the Ideological Age in The Industrial Society*, New York, 1975, pp. 27-47; Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology*, New York, 1960; Talcott Parson, "The Distribution of Power in America", *World Politics*, Vol. 10, October 1957, pp. 128-30; George Kouvetaris and Betty Dobratz, *Political Sociology*, New Brunswick, 1980, p. 47.

⁴¹Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against the War: The American Peace Movement 1941-1960*, New York, 1969, pp. 228-39.

⁴²Christopher Bone, *The Disinterested Children: A Study of New Left and the Generation Gap*, New York, 1975; "Protest in the Sixties", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 382, March 1969. This volume contained a collection of theory and research on the social movement of the sixties.

⁴³Paul D. Knott, *Student Activism*, Dubuque, Iowa, 1971; *Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest*, New York, 1971.

⁴⁴Bernard Sternsher, *Consensus Conflict and American Historians*, Bloomington, 1975, pp. 288-90.

policies and, in a variety of ways, created conditions favourable to the emergence of a major anti-war and social protest movement. The Survey of elite criticism appearing in the *New York Times* revealed that elites began publicly criticising Vietnam policies at least two years prior to the first major demonstration of April 1965. An appraisal by Kadushin showed that majority of elite were opposed to Vietnam war by early 1965. The same study also indicated that by April 1967, almost ninety per cent of American intellectuals were critical of the policies related to the Vietnam.⁴⁵ During the administration of John F. Kennedy there was a strong consensus among American elites on the need of American military involvement to prevent communist take over in South Vietnam. The intellectuals, like John Kenneth Galbraith and Theodore Sorenson, who became critics of American escalation of war, were silent during Kennedy administration. It was during Johnson administration that the intellectuals became forceful in their criticism against the war. Journalists Joseph Kraft, David Halberstam and Bernard Fall, Hans Margenthau, Senator William Fulbright were among those who criticised Johnson Administration for keeping the public in dark and not allowing Vietnam policies to be debated in the Congress. Theologians James Pike, Reinhold Neibuhr and Edwin T. Dahlberg criticised the immorality of American policy. Both Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy broke with the Johnson Administration on Vietnam policies and called for negotiation. The writings of radical elite intellectuals, like C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse, Norman Thomas, A. Williams Paul Goodman and I.F. Stone influenced the thinking of other intellectual elite and small groups of students that made up New Left and provided respectability to dissent against official policies. According to Michael G. Burton, the disunity among American elite on Vietnam war led to anti-war movement and radical protest movement throughout the country. The war produced relatively intense elite conflict as a reflection of the protest movement of the period. A more direct example of linkages between the elite dissent and mass protest was the 'Teach-In' movement which began in March 1965 at the University of Michigan soon after Johnson's order of sustained bombing of North Vietnam. The high point of the Teach-In movement was the "National Teach-In" which was organised by the Michigan group and held in Washington DC in May 1965. Thus, a number of elite were directly involved in encouraging, organising, sponsoring and leading anti-war demonstrations. They also articulated all major rationale for opposing war and launching protest movement against various social and political inequality, discrimination and exploita-

⁴⁵Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite*, op. cit., pp. 130-33; *The New York Times*, April 26, June 4, 1967.

tion.⁴⁶

The protest movement of the contemporary period was closely aligned with the anti-war movement. In 1960s America experienced the shock of what Sociologist Herbert J. Gans called the equality revolution. From the black ghettos of Newark and Detroit to the Mexican American barrios of the Southwest, from the demonstration of women liberation group at the Atlantic City Miss America Contest to the parade of the Gay Liberation Movement down New York's Sixth Avenue, from cries of student power on college campuses, to policemen demanding recognition as professionals, from American Indians objecting to the policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to Italian Americans organizing to end stereotyped treatment in the mass media, the sixties was alive with protest against discrimination, inequality and limited privileges and opportunities.⁴⁷ The bloody uprising in black ghettos during 1968 was an outgrowth of American ideas of individualism and myth of American dream. Black power and black nationalism were advocated by Stokely Carmichael, Marcus Gravey, Elijah Mohammed and El-Haji Malik El-Shabazz (Malcolm X) as militant forms of black consciousness and solidarity. Black intellectuals began to explore the roots of their cultural heritage.⁴⁸ The cultural discrimination against the Mexican American in 1968 gave rise to the cry for the Brown Power.⁴⁹ American women began to protest against oppressive machinery of social and political structure through the National Organisation of Women as well as radical groups like Women's Radical Action Project. The radical members of Women Liberation Movement became ardent New Leftists, who began to see liberation of women as merely one aspect of total revolution in the society.⁵⁰ The student for Democratic Society provided a focus for youth discontent, anti-war protest and promotion of hippie youth culture. The American Indians, the advocates of Gay Power, autonomy for neighbourhood conservation of environment soon joined the ferment for

⁴⁶Sandy Vogelgesang, *The Long Dark Night of the Soul: The American Intellectual Elite and the Vietnam War*, New York, 1974; Hans Morgenthau, "Truth and Power: The Intellectuals and the Johnson Administration", *The New Republic*, November 26, 1968, pp. 8-14.

⁴⁷Herbert J. Gans, "The Equality Revolution", *The New York Times Magazine*, November 3, 1968, p. 36.

⁴⁸Lewis M. Killan, *The Impossible Revolution: Black Power and the American Dream*, New York, 1969; Eric Foner, "In Search of Black History", *The New York Times Review of Books*, October 2, 1970.

⁴⁹Julian Samora (ed.), *La Raza: Forgotten Americans*, South Berd, Indiana, 1968.

⁵⁰Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, *Rebirth of Feminism*, New York, 1971; Maren Lockwood Garden, *The New Feminist Movement*, New York, 1974,

reform.⁵¹ These movements for social change were either results of or reaction to anti-war movement. The eruption of protest against discrimination was a result of social pressures that had been building throughout the nation for years. The Vietnam war produced a crisis in national leadership, pointed up problems of nation's condition. The tactics and rhetorics of anti-war movement and the civil right movement influenced a wide variety of discontented groups. The New Left concern for social change provided ideological support to this movement. Many social scientists analysed the phenomenon in various ways. B. Whyatt Brown compared the radical movement of the sixties to the abolitionist of the early nineteenth century. Robert L. Beisner highlighted the similarity between the anti-imperialist movement of 1898 and 1968. Howard Zinn found resemblance between the New Left and the radicals of the thirties. William Lee Miller, also explored the roots of contemporary social protest in the twenties and the base of its economic and political manifestations in the thirties.⁵² The emergence of the New Left has been analysed in a variety of ways. Abbie Hoffman, Staughton Lynd, Christopher Bone, and Carl Oblesby are sympathetic to the New Left. Levis Feuer, Stephen Kelman, Willian Gerberding and Daune E. Smith are highly critical of the radical left. Michell Cohen and Dennis Hale as well as Irwin Unger gave a neutral interpretation of the revolutionary New Left.⁵³

By 1970, some intellectuals started talking about a coming revolution. Charles Reigh, in his controversial best seller, *The Greening of America* (1970), wrote that the coming revolution would not be like revolutions of the past. It would originate with the individual and with culture and it would change the political culture only as its final act.⁵⁴ Philip Slater, while analysing chief characteristics of the old and new culture, declared "the new culure is not blindly reactive, but embodies a sociological consciousness. In this consciousness lies the key insight that possession actually generates scarcity".⁵⁵ Slater stresses the shift from a conscious-

⁵¹Seymour M. Lipset, *Rebellion in the University*, Boston 1969; Richard G. Braugart and Margaret M. Braungart, "Protest Attitudes Among College Youth: A U.S. Case Study", *Youth and Society*, Vol. 6, December 1974, pp. 219-48.

⁵²John R. Howard (ed.), *The Cutting Edge: Social Movements and Social Change in America*, Philadelphia, 1974; B. Whyatt Brown, "New Leftists and Abolitionists: A Comparison of American Radical Style", *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Summer, 1970; Robert Beisner, "1898 and 1968: Anti-Imperialists and Dories", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 85, June 1970, pp. 187-207; Howard Zinn, "A Comparison of the Militant Left of the Thirties and Sixties", in Le Roy Ashby and Bruce M. Stave (ed.), *The Distontended Society: Interpretations of Twentieth Century American Protest*, Chicago, 1972, pp. 279-88; William Lee Miller, "The New Anti-Americanism of the 1960's", *The Center Magazine*, September 1969.

⁵³Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, *Sociology*, New York, 1976, p. 284.

⁵⁴Charles A Reich, *The Greening of America*, New York, 1970, pp. 96-110, 201-50.

⁵⁵Philip Salter, *The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point*, New York, 1970, pp. 106-18.

ness predicted upon scarcity to one based upon affluence. Peter L. Berger and Brigitte Berger criticised the concept of green revolution in their thought provoking article entitled "Blueing of America" published in the *New Republic* in April 1971. They argued that, like the red and black revolutions, the idea of green revolution displayed a disregard for the realities of technological society and for the realities of a class and power in America. Green revolution or counter culture would accelerate social mobility in America giving new opportunities for upward movement of lower middle class and working class people and in the process would change the ethnic and religious composition of the higher classes and elite. But the process, they contended, would strengthen rather than challenge the technological society against which it was directed and would further the interests of precisely those social strata that were least touched by transformation of consciousness. They argued that the system, the class and occupational structure of the society will not change as a result of greening of America. It will simply draw its personnel from new sources in a Paretian circulation of elites. From greening America, there may be "the blueing of America".⁵⁶

The radicalism of contemporary America produced resistance among the conservatives known as radical right or New Right. The intellectual elite belonging to radical right seemed to be threatened by new changes during the decades following 1960. They began to assume that they were victims of status frustration.⁵⁷ Ira S. Rohter's empirical study, involving 169 individuals classified as rightists and 167 as non-rightists, to test this assumption showed that the radical right suffered from frustration and to compensate their loss of power and prestige launched a counter-attack on the liberal tendencies of contemporary America by expressing support to old fashioned policies, morals and values and intense opposition to social change, like integration, religious secularism, welfare, the United Nations, foreign aid, Supreme Court decisions and modern education. They identified themselves with the older tradition of protestant ethic, values of work, religion and morality so that their fight for status recognition becomes a crusade for truth, justice, decency, God and America. The data processed by Rohter showed that there were only ten per cent rightists in the highest occupations compared to twenty four per cent of non-rightists. The rightists were over-represented among lower middle class at a proportion of fifteen to four per cent. Rightists also tended to be older, average age being fifty four years compared to forty five for others. The radical rightists had low prestige white collar job or marginal independent business and they were less often an important part of modern industrial enterprise. Thus, Rohter

⁵⁶Peter L. Berger and Brigitte Berger, "The Blueing of America", *The New Republic*, April 3, 1971, pp. 20-23.

⁵⁷Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right: The New American Right*, New York, 1963,

found rightists close minded, insecure, authoritarian persons undergoing particular kind of status crises.⁵⁸ Samuel P. Hays examined the Columbia University strike of 1968 in terms of ideological battleground for right and left and concluded that the perception of right remained basically unchanged but the left has been undergoing considerable ferment and generated more variety in thought.⁵⁹ The radical right displayed extreme resistance to liberalism, internationalism, welfare programmes and school integration. Recently, they appeared slightly different from the previous radical right in being less pre-occupied with anti-Communism and favouring a thorough and consistent return to *laissez faire* economics and minimum Government activity.⁶⁰ The growing influence of George Wallace and Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan in contemporary America marked a significant phase in the changing dimension of radical right.⁶¹

The decline of radicalism had started by 1970. Peter F. Drucker on the basis of analysis, primarily of population dynamics and economic indicators, proclaimed the end of youth culture, a pre-occupation with economic matters and described the Seventies a "traditional old fashioned decade."⁶² As the decade of the 1970s began, Bernard Crick announced the breakdown of liberal unity in America. In foreign affairs, there was abandonment of Idea of victory. In economic matters, there was doubt about the myth of indefinite expansion. In politics, there was the failure of the party to deal effectively with race relations, poverty, and law and order. As unity gave way to disunity, the anti-war movements on the campuses revealed empirical intensity in hitherto, intellectual concepts like 'anomie' and 'alienation'. Crick's formula stresses stability, which rests upon effective government, which in turn, derives from 'hard pluralism'. He attributed the failure of radicalism to the demand of articulate minorities to compromise with majority, to new adjustment and Richard Nixon's acceptance of co-existence. The defeat of Goldwater, the drawing back of the student militants and the emergence of a programmatic literature of reform, which considers various policy alternatives and does not call for absolute commitment, all are encouraging indicators of progress in that they represent avoidance of extremes. The theory of consensus as necessary social cement

⁵⁸Ira S. Rohter, "The Righteous Right", *Trans-Action*, May 1967, pp. 27-35.

⁵⁹Samuel P. Hays, "Right Face, Left Face: The Columbia Strike", *The Political Science Quarterly*, June, Vol. 84, 1969, pp. 311-27.

⁶⁰Seymour M. Lipset, "George Wallace and the U.S. New Right", *New Society*, Vol. 12, October 1968, pp. 477-82; Stan Lehr and Louis Rossetto Jr., "The New Right Credo Libertarianism", *New York Times Magazine*, January 10, 1971, pp. 24-26.

⁶¹U.R. Holste and James N. Rosenau, *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus*, New York, 1984, pp. 206-65.

⁶²Peter F. Drucker, "The Surprising Seventies", *Harper's Magazine*, July 1971, pp. 35-39.

is beginning to be abandoned. Crick believes that Americans are discovering a hard and sensible, not amorphous sense of pluralism.⁶³ Stephen Kelman held growing and ruthless intolerance of the New Left responsible for its demise. James O'Brien and Dale Stone showed that SDS drifted into control by an elitist hierarchy. It was weakened by male chauvinism, its narrow middle class base, its lack of a coherent long-range programme and its naive activism which quickly reverted to a defeatist cynicism. It soon dissolved into warring factions and lost much of its following.⁶⁴ As student movement was the pivot round which other reforms revolved, its disruption paved the way for the decline of the radical spirit among American intellectuals. The growth of upper class Negroes with elitist tendencies weakened the radicalism among the Afro-Americans. A realisation that there is crack in the myth of melting pot and that ethnic cultural enclaves are beyond melting pot and that there may be behavioural not structural assimilation caused breakdown of consensus and articulated forces of pluralism based on union not unity. The radical aspect of women liberation movement also lost its force in recent years. All these changes removed the sharp edge out of the ferment for radicalism as interpreted by Howard and others.⁶⁵ William Gerberding and Duane Smith as well as Lewis Feuer criticised basic weaknesses of radical intellectuals and their basic contradictions and their abuse of discontent.⁶⁶ Andrew Greeley also demonstrated basic inconsistency in the approach of radical intellectuals. He ascribed lack of support of middle class to intellectual's endorsement of radical social reform like school busing, militant minorities or the black and youthful population and their denunciation of the middle class. He denounced radical intellectual elite and noted:

Historians of the future may look on the 1960s as a time not when middle America deserted the intellectual ethnic group, but rather as a time when the intellectual ethnic group deliberately turned its back on

⁶³Bernard Crick, "The Strange Death of the American Theory of Consensus", *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 43, January-March, 1972, pp. 46-51.

⁶⁴Stephen Kelman, *Push Comes to Shove: The Escalation of the Student*, Boston, 1970; James O'Brien, "Beyond Reminiscence: The New Left in History", *Radical America*, Vol. 6, July 1972, pp. 11-48; Dale Stone, "SDS and the Iron Law of Oligarchy", *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8, Spring 1972, pp. 59-64.

⁶⁵John C. Howard, *The Cutting Edge: Social Movement and Social Change in America*, Chapter II; Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond Melting Pot*, Cambridge Mass, 1965; Melvin Steinfeld, *Cracks in the Melting Pot*, New York, 1970; Perry L. Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics*, New York, 1973; *Time*, March 10, 1975, pp. 77.

⁶⁶William Gerberding and Duane F. Smith, *The Radical Left, The Abuse of Discontent*, Boston, 1970; Lewis S. Feuer, *The Conflict of Generation*, New York, 1968.

mass population support and began flirtation with radical groups whose ability to bring about social change was dubious, but whose moral rectitude at least from the intellectual elite's view point was beyond question.⁶⁷

According to Greeley American intellectuals are profoundly frustrated by the ambiguities, injustices and seemingly disastrous trends afflicting American society. Greeley also alluded to the cry of the intellectuals of coming revolution and said that revolution must have support of the majority of the population but only a tiny majority of the nation supports either protest of the students or the women's movement and only a minority of the blacks support the most militant kind of black protests. He laments the alienation of the intellectuals from the rest of society for reasons of presumed moral superiority or ignorance of what is going on in the rest of the country as a tragedy, both for them and for the whole country. The New Left was driven into retreat by the silent majority. According to one survey, claimed Greeley, only ten per cent of the country approved of the New Left which was denial of their emphasis on power to the people.⁶⁸ Stanley Diamond and Edward Nell analysed the basic division within University faculties on matters of protest and declared that this disunity among the intellectual elite paved the way for their decline.⁶⁹ Charles Kadushin, on the basis of empirical study of seventynine important intellectuals, who contributed to twenty five important journals from 1964 to 1965, indicated that though they belonged to left liberal group, they were unsympathetic to the New Left, to counter-culture and student rebels. These intellectuals were not radicalised by the Vietnam war, they opposed war because it did not work. They had moral commitment to collective security. Kadushin finally concluded that the intellectuals of 1960s missed a great opportunity to transform America.⁷⁰ By 1980s counter-culture has not much of its following. The campus is relatively quiet. The young graduates are looking for jobs in business organisations, like Dow Chemicals, which were once demons of the New Left. The radicalism is not dead. It moved to faculty offices of major universities. Most of the former radical activists are now working in schools, social agencies and corporate offices. They still remain liberal to radical in their attitudes. According to James M. Fendrick and A.T. Tarleau, they remain potential recruits for another round of radical activism when

⁶⁷Andrew M. Greeley, "Intellectual as an Ethnic Group", *The New York Times Magazine*, July 12, 1970.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹Stanley Diamond and Edward Nell, "The Old School at the New School", *The New York Review of Books*, June 18, 1970, pp. 38-43.

⁷⁰Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite*, pp. 140-95, 201-30,

conditions are favourable. A current study by Wini Breines has shown that the social protest movement of the sixties led to revitalisation of American intellectual life after the doldrum of the earlier decade.⁷¹

Thus, the intellectual elite emerged as a formidable force in the social and political life of America during contemporary period. The decade following 1980 has been witnessing a process of new formulation and perception of elite.

POWER ELITE

The power elite, according to C. Wright Mills, is composed of men whose positions enable them to make decisions having major consequences. They are in command of the major hierarchies and organisations of modern state. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the State and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. The power elite are not solitary rulers. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle level of power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper class of town, city and regions.⁷² Mills used the term power elite in preference to ruling class or political elite or governing elite because he considered this definition more precise and comprehensive. He asserts that power elite is composed of political, economic and military men. He attributed consensus in America to manipulation by single power elite. His concept of power elite emphasises the unity and homogeneity of the ruling class. He sees power elite not only in terms of wealth, status and prestige but relatively more in terms of institutions and institutionalised power.⁷³ According to Mills, the power elite is not an aristocracy. It is not a political ruling class based upon a nobility or hereditary origin. It, however, derives in substantial proportion from the upper class, both from new and old, of local society, from the metropolitan 400 and from, at most, the upper third of the income and occupational pyramids. Their fathers were at least of the professional and business class. They are native born Americans of native parents, primarily from urban areas, and they come mostly from the East. They are mainly protestants, especially Episcopalian or Presbyterians. The general similar social origin of the power elite is carried further by their increasingly common educational background. A substantial proportion of them have attended Ivy League Colleges,

⁷¹James M. Fendrick and Alison T. Tarleau, "Marching to Different Drummer: Occupational and Political Correlates of Former Student Activist", *Social Forces*, Vol. 52, December, 1973, pp. 245-52; Wini Breines, *Community and Organisation in the New Left 1962-1968: The Great Refusal*, New York, 1982, pp. 100-75, 220-45.

⁷²C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, Fair Lawn, N.J., 1956, pp. 3-4.

⁷³*Ibid.*, pp. 274-97.

although the education of the higher military leaders, of course, differs from that of other members of the power elite. The unity of power elite is reinforced not only by common social and educational background but also by psychological affinities, common interest, interchange of personnel and through personal friendship in trade and professional associations and various sub-committees, prestige clubs, political affiliation and customer relationship. Those engaged in behind the scene operations, like the corporation lawyers and investment brokers and those engaged in advisory and liaison work form 'invisible elite'. Mills considered the coming together of the politicians, the corporate rich and the ascendant military as the power elite 'as part of the transformation of American public into a mass society'.⁷⁴

This theory of power elite was similar to Floyd Hunter's concept. Hunter tried to show that major decisions in a community are made by an invisible power elite that stands apart from institutional governmental structure. If the political leaders want to accomplish something, they must have the support of community power system which tended to be dominated by an economic elite, mostly corporation executive and bankers, who by informal communication and because of a similar point of view agree on the major decisions affecting the lives of the members of the community. The top of the social structure is in the hands of the community economic elite which exercises power because of the control of the community's economic resources.⁷⁵ In his analysis of top leadership, Hunter extended this view to the entire United States starting with the assumption that the most influential men in national policy making are industrialists living in large cities, who are able to finance the lobbying necessary to influence legislation. Hunter based his findings on the analysis of the hundred and six organisations and officials. His sample was based on lists supplied by the management personnel of national organisations. Hunter concluded that the government is dominated by the economic elite who see government as an instrument of extending their privileges and executing their wishes.⁷⁶ Raymond Aron also considered the single ruling class exercising dominant power in society.⁷⁷

Therefore, according to Mills, Hunter and Raymond Aron, a single dominating power elite exercises control over decision-making process. Charles Anderson, in his *The Political Economy of Social Class*, showed that top level academics, generals, government officials and corporation

⁷⁴C. Wright Mills, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953.

⁷⁶Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959.

⁷⁷Raymond Aron, "Social Class, Political Class, Ruling Class", *European Journal of Sociology*, March 1960, pp. 260-81.

executives dominate the society on behalf of big business.⁷⁸ Similar views were expressed by others. James F. Burnham as early as 1941 had referred to the managerial revolution upon which subsequent theory of C. Wright Mills was based.⁷⁹ William G. Domhoff, in his analysis of ruling elite and the higher circles as late as 1967, confirmed the basic assumption of Burnham and Mills. Domhoff, by using new empirical reformation and documents, illustrates the power of big business ruling class. He places his study within larger national corporate power structure framework to suggest that the upper class is cohesive and their ideas and norms are related to business sector. He located close co-operation between corporate elite and the government.⁸⁰

However, many social scientists do not agree to the view of monopoly of a ruling class. John K. Galbraith, in his appraisal of American capitalism and the concept of countervailing power, accepted the fact that in the United States individual was replaced by corporations but, when power was concentrated in one large form in the big corporation, this necessarily produced countervailing power or natural interest groups to balance capitalism.⁸¹ Arnold M. Rose in his study of power structure observed that there are a number of elites with its own sphere of power. Different political parties balance one another and one set of ruling elite can be overturned by another set in the election. In essence, Rose argues, in the United States elites interact but the political elite dominates and this prevents the centralisation of power in one party or group. He asserts that with the ascendancy of the Federal Government over states and local Government and the increasing power of the President over the Congress, the influence of the economic elite is on decline.⁸² One can see any monopoly of power in American society. Similar view had been expressed by Leonard Reissman. Leonard Reissman argued that there is no dominant power elite and that the elite shifts with the issues. Power is dispensed among associations referred to as 'veto groups'.⁸³ William Kornhauser also expressed the same views and propounded the theory of veto groups.⁸⁴ Recent researches in the

⁷⁸Charles H. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Social Class*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974.

⁷⁹James F. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York, 1941.

⁸⁰William G. Domhoff, *Who Rules America*, Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1967.

⁸¹Daniel Bell, "The Power Elite—Reconsidered", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 6, November 1958, pp. 238-50; John Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, Boston, 1952, pp. 50-75, 80-95.

⁸²Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society*, New York, 1967.

⁸³Leonard Reissman, "Review of C.W. Right Mills' The Power Elite", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, August, 1956, pp. 513-14.

⁸⁴William Kornhauser, "Power Elite" or "Veto Groups" in Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (eds.), *Culture and Social Character*, New York, 1961.

community power structure have shown that a small number of groups have greater powers in decision-making within a community. Powers appear to be exercised through determining the policies of community organization. Though the top leadership of the community determine whether any given project, which will receive the support of the community, they have to depend upon the support of different groups in the community for successful implementation of a particular project. Community influentials appear to be more powerful in some areas while in others they become ineffective. Organised groups appear to be powerful when their aims are supported by community elite. The major source of power elite in the community is the support of people. Mass opposition frequently makes elite leadership ineffective. Michael Aiker and Paul E. Mott have shown that through demonstration, boycott and block voting, the poor can exercise veto power. They believed that the poor can achieve power and prevent exploitation, formulate positive programmes for their own welfare and replace a helpless apathy with a sense of being able to control their environment. However, some studies have demonstrated that the poor can be saved better by organisations which included members of all classes than by organisations of their own. Sometimes, alliance among different organisations can prevent positive action. The socialized-medicine controversies of recent years have found the American Medical Associations allied with the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation and many other organisations in opposing certain medical care proposals while many labour unions, public health and welfare organisations, and social work organisations have been united in support. The community elite are helpless unless organised groups are firmly in agreement.⁸⁵ Such studies have sought to prove that power is diffused among many groups.

The pluralists reject the idea that there is any one cohesive and homogeneous group controlling American life. Like Arnold Rose, Robert Dahl and David Truman, who emphasise role of various segments of social structure in the exercise of political power. Political institutions provide opportunities to veto, modify or delay passage or enforcement of policies that would entail comprehensive change. Americans respond to severe conflict in three ways—by forming new political coalition, by incremental measures to postpone change and by enduring compromise that would remove issues from serious political conflict. Aileen Kraditor has combined the approaches of advocates of a single unified ruling class and proponents of ideas of the power of

⁸⁵Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott, *The Structure of Community Power*, New York, 1970; Joseph Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organisations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 39, August 1974, pp. 475-91.

masses and looked at power resulting from elite manipulation and interest of mass.⁸⁶ A recent study by Robert Presthus on the role of elites in the process of policy making showed that interest groups are integral part of policy making and policy administering process. In this empirical, explanatory and tentative analysis, Presthus sought to delineate and determine the social background and political values of government elites. He based his research on interviews with 1404 directors of interest groups, 518 legislators and 472 bureaucrats of the United States and Canada. As a result of this empirical analysis, Presthus came to the conclusion that the organised interest groups are engaged in sustained consultation with senior bureaucrats and legislators providing them information on group needs and technical problems relating to their occupation, trade and industry. Such power elites are integral part of policy making process in the United States, whereas in Canada, Civil Service monopolises these processes. This showed a great deal of difference between American and Canadian power elites. This distinction was based on the difference of economic, social and political structures of the two countries of North America. Such elites in the United States are greatly homogeneous because most of them are highly educated and have career in high prestige occupation. There is a high elite consciousness among the members of this group. Their influence in the policy making and administering process is innovative rather than *status quo* oriented. Politicians respond not to the ideology of this group but to their piecemeal influence on public spending, regulation and other economic needs.⁸⁷ Thus, according to pluralists, a variety of different groups compete and share power. Major policy decisions, therefore, are the results of compromise, competing influences, and the force of circumstances.

Apart from the theory of single power elite and pluralist theory of diverse and competing interests, another school of sociological thought propounded by the right wingers see the power elite as radical intellectuals who have influenced the government, the schools and the communication media. According to this interpretation, the radical intellectuals by their control of the press, radio and television, determine the information which reaches the people. Likewise, by occupying key government posts, they make the decisions which sell out American

⁸⁶Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy and the United States: Conflict and Consent*, New York, 1967, pp. 99-103; James P. Young (ed.), *Consensus and Conflict: Readings in American Politics*, New York, 1972, pp. 2-10; Aileen Kraditor, "American Radical Historian on Their Heritage", *Past and Present: A Journal of Historical Studies*, Vol. 56, August 1972, pp. 139-53; David Truman, *The Governmental Process*, New York, 1960.

⁸⁷Robert Presthus, *Elites in the Policy Process*, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, pp. 49-80, 89-102.

individualism to leftist internationalism. They are held responsible for loss of China to the communists, for the doubling of welfare programme and for the judicial decisions increasing the rights of alleged criminals against the police and involving school desegregation and school busing.⁸⁸

The preceding appraisal of power elite in contemporary American society demonstrates that there has not been a uniformity of views with regard to components and nature of the ruling class. In spite of conflicting approaches of different schools of sociological thought on elites, it can be safely concluded that American society is largely controlled by highly organised groups dominated by an elite leadership.⁸⁹

In order to arrive at a comprehensive conclusion about power elite, it becomes necessary to analyse its various components keeping in view the findings of numerous conceptual and empirical researches.

POLITICAL ELITES

Political elites form an important component of American political structure. An analysis of political elites without discussion of empirical studies would not be adequate. Many social scientists have analysed social origin of members of the political elites. Beth Mintz examined the social composition of members of the Cabinet of the United States from 1897 to 1972 and found that ninety per cent of all Cabinet officials were either members of social or business elites. Over half of them belonged to both groups. Eighty per cent of them were Protestants. Almost half of them were Episcopalian or Presbyterians, while only over six per cent of the general population belonged to these denominations.⁹⁰

Richard Zweigenhaft also provides evidence of ruling class dominance of the American Government. He asserts that the socio-economic composition of Congress has changed very little in the last thirty years. His findings indicate that the members of Congress are mostly from white upper middle and upper class background and often were previously businessmen and lawyers.⁹¹

Michael Merlie and Edward Silva studied the class composition and family connections of American Presidents and found that a good

⁸⁸William S. Mcbirnie, *Who Really Rules America: A Study of the Power Elite*, Glendale, California, 1968, pp. 60-85, 100-30; Edith Efron, *The New Twisters*, Los Angeles, 1971; Patrick Buchanan, "Reflection on 74: Power of the Press and the Departing Star", *TV Guide*, January 11, 1975, pp. 5-6.

⁸⁹Paul B. Harton and Chester L. Hunt, *Sociology*, p. 327.

⁹⁰Beth Mintz, "The President's Cabinet 1897-1972: A Contribution to Power Structure Debate", *The Insurgent Sociologists*, Vol. 5, Spring 1975, pp. 131-40.

⁹¹Richard Zweigenhaft, "Who Represents America", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Spring 1975, pp. 119-30.

number of them were related with upper class Presidents and they, in turn, were likely to be related to each other. Upper class was over-represented among the relatives of Presidents. The dominance of Upper class in the White House was bound to have beneficial implications for those belonging to upper strata of society and business groups having wide social connections at the upper level of the society. Thomas R. Dye in his evaluation of institutional leadership in the United States showed that the high percentage of elites with upper class background belonged to ruling class. Their proportion was 30 per cent compared to one per cent of their population. Most of the rest were middle class with only three per cent of lower middle class or below. The top level of ruling elite were well-educated male with urdan background.⁹² Such empirical studies demonstrated the dominance of elite in the political life of America.

The structure of American political system has also enabled the political life to be dominated by elite. The contemporary decline and disruption of party organisations, erosion of Congressional control over public policies, rapid growth of executive leadership and its influence on decision-making process have tilted the balance of power in favour of the executive branch of American Government. The tremendous increase of power of the Federal Government with new responsibility for domestic prosperity, social justice and national security reinforced the national leadership with wide options and prerogatives.⁹³ The executive branch of government based on bureaucracy with close alliance with corporations determines the policy. The dominance of elite in such power structure is ensured by peculiarities of American political system. Walter Adams and Horace Gray contended that governmental measures enhanced both horizontal and vertical concentration of power.⁹⁴ Various bureaucratic organisations and federal agencies promoted special interests rather than general interests.⁹⁵ It is said that any President, who wants to run a prosperous country, depends upon corporation at least as much as or probably more than the corporation depends upon him. Hence, Nicos Poulantzas and G. Therborn look at state as the instrument of control by the dominant class

⁹²Michael Merlie and Edward Silva, "The First Family: Presidential Kinship and its Theoretical Implications", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 5, Spring 1975, pp. 159-70.

⁹³William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation*, New York, 1970.

⁹⁴Walter Adams and Horace Gray, *Monopoly in America: Government as Promoter*, New York, 1955.

⁹⁵Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government 1964-1970", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, September 1974, pp. 951-72.

which influences the system for the benefits of special class.⁹⁶ Some social scientists argue that American legal system primarily operates to promote the interest of power elite. Lawyers with their big legal firms largely survive because of big corporations and act as invisible power elite. Both the Republican and the Democratic Party differ little on major national and international issues and are dominated by the upper class. The Republican Party is pro-business and is supported by upper class which favour *status quo*. The Democratic party also cannot afford to be hostile to the interest of the elite and upper class, though it is supported by the racial and ethnic minorities.⁹⁷ Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie have contended that participation is powerful mechanism of control by citizens but how that mechanism works depends upon who participates. The political activities belonging to the upper class may be more influenced than others.⁹⁸ There is politics of limited choice because of absence of a third party at the national level. Robert Alford and Roger Friedland recognised the mobility of the electoral politics to represent the various cleavages in the community at least at the top level of structure of power which is concentrated in the hands of the wealthy.⁹⁹ To become elected official, money, influence, acquaintance and various resources are required. Candidates have to rely heavily on campaign contribution from corporate rich who gain control over the ruling elite. Hence, various studies have stressed the fact of over-representation of the upper class in the political process. The lower and lower middle classes participate less and when they do participate, they are less likely to be effective. The apathy of the white ethnic groups, the Negroes, and women to electoral politics facilitates the perpetuation and predominance of the elite. Consequently, the United States has one of the lowest rates of voting turnout. Andrew Greeley has shown the indifference of the white ethnic minorities to the political process. The elites of the society are also not willing to accept that these groups have made it. It appears that blacks have participated more actively in political process since the launching of the Civil Rights Movement but the extent of their voting participation in Congressional and Presidential elections still appears to be less than that of their white counterparts. The recent increase of political alienation among the blacks explains their distrust of government and rejection of

⁹⁶Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, London, 1973; G. Therborn, "What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules? Some Reflections on the Different Approaches to the Study of Power in Society", *Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 6, Spring 1976, pp. 3-16.

⁹⁷Richard Quinney, *The Social Reality of Crime*, Boston, 1979.

⁹⁸Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in American Political Democracy and Social Equality*, New York, 1972, pp. 195-235.

⁹⁹Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, "Political Participation and Public Policy" in Alex Inkeles (ed.), *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1975, pp. 429-79.

conventional mode of political participation. American women, inspite of their liberation movement, failed to turn the tide of American politics. They have mobilised and organised various reforms and took part in various organisations, but at the top level of decision-making, they have failed to capture power. The failure of equal right amendment supports this contention.¹⁰⁰ Thus, various studies support the view that the American political system is dominated by elite.

BUSINESS ELITE

In contemporary America, the technological and managerial revolution created modern corporations. The economy of America has been largely incorporated and corporate chiefs have accumulated wealth and captured power. The great American corporations seem more like states within states than simply private businesses. The corporate rich of modern America include those whose high income include privileges and prerogatives that have come to be the features of high executive position. The corporate rich, thus, includes members of big city rich of the great metropolitan 400, of the national rich who possesses the great American fortunes as well as chief executives of modern corporations. As men of status, they have secured their privileges and prerogatives in the most stable private institutions of American society. The distribution of income evidently proves the dominance of corporate rich.¹⁰¹ In 1949, there were 13,822 people who declared income of \$ 100,000 or more per year. C. Wright Mills fixed this figure to determine level of upper class or corporate rich. A study of American wealth in 1957 by *Fortune* magazine located 155 American worth fifty million or more and estimated that it failed to locate one hundred such rich in American society.¹⁰²

In his *The Higher Circles*, Domhoff asserts that upper class person is one whose parents, wife's parents, brothers, or sisters belonging to exclusive social club, attended private school and made \$100,000 or more as corporate executives, lawyers and propertied class.¹⁰³ In *Bohemian Grove and other Retreats*, Domhoff examines three resort areas which he contends provide major means by which ideas and norms of the ruling

¹⁰⁰Marvin E.O., "Social Participation and Voting Turnout", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 37, June 1972, pp. 317-33, Andrew M. Greeley, "Political Participation Among Ethnic Groups in the United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 80, July 1976, pp. 170-204; Wen H. Kuo, "Black Political Participation: A Reconsideration" in Kourvetaris and Dobratz (ed.), *Political Sociology*, pp. 167-82; Judith A. Leavitt, *American Women Managers and Administrators*, New York, 1985, pp. 295-310.

¹⁰¹C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, pp. 124-25, 148-49.

¹⁰²Richard Austin Smith, "The Fifty Million Dollars Man", *Fortune*, November 1957, pp. 176-78.

¹⁰³William G. Domhoff, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America*, New York, 1971.

class were related to the business class.¹⁰⁴ The managerial revolution has transformed the business management in a scientific way. Edward S. Herman noted increase in management from twenty three in 1900 to 25 per cent in 1970s. Thus, the typical great corporation is managed by a group of executives, who own a tiny fraction of the corporation's stock. While theoretically controlled by the stockholders, who elect them, the managers tend in practice to become a self-perpetuating group whose actual control is unchallenged by stockholders as long as the flow of dividends is uninterrupted. With few exceptions, the executive skill is transferable. The same individual may rotate among responsible positions in military, political, industrial or other organisations. Government often drafts corporate executives for top executive posts and business recruits many of its executives from government.¹⁰⁵ It is commonly said that success in business depends upon knowing one's way around Washington, having influence with legislators and bureaucrats. What has come to be called a 'revolving door' has developed between government and business.¹⁰⁶ Civil Service in Washington is regarded as an apprenticeship for a successful business career. A particular business policy is carefully linked to a national goal. Protecting the steel industry from foreign competition is promoted as contributing to national security, full employment, subsidising agriculture and so on without end. The decisions of federal agencies are also influenced by the corporate rich. On June 25, 1979 *The Wall Street Journal* reported that Securities and Exchange Commission's charges were settled by a former director of a corporation.¹⁰⁷ Such instances can be multiplied. Therefore, Michael Reagon, in his study of corporate power, has evidently proved that government gives vast weight to business interest in its policy perspective.¹⁰⁸ Jeffrey Pfeffer, in a recent study of power in organisations, has stressed the importance of social background and training on the process of decision-making in the corporate sector.¹⁰⁹ Several studies look at the social class composition of various governmental agencies and organisations and committees to determine the extent and level of social cohesion and its impact on policy unification. Gabriel Kalko, while analysing the roots of American foreign policy, insisted that capitalist class interests, not personal

¹⁰⁴William G. Domhoff, *The Bohemian Grove and other Retreats: A Study in Ruling Class Cohesiveness*, New York, 1975.

¹⁰⁵Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control and Corporate Power*, New York, 1981.

¹⁰⁶William G. Domhoff, "State and Ruling Class in Corporate America", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 4, Spring 1974, pp. 3-16.

¹⁰⁷Milton Friedman and Rose Fredman, "The Tide is Turning", in Peter Duigman and Alvin Rubushka (ed.), *The United States in 1980s*, New York, 1980, pp. 13-16.

¹⁰⁸Michael Reagon, "Reconstructing the Corporate System" in Irving Howe (ed.), *The Radical Papers*, New York, 1966, pp. 175-78.

¹⁰⁹Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Power in Organisation*, Pitman, Mass, 1981.

interests of bureaucrats or the pattern of recruitment of decision-makers, ultimately determine policy.¹¹⁰ Domhoff also asserted that American foreign policy is initiated, planned and carried out by members and organisations of a power elite that is rooted in, and serves the interests of an upper class of rich businessmen and their descendants. He determines influence of business through social clubs, policy planning groups and corporations.¹¹¹ Class studies by Lawrence H. Shoup on the Council of Foreign Relations, by Diana Roose on Advisory Council of the Department of Defence, by Frank Darknell on the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, by Glenn K. Hirsch on Advertising Council demonstrated the hegemony of the business elite on the policy-making process.¹¹² Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson examined socio-political composition of American businessmen on the basis of 1973 data of 567 Vice-Presidents of 500 companies and arrived at the conclusion that interest and ideology of business elite determined public policy, including foreign policy of America.¹¹³ Irving Horowitz, Morris Janowitz, Robert D. Putnam and many other sociologists have analysed the theories of contemporary capitalist class politics to indicate the perpetuation of upper class on various aspects of policies. Therefore, these studies indicate that long-range national and international policies are predetermined.¹¹⁴ According to Francis Scott Piren and Richard Cloward, welfare system is supported by the rich as a device for regulating the poor and preserving the system. They show moderate accommodation by approving measures which appear against their interests. Studies of community welfare by some sociologists also show that community and civic leaders are interested in seeing that government provides the services needed by businessmen without either burdensome regulation or excessive taxation.¹¹⁵

The fact that a minority of directors of corporations become members of board of several corporations is a proof of interlocking

¹¹⁰Gabriel Kalko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose*, Boston, 1969, pp. 9-12.

¹¹¹William G. Domhoff, "Social Clubs, Policy Planning Groups, and Corporations: A Network of Ruling Class Cohesiveness", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 5, Spring 1975, pp. 173-75.

¹¹²Kourvetaris and Dobratz, *Political Sociology*, p. 36.

¹¹³Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth M. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen*, San Francisco, 1975.

¹¹⁴Irving Horowitz, *Ideology and Utopia in the U.S. 1956-1976*, New York, 1977; Morris Janowitz, *Social Control of Welfare State*, New York, 1976; Richard D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, Englewood, N.J., 1976.

¹¹⁵Frances Scott Pevin and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, New York, 1971; Delbert C. Miller, *International Community Power Structures: Comparative Studies of Four World Cities*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1970.

control by small groups. For example, today members of board of directors of the City National Bank hold their meeting, sometime later, some of them attend the community luncheon for fund raising and a few days later some are elected to the board of the Church and so on. Thus, an overlapping network of membership links the organisations together, making it easy for vested interests to control many organisations.¹¹⁶

Michael Parenti, in his *Democracy For the Few*, has shown that the management elite of the top corporations are almost always wealthy men. He mentioned the names of Thomas Watson, George Humphry, David Packard, Charles Wilson and Robert McNamara. Some of them served in the Cabinet of American President. As President of General Motors, Wilson owned G.M. Stock worth \$ 2.5 million, McNamara owned Ford Stock worth \$ 1.6 million and held stock options valued at \$ 270,000. The interest that managers have in corporation's profit is direct one. Far from being technocrats, whose first dedication is to advance public welfare, they represent the more active and powerful element of a self-interest owning class. This power does not rest in their individual holdings but in their corporate position. The corporation, therefore, is the source of and the basis of the continued power and privilege of wealth.¹¹⁷ General C. Zilly, in his *Behind the Nylon Curtain*, demonstrated the role of Du Ponts as symbol of corporate power. Du Pont family controls eight of the forty largest defence corporations and grossed over \$ 15 billion in defence contracts during the Vietnam war. They also control ten corporations over one billion in asset, including Penn Central, General Motors, Coca Cola, Boeing and United Brands, etc. The Du Ponts serve as trustees in a number of colleges including some of the country's elite schools. They own about forty manorial estates and private museums in Delaware alone and in an attempt to keep the money in the family have set up thirty one tax exempted foundations. The family is frequently the largest contributor to Republican Presidential Campaign and has financed to right wing and anti labour organisations. In 1976, Pierre Du Pont won the governorship of Delaware¹¹⁸. Similarly Rockefellers have tremendous corporate power as business elite over different aspects of American life. They hold over \$ 300 billion in corporate wealth extending into just about every industry in every state of the Union and in every nation in the non-socialist world. The Rockefellers financed universities, seminars, churches, cultural centres, museums and youth organisations. At one time or another they or their close associates have occupied the offices

¹¹⁶Thomas E. Dye, Eugene R. Del Lerg, and John W. Pickering, "Institutional Elites", *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 54, August 1973, pp. 10-28.

¹¹⁷Michael Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, New York, 1977, pp. 10-12.

¹¹⁸Gerald C. Zilly, *Behind the Nylon Curtain*, New York, 1974, pp. 110-35.

of the President, Secretaries of State, Commerce, Defence and other Cabinet posts, the governorship of several states, high positions in the CIA, the Senate and House as well as the Council of Foreign Relations.¹¹⁹

John Sonquist and Thomas Koenig, by using graph theory and double interlock criterion to investigate the clique structure of top corporate of 797 corporations in 1975, conclusively demonstrated that there are cohesive, face to face groups interacting with each other out of the board room. They found high level of integration in spite of regional variations and bases.¹²⁰

Therefore, many social scientists belonging to the radical wing maintained that business elite exercised great influence on the process of policy making in contemporary America. Even the idealist human right policy of the United States has been assessed by corporations from the point of view of export of American manufactured goods. The business community has, therefore, displayed meagre interest in the promotion of human rights. The American policy to South Africa has largely been affected by the business outlook.¹²¹ The approach of Reagan administration to this problem proves this. American policy to the third world bears testimony to the impact of corporate rich. There are others who do not look at the hegemony of corporate power from the point of view of monopoly of business elite on political life. George P. Shultz, formerly Secretary of Treasury and President of Bechtel Corporation, points out that the typical businessman and politicians reflect entirely different ways of thinking. Business relies on market mechanism but politician relies on balancing and compromising interests. Richard Whalen suggested bringing together of brilliant academics and superlative entrepreneurs in the departments of Commerce, State and Treasury for extraordinary solidarity that characterises senior bureaucracy of Japan. Others have claimed that corporate control and behaviour are decided by market effects of stock, credit, rate of return and investment. In a current study, Daniel Quinn Mills of Harvard Business School, offers insight into ways American business can force a team of skilled and motivated managers to meet the challenge ahead. Similar points have been emphasised by Roy Rowan on the basis of interviews with successful

¹¹⁹Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *Rockefellers: An American Dynasty*, New York, 1976, pp. 75-110, 120-36.

¹²⁰John Sunquist and Thomas Keonig, "Interlocking Directorate in the Top US Corporations: A Graph Theory Approach", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 5, Spring 1975, pp. 196-229.

¹²¹Sandy Vogelgesang, *American Dream and Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy*, New York, 1980, pp. 215-17, 220-23,

business managers.¹²² Nevertheless business elite continue to dominate the contemporary American Society with varying degree of intensity depending upon national and international factors.¹²³

MILITARY ELITE

Military elite has emerged as a powerful segment of the power elite. C. Wright Mills described American capitalism as a military capitalism. The most important relation of the big corporation to the State rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs. He asserted:

Not politicians, but corporate executives sit with the military and plan the organisation of war effort.¹²⁴

The military and corporate men now occupy top position in the process of decision-making. The unity and shape of power elite can be determined in terms of the military ascendancy. The military are ascendant in two senses: as personnel and as justifying ideology. Since the World War II military elite has provided both ideology and legitimations. All political and economic actions are judged in terms of military reality.¹²⁵ The institutional changes by creating a single Department of Defence with subordinate Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force brought about great transformation of military power structure located in Pentagon. Great military leaders, like George C. Marshall, Douglas, McArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, had played great role in the determination of foreign and military strategy. The era of President Truman had seen conflicts between the President and General McArthur which resulted in the removal of the latter.¹²⁶ But the real origin of military industrial complex took place during last days of President Truman. He appointed Charles E. Wilson, former President of the General Motors Corporation as Director of Defence Mobilisation. The increasing expenditure on defence, which provided new dimension to military industrial complex, also occurred during this period. Appropriation for armed forces was increased from \$ 14.8 billion in 1950 to \$ 56.9

¹²²Richard Whalen, "International Business", in Peter Duigman and Alvin Robushth (ed.), *The United States in 1980s*, pp. 652-55; Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control and Corporate Power*, pp. 95-125, 175-96.

¹²³Daniel Quinn Mills, *The New Competitors*, Cambridge, Mass, 1985, pp. 300-85; Roy Rowan, *The Institutive Manager*, New York, 1986, pp. 65-90, 175-202.

¹²⁴C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, pp. 275-76.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 277-78.

¹²⁶John W. Spanier, *The Truman-McArthur Controversy*, Cambridge, Mass, 1959, pp. 195-220.

billion in 1952 of which some \$ 12 billion went to finance the Korean war. The Congress passed the Defence Production Act to maintain uninterrupted supply of defence materials. The administration of Eisenhower provided new impetus to this process. Charles E. Wilson, the President of General Motors, now became the Secretary of Defence and an industrialist of Ohio, George M. Humphrey, was appointed as Secretary of Treasury. As Hanson Baldwin, military analyst of the *New York Times* noted, American military planners sought to organise and maintain armed force capable of fighting any kind of war anywhere.¹²⁷

The military industrial complex was further broad-based during the presidency of President John F. Kennedy. The appointment of McNamara, former President of the Ford Motor Company and increase of defence expenditure to \$ 64 billion in 1962 added to the growing military industrial complex. The Korean war, the Vietnam war, global military expansion of the United States to meet the challenge of the Soviet military and nuclear dominance, America's military involvement in Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East tremendously increased the position and power of military elite. Some social scientists in their analysis of military elite from the end of the World War II tried to determine changing relation between civilians and military. Once out of service, both military officers and other rank and file may contribute to multiple effects of elite. The ex-soldiers became part of community as local leaders, teachers and bureaucrats in corporations and public offices and they may affect power complex from the point of view of national security. During active service, the military organisations and ideology may lead to over bureaucratisation. During the Vietnam war, it was found that results of many civilian programmes operated by the military were distorted by military leaders. Since military leaders are military professionals, they often judge civilian activities in terms of what is good for military effort. According to their perception, every activity must contribute to the winning of war. Military leaders also tend to be conservative in outlook.¹²⁸

The military spending led to close relationship between corporations and military leaders. Some of the corporations have been depending upon government purchase. Military leaders made contracts without competitive bidding. Civilian government officers, who made decisions regarding purchase of weapons and other materials for defence, had

¹²⁷Alvin J. Cottrell, "Military Security and the New Look", *Current History*, Vol. XXXVIII, April 1960, pp. 220-27.

¹²⁸Charles C. Moskas, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*, New York, 1970; Frank N. Trager, et. al, *National Security and American Society*, Lawrence, 1973; "The Military", *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1976; Ward Just, *Military Men*, New York, 1970.

made reputation in the very corporations from which goods were purchased. Leaders in the government returned to corporate positions, and retired military officers assumed positions in corporate enterprise still doing business with government offices staffed by their former military associates. Congressmen became part of this military industrial complex because of their interest in obtaining contracts for companies belonging to their constituencies. It was against this increasing danger of military industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned in his farewell address on radio and television on January 17, 1961. His remark was closely associated with a 'garrison-state'. The Bay of Pigs disaster of Kennedy administration and the American rapid involvement in Vietnam during Johnson administration bore testimony to this ascendancy of military elite.¹²⁹

Military expenditure, which absorbs 30 per cent of the American budget and six per cent of the Gross National Product, represent a central issue in the discussion of military industrial complex. Defence spending estimated at \$ 85 billion in 1974 has touched three hundred billion in 1987. According to one current estimate, the Strategic Defence Initiative will cost \$ 1000 billion and \$ 50 billion will be needed to maintain it every year. Space exploration and continued nuclear research add to this mounting defence expenditure. Such tendencies strengthen the military industrial complex in America. A number of empirical studies support the contention that capitalist economy of America depends upon military spending and that such a phenomenon strengthens the cohesive relation between military and corporate sector.¹³⁰ Harry Magdoff suggested that military spending fortifies a strategic centre of the industrial structure. It was military spending which brought the American economy out of the great depression of 1930s.

Magdoff has, therefore, asserted that military sales takes on an increased relative importance for the large firm.¹³¹ Victor Perlo also studied the profitability of large corporations involved in military production. He examined twenty five large corporations in 1959 and found that foreign investment accounted for 28.9 per cent of the total profits and military business for 11.5 per cent and the two sources combined for 40.4 per cent. Perlo questioned the findings of those who argued

¹²⁹Richard L. Watson Jr., *The United States in Contemporary World*, New York, 1965, pp. 8-11; Ritchie P. Lowary and Robert P. Rankin, *Sociology, Social Science and Social Concern*, New York, 1977, pp. 471-83.

¹³⁰*The New York Times*, January 21, 1987; *The Hindustan Times* (Patna), January 29, 1987; Romesh Bhandari, "Peace at all Costs", *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, February 11, 1987.

¹³¹Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, New York, 1969, pp. 180-90; "Milli-tarism and Imperialism", *Monthly Review*, 1970, pp. 1, 4.

that defence contractors were engaged in non-profitable business, and proved that big defence contractors realised rather healthy profits from early 1960. Richard Kaufman revealed the extent to which defence contractors went to hide their profits from public scrutiny and noted that investigations showed excessive profit making, ranging from 47 per cent to 142 per cent during the Korean War. Kaufman has also indicated that military business has become solid part of business operations of corporations.¹³² Murray Weidenbaum's empirical study also revealed the profitability of the military business. He took six giant defence contractors and compared their profits with six other companies of similar size doing civilian oriented business. He found that during 1962 to 1965 the defence firms studied showed a 17.5 per cent return on investment but the non-defence firms showed only 10.6 per cent profit. He also showed that 77 per cent of the contract awarded by the Federal Government to the private sector were through the Department of Defence. If NASA and AEC contractors are included, then the figure goes to eighty per cent.¹³³ Paul Stevenson, on the basis of analysis of profit of top 500 American corporations, mentioned in a *Fortune* magazine report that from 1967 to 1969 the profit of military industrial giants showed a higher profit rate than the top 500 corporations in general. Stevenson has examined 24 top military contractors, seven MLC giants and top 500 corporations and their range of profit from 1961 to 1969 and concluded that corporations engaged in the defence business get their share or more than their share, of profits flowing to the industrial concerns in America.¹³⁴ Thomas E. Weisskopf's analysis of problem of surplus absorption has emphasised the fact that the economic prosperity of the post war years has been closely linked to the defence expenditure.¹³⁵ Michael Reich and David Finkelhor, on the basis of empirical evidence, also argued that a review of list of the top military contractors indicated virtually a list of all the largest and most powerful industrial corporations in America and "the business of war industry goes to the biggest firms and is used by them as a base from which to expand their areas of control."¹³⁶ On the contrary, study by

¹³²Victor Perlo, *Militarism and Industry: Arms Profiteering in the Missile Age*, New York, 1963, pp. 100-120; Richard Kaufman, *The War Profiteers*, New York, 1970, pp. 27-58, 130-35.

¹³³Murray Weidenbau, *The Modern Public Sector: New Ways of Doing the Government Business*, New York, 1969, pp. 30-36.

¹³⁴Paul Stevenson "American Capitalism and Militarism", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 77, July 1971, pp. 134-38.

¹³⁵Thomas E. Weisskopf, "The Problem of Surplus Absorption in a Capitalist Society" in Richard C. Edward et. al. (ed.), *The Capitalist System*, Englewood, N.J., 1972, pp. 370-75, 425-28.

¹³⁶Michael Reich and David Finkelhor, "Capitalism and the Military Industrial Complex", *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 2, Fall 1970, pp. 4-25.

'think tank' of Pentagon, the Logistic Management Institute (LMI), tried to show that military enterprise earned profit in 1950s, but they had sunk below the level of profit earned by all companies in 1962. George Berkeley as well as Stanley Lieberman, on the basis of empirical analysis on same approach as that of LMI, tried to show that the majority of the largest industrial corporations derive only a small portion of their total business from primary military contracts.¹³⁷ These findings have been challenged by Magdoff, Perlo, Weiden-Faum, Weisskopf, Reich and Finkelhor and Stevenson in their studies, alluded to earlier, on the ground that pro-business analysis was based on under-reporting of profits and manipulation of quantitative data. Stevenson has thoroughly reviewed a number of studies on this subject and concluded that large American corporations have been depending upon a large military budget for their continued high profitability. Stevenson agrees with David Horowitz and John Gurley that no political party or government can step outside the framework of the corporate system and its politics and embark on a course which consistently threaten the power and privileges of the giant corporations. Gurley has charged that corporations keep wages low, profit rates high and thereby greatly stimulated capital spending.¹³⁸ The experts and military generals of Pentagon as well as the US Air Force and Navy compete with each other in grabbing a large chunk of military spending. The major decisions are taken at Pentagon rather than the Department of State.¹³⁹

The growing military industrial complex has created great apprehension in the mind of a liberal like John C. Galbraith about unlicensed activities of military personnel like Vice-Admiral John Poindexter and Col. Oliver North who kept President Reagan ignorant of what was going on and suggested that foreign policy, as it is in all democratic countries, be in the hands of experienced politicians because such individuals are less likely to be attracted by the short-run charm of secret operations. He recommends the recruitment of top foreign policy

¹³⁷George Berkley, "The Myth of War Profiteering", *The New Republic*, Vol. 20, December 1969, pp. 15-18; Allan T. Demarie, "Defense Profits: The Hidden Issues", *Fortune*, February 1969, pp. 82-83; Stanley Lieberman, "An Empirical Study of Military Industrial Linkages", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 76, January 1971, pp. 562-84.

¹³⁸David Horowitz (ed.), *Corporations and the Cold War*, New York, 1969, pp. 10-13; John Gurley, "The Future of American Capitalism", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics and Business*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn, 1972, pp. 7-17; Paul Stevenson, "The Military Industrial Complex: An Examination of the Nature of Corporate Capitalism in America", in Kourretar and Dobroz (ed.), *Political Sociology*, pp. 369-79.

¹³⁹Neil Sheehan, et. al., *The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times*, New York, 1972, pp. 10-28, 75-110; Daniel Forb, *The Button: The Nuclear Trigger—Does it Work?*, London, 1986, pp. 170-95.

personnel from the Congress. The present disaster would not have occurred if Charles Porcey of Howard Baker, both Republicans had, been incharge of foreign affairs. If William Fulbright had been there, there would have been no Bay of Pigs or steady movement into the sink hole of Vietnam. Galbraith referred to the appointment of Edward Muskie by President Jimmy Carter to handle Iranian crisis and the current role of Mike Mansfield, formerly of the US Senate.¹⁴⁰

Therefore, an interpretive study of different components of power elite in contemporary America demonstrates that the politicians, the corporate rich and military leaders form a cohesive ruling elite. Consequently, a distrust in government has been growing since the Vietnam war. It has been sustained through the various misfortunes that have occurred since then. The radical protest of 1960's Watergate, recession, inflation, American involvement in Latin America, South East Asia, the Middle East and recent arms deal with Iran have added to popular discontent against power elite. The Survey Research Centre (SRC) of the University of Michigan noted that between 1964 to 1978 the percentage maintaining that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves rather than for the benefits of all the people climbed from 30 to 52 per cent and to 67 per cent in 1978. The percentage of those, who feel that the people running the government are crooked, rose from 30 per cent in 1964 to 33 per cent in 1970. But soon after Watergate, this figure rose to 57 per cent in 1973. After the resignation of President Nixon, the figure went down to 39 per cent in 1978.¹⁴¹ A major pollster, Daniel Yankelovich, observed in 1977 that, approximately three out of five people felt that the government suffers from a concentration of too much power in too few hands.¹⁴² These conclusions have also been confirmed by Gallup, Harris, Roper, NORC and SRC. Louis Harris found that public confidence in leadership fell from 47 per cent in 1966 to 28 per cent in 1971, and in military leaders fell very sharply from 67 per cent in 1966 to 27 per cent in 1971. Business leaders declined in public esteem from 55 to 27 per cent between the same period. Confidence in the Congress declined from 42 to 19 per cent. Various surveys tend to concur that relatively little change has occurred since 1970. This conclusion is supported by a recent survey conducted by *Washington Post* in January 1987.¹⁴³ In 1979, the editors of the *Business Week* declared, "erosion of power

¹⁴⁰John Kenneth Galbraith, "Let Politicians Not Academicians Run Foreign Policy", *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, news service reported in *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, January 12, 1987.

¹⁴¹Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy", in Duignan and Rabushka (ed.), *The United States in 1980's*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 66-67, *The Washington Post*, January 25 and 27, 1987.

is the product of the failures of US leaders to recognise the connection between political, military and economic events and to develop coherent approaches that did deal with them in integrated fashion."¹⁴⁴ This assertion indeed is affirmation of a unity and coherence of political, economic and military elite from, of course, business point of view,

The preceding conceptual and empirical interpretations reinforce the assumption of C. Wright Mills and others about the dominance and perpetuation of elite in American society and politics during different periods of America's development. These findings also substantiate the Paretian circulation of elite with certain modifications and variations according to changing needs of each period. Intellectual, political and business elites emerged from the early decades of American history. The new component of military elite developed after World War II. In contemporary American society, intellectual, political elite, business elite and military elite co-exist in spite of the prevailing myth of democracy and social equality. Social and cultural forces perpetuate the dominance of elite based on unequal distribution of income, wealth, power and prestige as well as system of education. The possibilities of unlimited opportunity and social mobility have been described as myth. The poorest fifth received only 5.4 per cent of the nation's income and own less than half per cent of the national wealth. The richest fifth receive 41.1 per cent of national income and control 77 per cent of wealth. The blacks are generally poorer than the whites.¹⁴⁵ The system of education promotes the hegemony of the upper class. Children of families belonging to higher income group attend and complete higher education. According to the census figure of 1973, about fifty four per cent children from families of upper class were attending colleges and universities and only about thirteen per cent of children from low income group were able to attend institutions of higher learning. Moreover, children of lower income group families were forced to terminate educational career. Therefore, educational system also promoted elitism in American society.¹⁴⁶ Social and cultural forces also perpetuate and legitimise the supremacy of elite. Social stratification is influenced by capitalist ideology which is used by the ruling and upper class to maintain and enhance their power and privileges in society. The upper class tend to manipulate attitudes and beliefs of the middle class and middle level bureaucrats in favour of capitalist ideology.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴*Business Week*, March 12, 1979, p. 36.

¹⁴⁵Joan Huber and William Form, *Income and Ideology: An Analysis of the American Political Formula*, Urbana, 1973; Robert Kaufman, "A Structural Recomposition of Black-White Earning Differentials", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 89, No. 3, November, 1983, pp. 585-610.

¹⁴⁶Michael W. Apple, *Education and Power*, Boston, 1982, pp. 265-85.

¹⁴⁷Jonathan Turner and Charles Stearnes, *Inequality, Privileges and Poverty*, Santa Monica, CA, 1976.

An appraisal of changing pattern of elite in contemporary American society shows that different spheres of life have been dominated by the upper class or elite. They are restrained by unorganised and apathetic masses whose basic attitudes towards life are often sharply different from those of elites. The interest groups or countervailing power seek to balance different groups without dislodging the dominant group from the seat of power and privileges. The phenomenon of disunity or desertion of intellectual elite facilitate the perpetuation of political, economic and military elite. The intellectual elite is less cohesive, less powerful and less organised than most other elites. In the United States, radical movement of right and left have been weak and the most successful movements are those created by the elites, and most important elites are those who control the means of production. However, American elites are different from the British elites as the British society is dominated by aristocratic and feudal tendencies. The Canadian elites are also different from American elites because the former are based on civil service and bureaucracy. The Canadian elites maintain political stability despite strong disintegrating tendencies in the Canadian population. The Soviet elites are different from their American counterparts because of hegemony of ideology of the Communist Party and dictatorship of proletariat. The present Soviet elite may be described as a bureaucratic stratum lacking the functions of a social class but monopolising the political process of the Soviet Union. There is new evidence of generational transition within the top leadership.¹⁴⁸ The rising elites of developing countries are also different from American elites because now elites of Asia and Africa are largely drawn from the middle class, born and brought up in urban areas under the impact of western education. The Indian elites are also not similar to American elites because of difference in political, economic and social structures of both the countries. The Indian elites occupy high status in society because of occupation, education and training with diverse background. The Indian political elites, however, are developing new alliance with the business elite in recent years. There is also a tendency towards a collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the close relationship between economy and power as it exists in the United States can be found in western Europe and Japan. Therefore, a comparative appraisal of American elites and elites of other nations shows

¹⁴⁸Philip Slanworth and Anthony Giddens (ed.), *Elites and Power in British Society*, London, 1974; Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, Cambridge, 1978; Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elites", *Problems of Communism*, January-February and March-April, 1967, pp. 28-33, 18-25.

¹⁴⁹T. Kerstiens, *New Elites in Asia and Africa*, London, 1969, pp. 4-12; R.N. Thakur, *Elite Theory and Administrative System*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 323-47; Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary: Salvaging the Services", *The Times of India*, February 13, 1987.

that American elites have their own characteristics and unique patterns.

The preceding analysis demonstrates that no widely accepted conceptual or empirical framework can embody all aspects of American elites. Pareto, Mosca, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Blumberg, Mills, Mitchells and Arnold Rose may help in probing the social background, working and influence of American elites, but none of them can provide a comprehensive idea about contemporary American elites. Only a multi-dimensional approach can be fruitful in evolving a comprehensive idea about changing patterns of American elites. The changing pattern of elites is a reflection of fundamental economic, cultural, demographic, social and political structure of contemporary America. In spite of the myth of mobility, unlimited opportunity and melting pot, the power is lodged in the elite who occupy key position in the social and political system.

Elites, Masses and Democracy: A Juxtaposition

STEPHAN E. NIKOLOV

To compare two very different cultural and political systems, such as in the USA and Bulgaria, seems unnatural and illegitimate. The United States is one of the largest and most developed multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, with its 1,11,000 sq. km. of territory and a population of less than 9 million is one of the smallest European countries. The ethnical composition of the population is predominantly Bulgarian (more than 90%). The huge economic potential of the USA provokes the ambitions of the leading political and business circles of this country toward imposing their influence and interest on a global scale. The Bulgarian state has existed for more than 1,300 years, but for more than half of this period, it has found itself under foreign rule. Beginning with 9th of September 1944, our country has developed itself in a socialist way. The economic backwardness of the past was relatively rapidly overcome, but scarcity of natural resources had its impact on the scale of industrial progress. The United States of America has developed itself as an independent state for more than 200 years and during this time, it has succeeded in creating a stable and effective political system of bourgeois democracy. The USA, better than other industrial countries, coped with historical challenges toward the establishment of the country's socio-economic and political order. During the entire history of the USA, there has not been any case of a serious political crisis threatening a shift in political life or with a break in the routine succession of the power within the framework of the relatively narrow scope of political ideas, trends and alternatives. After the Civil War in the USA, more than 120 years ago, in spite of the considerable social contradictions and discontent, all violations of the social order have always had a sporadic, provisional and local character and have never roused any serious troubles for the system as a whole.

The Bulgarian political system proved to be stable and solid too. Unlike other socialist countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, China), Bulgaria succeeded in avoiding divergences from the chosen

road, as well as extremities in her economic and political development.

We can add to the above list also geographical remoteness, as well as chronic under development of political, economic, and cultural relations between Bulgaria and the USA. Both bourgeois and socialist Bulgaria always was far from the preferences and sympathies of the USA. Recent years mark a particularly disagreeable phase in the two countries' relations as Bulgaria becomes a victim of propaganda campaigns, regularly undertaken by the USA, which have an effect both on bilateral relations and on the relations of Bulgaria with Third World countries.

These fundamental distinctions face the researcher engaged in searching for a base for juxtaposition with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Without any intention to make whatever general suggestions and conclusions concerning one society or other, we shall try to formulate the most general criteria for tracing the categories of interest to us—democracy, social structure and social hierarchy, masses' access to and participation in power and management at different levels and political activity of the population. These categories may and have to be considered within the framework of socio-historical limitations and the specific demands of the time and the concrete society. It would be a misinterpretation, if we analyse the characteristics in the ancient Greek polis, for example, applying the criteria of bourgeois universal suffrage. This condition, however, does not repeal by no means the possibility to juxtapose these and other social phenomena irrespective of the concrete social and historical context, outside of the concrete society, political system, national ethos, beyond ideological characteristics and claims, since these are phenomena of a definitely universal nature and significance. To deny the possibility for such a juxtaposition and comparative analysis means to admit the uniqueness, inimitability, extraordinariness of any social phenomena; it means to deny the existence of any common objective and regularities of social development and to explain it solely by the caprices of human beings or, on the contrary, by some unknown forces standing above society and nature. In the long run, all this means to reconcile ourselves with incognizability of these phenomena, with the impossibility to examine them, which is an absurdity and is at variance with the permanently seeking human mind. These phenomena can be decompassed and reduced to systems of objective, including quantitative indicators which can be juxtaposed. What should not be forgotten in this case is to adhere to the historical approach, *i.e.*, when making a juxtaposition of two different phenomena in their concrete forms, we should never forget from where we have 'taken' them, we must bear in mind the objective characteristics and possibilities for their development, provided by the concrete historical context of the given society. On the other hand, if we proceed only from an idealized and subjective

notion of democracy in general as a totality of abstract freedom and general humanistic demands, we would fall into an unjustified idealism and we would not be able to achieve any practical goals and results.

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

To answer this, at first glance, elementary question, is by no means an easy task. There is hardly any political thinker who has not tried to find this answer, but all answers have been incomplete and unsatisfactory.

Etymologically, approaching this which has been interpreted in such contradictory ways, we can translate from ancient Greek democracy as power of the people. Since in the past, there has been no power, including the most fierce dictatorships, which has not referred to itself as a 'democratic' one—an assertion which, is naturally disputed by its adversaries, who, in their turn, when gain the power, use well known traditional ways for suppression and holding the position—it is easy to believe, that democracy is an illusion, a fiction, an ideological formulation alone.

What is fiction—and in many cases a dangerous delusion—is the notion of 'pure' democracy, 'democracy in general'. Like any politics, democracy has always been a class phenomenon—as long as there exist classess, and all contemporary societies are class societies. Hence, we have to speak of different historically-based notions of democracy. In the process of its historical evolution, the notion of democracy has undergone significant changes and development, and with the development of human society, it has been enriched. In the pre-capitalist social formations, the right to an access to decision-making has been strictly limited to an extremely narrow circle of affluent representatives of society. Slaves in ancient society, serfs in the feudal society or low castes in old Indian society—although they have been the huge majority of the population—have been totally excluded from the political process.¹

¹“Legal norms and relations within the cities are to a high degree theoretically and even more practically secularized. Even the city commune in its earliest period is connected with evident inequality between the social groups composing the city. A part of the population, and that the poorest part, lacks rights. The right to participate in the city-social affairs is given to citizens with specific qualifications. These qualifications still include a combination of economic and non-economic criteria. Differentiation of legal-state institutions in the city progresses in the direction of increasing determination from the point of view of economic inequality. The emerging bourgeois class profits as a matter of principle and practically by more rights. In Renaissance cities of a republican structure the rich and the common people are legally unequal, which continuously rouses political struggles among them. These political struggles are not always economically motivated, i.e., are not always motivated directly

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Capitalism destroyed these formal hindrances, without eliminating them entirely. It rendered the universal right to participation in political decision-making into a fetish, into an ideal, never to be attained, substituting law restrictions by more effective—the economic ones.² As the election campaigns in a western style become more and more expensive, it becomes possible only for affluent candidates or candidates enjoying the confidence of the Big Business to participate on an equal footing and with any prospects of success. Furthermore, there are a good number of protective, hidden or well-veiled mechanisms, which put additional obstacles in front of the candidates of left, progressive, democratic groupings, representatives of the workers and the non-bourgeois strata—for instance, premeditated division of districts, the system of proportional representation and the majority election system, some formal requirements in the registration of candidates and voters, etc. Making use of effective levers, capitalists prevent labour unity, crumbling their interests and political demands within the framework of immediate everyday need and consumerism. In this way, they succeed in keeping their power, regardless of the relative narrowness of their own social basis. The opportunities and rights the working masses are entitled to in the conditions of relative economic stability and growth can be taken away comparatively easily. At some serious threat to the system, the Big Business can abandon democratic institutions and replace them by a totalitarian fascist dictatorship—still in the name of general democratic ideals, unattainable under the conditions of class society—as more than once happened in the past.

Democracy always represents a certain form of polity, reflecting the essence of a given state. If the state is an exploiter one, as all pre-socialist forms of states have been, *i.e.*, essentially dictatorships of some exploiter class, then, irrespective of the concrete form of state (republic, monarchy, etc.)—democracy is democracy for the dominating class (and therefore for the minority in society) and dictatorship for the exploited and oppressed majority, *i.e.*, democracy is inevitably, dialectically combined with some kind of dictatorship, violence or imposition of the interest of

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by the structures of economic inequality, but the later lies in their foundation. Within the Renaissance cities, which have tyrannical form of government, legal inequality is particularly drastic. It is drastic also under the oligarchic form, when power is, as a matter of fact, usurped by one or several dynasties.” George Fotev, *Sotsialna Realnost-i-Vuobrazhenie (Social Reality and Imagination)* (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Nauka-i-izkustvo Publishing House, 1985, p. 131, comp. also with p. 192.

²This doesn't mean at all that with the very victory of bourgeois revolution all non-economic restrictions of participation in political life fall away. Centuries after the victory of bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe and North America, certain categories of the population were formally and legally deprived of primary political right—to vote: women, national minorities, etc.

one portion of society over the whole society. This process does not necessarily take forms of open repression and brutal terror, but it simply can be manifested in restricting the rights of individual social groups. In order to achieve its goal, the class, or the social group, which seeks to impose its domination over the whole society, is compelled to present its private interest as a universal one, as interest of the whole society,³ and use all possible means to this end.

Only Marxists, who in their theory freed state and democracy from the halo of mysticism and called the things by their proper names, following logic of their own doctrine, refer to socialist democracy as 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. But what type of dictatorship they mean? As V.I. Lenin wrote in his work, *The Great Initiative*, "dictatorship of the proletariat, if one puts this scientific, historical-philosophical Latin expression into a more simple words, means that: only a particular class, namely, urban or industrial workers in general, are capable of leading the masses of working and exploited people in the struggle for overthrowing the yoke of the capital for construction of a new socialist social order, in the struggle for the completely abolition of the classess."⁴ Hence, the question is one of imposing the interests of the majority of the population—the working masses—over the minority, i.e., of dictatorship of the majority over the minority: a historical ambition, which for the first time acquired concrete dimensions in the socialist doctrine. "It would be complete nonsense and nothing but empty utopianism to believe—wrote the leader of the first successful socialist revolution in the world—that the transition from capitalism to socialism would be possible without coercion and dictatorship."⁵ Being by its very conception a dictatorship of the majority, the proletarian state already immediately after the victory of the October Revolution was "the most democratic among all known earlier forms of states, because 'democracy is power of the majority', it is "a million of times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy...than the most democratic bourgeois republic."⁶ This is the kind of power, which ensures the closest, indissoluble, testable and renewable link with the masses, with the majority of the people. Its historical goal is to guarantee the decisive participation of the working people in the polity, to grant the majority of people initiative not only during the election of deputies, but also in the very process of government, in the realization of all kinds of reforms and reconstructions.

³K. Marx, F. Engels, "German Ideology", in *Collected Works* (in Bulgarian), Sofia, BCP Publishing House, 1957, Vol. 3, p. 34.

⁴V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works* (in Russian), Vol. 34, p. 302.

⁵V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works* (in Russian), Vol. 36, p. 194; comp. with *Ibid.*, Vol. 33 (The State and Revolution), p. 35; Vol. 41, pp. 184-85.

⁶V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works* (in Russian), Vol. 32, p. 408; Vol. 37, p. 257.

The close interrelation between politics and economy in the course of social development puts forward definite and irreversible demands as regards the quality and scope of democracy in society. This interdependence manifests itself particularly clearly under the conditions of socialist construction, where especially at the initial stage, politics plays a superior role with respect to economy. It is well known from history, that the previous socio-economic formations, based upon different forms of private ownership of the means of production, arose in the entrails of the preceding formation. The feudal socio-economic relations already were formed in the depths of the degenerating slave-owning system. In its turn, feudalism, which had exhausted its potentiality, provided that favourable environment, where the capitalist mode of production began gathering. So the new exploiters' class standing already on its own feet, needed one more effort only—to seize the state power—in order to gain complete dominance in society. In the case of socialism the seizure of state power is not the last, but the first act in the struggle for a new society. Public ownership of the means of production can be attained only under conditions, when the working people firmly hold state power with all ensuing consequences, and expropriate the factories, plants, equipment, land of capitalists.⁷ History has willed, that the socialist transformations should begin initially in economically backward coun-

⁷It is necessary to underline the essential difference between social and state property over the means of production. The former is possible exclusively under the conditions of socialism, while the second one, under the form of so-called state capitalism can exist both in capitalist countries and in some socialist countries at certain stages of their development (for example, in German Democratic Republic until 1973). Under the conditions of capitalism nationalization by the state of certain sectors of economy, single enterprises and companies, and so on, doesn't change social relations in essence, the role of a kind of 'collective capitalist' is played by the state. It is a question of special measures, to be applied usually toward unprofitable, but important strategic branches, such as transport, energetics and so on, or to branches demanding significant investments as electronics, aerospace industry, and so on. During recent years in a number of developed capitalist countries (Great Britain, France, etc.), there is a well-defined tendency toward selling out of state-owned companies to private owners (privatization). In socialist countries, since the state is a collective representative of the working class and masses, the nationalization of the means of production has a qualitatively different character and is a first step toward national social property. In People's Republic of Bulgaria have existed up to now three forms of property: state-social, cooperative, and personal. The first one applies to the sphere of large, middle, and some small industrial enterprises; the second one to some middle and smaller industrial and artisan enterprises. Personal property are the domestic means of the people (house/flat, car, furniture, etc.), as well as small means of production, applied without exploitation of hired labour. Here, in Bulgaria, in distinction from other socialist countries, the land was not nationalized, but co-operated. Relations of property are continuously being improved. In our country, there is a process of assignation of the means of production to be managed by direct producers—labour collectives, while their nominal proprietor remains the state.

ries. This circumstance put additional demands for the rapid overcoming of this backwardness, which could be attained only by total mobilization of all population strata and, by the corresponding unavoidable restrictions for democracy. Under these conditions, if not for this 'imperfection' of democracy, dictated by the objective demands of social reality, democracy would have been mere anarchy, it would have meant sheer suicide for the new society. The then existing necessity of rapid industrialization, for collectivization of agriculture, increased vigilance in view of internal and external enemies, created a solid system of extreme centralization of social management, total control and discipline.

Socialism, more than any other social order, needs self-development and renovation. And even more than any other social order, it possesses inner forces for the realization of self-development and renovation. However, these inner forces can develop only and solely if the rigidity in the scope of nomenklatura apparatus is overcome, because these internal forces are not anything supernatural nor any heavenly motive force. They are simply the powerful and renewed creative energy of the people.

The crucial and profound social processes, which have been initiated during the recent years in the Soviet Union under the leadership of M.S. Gorbachev, finding an ever stronger support in and having an increasing impact on the other socialist countries, including People's Republic of Bulgaria, reveal the historical power and vitality of socialism, its capability to overcome its own deviations and crises, to survive and spread its original values—genuine democracy, justice and equality.

MARXIST APPROACH TO THE NOTION OF 'ELITE'

The notion of 'elite', used in the title of both the present study and the collective work, requires special discussion and particular specification. 'Elite' is a French word, which means "the best, chosen, selected, extraordinary one". It originates from the Latin verb *eligere*, which is to be translated 'to choose, to select'. It is necessary to make it absolutely clear, that this is a term, borrowed from biology, which has been widely applied in Western sociology. It gives expression of the division of society into a majority of individuals, possessing mediocre physical and intellectual capacities (crowd, mass), and an 'elite'—a selected minority of individuals, endowed with high talents and predestined to lead others. Elite theories are among the most widespread in Western sociology. They are an extension of the ideas in idealistic philosophical and socio-political thought, opposing the leader to the people, the masses.

During the nineteenth century, elite theories were welcomed by the

bourgeoisie as a reaction against class struggle and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the working masses. The British philosopher Thomas Carlyle wrote in his *History of the French Revolution* that as the masses appeared on the historical stage, replacing the great personalities, there came a decline of civilization. All historical events, in his opinion, have been the deed of great, extraordinary persons—heroes, while the masses are a passive element, hindering social development. Similarly, the French psychologist and sociologist Gustave Le Bon explains all deformations of society and the negative social phenomena with participation of the crowd in solving the social and political problems (for example, revolutions). In his works (*Psychology of the Crowd*, *French Revolution and Psychology of Revolutions*, etc.), Le Bon opposes rationally thinking leaders to the irrational, dogmatic crowd moved by low instincts. Social Darwinism, which mechanically applies Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection in the sphere of human society and on this ground explaining the rise of the State (L. Gumplowicz) and the so-called 'innate interests' (G. Ratzenhofer, and L. Ward), represents a further contribution to the development of elitism as a mode of explanation of things and phenomena in society.

Priority in construction of a harmonious theory of elites belongs to two Italians—Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Mosca sets forth his views most thoroughly in his book *Elements of the Political Science*, which became later popular under the 'market' title *The Ruling Class*. He believes that power is a monopoly of a small group of people, gifted with some special qualities, and it is handed over by one minority to another, but never goes into the hands of the majority of the population. Mosca calls this narrow circle of 'selected' people involved in power, 'the ruling class' or elite. He sees the *raison d'être* of the different sociological doctrines in finding the ideological—though illusory—grounds and justification of the power, or the aspiration after it of a certain elite. According to him, the whole political history boils down to a confrontation between two tendencies—an aristocratic and a democratic one. The difference between them lies in the following alone: while the aristocratic elite is a closed group, its membership being inherited, the 'democratic' elite periodically renovates its composition by means of recruiting from outside individuals, who have proved their superiority over the 'crowd'.

Mosca's conception is further developed in the works of Pareto—a mathematician, engineer, economist and sociologist—especially in his voluminous *Treatise on General Sociology*. Pareto argues, that human behaviour is guided by certain inborn qualities, which are combinations of what he called 'residues'—peculiar 'social atoms'. The most valuable combinations occur very rarely, very few persons are gifted

with them and the elite are predestined for great deeds. If some economic, political and other factors prevent these people from gaining the power, they form the so-called 'contra-elite'. When the dominant elite begins to lose its potentialities for effective leadership because of ageing, closing in his own circle, changes in socio-political conditions, and so on, the 'contra-elite'—supported by the masses it had organized, or by some other means—commits a *coup d'état* and takes hold of the top of the social pyramid. Pareto calls this periodical replacement in the elites 'circulation'.

In more recent times, elite theories in Western sociology, following the spirit of the time, bring to the fore the technological and scientific intelligentsia, the so-called technocrats as social groups the most suitable for managing society. These theories are echoing in the works of contemporary neoconservatives. Elitism in Western sociology is inevitably associated with racism, regarding some races as 'superior' or some ethnic groups as 'inferior', as would fit only for crude physical labour, a kind of livestock in society, while the goods created by them should be in disposition of the 'superior race' of the Aryans. These theories reached their most dangerous extremity and began being methodically accomplished in the practice of the "One Thousand Years' Nazi Reich", when millions of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies and representatives of other 'non-Aryan' peoples were holocausted in its concentration camps. In our days, these theories find reflection in the shameful practice of apartheid in the South African Republic, which dooms the Black majority in this country to a 'second rate' life as unskilled labourers in the diamond mines, factories and corn fields in order to maintain the luxury and magnificence of the white minority. Even today, in the most civilized Western countries, various man-hating political doctrines about the superiority of particular socio-demographic and ethnic groups have been spread given the silent support of the governing circles. These theories, which in earlier times served as grounds for dependence and subordination of the underdeveloped countries and peoples from the South with respect to the rich North, have not been abandoned yet and are used nowadays as a justification for the neocolonial exploitation and enslavement of Third World countries.

In post-war Western sociology, especially in the USA, a trend developed, whose adherents by means of an empirical analysis of the dominant groups in the capitalist society find objective evidence of the lack of real democratic practice. The most prominent representative of this trend was C. Wright Mills with his well known book *Power Elite*. His conclusion is that key power in society is concentrated in the hands of those, who hold the most responsible decision-making positions in society—its top political, economic, and military institutions. The 'power elite' consists of "these political, economic and military circles

which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them".⁸ The unity of the power elite lies in the common background, education and way of life of its members; the prevailing criteria of admission, honouring and career; the structural coincidence of interests which is tightening together with their institutional spheres (e.g., business and the military), as well as their mutual co-ordination.

The elitist trend in American sociology was further developed in the studies of William Domhoff, Charles Lindblom, Thomas R. Dye and some other authors.⁹ Without being followers of C. Wright Mills, they have definite merits in developing the elitist approach and in disclosing the deficiencies in the political system of capitalism. It is necessary, however, to emphasize, that even in the hands of such radically and realistically minded sociologists, concerned about the fate of the democracy and the powerless in the bourgeois society (as M. Parenti called them), the theory of the elite remains limited and incomplete, neglecting the presence of objective social regularities. Although directing the researchers' attention to problems related to class domination, in practice, elite theories distort the very character of this domination. In a number of cases, they serve for ideological opposition to Marxism, and, in their most reactionary versions—for grounding fascism and the dictatorial tendencies in the management of society.

Marxism is intrinsically alien to any artificial division of society into 'more' and 'less' capable individuals, to any discrimination of particular groups of the population or individuals by race, gender, social and ethnical background and any other 'innate' qualities and characteristics. Categories such as 'elite' and 'non-elite', 'crowd' and so on are simply out of place in Marxist sociology, since they have nothing to designate and differentiate. In the works of the classics of Marxism, especially in the writings of V.I. Lenin, during the first years of Soviet power, the necessity of participation of broad masses of people, the poor, and all

⁸C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 18. We must point out here that even in the contemporary American sociological and political literature, the exponents of crude elitist, antipopular views similar to these offered by G. Le Bon, V. Pareto or G. Mosca have not disappeared, "Masses are Incompetent, incapable to Govern", concludes M. Marger, *Elites and Masses: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York, 1981, esp., pp. 84, 374; comp. also W.A. Welsh, *Leaders and Elites*, New York, 1979.

⁹See G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967; Deodem, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America*, N.Y., Vintage Books, 1971; Deodem, *Who Rules America Now?* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1983; Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, N.Y., Basic Books, 1977; Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership in the United States*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1976.

strata of the population in management at all levels, of training their skills in managing, was repeatedly emphasized. Genuine Marxist-Leninists always and persistently have declared themselves against any elitist notions of politics as a sphere of professional competence of a narrow circle of activists. Coincidentally they have never fallen into utopian enthusiasm and have never imagined that "every unskilled worker and every cook can just begin to govern the state".¹⁰ Wagelevelling is not inherent to socialism too, but is a distortion and deformation in the course of gaining genuine social justice. Socialism by its nature sets equal opportunities for all to develop their learning and talents, and their abilities and skills. That's why socialist society constantly seeks to improve the system of distribution of material and spiritual goods in order to make it to correspond most fully to the quantity and quality of labour and knowledge invested by every toiler for the commonwealth.

Elitism is alien to the very philosophical conception of Marxism, at the basis of which lies dialectical materialism. In substance, elite theories pre-suppose the presence of certain primary, invariable, given 'from above' qualities, which differentiate a part of humanity as being 'better', 'brighter', 'more perfect' than the others; it also presupposes a supernatural or suprasocietal order, which secures the unquestionable reproduction of the imposed system of division of society into 'elite' and 'defective mass'.

Monoracial societies, such as most European ones, do not offer any objective indicators (for instance, the colour of the skin) for speculatively distinguishing between people. That's why, the European Middle Ages gave birth to the myth of the 'blue blood', that supposedly flows in the veins of aristocracy, in contrast to the simple red blood of the 'crowd'. Biological science, however, is positive on the question that blood in all human beings is of one and the same colour and, within fully acceptable limits, of as nearly identical composition. Minimum differences and normal divergence in the physiological indicators do not warrant divisions into different social categories. Such divisions arise on the basis of different living conditions, created first of all by the existing social order, which grants to the dominating affluent social strata incomparable advantages for the complete development of ones physical and spiritual qualities, spanning from nutrition, medical care, training and education to advantages in occupying top positions in the social hierarchy. High social status is foreordained to great degree and

¹⁰V.I. Lenin, *Complete Works* (in Russian), Vol. 34, p. 315. See also O.M. Solovyov, S.I. Sorokin, "Politicheskaya aktivnost trudyashchikhsya kak faktor sovershenstvovaniya sotsialisticheskogo obshtestva" (Political Activity of Working Masses As a Factor of Improving Socialist Society) (in Russian), *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta*, Series 6, issue, 21, 1986, esp. pp. 17-21,

secures its reproduction in the next generations as well, when only accidental or sharp social change can offer a more or less full realization of talents and skills to at least a small part of oppressed and suffered people. In order to avoid or at least maximally to postpone social changes that are undesirable for the privileged minority, that menace its social status, it fences itself and its social position with various social myths.

Socialist society, unlike earlier class societies, does not need such invocations and immunisations. There is a simple explanation for this: socialism does not aim at maintaining and perpetuating power and privileges of one minority or another, which is the destiny of class social-economical formations; it seeks to surmount and destroy all privileges, social barriers and unjust distribution of wealth within the society. Indeed, this is the ideal—just society, for the attainment of which it is necessary to overcome mountains of objective and subjective troubles, of traditions, customs, settings and senses deposited over the centuries.

TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

For the purposes of our research, we need to reveal basic features of the political systems of People's Republic of Bulgaria and of the USA—the circumstances under which the processes and phenomena in question occur, the structures, within which politics proceed and democracy moves from an ideal abstraction to the sphere of concrete reality.¹¹

¹¹The category 'Political System', firstly appeared in an article written by V.I. Lenin more than 80 years ago, and has just now begun to enter widely in Marxist literature. It has, however, not yet been fully defined and is under discussion both in Marxist and Western political literature. Individual authors use it in very different, contradictory meaning. Some Marxist authors consider the categories of political system and political organization of society (for example, A.I. Denisov, "Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya-i-politicheskaya organizatsiya obshchestva" (Socialist Revolution and Political Organization of Society) (in Russian), Moscow, 1971, p. 71; Nora Ananieva, "Politicheskata sistema na suvremenniyat kapitalizam. Obshta kharakteristika-i-osnovni tendentsii na razvitiето" (Political System of Contemporary Capitalism. General Characteristics and Basic Tendencies of Development)—in collective work *Politicheskata sistemata na suvremenniya kapitalizam* (Political System of Contemporary Capitalism), (in Bulgarian) Sofia, Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1977, esp. pp. 10, 11, 56; Nikola Muleshkov, *Politichesk organizatsiya na obshchestvoto v NR Bulgaria* (Political Organization of Society in P.R. of Bulgaria), (in Bulgarian), Sofia, 1978, pp. 28-30; Kolyo Yotov, *Politicheskata organizatsiya na razvitoto sotsialisticheskoto obshchestvo*, (Political Organization of Developed Socialist society), (in Bulgarian), Sofia, 1981, pp. 12-15; M.N. Marchenko, *Politicheskaya sistema sovremennogo burzhoaznogo obshchestva* (Political System of Contemporary Bourgeois Society), (in Russian), Moscow, Nauka, 1981, pp. 3, 7, 41-42, and so on to be identical.)

The political system of the USA need not be represented in detail, since its components are quite familiar to every student. The United States of America is a bourgeois constitutional republic, built on federal principle. Federal power is divided among the two chambers of Congress—the Senate and the House of Representatives (legislative power)—, the President and his administration (executive power), and the Supreme Court (legal power). All members of the Chamber of representatives have a 2-year mandate, and senators a 6-year one; the President is

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cal. N.N. Razumovich, "Politicheskaya organizatsiya-i-politicheskaya sistema obshchestva" (Political Organization and Political System of Society)(in Russian), in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, n°1, January, 1975, esp. pp. 105, 109) defends the opinion that the category "political organization of society" has a wider connotation and includes the category "political system". Most Marxist authors consider that by its content category "political system" is wider, but they are not unanimous as to what enters in this content and, finally, what should be understood under this category. In the works of these authors, "political system" appears to be so "omnivorous" a notion, that it accommodates practically everything characterizing politics and political life as a whole from the point of view of philosophy, law (theory of the state and law), theory of the scientific communism: sociology, political economy, etc. (See B.N. Topornin, *Sovetskaya politicheskaya sistema* (Soviet Political System), (in Russian), Moscow, 1975, pp. 29-32; I.P. Ilyinsky, N.V. Chernogolovkin, "Politicheskaya sistema sovetskogo obshchestva: ponyatie i struktura" (Political System of Soviet Society: Notion and Structure) (in Russian) in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, n°1, January, 1977, pp. 11-14; *Problemy razvitiya politicheskoi sistemi sotsializma. Materialy mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma* (Problems of Development of Political System of Socialism: Material from an International Symposium) (in Russian), Moscow, 1978, part I, pp. 12, 73, 76; part II, pp. 54, 58, 84; F.M. Burlatskiy, "Sotsialisticheskoto obshchestvo: ponyatie i elementy (Socialist Society: Notion and Elements)—in collective work *Politicheskiye sistemy sovremennosti* (Political Systems of the Present), (in Russian), Moscow, Nauka, 1978; Peyko Slavov, "Struktura na politicheskata nadstroyka na sotsialisticheskoto obshtestvo" (Structure of Political Superstructure of Socialist Society) in collective work *Usuvurshenstvuvane na politicheskata nadstroyka na sotsialisticheskoto obshtestvo* (Improving of the Political Superstructure of Socialist Society) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo Publishing House, 1985, esp. pp. 46-47; Stoyan Petrov, *Sushtnost i kharakterni cherti na politicheskata sistema v NRB* (Essence and Characteristic Features of the Political System in PRB) in collective work *(Po-)Politicheskata sistema na sotsializma v NR Bulgariya* political System of Socialism in Peoples Republic of Bulgaria) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Partizdat, 1985, pp. 7-10, as well as in many others. The causes of these differences and vagueness are rooted in the fact of the incomplete emancipation of Marxist political science (including here sociology of politics too) from other social sciences. We consider that to a certain extent a misunderstanding lies behind the category of "political organization". The political system from a sociological point of view can be regarded most generally as as a particular (political) organizing (ordering) of society, a specific cross-section of the social system. The political system isn't exhausted by the structural elements inherent to the political sphere, such as state, political parties and organizations, political relations, and so on, but is spread over, penetrates the whole society, all its spheres and components.

elected for four years, and can be re-elected only once. Members of the Supreme Court, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, have lifelong mandate (with the right to resign on their own wish). Each of the 50 states participating in the American Union, has its own legislative power (state Senate and legislative assembly), executive power (Governor and state administration), legal power (state Supreme Court). The separate constitution and legislation of each state define the mandates of tenure of the elected officials. Election for the seats, freed because of expiring mandate and other causes (death, resignation, impeachment, etc.) runs once in two years, most often "on the first Tuesday after the first Monday" of the month of November. In leap-years on this day, elections are held for President, Vice-president, the whole House of representatives, for about one-third of the composition of the Senate, as well as for personalities of state, city and communities (countries) nomenclature; those are the 'large elections'; the mid-term ones in the middle of the Presidential mandate, are 'small ones'. Election of the legislators at each level is direct, while Presidential elections are indirect: on election day voters give their votes, as a matter of fact, not directly for their preferred candidate for the supreme position, but only for electioneers, who gather about a month later in Washington, D.C. for a final voting. According to XXVI Constitutional Amendment, adopted in 1971, all American citizens, 18 years old and more, are eligible for voting.

The division of powers, uncoinciding mandates of separate branches of power, as well as the whole system of specific mechanisms for appointment, approval of appointees, legislative initiative, formation of the legislation, adoption of bills and transformation of bills into laws, as well as checking their constitutionality by the Supreme Court—all this, by the project of the Founding Fathers aims to prevent any abuse of power and to guarantee the democratic process through the well known system of checks-and-balances, developed in the USA more than anywhere in the world.

An especially important feature of the US political system is the monopolization of almost the entire political spectrum—appreciably right-oriented in comparison, for instance, with West European industrialized countries or, at least, lacking a real and strong political left—by two big political parties, Republicans and Democrats. Already, during 150 years, these parties have successively interchanged the power without offering any real political alternative to the existing socio-political order, channelizing political demands and conflict, and reducing them to a trifling individual insistence on minor reforms, advantages or benefits for individuals, or limited groups of the population.

A definite role in the American political process play the multiple interest groups of the individual strata or the population, mass media

(and, first of all, the TV) factors, which we cannot discuss in detail here.¹² But as American researchers themselves confess, money plays an especially important role in American politics, and this role of the money in the policy formulation is constantly increasing.¹³ This circumstance in itself is an indication of the real dimensions of democracy in the USA, about its specific class address.

We find it necessary to dwell in greater detail on the characteristics of the Bulgarian political system, because hardly familiar to. Being a political system of the socialism, its nature has often been deliberately distorted for ideological reasons, although the Bulgarian case, for better or worse, is not so attractive for the Western 'Marxologists', as other ones are.

The popular democratic revolution in our country triumphed on 9th of September, 1944, as a result of a long struggle of the Bulgarian people under the leadership of the Communist Party against internal and foreign enslavers and fascists; it happened with the decisive assistance of the Soviet Army, which undertook a general offensive against Hitlerist Nazism and its fascist allies and satellites. Contrary to a number of lies, the new power in Bulgaria was not brought on the armour of Soviet tanks or descended by parachutes. It arose and affirmed itself in the framework of a broad popular movement, the Fatherland Front, which united all antifascists and democrats within the country and grew gradually as the most authoritative and representative political force in the country. This was a new, different from the Soviet type of political system, aptly called by the then leader of the Bulgarian communists, G. Dimitrov, 'people's democracy'.

The formation of the political system of socialism in Bulgaria passed through two stages. The first one (1944-1947) was characterized by political pluralism. The country was run by old bourgeois Constitution¹⁴ and until the nationwide referendum in September 1946, the

¹²See for more details, William Rivers, *The Other Government*, N.Y., Universe Books, 1982; Dan D. Nimmo, Reith R. Sanders (eds.), *Handbook of Political Communication*, L.A., Sage Publications, 1981, esp. pp. 121-140.

¹³See Michael J. Malbin (ed.), *Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws*, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980; Gary Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980; Herbert E. Alexander, *Money in Politics*, Washington, DC, Public Affairs Press, 1972.

¹⁴The bourgeois Constitution of Bulgaria—the Tirnovo Constitution (adopted in 1878), elaborated on the basis of the Belgian fundamental law, was a progressive and democratic one for its time. But under the conditions of sharp factional conflicts, unprincipled struggle for power among various groupings of the bourgeoisie, and continuous splitting up of society, it couldn't survive, and fascist regimes during the twenties and early forties abolished it completely. Resorted by the Fatherland's Front

monarchist form of government was conserved; during this period the country was governed by a Regency, one of the members of which was a communist (academician and philosopher Todor Pavlov). Some of the organs of the old state apparatus, especially those compromised with persecution of the people and police terror, were eliminated, and in the Armed Forces there was effected a deep reconstruction while the army was included, and participated together with the Allied Forces in the routing of Hitlerist Germany. Promoted mostly by the USA and Great Britain, within the country emerged and became active numerous oppositional groupings and parties—some of them armed and realized subversive terrorist activity—which, however, didn't enjoy public support and popularity and couldn't find agreement between themselves either. The decisive victory of the Fatherland Front and first of all of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the elections in 1946 definitively deprived the opposition of hope to halt the development of the country toward socialism by parliamentary, legal way and devices and pushed it on the way of adventurism and plotting. In such a manner, it put itself outside the law.

The second stage of formation of the political system of socialism in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1948-1959) began with the transformation of the Fatherland Front (FF) from a multiparty coalition in slender socio-political organization—some kind of 'super organization', uniting all political parties and mass organizations within the country and all the people without importance of their party affiliation, ethnicity, religiosity, and social status. Two of the parties—coorganizers of the FF, *i.e.*, the political circle 'Zveno' ('Link'), and the Radical Party—dissolved themselves because of loss of social support. The Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party united itself with the Bulgarian Communist Party in a common party of working class. As a second political party in the country, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BZNS) was kept and it acts until now. Step by step a new state apparatus was built, which corresponded to the demands of socialist construction. A new type of mass organizations were built too—the Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (DKMS), the Committee of the Movement of Bulgarian Women, etc. A qualitatively new type of political relations were to be confirmed. On the basis of broad and conscious understanding of Marxist ideology, socialist political consciousness and the political culture of the working people were built up.

An important role for the restoration of the Leninist norms of

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government in Autumn of 1944, it functioned until the adoption in 1947 of the Dimitrovan Constitution. In 1971, through a nationwide referendum, a new Constitution was adopted, which corresponds to the present stage of socio-historical development, and which functions now too.

political party and social life, violated during the period of the cult of personality around and after the death of the leader and teacher of Bulgarian people, G. Dimitrov, played the April plenum of the CC of BCP (1956). In the words of the General Secretary of CC of BCP, Todor Zhivkov, the April plenum "gave scope to the interest of individual man...gave scope to the interests of different social groups and classes and for the nation's interest as a whole".¹⁵

The core and fundamental leading and directing force in the political system of People's Republic of Bulgaria is the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)—"a supreme form of organization of the working class, its tested Marxist-Leninist vanguard, commonly acknowledged leader of the people".¹⁶ About 15 per cent of the adult population of the country constitutes the membership of the BCP, but its policy enjoys the support of all the people. Primary party organizations play active role in all spheres of social life, and in all labour collectives. Yet they are not closed systems, 'secret fraternities', but discuss many of the most important social problems openly and together with non-members and members of the Communist Youth.

An important peculiarity of the political system of People's Republic of Bulgaria is its two-party character. Multi-party systems exist in other socialist countries as well—for example GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, People's Democratic Republic of Korea—and this is a result of concrete historical circumstances in each of these countries. The place of the BZNS in the structure of political system in Bulgaria is conditioned by historical as well as socio-economic causes, and first of all by the great relative share of the peasantry in Bulgarian population and the high importance of agricultural production in the underindustrialized Bulgarian economy in the past. BZNS overcame its characteristic erroneous conceptions about 'independent peasant power' and 'leading role of peasant masses in social life' and entirely assimilated the programme of BCP for socialist construction in Bulgaria.

Fatherland Front occupies a very important place in Bulgarian political system as a binding link between the state and people, between state, political parties and mass organizations within the country, 'the most mass stronghold of the people's power'.

Each political system has to develop and improve itself. If not, a political system will cease to fulfil its functions of maintaining an

¹⁵Todor Zhivkov, "*Problemi i podhodi na izgrazhdaneto na zreliya sotsializam v NR Bulgariya* (Problems and Approaches of Building up of Matured Socialism in P.R. of Bulgaria) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Partizdat, 1984, p. 176. See also Goran Goranov, Lyuben Nikolov, Mincho Semov, *Aprilskata liniya—progresat, politikata, lichnostta* (The April Line—The Progress, the Politics, the Personality) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Partizdat, 1981.

¹⁶*Programa na BCP* (The Programme of the Bulgarian Communist Party) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Partizdat, 1971, p. 110.

optimal environment for established socio-economic relations, it will change from a regulator and engine of social development into a handicap. Under the conditions of socialism, when social development is directed along new tracks, the optimal functioning of the political system acquires decisive importance. Under class societies, the meaning and destination of the political system, to a great degree, is reduced to the functions of protecting private ownership and exploiter economic relations in society, and of defending the exclusive rights of a definitive class or social stratum. Thus, it plays the role of a subordinate element in respect to the economic system of society and follows in a haphazard way the changes emerging within the economic system (connected with economic cycles and field's dynamics of the infrastructure), simply adjusting, adapting itself toward them. Under socialism, things are more complex. Here we have a radical transformation of society, because of which, especially in the case of societies insufficiently developed economically and culturally, the political system assumes to the greatest possible degree the guiding and regulative, directing functions toward other social sub-systems (spheres, components) of the society. The responsibility of the subjective factor (*i.e.*, the party-vanguard, which is the collective mind and leader of society) for the integral development and advancement of society increases as never before. Under these conditions, temptation of resorting to administrative-command, *i.e.*, essentially to authoritarian methods of management is enormous. If there exists at all a necessity for such methods, this is only for a brief historical period of time and corresponds to the concrete historical circumstances a serious inner and external threat to new power. When, however, one relies exclusively on such style and methods of management—which is tantamount to transformation of the political system into a limitless tutor of society—then the consequences are harmful and stagnation of whole social development comes instead of the expected rapid growth.

Having found themselves in specific, extreme socio-historical conditions, socialist countries, including People's Republic of Bulgaria, could not avoid such deviations in some degree or another. In Bulgaria, during more than thirty years a search is proceeding for creating a political system of socialism, adequate to Bulgarian conditions. In this respect, Bulgaria has something to be proud of, which however is far from being the ultimate achievement.

Parallel to the innovating processes in the Soviet political system, in some instances even before them, here in Bulgaria broad changes have been taking place. The most important among them are decentralization and democratization of management of economy—economic independence of separate economic units, debureaucratization of the state apparatus (substitution of the branch ministries by associations of

producers and a reform of banking). There is going on an emancipation of the planification system, direct contacts and development of joint ventures with partners abroad are encouraged. Labour collectives affirm themselves as direct owners of the means of production, and their managers are no longer appointed from above, but are elected by the workers. This means, as a matter of fact, complete redistribution of the economic power in the society. A harmonious system for answering the petitions and complaints of the population has been built, which gives opportunities for all branches and levels of state power to inform themselves more directly and to see to lawfulness and social justice. Some years ago, there was formed in the People's Assembly a special standing commission for defending of social interests and rights of the citizens. With adoption by the People's Assembly (the Bulgarian Parliament) in July 1987 of the Declaration for Transformation of Communities* into self-governing communities of population, the preparatory stage of transition toward a new, higher type of democracy was completed. Its essence is power of the working man, realization of his political and civil rights under the conditions of socialist self-management. As it is emphasized in the Declaration, "thus a new structure of the power will be built in the aspect of territory, where state and social principle will merge, the working people will become subjects of management, the conditions will appear for power in the name of the people to pass into power through the people".⁷

These processes in essence represent revolutionary changes in the political system and in social relations as a whole. An added thrust for their further development and deepening were the decisions of the July plenary session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1987)—Basic Theses of the Conception for further Construction of Socialism.¹⁸ Some of the proposed changes are under wide discussion and will probably result in amendments to the Constitution, which will be voted on a national referendum. The question is about problems, whose solution in the concrete and specific Bulgarian conditions are

*Smallest territorial unit in the Bulgarian administrative division.

¹⁷"Deklaratsiya na Narodnoto subranie na Narodna republika Bulgariya za prevrushtane na obshtinite v samoupravlyavashti se obshtnosti na naselenieto" (Declaration of People's Assembly of People's Republic of Bulgaria about the Transformation of Territorial Communities into Self-governing Communities of the population) (in Bulgarian) in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, No. 189, July 8, 1987.

¹⁸"Osnovni polozheniya na kontseptsiyata za po-natatushno izgrazhdane na sotsializma v. NR Bulgariya" (Basic Theses of the Conception about Further Building of Socialism in P.R. of Bulgaria) (in Bulgarian), in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, No. 210, July 29, 1987. Soon after the adoption of this document by the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, it was issued in mass edition as a booklet.

expected to correspond to the ambitions of socialism as a society and order of the future, to meet the challenges of the new century.

ABOUT THE 'ELITES' UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIALISM

On the previous pages, we have produced arguments against applying the category of 'elite' in Marxist sociology. There is no contradiction when we use this category here. We are speaking about a specific group of the population, which at a certain stage of development of socialism, owing to concrete and transitional circumstances—specific tasks faced by the political system, acute shortage of cadres, deficit of goods and services—found themselves in a privileged position in respect to the mass of population. This seems to be a temporary deviation from the social ideals of socialism, which will be overcome with the development and improvement of socio-economic infrastructure.

During the first years of socialist construction, the restrictions imposed upon certain categories of the population, such as the representatives of the former governing circles as well as privileges for other categories—such as the former oppressed social strata, active participants in the revolutionary struggle and others for occupying leading position, better education and qualification—seemed warranted. But gradually these restrictions and privileges became obsolete and harmful for the development of the new society. A serious danger is of the formation of a specific social stratum, which is like vermin living on the unjustifiable privileges of supply and service, higher pay, admission of their children to more prestigious schools and specializations in the higher education, and so on. This is the group of the so-called *nomenklatura* cadres and their families, which can justly be called 'a socialist elite'. The very existence of it can in time become malignant tumor on the body of socialism. As it is emphasized in the Basic Theses of the Conception for Further Construction of Socialism in People's Republic of Bulgaria, *up to the present time applied way of construction and functioning of the system of hierarchy has led to the formation of a bureaucratic layer:*

- This layer has created its own standard along tens, hundreds of channels and leads to a deficient sensitiveness towards the problems of people.
- It is not a large one, but the harm it does in striving for the preservation of the *status quo*, for preserving the occupied positions and jobs, is not small one. We mean bureaucracy and its bearers, but not employees and specialists in general, which in their majority are working honestly.¹⁹

¹⁹*Basic Theses of the Conception for Further Building of Socialism in P.R. of Bulgaria, op. cit.*, Section III.

The question of 'elites under socialism' is among those, which are of great speculative value in bourgeois Marxology. In numerous books and articles there have been allegations that socialism supposedly regularly raises a specific privileged estate—'nomenklatura', composed of functionaries ('apparatchiks') in positions of responsibility in state governing apparatus, and their relatives and entourage. They enjoy special privileges, do their shopping in special stores, are served by specially created system for them, dispose of special means of transport, rest in isolated and luxurious resorts, etc.²⁰ Bourgeois Marxologists tend to prove that socialism is inevitably bound to the existence of this 'elite'.

We have to make here a specification of a more general character. A number of privileges mentioned above are an attribute of all personalities at power whether in capitalist, socialist or developing countries. A statesman is a person with peculiar responsibilities and many of the advantages granted to him are stipulated by the specificity of his job. It is entirely natural that at least during his tenure the special measures for security, transport, supply and services include the members of his family as well, in order to free him from additional cares. All this is common practice everywhere in the world with inevitable differences and variations, dictated by concrete conditions, local customs, the degree of development of society, and so on. A common problem for all societies is to develop an effective system of control, to eliminate corruption. A thankless task, however, is to make hostile speculations about the shortcomings, the 'shady sides' of a given society.

Hence, the presence of definite privileges is not in itself a criterion for the classification of state functionaries under socialism into a special category and for opposing them to the mass, the people. Besides that, there is something which the above mentioned 'critics' of socialism deliberately omit noticing. Under Bulgarian conditions, special medical institutions, holiday homes, etc., are not exclusively reserved for a narrow circle of the privileged, but serve a rather wide contingency of honoured men and women in the country—the best workers, prominent representatives of art, science, literature and culture, and veterans of the revolutionary struggles. By its nature, the social policy of socialism is much more human and all-embracing than that of the most developed bourgeois democracies.

It is a different question that socialist society is composed of and managed by the same human beings with corresponding weakness and temptations. That is why the socialist society is not insured against defor-

²⁰Walter D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in East Europe and the USSR*, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979, esp. pp. 47-48, 79-83, 223, 248-259, 308; George Schopflin, "Corruption, Informalism, Irregularity in Eastern Europe: A Political Analysis", in *Sudosteuropa*, Jg 33, Heft 7-8, 1984, S. 389-401,

mations, power abuses, corruption and distortions of different kind. Reality is always far more crude and imperfect than the dreamed ideal pattern. In this case, it is necessary to make a careful analysis in order to discover the causes of such phenomena and on this basis to seek ways to eradicate them, instead of giving malicious hoots from behind the corner. Researchers in a socialist society are not trying to avoid this task but are at great pains to solve it.

Bearers of such negative social diseases are first of all the bureaucratized managing links. "In family inter-relations, in relations between workers in labour collective, between students, relatives, friends, in general, between equally situated personalities there is no corruption—concludes the Bulgarian scholar Baicho Panev—it (corruption) emerges when people meet with services and institutions, where there is some kind of dependence of citizens on the decisions of these services and institutions."²¹ The still existing lower standard of living in socialist countries compared with most advanced industrialized countries raises natural aspiration in those able to afford it, to 'hasten' to make up for the difference, when, taking advantage of their social position, they build large private country houses, purchase luxurious Western cars, sumptuous furniture and so on. "Privileges create a feeling of impunity, an unhealthy elitist mood, avidity. They are one of the preconditions for corrupting of individual personalities endowed with power and social self-confidence. Their moving away from the way of life of the working people is at the same time moving away from the popular virtues—modesty, democratism, honesty and relying only on earned income.... The existence of 'millionaires' and of families with insufficient income cannot be considered normal in a society, that is speeding toward the creation of social homogeneity."²² High positions, however, are not an immunity against punishment. In recent years, in Bulgaria a number of high employees were condemned, whose behaviour thoroughly provoked wide public indignation: a vice-minister of foreign trade, a retired general, a chairman and secretary of a district people's councils in the nation's capital, chairmen of agrarian-production complexes (enterprises for agricultural production), the chief executive of the Sofia City Committee for State and People's Control, administrative and economic managers at different levels, inspectors, accountant generals, university instructors, foreign trade officials, sports managers, functionaries in the

²¹Baycho Panev, "Koruptsiyata i putishtata za neinoto izkorenyavane" (Corruption and Ways for Its Eradication) (in Bulgarian)—in, *Politicheska Prosveta*, June 1987, p. 47. Compare also with: Deodem, "Obshtestvenata otsenka za bakshisha i podkupa kato proyavi na koruptsiya" (Social Estimation of the Tipping and Bribery as Types of Corruption) (in Bulgarian) in *Sotsiologicheski Problemi*, No. 6, 1922, esp. pp. 52-52, 61-62.

²²B. Panev, *Koruptsiyata i putishtata za neinoto izkorenyavane...*, p. 50.

system of the Ministry of the Interior, etc.

Social strata with material resources that considerably exceed the average ones possibly appear under the conditions of socialism even outside the category of high public officials. Such, for instance, are individual representatives of the artistic-creative intelligentsia, especially those who are on tours abroad, as well as sports stars, whose incomes are far above the average ones for the country. They are exposed to the strong temptation of imitating their colleagues from the Western consumer societies in their style of life. Such a stratum emerges with the formation of the so-called 'second' or 'shady' economy—legal, semi-legal or illegal extraction of profits and unearned income, in most cases avoiding taxation, owing to private production, trade, speculation, and so on. Under the conditions of socialism, personal initiative was for a long time restricted and persecuted, it was looked upon with excessive suspicion, which led to harmful consequences. The socialist state, confronted with multiple and difficult tasks in the economic and social spheres, was not able to satisfy the constantly increasing needs of the population, especially with agricultural commodities and public utilities. Therefore, it was correctly estimated that in these fields the personal initiative of citizens has to be encouraged, without infringing the principles of socialism and legality. It is inadmissible for personal initiative to cause damage to the national economy, to lead to illegal enrichment of individual people, or to exploitation of hired labour. For this purpose, it is necessary to exercise more wide and varied social control.

In contrast to other socialist countries—Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia²³—in Bulgaria the above mentioned social strata are comparatively fewer and with more restricted possibilities. Causes of this are rooted both in the smaller size of the country, as well in the weaker display of personal initiative until recently, stronger control over it, and so on. The governmental decree adopted in the summer of 1987 concerning productive activity and services outside the state enterprises undoubtedly will lead to significant changes in this field. The dynamics and development of these specific strata under the conditions of socialism demand special attention on the part of sociologists.

Following the logic of the progressive changes and extended democracy, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party took important decisions during the summer of 1987, which aim, as much as possible, at overcoming factors, leading to social stratification and inequality. These decisions abolished honorary titles,

²³See, for instance, "Private Wealth and Society", an interview with Prof. Katalin Szikra in *Hungarian Digest*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 16-19, in which some feature of the "excessively rich" Hungarians are described.

given to public and cultural figures and bringing additional lifelong material rewards; earlier practice of celebration, glorification, and decoration of living and acting political men and women, as well as privileges of admission to educational institutions for certain categories of people and their children were also ceased.

THE SOCIAL-CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIETY—A KEY TO ESTIMATING ITS DEMOCRATISM

In analysis, it is of utmost importance to analyse the social-class structure²⁴ of the societies we are comparing, *i.e.*, Bulgarian and American. The social-class structure of society reflects most fully and precisely the fundamental characteristics of its economic basis. In this way, it represents by its very nature a reflection of the economic basis of society. The adequate correspondence and interweaving between the social-class structure and the political system is a fundamental guarantee and most precise criterion of its democratism. This means that in such a political system, individual social classes, groups and strata with their interests are correctly represented (reflected) as to the greatest possible degree, retaining their proportional weight in the 'general totality', in the society as a whole. If this condition were observed, we could rightly say that the given political system and social order is democratic. If it is not, *i.e.*, if we observe serious disproportions and deviations in representation of individual social groups, over-representation of some at the expense of

²⁴During recent years, Marxist researchers in socialist countries are increasingly dissatisfied with the limited treatments of the content of category "socio-class structure" and are striving for deepening and concretization of social analysis, which was demonstrated in some of the papers presented at XIth World Congress of Sociology at New Delhi, 1986. See Manfred Lotsch, N. Prufer, *Workstyles as an Aspect of Lifestyles: Findings from Recent Investigations*, esp. p. 2; Tamas Kolosi, *Structural Groups and the Reform in Hungary*; Lidia Beskid, *Equality and Inequality in Socialism on the Basis of Polish Materials*; Nikolai Tilkidgiev, *Changes in the Social Structure in Contemporary Bulgarian Society*. According to the Bulgarian Sociologist Nikolai Tilkidgiev, "stratum structure is a transitional socio-class type of structure, which no longer is an inherently class structure (because of the destruction of the dichotomic character of the existing class relations, and, together with, of the classes themselves), and, from the other side—it *isn't yet* emancipated from all socio-differentiating factors of social inequality. In this sense it still isn't transformed into socio-professional structure. . . . Indeed, being a transitional type, the stratum structure is not a perpetually changing formation, but possesses relative stability." N. Tilkidgiev, "Sloevata struktura na sotsialisticheskoto obshtestvo" (Stratum Structure of Socialist Society) (in Bulgarian), in *Sotsiologicheski Problemi*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 11-42, esp. p. 29. Here we apply the category "socio-class structure of society" as the widest, generic notion, which can be applied to all kinds of societies, and concretized according to the conditions of a given society,

others, then a serious divergence from democratic principles is present, and no idle talk can refute conclusion of lack of democracy.

As Krustyo Dimitrov, one of the prominent researchers of these problems in Bulgarian sociology, has written, "social-class structure is the basic nucleus of the social structure within each socio-economic formation. First, its components stem directly from the mode of production of material goods and from relations between men in the process of social work—a determining type of relations in the system of social relations. Second, social work, whose group human subject is also a sub-stratum of the social-class structure, creates material and spiritual values, necessary for the existence and development of human beings, of their social groups and communities of the whole society. Third, *it directly conditions the character of the political and cultural-ideological superstructure of society and through them influences the nature of the other social groups and communities, of the whole social order* It expresses the social inequality that exists not only in the socio-economical situation of people, but in their socio-political role in the society Briefly, it directly generates and most precisely expresses the hierarchy in social inequality and social relations."²⁵

In American sociology, there exists a long tradition of denying the class division of American society. Several generations of American sociologists have made great efforts to prove that classes are "an European invention" and that in the United States class contradictions have lost their edge in comparison with those in Europe. Arthur F. Bentley, the first American sociologist to have become acquainted in the end of last century with some of the works of Karl Marx, qualified Marx's theory of class division of society and class struggle as 'too crude'. Instead, he proposed a structural model of society, composed of multiple, mutually overlapping—vertically and horizontally—"interest groups". The interest that moves them is not necessarily mainly economic; economic interest is completely equal in force and potentiality for causing certain social movement with all other possible interests—cultural, aesthetic, religious, love for nature and animals, gastronomical, and so on. These numerous interest groups are found to be in permanent motion—they arise, increase, merge, come apart, in order to open the way for new

²⁵Krustyo Dimitrov, "Teoretiko-metodologicheski problemi (na sotsialnoklasovata struktura)" (Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Socio-Class Structure) in *Collected Work Sotsialnoklasovata struktura na suvremenoto bulgarsko obshtestvo (tendentsii i problem)* (Socio-Class Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society (Tendencies and Problems) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo Publishing House, 1986, p. 19, Comp. with Deodem, "Sotsialno-klasovata struktura" (Socio-Class Structure) in collective work *Sotsiologicheskata struktura hasuvremenoto bulgarsko obshtestvo* (Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society) (in Bulgarian), Sofia, Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1976, pp. 83-114.

formations—just like the chaotic motion of micro-organisms in a drop of water. Individual groups are found to be in a permanent conflict between each other (conflict, but not struggle) in which they solve their contradictions as well-bred men—through bargaining and compromise. All that remains for the organs of state authority is simply to ratify ('to stamp') the results of the situational balance. Under such a system, those who lose today, can hope to gain success and profit tomorrow, *i.e.*, no one is permanently deprived or privileged ('zero-sum-game').

With very little changes, this conception is maintained till today as pivotal for pluralist views of democracy. Generally, pluralists consider power to be the ability (potential) of individuals or groups to realize their will in political conflict. Those of them who have the resources needed to impose their will on others in a given situation, therefore, dispose of power in this situation, which supposes that the 'power' changes hands when the situation changes and goes to other individuals or groups. Pluralists consider that there exists numerous resources relevant to power. One of the most prominent representatives of this trend in American sociology, Robert A. Dahl, points out some such resources: money and credit; control over jobs; control over the information of others; social standing; knowledge and experience; popularity; esteem and charisma; legality; constitutionality; ethnic solidarity; and the right to vote²⁶. Dahl and like-minded scholars do not pay attention to the question of heterogeneous categories, some of which—for example, ethnic solidarity—are very unrelated in meaning, while the other ones—money, control over the information and over jobs—are mutually presupposed. Is it really possible that a person who disposes of financial resources, would lack control over jobs in the respective field? Social standing is in direct dependence on the place, occupied by a given person in the society, *i.e.*, his role in the social production, his relation toward the means of production, etc. The knowledge and experience of an unemployed person is not worth a brass farthing—having only them, he can not maintain his family. Popularity and charisma in a lot of cases have proved powerless against the overwhelming might of powerholders, and the age of the TV make-up and popularization campaign-makers—backed up by Big Money—our notion of charm and charisma has strongly modified. Legality and constitutionality can easily be transformed into bigotry. Without any foundation, pluralists insist that the question amounts to an 'unequal allocation' of these resources in society, from which they conclude that power is not concentrated in one social group, but is dispersed in the whole society. The simple but fallacious reasoning of pluralists consists in breaking down the notion of power in society and its substituting by a multiple of variations of 'power', each of

²⁶Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1961.

them with its own value and limited space of manifestation. For example, ethnic solidarity and the right to vote can be of decisive significance for the results of given elections, but they have only a slight influence on the direction of economic policy which manages 'power' of those, who control finances and employment. Postulating the unequal value and significance of resources relevant to power in the different spheres of political conflict, pluralists tacitly, but triumphantly press on the reader the doubtful conclusion that individual communities in the American society as a whole are approaching or even already have attained the ideal of a 'good society', having primordial democratic distribution of power.

There exists enough proof that picture zealously offered by pluralists relating to American society is utopian and remote from reality. A number of American scholars, on the basis of broad empirical data, reveal the narrow populational foundation of 'Big Power' in the USA. As, for example, Thomas R. Dye and John Pickering, who compared a number of indicators, such as social background, the place where person has received his education, profession, income, etc., establish, that more of 30 per cent of the persons occupying responsible public positions in the USA are connected with the higher ('top') one per cent of social structure of the society, *i.e.*, with its 'cream', elite.²⁷ Thomas R. Dye, William Domhoff and others reveal that elites in different spheres of society—politics, business, military, education, artistic culture, etc.—have approximately the same background, almost without exception connected with that, which Marxists call the upper and middle bourgeoisie, and American sociologists prefer to designate them—without significantly changing the essence of the thing—as 'upper' and 'upper middle' classes. They have received their education, as a rule, in one of the dozen elite colleges and universities (for example, the so-called 'Ivy League'). Their private wealth is calculated to reach hundreds of thousands, and often, millions of dollars. Their wives have usually the same social status, and their children are following in the footsteps of their fathers and forefathers, reproducing the elite attached to 'Big Power' and 'Big Business'. And, in addition, they are, as a rule, members of strictly exclusive prestigious private clubs, and as regards their affiliation to socio-political organizations, their preference here is apparently on

²⁷Thomas R. Dye, John W. Pickering, "Governmental and Corporate Elites Convergence and Differentiation", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 3, July 1974, pp. 900-25, esp. pp. 900-905; Thomas R. Dye, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-53; G. William Domhoff, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 126-29, 136-43, 146-51. As concluded by Domhoff, "Involvement in government is only the final and most visible aspect of power elite domination, which has its roots in the class structure, the nature of the economy, and the functioning of the policy-planning and opinion-shaping networks", *Ibid.*, p. 150.

the side of right-wing, chauvinistic groupings, prestigious and powerful business organizations and associations of highly-paid professionals, whereas a membership card of trade unions, for example, or of democratic (to say, antiwar) organizations, is a compromising and suspicion-arousing document.²⁸ There in the "country of unlimited opportunities" the expensive and prestigious schools are practically closed for workers' children, which means that roads to a significant career in the fields of politics, business, and whatever social sphere, are closed too. The higher up we go in the social hierarchy, the fewer children of workers we find. The superior ranks of power in the USA up to now can be expressed by the abbreviation WASP: White man, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant. To this invariable characteristics of the ruling elite we can add two more qualities: more than decent pecuniary situation, a rank in the military reserve, and, so much the better, war veteranship. During the recent two decades, a requirement for membership in the executive branches of management at all levels—in politics and business—of representatives of coloured ethnical minorities and women was asseverated; this rule, however, was cynically ironized by the ex-Secretary of Labour in President Reagan's Administration, R. Donovan, who summed it up in the words: "Black, Jew, Woman, and Disabled". But this 'opening' to traditionally non-privileged social groups still brings no essential change in power-relations in the United States. Even American authors have called the long exclusion of Afro-Americans, a significant group by its share in the population and by its role in public production and public life, "a dramatic and sad example".²⁹ During the period immediately after the Civil War, owing to special election regulation imposed by the fighters against slavery, for the first time in the history of the USA two Negroes became US Senators, and twentyfour Black Americans were elected Southern Representatives. Afterwards this representation declined—Edward Brook, the next Black US Senator, was elected as late as 100 years later, and he acted in the Upper House of the US Congress only one term. From 1900 till 1928, no Black Americans were elected to Congress from any part of the country; from 1928 Black Congressmen

²⁸See G. William Domhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-32, 37-41, 44-51. "... there is an interacting and intermarrying upper social stratum or social elite in America that is distinctive enough in its institutions, source and amount of income, and life-style to be called an "upper class"...Not everyone in this nationwide upper class knows everyone else, but everybody who knows someone in other areas of the country thanks to a common school experience, a summer at the same resort, or membership in the same social club", *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

²⁹Lucius J. Barker, Jesse J. McCorry Jr., *Black Americans and the Political System*, N.Y, Winthrop Publishers, 1976, esp. pp. 270-73; James Mac Gregor Burns, J.W. Peltason, Thomas E. Cronin, *Government by the People*, 12th Alternate edn., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1985, pp. 90, 97-101, 105-107, 115, 179-82, 278-79.

began to be elected in the industrial centres of the north-east (Chicago, Boston, Detroit, New York, etc.). Andrew Young was the first Negro-Congressman, elected from the southern states (Atlanta, Georgia) after a 72-year interval. In the present 100th US Congress are sitting 22 Black Congressmen from a total of 435 members of the House (four of them were first elected in 1986, and nearly all of them are Democrats)—approximately as many as in previous several compositions of the House of Representatives, which is far from proportional to the share of the Afro-Americans in the population, or of their real social role. There is not any Afro-American in the US Senate. In 1984, a total of 5,000 Black American men and women occupied different positions as elected officials in the country, which is equal to scarcely one per cent of all elected officials in the USA. Not a single Negro during the whole history of the USA—with the exception of an isolated case in Louisiana, immediately after the Civil War, and only for a month—has ever been a State Governor.³⁰ A similar situation is observed with the explosively increasing Hispanic minority, which continues to suffer significant under-representation in the branches of power.

The political system of the USA turns out to be closed for women too. Women were deprived even of voting rights until 1920. As American investigators show, a significant obstacle for women candidates is the lack of access to the badly needed funds for the more increasingly expensive election campaigns. This is connected with their professional (which also means social) status: women applying for official public jobs are most often housewives or if they are employed, their vocation is most often from the area of those considered feminine ones, such as secretary, primary or secondary school teacher, nurse or social worker. Their political experience is accumulated mainly in work in public organizations or party groups at the local level, while it is most usual for men to devote themselves to a political career in law or business.³¹ Although the share of women-voters, at least slightly, outweighs that of men in the US electorate, yet hardly 21 women now are deputies in the House of Representatives (Congresswomen) (in the 99th Congress-22). There are only two women Senators, and as many women—state Governors. It is noteworthy to mention that in most cases the women elected to such positions, are most often widows or daughters of former Senators, Congressmen, and Governors, *i.e.*, they simply inherit the career of their father or husband.

It is necessary to mention also that the women and representatives of

³⁰Keesing's, Vol. XXXII.

³¹See Marilyn Johnson, Susan Carroll, *Profile of Women Holding Office II*, Washington, DC, Center for the American Women and Politics, 1978; Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman, "Changes in Public Attitudes Toward Women in Politics", *Social Science Quarterly*, June 1982, pp. 312-22.

ethnic minorities holding different positions in the branches of power at various level in the USA, as a rule, represent bourgeois social strata. Their presence in these branches does not essentially alter the social-class portrait of power. The same is true in connection with a certain rejuvenation of the average age of the members of the US Congress, which is to be observed in recent years. Young men, who take up a political career, by their social characteristics don't differ very much from the older generation of politicians. Essentially, the question amounts not to a process of renovation in the broad sense of this category, but to a natural succession of generations. Owing to the laws of nature, these people, who came into the US Senate and House in the years around and after World War II, release now their seats, since they have made their political career a profitable profession and have been re-elected successively ten and more terms in the House and for 25-30 years on end in the Senate. For the present, there are no signs of tendencies toward formal or non-formal restriction of the period of public office-holding in the supreme organs of the legislative power in the USA—a circumstance, which is recognized by American observers and commentators to be a factor for conservatism.

As for the so-called 'mass' (grassroots) politics, its manifestations in the USA have been nearly reduced to participation in elections and affiliation to public organizations ('interest groups', according to the American political terminology).

Although some American authors try to convince us of the opposite, yet there is a sufficiently clear and empirically observable tendency of priority of membership in one—most often professional—economic organization rather than other possible memberships into church, humanitarian or simply hobby-groups, clubs, and associations. The fact that no worker can belong to the same philatelic society as his boss, for example, neither the worker becomes more of a capitalist, nor the owner or manager approaches the worker's social status. On the other hand, affiliation to such public associations is based on certain unavoidable rules that strictly follow the line of socio-class division. Capitalists can not become members of trade-unions not only because they will not be admitted, but because they have no business there, to say nothing of the feeling of class hostility, which they nourish toward such an organization. Similarly, it is hard to find any worker among the members of the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), or the American Bankers' Association. Reproducing corresponding class characteristics, various organizations have qualitatively different roles in society and politics. Today even the exponents of pluralist views on American society endeavour not to delude themselves or their readers by denying that business' organizations dispose of evident advantages and significantly broader opportunities than the

organizations of the working masses, ethnic minorities and other deprived social strata outsiders.³² So, the score of the game is not 'zero-sum', but, in fact, one side appears on the playground with a considerable bonification before the beginning of the 'match'.

In the USA, definite social categories from the population are practically totally deprived of access to power. According to official statistics, about 35 million Americans live below the poverty line. About 7 million are registered as unemployed. Under the shadow of enormous wealth and might, in the richest country of the world, homeless, illiterate, lumpen and declassed people live in a continuous struggle for survival. These are the people, who not only can't dream of their own representation in the branches of power, but also on the ground of formally imposed hindrances (lack of permanent residence, inability to read and write) they are excluded from the voters' list altogether. Because also of despair of changing anything by their vote, they continuously enlarge the ranks of the 'party of absentees'. The dominating system not only does not undertake anything for activizing their political participation, but is satisfied by such a situation, because in this way a possible opposition is 'naturally' removed. The question is of people, deprived of elementary political and human rights. Official propaganda in the USA completely forgets them, when it zealously acts 'in defence' of individual cases of imaginary or real violations of human rights in socialist countries.

Here in People's Republic of Bulgaria, a socialist country, the working class occupies a special place in the social-class structure, as well as in the political system. In the words of the leader of our state Todor Zhivkov, "continuously raising the influence and role of the working class, of all social subgroups of it, both in the management of production and in the socio-political life of the country—such is and will be the line in the development of the socialist order."³³ Socialist state spares no effort in order to increase the educational and qualificational structure of the working class in our country, which is dictated by two main factors: the proper nature of socialism as a social order, and the challenge of the scientific-technological revolution toward the development of the qualitative level of production and economy. According to data from a large-scale sociological investigation, "Charac-

³²"Political action committees further institutionalize inequities between those who have great wealth and highly effective political representation and those who have neither", writes Jeffrey M. Barry. "This is a greater threat to liberty than diminishment in one kind of political participation that will come from PAC reform", Jeffrey M. Barry, *The Interest Group Society*, Boston, Toronto, Little, Brown, 1984, p. 218. Cf. Kay Lehman Schlozman, John T. Tierny, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*, N.Y., Harper and Row, 1986, esp. pp. 71-73, 400.

³³Todor Zhivkov, *Collected Works* (in Bulgarian), vol. 16, pp. 8-9.

teristics of the population of People's Republic of Bulgaria and its socio-class structure", 86.6 per cent of the industrial workers and 65.8 per cent of the agricultural workers in our country show a *medium* level of socio-political activity. More than 47 per cent of all workers systematically take part in socio-political life (for agricultural workers this share is 31 per cent.³⁴ Nearly, 45 per cent of the members of the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party are workers. Workers are consistently and systematically, and without ceasing their jobs in the factory or on the fields and farms, being elected to the People's Assembly (the Parliament), as delegates of party congresses and forums of mass organizations. Those people came into Parliament and congress halls with the mandate and demands of their comrades and the people. They all have a significant advantage even over the most powerful managers and ministers: they are not afraid of the consequences of their speeches, spoken simply and without diplomatic shifts, but veraciously.

The participation of social groups in state management is an important indicator for measuring their place in the political system of the society. In 1976, workers engaged in material production were 20 per cent of the people's representatives (deputies) in the People's Assembly. Ten years later their share reached 30 per cent. In the composition of regional (district and communal) people's councils and municipalities, the relative share of workers, elected in 1983 as members of Executive Committees, reached 57.1 per cent. Parallel to the increase in the quantitative share, there has been an increasing activity of the representatives of the working class within various commissions attached to these organs, which is a direct result of its heightened educational level and socio-political maturity. According to data from sociological investigations, a total of 34.4 per cent of the members of the leading organs of the state and socio-political organizations are workers, 13 per cent cooperated farmers, 1.6 per cent cooperated artisans, and 51 per cent employees and intellectuals.³⁵

Revolution of the 9th of September 1944 in Bulgaria accomplished a radical overturn in the socio-class structure of the state apparatus. Representatives of the exploiting classes were removed. Their place was occupied by people from the poorest classes of the nation. This circumstance demanded from them together with urgent work on state and social management to augment their knowledge. Today, more than forty years after the socialist revolution, all posts at all levels of state and social management are occupied by competent, skilled and able persons,

³⁴Quoted according to Margarita Eschkenazi, "Sotsialnoklasovi razlichiya i sblizheniya po potsialna aktivnost" (Social-Class Differences and Rapprochements by Social Activity) in collected work *Sotsialnoklasovata struktura na suvremennoto bulgarsko obshtestvo* (in Bulgarian), pp. 261, 283.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 282.

who, in their majority, haven't lost their feeling of belonging and closeness to the people.

CONCLUSION


The 1980s have proved to be a decisive period and have raised the definite demand for changes in the style and methods of social management both in capitalist and in socialist countries. In most of the developed industrialized Western countries, these changes have been directed toward the realization of the recipes of neo-conservatives for removing restrictions and reducing the tax burden over the profits of the Big Business, together with cuts of budget expenses for social goals, and increasing economic effectivity and rationality for the sake of direct producers. These measures as a whole have led to certain positive results and improvements of a number of economic indicators, especially in the USA. It is, however, necessary to remember, that this turned out to be possible only after the capitalist state abandoned its claims to be a state of universal prosperity, after it sacrificed the social gains of the most unprivileged social strata, gains achieved with great efforts and struggle. Instead of gradually smoothing over social differences, in many cases social differentiation has deepened. The Marxist conclusion was practically confirmed: under conditions of capitalism, the durable attachment of social privileges to a part of society is unavoidable and immanent, as are the existence of classes, and chronic deprivation of the majority of society of just participation in the distribution of material and spiritual wealth, and real access to the processes of decision-making at various levels. This social rule manifests itself especially striking in the case of the most advanced and developed capitalist country. Against the background of seemingly unlimited political freedom and democracy in this country, the most responsible socio-political decision-making is limited to fewer and fewer personalities, behind the public's back, behind also the back of the American Parliament—the Congress. Indicative of this are the periodically revealed scandals connected with abuse of powers of single echelons of executive power and first of all of the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Pentagon. It may be supposed that various adventures of this kind, which became known to the public at large or safely covered, are not and can't be an affair simply of single 'triller-seekers'—such as Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North—if only because they require extraordinary coordination, organization, efforts of a lot of people, and significant funding. Somebody has interests in such an antidemocratic style and method of policy-making, and this somebody are not the wide strata of American people. Widely applied as justification and grounding of bullying in US politics,

the notion of 'American Interests' in practice is identical with the interests of a quantitatively small share of the population—about one per cent—who dominate most of the national wealth and are preoccupied with the preservation and perpetuation of the *status quo*. This *status quo* means deprivation and exploitation not only of American people, but of the other peoples all over the world. No matter what we shall call this strata—'elite' or, more prosaically, upper monopolistic bourgeoisie, its existence makes a democracy illusory, limited.

The last thousand years of mankind's political practice have witnessed countless thwarted attempts for the creation of an 'ideal', just society. Even the most noble projects in this direction were handicapped by two essential problems—who will govern such a society and how the national wealth will be distributed. After the fundamental elaborations of Marxism, which located the initial cause of all social inequality and injustice in economic inequality and, more precisely, in the possession of the means of production by a small part of the population, which dooms the majority to wage labour, submission and chronic deprivation, only naive or intellectually blind men can expect that the ideal of justice and democracy can be attained without a radical socio-economic reconstruction of society. There is no doubt that this is an extremely difficult and prolonged process. Its realization passes through much uncertainty, many errors and delusions. But this is the most significant and most revolutionary social experiment in the history of man.

Marxism is not a religion or dogma, it does not impose recipes for building up a new society. The experience of Bulgaria is unique and inimitable, as is that of the other countries which have chosen the socialist way of development; the Bulgarian experience is nevertheless open to everybody, who wants to learn and apply it in an appropriate manner according to local conditions. The socialist revolution saved Bulgaria from the pernicious politics of a small, venal clique. During the sixty-six years between the liberation from Ottoman-Turkish rule prior to the socialist revolution, the national economy was one of the most backward in Europe. The predominantly peasant population of the country lived in misery and hardship. Wars, inner conflicts and social unrest took approximately every six years their bloody tribute, when the country as by wonder was not annihilated because of submission to the interests of the great foreign powers. Here, in Bulgaria, national aristocracy was non-existent, wiped out during the five centuries of Ottoman yoke. A handful of greedy *nouveaux riches* pretended to its role, severely exploiting the poor and selling out the national wealth to alien masters. That is why, the elimination of this parasitic layer from political power and economic domination was met with the satisfaction and enthusiasm by the wide popular masses.

During the past relatively brief historical period, from 1944 until now Bulgaria achieved remarkable successes both in its economic development, and in building and maintaining of democracy in all social spheres. We are proud of our achievements, but we are not satisfied with them. We know that what is achieved is far from sufficient and needs permanently to be developed and improved. We know, and are convinced that more socialism means more democracy, and more democracy means more socialism.



II. Elites in Africa and Asia

The African Elite and the Development Challenge: Problems and Prospects

K.K. PRAH

If sociological concepts are elusive in attempts to pin them down too concretely, then the elite concept is possibly a classical case of this phenomenon. Its contemporary usage has generally moved away from the classical formations of Pareto and Mosca while retaining generally the notion of 'circulation', implying transience or changeability both in composition and societal orientation or ethos. The concept has been put to incisive usage by social scientists as diverse as, Aron, Lasswell, Nadel, Bottomore, Wright Mills, among others.¹ Its definitional elusiveness has not hindered its widespread use as a sociological analytical category. In European studies, put together by Lerner and Gorden, this is explicitly conceded.² Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell are of a similar view.³ For Mills, the element of power is central to its usage.⁴ While Goldthorpe considers, within the African context, education as an important criterion.⁵ Lipset and Solari's collection on Latin America further reveals the wider possibilities of employability of the concept in diverse situations.⁶ On Africa, two early bodies of studies deserve recall. The first is a special issue of the *International Social Science Bulletin*, and selected proceedings of the International African Institute's Sixth Seminar on 'The New Elites of Tropical Africa', which was held at the

¹E. Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 1, 1950; H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and C.E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Stanford, 1952. S.F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1956; T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, London, 1964; and C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, 1957.

²Daniel Lerner and Gorden Morten, *Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites*, Cambridge-Mass, 1969.

³H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and C.E. Rothwell, *op. cit.*

⁴C. Wright Mills, *op. cit.*

⁵J.E. Goldthorpe, "Educated Africans: Some Conceptual and Terminological Problems", in A. Southall (ed.), *Social Change in Modern Africa*, London, 1961.

⁶Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, *Elites in Latin America*, New York, 1967,

University of Ibadan, Nigeria, in 1964.⁷ Since then, numerous studies relating to African elites have been undertaken by a wide variety of social scientists. Such wide usage has not necessarily produced firm acceptability of any specific definitional formula. What can be said to be a fairly common denominator in various definitions, is the often implicit acceptance of the fact that elites are firstly social minorities; secondly, they in various ways exercise power, have influence, prestige, and generally have greater access to the material and non-material resources of a given society, than the overwhelming mass of the population. Elites are not necessarily homogenous social groups in a socio-cultural sense. Neither are they, as of necessity, formal wielders of social power. Hence the usefulness of the notion of the power elite, the governing elite, and the ruling elite. Euphemistically put, "the throne is not always the center of power. Sometimes real power is behind the throne".

The concept is used by some, as a loose stratificational model; or an alternative to class analysis, particularly among social scientists who do not favour Marxian or Neo-marxian approaches to sociological analysis. Others use the elite concept in conjunction with class-based approaches and not necessarily as an alternative paradigm.

We would argue indeed that the elite concept could assist in attempts to analytically structurize the ruling class or classes in a given society by providing possible insights into the dynamics of the structural components of a given ruling class or classes as aggregations of elites. In a way, such perspectives integrate the Paretian notions of changeability and flux among pre-eminent social groups with the harder stratificational approaches of particularly, Marxian class analysis, without necessarily requiring fundamental philosophical eclectism or synthetic conceptual marriage.

CLASS, IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT

If we define a class as a group, who, in the social relations of production within society, particularly with respect to the ownership or control of the means of production, or the expenditure of labour, have more or less the same position; and who have a similar access to the material results of production, distribution, and exchange; it is possible to stratify contemporary African society into various strata. These range from a small group of owners of immovable property and productive capital, a larger group of independent producers or small-holders, wage labourers of various sorts both rural and urban, declassé elements, and various levels of peasantry. Such class structures are dominated in post-colonial

⁷*International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, of Tropical Africa, London, 1966.

Africa by the small producers and middle peasants. The expression of the power of these classes is articulated in most African countries by the military and civil bureaucracy, who dominate the state, often to the limited exclusion of the politico-civilian elite, and the judiciary. The phenomenon of the African military coup tends often to narrow the bases of the coalition of elites which dominate the state, with the military and bureaucracy as the only enduring pillars in this process.

The post-colonial state in Africa is largely a historical extension of the colonial state. The transformation from colonialism to post-colonialism precluded any fundamental or radical restructurisation of the state. Essentially, the dominant positions of colonial administrators was inherited by indigenous elements. The political economic which linked colony to metropolitan power was for all intents and purposes handed-down to local elites "historically groomed" for the purpose. Thus, the local elite in post-colonial Africa has largely protected and maintained with little change the structure of politico-economic dependency created under colonial tutelage. It is in this sense that the African elite, as it currently exists, is part of the problem and structure of dependency. Its role is thus defined and limited by its history.

During the period of anti-colonialism, the elite in Africa favoured a populist ideology which united all the major classes opposed to colonial administration. The primary contradiction was drawn between the indigenous people and colonial administration. The politics of populist consensus was particularly relevant insofar as it avoided exacerbating class differences internally. With African independence, slowly populism is losing relevance as internal socio-economic differences aggravated by unfavourable terms of trade, declining world prices for primary products, high costs of energy and a generally deepening world economic slump, help to accentuate class cleavages in Africa. Competition for available local resources increasingly prompt a steadily narrowing process in the composition of the dominant or ruling elites.

Development is often conceived of, in terms of per capita growth, or simple arithmetic expansion of the Gross National Product. There are others with simpler conceptions, particularly in the Third World, who equate development with skyscrapers in cities. For such minds, the imagery of "Little New York" for Nairobi, or Abidjan, is not uncommon. Both approaches to the concept of development, that is firstly the technicist, econometrist, approach favoured by institutions like the IMF and World Bank, and secondly the popular "man in the street" view bear poorly on the reality of underdevelopment or development. The classical dependency approaches which became fashionable in the late 1960s and early 1970s while generally representing critiques of international capitalism and its relations with the poor world tended to shy away from conclusions which might represent determined revolu-

tionary options in the Third World. Most of the dependency theories were more neo-Marxian than Marxian.

The conceptualization of development in Africa as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, implying the removal of gross social inequalities, the rapid advancement of literacy, the lowering of mortality rates and advancement of life expectancy, the technologization of indigenous cultures, the arrest of super-power hegemony, and the emancipation of the masses, has not taken root in the thinking and approaches of the African elite in its confrontation with the problems of underdevelopment.

The African elite seeks solutions from approaches suggested by international groups and bodies whose interests are largely linked with the existing structures which keep African societies underdeveloped. This in itself is a reflection of the neo-colonial condition of contemporary Africa.

The concept of aid, so acceptable to the ruling elites in contemporary Africa only strengthens in effect the links between the metropolitan centers and groups controlling capital resources, and the African elite. As Mandel rightly points out:

Propaganda for 'aid to the underdeveloped countries' also assumes a special meaning. The exploitation of the "third world" by the imperialist countries goes forward more merrily than ever, as is shown by the deterioration in the terms of trade. But this deterioration deprives the under-developed countries of the means of buying an increasing amount of capital goods from the metropolitan countries. 'Aid' to the underdeveloped countries comes in to make up the growing deficit in their balance of payments—and thus in the last analysis amounts to a redistribution of profits within the imperialist bourgeoisie, to the advantage of the monopoly sectors which export capital goods, at the expense of the 'old' sectors (textiles, coal, etc).⁸

The intelligentsia within the African elite has been slow to come to terms with these facts.

The cultural and political dimensions of underdevelopment needs also to be critically confronted. The sharp contrast between the cultural pro-westernism of the elite and the more authentic African culture of the masses, particularly in rural Africa, have possibly far-reaching implications on any strategy for African development. The idea of self-reliance has gained popularity with the elite but its implications for culture and ideology is generally unclear for the present.

⁸E. Mandel, *Marxist Economic Theory*, London, 1977 edition, pp. 480-81,

ETHOS AND INHERENT PROBLEMS

If we consider the elite or elites to be influential groups within the dominant class or classes in society, on whom key decisions rest, and on whom the tasks of giving societal direction is vested, African elites would be mainly those groups in contemporary Africa, who enjoy relatively, a fair degree of western education, and who have more importantly material or social resources to command respect and influence in the general direction, and ordering of society. Education and skills often offer access to other resources important to the exercise of influence. But while education is often crucial to this status, it is not the only consideration, or the most significant consideration. The ability to exercise access to resources, ensures invariably choice education.

One of the interesting peculiarities of the African situation is that only a small fraction of the elite elements have the basis of their status rooted in purely ascriptive criteria of a 'traditional' kind. Chiefs, for example, today have little influence compared to what they enjoyed in colonial or even more in pre-colonial times. Most of the contemporary African elites derive from social classes thrown up by the process of capitalist penetration into the older pre-capitalist social system. As has been earlier suggested, essentially the African elites are in class terms petit bourgeois. While they are drawn from all sections of this rather amorphous social category, most can be identified as belonging to the more affluent, educated, or skilled sections of this group. They are often sub-culturally very distinct from the lower echelons of this social class. Thus, while doctors, lawyers, lecturers, teachers, may be culturally westernized, the street-hawkers, petty traders, small shopkeepers, are closer to the pre-capitalist cultural world of rural Africa. However, as a group they are even more socio-culturally distinct from the overwhelming mass of the African people inhabiting the countryside, close to nature, and close to the pre-capitalist world. These latter, consisting today largely of peasants, are more tradition-bound. They feel safer in their own time-tested ways and at heart remain faithful to the traditions of their ancestors. But almost at the same time they are tantalized by the ways of the west, and have a schizophrenic admiration for the outward opulence and decor of westernization displayed so near them in more ways than one by their western educated kinsmen. These kith and kin, concentrated in towns and cities, are mostly first and second generation urbanites, now largely removed from the subsistence economy. They are fielded at the middle levels of the periphery economy of contemporary international capitalism and espouse values which are culturally and politically responsive to the middle and upper levels of the metropolitan social classes. They, however, remain often critical of the

excesses of their imitative sub-culture, its basically uncreative, unimaginative, and unselective tenor. From the 1920s onwards, large numbers of the upper ranks of the African elite were formed in institutions like Achimota School Ghana, Kings Lagos, Kings Budo, William Ponty Dakar, Alliance High Nairobi, and the numerous universities which have since emerged in post-independence Africa. The more prevalent elements of this elite are, however, less tutored, and consist of traders, shopkeepers, hawkers, teachers, petty bureaucrats, junior soldiery, and a variety of similar elements and small-holders in the rural areas. This mixed bag of social types have a fairly differentiated reaction to the metropolitan capitalist culture and its faded local representation. The most economically and socially loyal to metropolitan interests and values are usually grouped within classes more occupied with business than political activity. They are frequently apt to be disturbed and fearsome of social conflicts, at the slightest manifestation of social disorder. In essence they appear to be the most sensitive to the need to maintain links in their myriadness with the former colonial powers. These sections of the African elite grope for reforms which could obviate revolutionary alternatives, and actively support mores aimed at thwarting revolutionary options. They admire intellectuals in their midst for their ostensible success in immersing themselves in the core of westernism but disparage and despise them for their obvious lack of success in the acquisition and display of the emblems of material ascendancy. The men in uniform within the elite are often social types who were in the same schools as the intellectual or business elite but have, like their business counterparts, been less successful in advancing as scholarly minds. The more privileged groups within the bureaucracy are of a similar ilk. The politicians consist of elements drawn from all these groups with a good sprinkling of professional types. While some consider the vocation of politics as a *cause celebre*, others view it as a route to acquisition of wealth. In the running of the neo-colonial state, the officered military and the bureaucracy share within the ruling classes the most pre-eminent positions.

Western education has from the start weaned the educated African elite away from their historico-cultural roots. It is an elite which is *in loco* African, indigenous in all ascribed sociological terms, but has achieved only affirmation for those psycho-social responses which promise further integration into the Western cultural and economic system. This aspired integration and absorption has so far appeared acceptable, if available only on the basis of an imitator-status. The syndrome rests on a premise of cultural capitulationism structured within a global politico-economic arrangement of dependency. Lacking the material resources for accumulative practice, it is largely a parasitic group living essentially at the expense of the state. The burgeoning bureaucratic

state apparatus in contemporary African countries underscores this point. With capital resources scarce, recourse to graft and other corrupt practices becomes an easier and more available route to the wealth necessary for maintenance of the desired lifestyle.

A striking feature of Africa's contemporary premier groups is their fidelity to the ethnic sub-cultures of their former colonial overlords. The attachment to the Sorbonne or Racine is as peculiar to the so-called Francophone African as Shakespeare and Cambridge are to the Anglophone type. In the cultivation of such tastes and esoteric joys, the unity of European culture is lost. The Francophone African or his Anglophone contrast inherit and exhibit in reaction also to one another the petty national prejudices which the Gallic mind reserves for the Anglo-Saxon and vice versa. Where such cultural orientations are most internalised, African cultural traits are lost, relegated to the oblivion of irrelevance. When they are appreciated, they are idealised and iconised, perceived as fossils of a paradise lost, the features of an arcadian African past, in reality as mythological as folk-tales, but serviceable to the populist turn of mind, and the material interests of middling social classes.

CONCLUSION

The very class basis of the dominant element in the contemporary African elite poses certain problems with regards to its ability to serve as a 'modernizing elite'. Firstly, its petit bourgeoisie character makes it more a weak appendage to international interests, than an autonomous, and independent social category capable of advancing as an economically productive social group. Secondly, its cultural orientation lacks innovative perspective of an original kind, being more imitative of Western cultural patterns than homegrown African approaches. Thirdly, its awareness of the above conditions and limitations is weak. This does not afford it currently the possibility of critical and innovative appraisals of its tasks and objectives.

However, since the process of social emancipation for mankind as a whole presses inexorably on, transformations within the African elite composition and its orientation are likely to occur in the future, in directions favourable to the processes of social emancipation and the general development of African society. If this is to unfold, sections of the African elite would in future become increasingly alienated from the currently dominant and pre-eminent ethos which binds it in a relationship of dependency to metropolitan power and culture. The alienation and subsequent betrayal of the intellectuals of the dominant elites is emerging in current debates among various African scholars and academics. The discussions on the cultural prerequisites of African develop-

ment have parallels with the debates between Slavophiles and Westerners in 19th century Russia, or the debates in Japan soon after the Meiji Restoration.

In the view of the present author, for the African elite to measure up to the development challenge and the crisis of social emancipation, African languages and cultures need to be more centrally placed as the basis of African development. Furthermore, the national and agrarian questions impinging on the relevance or irrelevance of existing borders bequeathed by the colonial powers need to be radically approached and redressed. The colonial factor, as a crucial but limited interlude, in African history would need to be socially digested.

Political Elite Formation in the Peripheral Societies: Bangladesh and Kenya

HABIBUL HAQUE KHONDKER*

In this paper, we attempt to understand the process of political elite formation in the peripheral societies. By comparing two somewhat dissimilar yet comparable cases, namely Bangladesh and Kenya, we argue that the process of elite structuration in these two societies is marked by a certain degree of homogenization which we suggest is attributable to the nature and dynamics of the modern world system. The crucial factor that provides a common experience to both these societies is their incorporation to the world capitalist system via colonialism. Bangladesh, compared to Kenya, has a longer history of colonial subjugation: first, nearly two hundred years under the British imperialism, and secondly, about 25 years under the sub-imperialism of Pakistan. On the other hand, Kenya was under the tutelage of British colonial rule for about sixty years. The emergence of new classes and the structuration of elites in both Bangladesh and Kenya, we argue, can be understood in the light of their incorporation to the world system. In the light of the world system paradigm, it can be said that the social, economic and political conditions prevailing throughout today's peripheral society are not due to the persistence of an original state of affairs, but are the results of the same world-historical process in which the core became developed; the development of the latter involved a closely associated course for the former, a process of subordinate 'development' or underdevelopment. Despite their different origins, the peripheral formations tend to converge toward a pattern that is essentially the same. This phenomenon reflects, on the world scale, the increasing power of capitalism to unify. According to Samir Amin, "all peripheral formations have four main characteristics in common: (1) the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the national sector; (2) the creation of a local, mainly merchant,

*I am grateful to Professor Don Whyte for his helpful suggestions and to Ms. Vanaja for secretarial assistance.

bourgeoise in the wake of dominant foreign capital; (3) a tendency toward a peculiar bureaucratic development, specific to the contemporary periphery; and (4) the incomplete specific character of the phenomena of proletarianization".¹ Samir Amin's schema may be considered as a starting point for further investigation. The predominance of agrarian capitalism falls short of being a common feature of all the peripheral societies. The Latin American Latifundia owners are best examples of the large non-feudalist land owners, whereas such a large landholding class is missing in Black Africa as well as in Bangladesh. However, regardless of the size of land-holding and patterns of ownership, capitalistic production relations have made inroads even in the remotest periphery.

The bourgeoisie in the peripheral countries are unlike the independent revolutionary bourgeoisie in the west which played a revolutionary role in the social transformation leading to the advent of capitalism. The peripheral bourgeoisie have been dubbed by Chinese Marxists as 'Comprador'—a class of middlemen between the dominant capitalist world and the rural hinterland. This class lacked in revolutionary zeal owing to their dependent growth and existence. "They are half-caste in culture, bilingual in speech, individualistic, and agnostic, not only in religion, but also in cultural values".² Gunder Frank has termed this class as 'Lumpen bourgeoisie' a class which was no more than the passive (rather than 'active') tool of foreign industry and commerce and its interests were therefore identical with theirs. The members of this class are deeply interested in keeping the *status quo*—a state (or shall we say, process) of wretched backwardness from which foreign commerce derives all advantages—a state Frank has termed as 'Lumpendevelopment'.³

The development of bureaucracy in the peripheral societies is of crucial importance. Most of the peripheral societies of today's world were the colonies of the former years. Bureaucracy in the peripheral societies, like many other legacies, owes its form to the colonial rule. As the most powerful and useful mechanisms of oppression for the colonial power, it plays the most vital role in the power politics of the peripheral societies. With the coming of political independence and the formation of national states, the connection between the bureaucracies and the social structures assumed different forms. "Because of the weaker and unbalanced development of the local bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy is even the only actor on the stage".⁴ Independence has suddenly increased the

¹S. Amin, "The Peripheral Formations," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1976, p. 27.

²D. Chiriot, *Social Change in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Harcourt, 1977.

³A.G. Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 5.

⁴S. Amin, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

specific weight of the new state bureaucracy in the national society. The bureaucracy inherits that prestige of state power that is traditional in non-western societies and is strengthened by the experience of the colonial administration's power, which seemed absolute, and by the fact that the petit-bourgeoisie from which the bureaucracy stems has a monopoly of modern education and technical skill. The new bureaucracy tends to become the main social driving force. Hamza Alavi has elaborated on the role of bureaucracy (military-bureaucratic oligarchy) and its relationship with the existing class-structure in the newly independent peripheral societies ('post-colonial societies').

The centrality of the "military-bureaucratic oligarchy" in the post-colonial societies cannot be explained properly by the conventional Marxist theory of state (for example, as discerned in the *Communist Manifesto*), which treats the state apparatus as simply the organized power of one class for oppressing another. According to this formulation state is nothing but a committee looking after the interests of the whole bourgeoisie. Contrary to this view, state in the post-colonial societies does not represent the interests of one particular class. It can hardly be viewed as the instrument of the bourgeoisie, because most of the post-colonial peripheral societies are marked by an absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Marx's formulation, it is to be noted, was rooted in his historical analysis of the development of nation-state vis-a-vis bourgeoisie in the western society. The consolidation of the nation-state by an indigenous bourgeoisie, in the wake of their ascendant power, to provide a legal and other related institutional framework essential for the development of capitalist relations of production featured only in the western societies. The process is markedly different in the peripheral societies in both colonial and post-colonial situations. The relationship between the social classes and the state is more complex than it was in the history of western societies. State machinery in the colonial societies are implanted by the core countries to safeguard and perpetuate their exploitative relationships and domination over the indigenous social classes. Such a state machinery can in no way be the representative of any of the indigenous social classes and their relationship between the indigenous social classes and the state are mutually conflicting. Since the state apparatus is a transplanted institution in the colonial country from a 'developed' core country, its features seem to be 'overdeveloped' in the context of the colonial societies. Alavi⁵ regards the 'superstructure' as overdeveloped in relation to the 'structure' (basic structure) in the colony since its basis apparently lies in the core country itself. The post-colonial society inherits such an 'overdeveloped' apparatus which enables 'the military-bureaucratic oligarchy' to be at the command of political power

⁵H. Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review*, No. 74, 1972.

instantaneously. The rest of the indigenous social classes find themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic control which blocks their autonomous growth.

Now whether we should see the phenomenon of elite in the peripheral societies from the paradigm of bureaucracy or from that of class is an important theoretical question. In other words, should we view bureaucracy as a class, a social category, or as hegemonic elite?

It has been customary to view elite as a political category as opposed to the concept of class which, thanks to the contributions of Marx and the Marxists, has been viewed as an economic category. The concept of ruling class in Marxism comes closer to the concept of elite yet in this notion political power is viewed as dependent on economic power. In the advanced capitalist societies, the separation between control and ownership of means of production on the one hand and the increasing understanding of the relative autonomy of politics from the economic structure have increased the importance of the concept of elite as a political category even in Marxist discourse. The contributions of C. Wright Mills⁶ and Domhoff⁷ in this regard are important. Anthony Giddens has taken issue with the traditional notion that separates the concepts of elite and class; he argues that these concepts can be integrated.⁸ In our opinion, such a conceptual integration is of utmost importance in the discussions of the peripheral societies and we will have occasion to see the correspondence between the petit-bourgeoisie class and the elite in the discussion of our case studies.

Since Davis-Moore suggested that no society is classless or unstratified it has become a truism, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of their functional thesis of stratification. There has always been a group of people, relatively small, at the helms of affairs in all known human societies. The existence of a small group at the top may be due to the advent of private property, rare personal qualities of some individuals, or it may be a functional necessity—whatever the reason may be, the fact remains the same: a small group exercises power in the community. We will call this small group 'elite'. The fact that a small group is the holder of power differentiates them from the rest of the population. Now whether their allegedly distinctive attributes become a source of power or the attributes become distinctive only because they have power poses a puzzle. But the latter possibility can not be ruled out off hand. There is an element of circularity, a process of mutual reinforcement involved in it. According to Olsen, "Power is the ability to affect social activities".⁹ In

⁶C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1956.

⁷G.W. Domhoff, *Who Rules America*, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967.

⁸A. Giddens and P. Stanworth, (eds.), *Elites and Power in British Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

⁹M.E. Olsen, *Power in Societies*, London, Macmillan, 1970.

the modern society, the actors who exercise social power may be individuals as well as organizations. For example, in the United States mass media constitute a powerful actor. But in the pre-capitalist societies, it is only individual who can hold and exercise effective social power and they can be identified by virtue of their position, while in the complex, modern societies, such powerful individuals are hard to locate. The elite exercises power over the rest of the population by virtue of their possession or/and control of resources and rewards in the society.

Although elite theories have been articulated in the writings of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels at the turn of the century, it has been a very important area of study for the political philosophers and social thinkers in earlier ages. We can trace back its origin in the discussions of the Greek masters of political thought. Plato's idea of 'guardian class' contained the germs of modern elite theory. Elite are created in the society and they in turn tend to recreate the society by assuming the role of what Eisenstadt regards, in the context of "the modernizing societies", as 'the managers of modernization'. Modernization as a way of planned societal change is the key word in most of the peripheral societies and the role of the elite, therefore, has become very critical. They are the arbiters of the destinies of millions in those countries which are undergoing decisive changes.

CONCEPT OF ELITE REVISITED

All existing human societies are cleft into rulers and ruled and that rulers are fewer in numbers seem to be an unexceptionable axiom. Elite can be defined as the relatively small, yet organized group which legitimately or not, exercises authority over the other groups. One of the better definitions of the term elite is that of S.F. Nadel, advanced in his analysis of the concept of social elites. He concludes that an elite is an aggregate of people with distinct characteristics: a position of high status; some degree of corporate group character as well as exclusiveness, awareness of their pre-eminent position as the consequence of some attribute which they share by right; recognition of their general superiority by the society at large; and imitability—"the elite", by its very manner of acting and thinking, sets the standards for the whole society, its influence on power being that of a model accepted and considered worth following.¹⁰ Nadel's definition is excellent, insofar as it includes and describes all those individuals who occupy top positions in a society. However, it does not distinguish between what Pareto called governing and the non-governing elite; that is, between those who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in the government and those who do not.

¹⁰Le Vine, *Political Leadership in Africa*, Stanford University Press, 1967 p. 12.

Etymologically speaking, the term elite derives from the Latin word *eligere*, meaning 'to choose'. In common usage the word refers to 'the choice part' or 'the flowers' of a nation, culture, age-group, and also to persons occupying high social positions. Initially the term referred to 'the choice part or flowers' of goods offered for sale and as dignified objects worthy of choice. By the eighteenth century, French usage of the word had widened to include distinction in other fields. In social science, the emphasis has shifted from that of choice to eminence. The most general meaning is that of a group of persons who in any society hold positions of eminence. Frequently, a particular field of eminence is selected, such as politics. Elite could be identified in various fields, such as sports elite, economic elite, cultural elite, spiritual elite, etc. In the present discussion, we are restricting our focus on the political—or more specifically governing—elite. It is necessary to break down the concept of elite into political and non-political elite. The political elite may further be broken down into governing and non-governing elite. In advancing a taxonomy of elite, we will follow very closely the earlier elite theorists and will tend to propose a synthesis.

In the light of the formulations of Pareto, we can divide the entire population of a society into two groups: elite and non-elite (or masses). Then the elite can be classified into strategic and segmental elite. The latter are the elites in their respective branches, e.g., cultural elite, economic elite, etc. Strategic elites are those whose judgements, decisions, and actions have important and determinable consequences for many members of society.¹¹ Among strategic elites, we can identify an even smaller group who can be termed in Mills' words power elite. By power elite we refer to those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences.¹² In other words, insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them. As we go on narrowing the group from small to smaller—starting from elite to strategic elite to power elite—their relative power increases. The strategic elite may have determinable impact on many members of society while the power elite have national consequences. At the last instance, we can divide the power elite into governing and non-governing elite. By governing elite we refer to those elite who are directly in charge of ruling the country. Non-governing elite are those who are capable of influencing the governing elite more strongly than any other groups but they do not in actual practice rule the country. The term governing elite may include various categories of national leaders, such as politicians, high ranking bureaucrats,

¹¹S. Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class*, New York, Random House, 1963, p. 20.

¹²C.W. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

and military leaders.¹³ In our typology of elite what we are terming as governing elite is in Bottomore's words 'political elite'. He views that the term elite is now generally applied to functional, mainly occupational groups, which have high status for whatever reason in a society. Bottomore argues that there is a need for another term to define the minority who rules a society. He uses Mosca's term, the 'Political Class', to refer to all those groups which exercise political power or influence, and are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership. Bottomore further distinguishes within the political class a smaller group, the political elite, which comprises those individuals who actually exercise political power in a given society.¹⁴

Our classification of elites into various groups are not to be seen as watertight, for there is often overlap between these groups, for example, economic elite or religious elite in a given society may be at the same time the political or governing elite. Besides, there may be a continuous flow of individuals from one group to another. The classification of elite only serves analytical purposes.

A major part of the literature on elite is devoted to the investigation of the ultimate power group or governing elite as defined here. In *Mind and Society*, Pareto concerns himself with a simple opposition between those who have power, the governing elite and those who have none, the masses.¹⁵ Mosca expressed his fundamental idea in these words: "In all societies—from societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawns of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs the political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent..."¹⁶ Both Mosca and Pareto were concerned with elite in the sense of groups of people who either exercised directly, or were in a position to influence very strongly the exercise of political power. Later studies of elite have followed Pareto and Mosca, especially the latter, closely in their concern with problems of political power. According to H.D. Lasswell, "The political elite comprises the power holders of a body politic..."¹⁷ Amitai Etzioni

¹³Yoshinori and I. Takeshi, "The Education and Recruitment of Governing Elites in Modern Japan" in Rupert Wilkinson (ed.), *Governing Elites*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 109.

¹⁴T. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, London, Watts, 1964 p. 14.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁶G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 50.

¹⁷H.D. Lasswell, et. al., *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Stanford University Press, 1952.

defines elites as "groups of actors who have power" emphasizing the political dimension of the concept. Now power is one of those nebulous concepts which have no precise and agreed upon definition. Power is—what St. Augustine said of time—that we all know perfectly well what it is, until someone asks us. Provisionally, we can regard those as power holders in a society who have access to and control of resources. They are also in charge of allocating the resources and rewards in the society. M.E. Olsen views that resources are the basis of social power. In order to exert any social power, an actor must have access to resources upon which he can draw. "These resources may be tangible goods, such as money, land, material possessions, and organizational membership, or relatively intangible assets, such as knowledge, skills, legitimacy, and organizational unity".¹⁸ But insofar as political power is concerned, we have to search for a more precise definition. H.D. Lasswell defines power as sharing in decisions. A decision can be defined, according to Lasswell, as a severely sanctioned choice. If decision could be defined as 'what officials decide', the task of identifying elites would be very simple because in that case the officials are the elites. But in real situation, the officials may not be the real decision makers. Lasswell suggests that since the true decision makers are not always known at the outset of the research, the search for the political elite may well begin with the government.¹⁹

Elites in the Peripheral Societies

The key word in all the peripheral societies in today's world is modernization. Although the concept of modernization has invoked fiery debates among the intellectuals, presumably for the ideological content of the concept, but, insofar as it describes a process to replace the old ways by the new ones, it still has some utility in the discussion of social change. In the process of modernization, social relations change, old norms no longer obtain, the traditions of the past cease to provide guidance for decisions and actions, the old leaders may no longer have status, nor are they always able to wield the social and political power they once held. These transformations are often stimulated, initiated, or guided by relatively small groups of people whom we have come to call elite. Elite, in our definition, are those with the most of power in a society. They are able to get the most of what there is to get within the system where they wield power. Governing elites by virtue of their monopoly of power are able to, or at least attempt to attain objectives which have national consequences in the modernizing societies. Bottomore writes, "There is no context in which the idea of elites is invoked more frequently at the present time than in discussions of the problems

¹⁸M.E. Olsen, *op. cit.*

¹⁹H.D. Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 7-8

and prospects of the underdeveloped countries". This is mainly because of the "profound association between changes in social structure and the rise and fall of elites. Economic, political or other changes first bring about modifications in the prestige and power of different social groups and those groups which are increasing their power then seek to take control of the changes and to press them forward. At the same time, the need for outstanding leaders and elites is most keenly felt by the population wherever complex and difficult social changes are taking place and the familiar ways of life are disappearing. In the present day developing countries, therefore, we have an excellent opportunity to examine the social forces which are creating new elites, as well as activities of the elites themselves in the attempted transformation of their societies into modern, economically-advanced nations."²⁰

The composition of elite in the developing societies is significantly different from that in the developed, industrialized societies. Most, if not all, of the developing societies of the present world were the colonies of the yester years. The consequence of the colonial relationship created such complexities in the modernizing societies, which are in many ways unique. In the post-colonial developing societies, the new elite often owe their origin to the colonial rule. This group comprises the urbanized and the urbane, the educated from the Universities, the military officers, and ambitious bureaucrats, who find the destiny of their newly independent nation thrust upon them. Sometimes this elite group also includes in their numbers members of the old, traditional elite, who are capable of assuming new roles demanded by the system's transforming process of modernization. Bottomore has listed five types of elites in the context of the developing societies who customarily and variously take the leadership of the industrialization process: (1) a dynastic elites; (2) the middle class; (3) the revolutionary intellectuals; (4) the colonial administrators, and (5) the nationalist leaders.²¹ Bottomore, however, maintained that of these five types of elites the middle class, the revolutionary intellectuals, and the nationalist leaders play the most decisive role in most of the developing societies. These types are not always mutually exclusive; very often the nationalist leaders and the revolutionary intellectuals are indistinguishable and when they are distinguishable their common root can be found in the middle class. Other writers have viewed with reference to Southeast Asia that there are two types of national elites; intelligentsia elites and the modernizing traditional elites²². Since most of the modernizing

²⁰T. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 96.

²²H.J. Blenda, "Political Elites in Colonial South East Asia: A Historical Analysis" in S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Change*, Boston, Little Brown, 1968.

societies are newly independent nations, political elites or the nationalist leaders assume the most important role in carrying out the war or movement of independence. And after independence is achieved, the task of socio-economic development falls on them. "It is political elite in the underdeveloped countries which has been pre-eminent in deciding the course of their development".²³ Independence as a state of affairs, as a goal, as a political symbol, has affected the values, behaviour, and the expectations of the political elite of the developing countries. For members of the elite in government, for example, it has meant forming new sets of priorities with respect to the allocation of scarce human and financial resources for social and economic development. The governing elite, given the new priorities, has also had to consider whether changes in political organization were necessary in order to mobilize their resources to the fulfilment of their new social goals. Further, independence is no longer a relevant goal for political action; its value as a symbol for political mobilization has been sharply devalued with its attainment. In short, independence now represents an almost new political context where new roles and modes of behaviour are expected of the political elite. An increasing distance between the bulk of the population and the newly arisen leadership is a common experience in most of the post-colonial societies. The most notable gap is the one that divides the dominant western educated, urban group from the uneducated, tradition-bound mass mainly composed of the peasantry. The social structure in Asian and African nations is that a newly fashioned elite, oriented toward the west and modernization despite its denunciation of the western colonial control, has taken a predominant lead in societies, the bulk of whose members are still close to their ancestral past. In the post-independence situation, new gaps and divisions also arise within the elite group. As long as national independence was the common goal, various conflicting groups banded together to accomplish their common goal, but once independence has been achieved, divergence and difference in their interests come to surface. It is a widely shared assumption that a unified elite governs more effectively and more stably than a disunified elite. G. Lowell Field and J. Higley point out, "The evidence is overwhelming that politics, even in fully consolidated nation-states normally approximate a fight to the death by mutually suspicious groups of activists struggling to defend or advance partisan interests with little regard for prosperity or cost...(but) the normal situation of political instability is abrogated in societies where a unified elite is present".²⁴ In the post-independence developing societies, elite are typically fragmented by the onset of forces of social transformation. Population growth and

²³T. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

²⁴R.D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1976, p. 124.

attempted socio-economic development foster a division of labour which in turn produces a highly differentiated elite structure. New members, such as wealthy business class, find their access to the elite structure. Within the existing elite itself, integration declines as its members are differentially affected by socio-economic changes. Moreover, in the post-colonial period, centrifugal conflicts along generational and cultural lines threaten the fragile unity achieved during the struggle of independence. At the same time, increasing education, growing unemployment, urbanization, commercialization, the spread of mass media, and the growth of new political demands and movements undermine the unity of the elite. While unified leadership and the integration of elite are prerequisites of political consolidation and economic development, the record of political instability and military coups in much of the peripheral societies show that elite integration is still a far cry. Many scholars of African politics believe that political stability of the new states is greatly furthered by increasing the group-cohesiveness of its elites.²⁵ Many civilian leaders argue that only a single party regime can provide the necessary elite integration, and military leaders often tend to justify their intervention in politics by the need to impose unity from above. Neither one-party rule nor military dictatorship can, however, guarantee elite unity: indeed, high-handed repression of political competitors often encourages continued elite disunity and endangers political stability. In such countries like Tunisia and Tanzania the single-party strategy seems to have succeeded in sustaining elite integration, but elsewhere the more familiar sequence of coup and counter-coup testifies to the persistence of the underlying quandary.²⁶ One of the major dilemmas of the emerging nations is that very few of these can have a stable government and a legitimate government at the same time. Overthrow of the popularly elected regimes by extra-legal forces in the modernizing societies has been a routine phenomenon. In a study of the eighty-five developing countries, forty have been found to be victims of successful coups or serious attempts to overthrow the established governments. Fourteen former colonies achieved independence in the period 1945-1955: in eleven of these, the governments have been either attacked or overthrown by extra-legal force²⁷. In a typical post-colonial society where classes, various social groups, trade unions, etc., are not organized, the military represents the only effectively organized element capable of bringing a veneer of stability in the government. In any society, it is usually recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier.

In developing society, a new dimension is added: the good soldier

²⁵C.E. Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration*, N.Y., Homewood, 1967, p. 79.

²⁶R.D. Putnam, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²⁷F.R.D. Mehden, *Politics in the Developing Nations*, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964.

is also to some degree a modernized man. As such, the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to modern ideas and practices.²⁸ A new recruit in the army not only breaks away with civilian life but also with his age-old tradition; in his new career he becomes resocialized.

A survey of the literature on military intervention in politics discloses four broad categories of factors suggested as causes of, or conditions for intervention: (1) aspects of socio-economic development, (2) aspects of political development, (3) characteristics of the military establishment itself, and (4) foreign influences.²⁹ In a given situation, one or more than one of these factors may combine to result in a military coup. It may be noted that military is not always a monolithic force and there are instances when sections of the military have intervened in the politics replacing civilian authority. In the countries where army has been participant in the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena on the plea that self-seeking, corrupt politicians are abusing power to their own narrow interests. However, it is very difficult to find a pattern of the process of military intervention in politics in the newly independent countries.

ELITE FORMATION IN BANGLADESH

The violent emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country in South Asia, under the leadership of a civilian nationalist party in the winter of 1971, attracted world attention. In less than four year's time, world attention was again drawn to Bangladesh when a violent coup toppled the civilian government. The usual pretext of 'saving' the country from disorder and chaos was not absent in Bangladesh. But obviously, there were more important underlying reasons than restoring order. Such violent change of elite in the post-independence Bangladesh can be understood only with reference to the historical background of elite formation in this country. The history of elite formation in Bangladesh is closely entangled with the history of colonial domination, the first phase of which lasted from 1857 to 1947 under British rule and the second phase under the sub-imperialism of Pakistan which lasted from 1947 to 1971.

Historically speaking, Bengal—present Bangladesh—had always been a turbulent region. Even prior to the British take over, the Moghul rulers of India with their central capital in Delhi were never at ease with this province. Following the British take over, "Bengal was the micro-

²⁸L.W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in Finkle and Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change*, New York, J. Wiley and Sons, 1966, p. 281.

²⁹R.D. Putnam, *op. cit.*

cosm of British rule in India, the original seat of imperial power, the base from which the (British) East India Company set out on its career of aggrandisement, ending in the complete subjugation of the (Indian) subcontinent..." The events of the opening decades of the nineteenth century placed Bengal on the threshold of momentous social and economic changes. New land settlement by the colonial rulers was at the heart of the socio-economic changes in Bengal—a predominantly agrarian society. The British rulers introduced private property relation in Bengal in conjunction with fixing in perpetuity the revenue demanded by the state. Introduction of private property and the creation of a landlord class had enormous consequences in the social structure of Bengal. This process of 'feudalization' replaced a class of tax-collectors, who were mainly Muslims by religion. In the pre-British Moghul rule, private property in land did not exist; the central Muslim authority created a class of muslim tax-collectors who had no ownership title to land. The British created landlords were predominantly Hindus.

The educational, cultural, and the socio-economic advancement of the Hindu community in the later days over their Muslim counterparts can be explained in terms of their access to landed property granted by the colonial rulers. The asymmetrical growth of the Muslim and Hindu elites caused by their unequal access to the landed property resulted in the movement for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. This movement culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947 under the leadership of Muslim League, a party that expressed the aspirations of the Muslim population in the Indian subcontinent. The leadership of Muslim League was composed mainly of lawyers, merchants and other western educated urbanites, who came from various parts of India other than Bengal.³⁰ In Bengal, the poor Muslim peasants rallied behind the non-Bengali western educated Muslim League leadership in order to overthrow the domination of the Hindu landlords. It was an act of desperation which explains why the poor peasants of Bengal joined Pakistan despite the geographical separation of over one thousand miles from the mainland. Pakistan inherited from the British colonial rulers a bureaucratic and military apparatus which took effective command of state power right from the beginning. The narrow base, and hence weakness, of the political leadership made them reliant on the military-bureaucratic axis in Pakistan. After the formal usurpation of political power, the army in Pakistan developed a symbiotic relationship with the commercial class delegating them the charge of industrialization with the help of foreign capital. The lop-sided industrialization in the mainland Pakistan went hand in hand with the impoverishment and underdevelopment of Bengal.

³⁰M. Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia" in Almond and Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 193.

The foreign exchange earned from the agricultural products of Bengal went to the benefit of the military-bureaucratic apparatus in Pakistan. The exploitation of Bengal was not challenged until the emergence of an intelligentsia in Bengal. A nascent professional and commercial class along with the intelligentsia led the nationalist movement in Bangladesh. These rising classes in Bengal constituted a group of marginal elites under the tutelage of the Pakistani hegemonic elites. The prosperity of the emerging professional and commercial classes was stunted by the governing elites of Pakistan. Of these three groups—the commercial class, the professionals and the intelligentsia—the latter group was the vanguard of the nationalist movement in Bangladesh. Insofar as the class basis of this leadership is concerned, they can be viewed as petit bourgeoisie, who revolted against the semi-imperial bourgeoisie of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that what Bottomore referred to as a general pattern in the developing societies, is particularly applicable to the situation of Bangladesh. In the words of Bottomore, "The origins of their elite are to be found, in most cases, in the nationalist leaders or the revolutionary intellectuals, which in some cases are associated or merged with one another. In almost all the Asian and African countries, intellectuals have taken a prominent part in the struggle against colonial rule. University students were often the shock troops of the independence movements".³¹ In the nationalist movement of Bangladesh, the University of Dhaka played a very crucial role. It was in the campus of the University of Dhaka that the flag of Bangladesh was unfurled for the first time. As early as 1952, when the nationalist movement was yet to be articulated, the students of this university laid down their lives to establish the rightful position of their language, Bengali as one of the state languages in Pakistan. In a way, this historic event laid the foundation stone of the nationalist movement in Bangladesh. As the nationalist movement came to a head, the military rulers of Pakistan made the university their first target of attack. Hundreds of students and teachers were gunned down during the war of independence in Bangladesh. The core of the leadership of the political party, namely, Awami League, that led the war of independence, consisted of university educated lawyers and college professors. In the top layer of the Awami League leadership, 29 of the 32 were university graduates. At least two vice-chancellors and eleven university professors, most of whom were educated in USA, UK, etc., were among the ranks of the freedom fighters.³²

With the conclusion of the war of independence, the petit bourgeoisie

³¹T. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

³²M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategy and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1972.

party Awami League took over the leadership of Bangladesh under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The post-independence developments in Bangladesh were similar to many other developing societies where "a single party which was successfully led the independence movement establishes itself as the ruling elite and justifies its power by its past deeds and by its promise to create a modern nation in the future."³³ Most of the promises of the ruling elites in Bangladesh remained unfulfilled in the face of world food shortages in the early 1970s and the internal crises. The economic downturns, runaway inflation, political instability, social unrest and mass starvation eroded the charisma of Sheikh Mujib rendering, Awami League leadership unpopular with the masses. While there was a sharp difference between the promise and accomplishment on the part of the leadership, there was a corresponding gap between the expectations and the achievement on the part of the masses. The revolution of rising expectations became converted into a groaning revolution of frustrations. As Apter stated, "When nationalists achieve self-government and succeed their colonial predecessors, the public expects continuation and expansion of benefits. They also expect increases in participation, access to power and prestige positions in government and other forms of social life, and a speeding up of the tempo of social mobility. Nationalists are capable of absorbing some people in (the) government."³⁴ The rest remain unsatisfied. This was exactly the situation in Bangladesh, which resulted in a widespread sense of frustration among the common people. While the ruling elites were being isolated from the masses of the people day to day, there was growing resentment among various factions within the elite. The unity of the elite could not be maintained for long. A section of the ruling party broke up to form Jatio Samajtantrik Dal or, for short, JSD, a formidable opposition party. Many of the members of the intelligentsia became disillusioned and withdrew their support from the ruling party, Awami League. In order to tide over this disintegration attempts were made to routinize the charismatic leadership and to integrate the governing elites by establishing a one party regime. Following the imposition of a one-party rule, a massive reorganisation plan of the entire bureaucratic system was drawn. It was in the wake of these changes that the political leadership was replaced in a violent military coup engineered by a group of young officers. Obviously the disunity of the governing elite in Bangladesh was one major reason for their displacement, the other reason is the attempt on the part of the Awami League to subside, destabilize and even dismantle the bureaucratic structure. The army struck partly because the interests of the

³³T. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

³⁴D.E. Apter, "Nationalism, Government and Economic Growth", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 7, 1959, p. 119.

military and the bureaucrats were undermined. The axial relationship between the military and the bureaucracy in Bangladesh is revealed not in the timing of the coup but also in the development which followed the coups and the counter-coups. One writer has termed the rule of the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan and elsewhere as military-bureaucratic oligarchy.³⁵ The tension between military bureaucratic oligarchy versus the populist regimes has been a routine phenomenon in the developing societies in general and Latin America in particular. We viewed the class basis of the political elites as the petit bourgeoisie in Bangladesh since in the classical Marxian sense these classes fall in between the working class (peasantry) and the bourgeoisie, but how should we identify the class basis of the military-bureaucratic axis? In one sense, they also constitute the somewhat amorphous class—petit bourgeoisie. But we would argue that the military-bureaucratic axis do not represent any class, they are a group by themselves and their rule help further their own group interests. The autonomy of the military and bureaucratic apparatuses from any class in the developing societies is key to the understanding of those situations. Contrary to the popular Marxist version, the governing elite—the military-bureaucratic nexus—do not represent nor do they act at the behest of any economically dominant class or classes in Bangladesh. The autonomy of the military-bureaucratic elites in Bangladesh can be explained by the absence of a dominant bourgeoisie class. Besides, the modernization attempts from above by the governing elites allow them to create a class of contractors and middle-men by granting business licences, permits, and contracts of various modernizing projects to any particular group of their linking. Thus, the emerging bourgeoisie class in Bangladesh is a caricature of their western counterpart who were the harbingers of modernization at an earlier period in history. The nascent bourgeoisie in Bangladesh is structurally subservient to and dependent on the military-bureaucratic governing elites. The structural weakness of the bourgeoisie due to historical factors in large part explains the authoritarian nature of the governing elites in Bangladesh as well as in a large part of the periphery.

ELITE FORMATION IN KENYA

In order to understand elite structuration in Kenya, as in other peripheral societies, through its historical development, a focus on the period of colonial rule is of utmost importance. With few exceptions, most of the peripheral societies of today's world were former colonies and in those societies colonial rule with its exploitative relationship

³⁵H. Alavi, *op. cit.*

played the most vital role in shaping the class structure and the formation of elite.

The first explorers of what is now Kenya, as of the rest of the Eastern Africa, were missionaries. In the late 19th century, the whole area was rapidly and systematically mapped out by the official and semi-official agents of three colonial powers namely, Britain, Germany and Portugal, seeking in rivalry to establish claims to suzerainty in this region. This region was parcelled out among the three imperial powers on a conference table in Berlin in 1885. The Kenya part went to the British hand, firstly to the British Government and in 1888 to a chartered company.³⁶ When the British established colonial rule in the central highlands of Kenya, they asserted control over peoples who were preliterate, who had not previously used formal systems of money, and who had not engaged in wage labouring. Governor Charles Eliot wrote:

We have in East Africa the rare experience of dealing with a *tabula rasa*, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do as we like, regulate immigration, and open or close the door as seems best. This lessens the difficulty of administration, but it increases the responsibility and need for reflection.³⁷

The three prominent tribes that constituted Kenya were the Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai. While the last one was pastoral tribe, the other two were agricultural. The impact of British capitalism on a tribal society was far-reaching. The onset of British colonial rule in tropical Africa marked the beginning of the integration of that region to the world capitalist system.

The phenomenon of class distinction was absent in the tribal societies of tropical Africa although they had social ranking on the basis of other criteria like age, family, etc. Tribes were divided into sects or clans, consisting of one or more villages:

Villages vary in size from one household to hundreds of households. A village is the normal unit for the things a household cannot do alone, such as building houses and bridges. Pasture land is always used in common by all stock owners in a village, and all villagers have a common right to cut firewood in it. But arable land is not communal except in certain senses of the word. The rights of the individual occupier lapse if he abandons cultivation so that the land reverts to the wild state. Also, tribal law rarely allows an occupier to dispose of any rights in land to any but his rightful heir.³⁸

³⁶Imperial British East Africa Company.

³⁷N. Leys, *Kenya*, London, Leonard, 1926, p. 114.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 51.

Absolute ownership of land was an idea foreign to the thoughts of all the tribes in Kenya. The colonial rulers adopted a policy of alienating the controllers, if not owners, of land bringing it under the 'crown'. In the 'Crown Lands Ordinance' of 1915, the term 'crown lands' was specifically defined as including 'all lands occupied by the native tribes of the protectorate, and lands reserved for the use of the members of any tribe'. Sir Robert Hamilton says of the true legal position as regards the ownership of land in Kenya:

...it may be true to say that the proprietorship of public and crown lands had not, perhaps, been definitely assumed in a legal sense, but practically the control and administration of these lands was reserved to the Government in such a way that the net result was very closely taking to actual proprietorship.³⁹

In 1921, a Supreme Court decision made it clear that the combined effect of the Crown Lands Ordinance (1915) and the Annexation Order (1920) was to prevent Africans from owning land on the same basis as Europeans. Africans were now tenants-at-will of the Crown; tenants who could theoretically be removed *en masse* or individually on the order of the Government of Kenya.⁴⁰

Acting on these powers of control, the crown in Kenya granted rights in land which may be summarized thus: to Europeans, some 2000 square miles in freehold and some 5,500 square miles in leasehold; to Indians, 22 square miles either freehold or leasehold; to Africans, no land at all. The courts recognized that certain Africans have rights of occupancy of certain areas as against other Africans. But they recognized no rights of occupancy or of ownership as against the crown.

The process of confiscation of African land by the settlers was prompted by their need to introduce capitalistic agriculture. The African peasant lost his title to land and *en masse* they were forced to enter the world of money as wage labourers rather than independent producers with control over the means of production. Once alienated from land, the African peasants were compelled to work for the settlers in an export-oriented productive system.

The policy that was followed in regard to land in Kenya proved to be decisive of the whole history of the colony. In pursuing the policy to make Kenya a white man's country and to perpetuate the exploitation, the British invited settler farmers along with merchants and administrators. According to the 1911 census, there were 3,000 Europeans in

³⁹N. Leys, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰C.G. Roseburg, Jr. and J. Nottingham, *The Myth of Mau Mau*, Hoover Institute Publications, 1966, p. 62.

Kenya. Following World War I, the colonial office undertook to increase the number of Europeans in Kenya by settling a group of ex-soldiers there. The 1926 census estimated the European population at 12,529 and the 1931 census put it at 16,812.⁴¹ Next to the European settlers in the social structure in Kenya were the Indians. Indian traders and shopkeepers formed the petit bourgeoisie class in Kenya since the early part of this century. The British were, in fact, utilizing their experiences of colonial rule in India to the context of Kenya. In the beginning, the currency was Indian, and the Indian penal code was taken over bodily. Indian armed police were attached to every important Government station. The Mombasa-Uganda railway was largely built by the Indians. This railway—built between 1896 and 1901—laid the infrastructure of colonial exploitation in tropical Africa. The influx of Indian and British compradors derived their ability to exploit East African resources from the power of the colonial state on the one hand and the inability of the members of the indigenous society to compete with them on the other. Since the pre-colonial East African society was of a tribal nature and was relatively underdeveloped, skilled personnel had to be imported in the first instance to man the administrative, educational and economic institutions required to integrate the region into the international system of exchange. The Underdeveloped nature of existing social structure was, of course, used by the expatriate groups (both Europeans and Indians) to justify their claim to these positions of power and privilege.

Since the early part of this century, Kenya began to play the classic role of a country at the periphery of the capitalist system, exporting primary commodities and importing manufactures. Since the region now known as Kenya seemed to contain few mineral resources, an agricultural system capable of maintaining a permanent white settlers community was established. The existing African agriculture was pre-capitalist in the sense that the bulk of production was for subsistence rather than for the market, and the means of production, notably land and labour, were not exchanged on the market for money. The establishment of a capitalist economy in agriculture by the European settlers and their increasing control of production and expropriation of labour brought Kenya into an exploitative relationship. The expansion of the production of cash crops and their export to the world market brought Kenya into the orbit of world market system. Export of primary products and import of manufactured goods marked the beginning of a dependent relationship. All this process began in Kenya with the onset of colonial domination. According to Brett, "creation of capi-

⁴¹R.L. Tignor, *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya*, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 25.

talistic agriculture in Kenya was principally a function of official policy".⁴²

The growth of business and trading activity accompanied by the strengthening of the state machinery gave new dimension in shaping the class structure in Kenya. The relationship between the state and the social forces generated by the creation of the new system of colonial production is very important. "The colonial state in Kenya was distinctive in that it accommodated the interests of a settler population and was not simply an agency acting on behalf of mercantile interests in the metropolis".⁴³ Bureaucracy right from its implantation in Kenya started playing an important role in the social structure. The members of the bureaucracy became a part of the bourgeoisie in Kenya. Colin Leys says, "The African bourgeoisie proper consists primarily of successful traders and transporters, and civil servants, professional workers and politicians...".⁴⁴ Below this bourgeoisie there was a class of petit bourgeoisie whose creation and development was tied to the colonial state structure. This class was at the forefront of Kenyan nationalism. Steve Langdon clearly explains this situation:

The state was the critical institution in managing Kenya's exchange relationship with the metropolitan centre—generating considerable prosperity for a few, and poverty and stagnation for many. The dynamics of African nationalism can be understood only in this context of state-administered exchange relations with the metropolis and of the internal polarization occurring. The state-centered structure generated an African petty bourgeoisie of clerks, teachers and small-scale traders on its margins...

The regulated, racist nature of the colonial system made it virtually impossible for the rising Africans to advance very far. They soon reached an upper limit as a result of experienced Asian commercial competition, racial bars in the government sector (and elsewhere), and white-run production/marketing arrangements and landholding rights in agriculture. The consequence of this increasing frustration was the rise of various protest movements...⁴⁵

These protest movements of the petty bourgeoisie culminated in a

⁴²E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, New York, Nok Publishers, 1973, p. 186.

⁴³L. Cliffe, *Underdevelopment or Socialism? A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Tanzania* in R. Harris (ed.), *The Political Economy of Africa*, Cambridge, Mass, Schenkman, 1975, p. 156.

⁴⁴C. Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 313.

⁴⁵S. Langdon, "The Political Economy of Dependence", *Journal of East African Research and Development*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1974, p. 129.

nationalistic movement in Kenya. Although the petty bourgeoisie class gave leadership to the nationalist movement, it established an alliance with the peasantry to wage the struggle of national emancipation against the colonial power. African nationalism, in the words of E.A. Brett:

...invariably required the existence of a small western-educated elite within the African population capable of organising a national movement which could deal with the colonial authorities on their own terms. It also required the support of large sections of the rural population, which would only be forthcoming where they could be shown that their interests had come into direct conflict with the policies of the colonial state.⁴⁶

In Kenya, the creation of settler dominance drew large sections of the rural population directly into anti-colonial struggle from the earliest stages of the evolution of the cash economy. The key role of the peasantry⁴⁷ and their revolutionary potential has been accentuated by many writers on Kenya notably among them being Colin Leys who tends to examine the question raised by Barrington Moore as to 'whether the great wave of peasant revolutions, so far one of the most distinctive features of the 20th century, may not have already spent its force' in the context of Kenya. According to Leys:

The facts are decisively against anyone who is tempted to see development in Kenya as implying the steady erosion of the peasantry in favour of the formation of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. The idea that 'for the future it may be said that peasantry are ceasing to be' rests on a linear view of the process of development, based on western experience; in which the process of industrialization absorbed a steadily increasing proportion of the population into the towns. . . . none of these conditions hold in Kenya, or in many other under-developed countries.⁴⁸

⁴⁶E.A. Brett, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

⁴⁷Some writers have differentiated peasants from 'primitive agriculturalists' on the one hand and from 'farmers' or 'agricultural entrepreneurs' on the other but we hold that "the peasantry consists of small agricultural producers who, with the help of simple equipment and the labour of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of obligation to the holders of political and economic power". Our definition of peasantry includes both the landowners and the landless peasants (cultivators). In a word, whoever gets his subsistence from agriculture. This definition is, however, applicable to the Kenyan context in particular and African context in general.

⁴⁸C. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

Other than an expatriate bourgeoisie and a predominantly native petit bourgeoisie the last but not least important class in Kenya was the peasantry. In traditional Marxist literature, peasantry is considered to be a class with little revolutionary potential. This class gives way to proletariats with the onset of capitalism and its concomitant industrialization. In Kenya, the peasantry as a class survives notwithstanding the fact that a bourgeoisie and a proletariat are being formed historically as opposing classes. "The peasantry develops its own pattern of relationship with the elite. A peasantry needs towns to sell to and an elite to fulfil various bureaucratic and cultural functions for it; it is not a 'whole society'. It must therefore establish exchange relationships with the towns and with the elite, which are sufficiently satisfactory and stable to provide the peasant with a sense of separateness and value of his own life".⁴⁹

Since the nature of peasant society is that it provides a surplus for the elite, the extraction of his surplus may, in the long run, generate class consciousness and class antagonism on the part of the peasantry towards the elite, and may lead to revolutionary change of the old order. But insofar as Kenya is concerned, there is no old order in the actual sense of the term. The peasantry itself is part of a new order and does not come into conflict with any immediate opponent class. This is not to say that differentiation among the peasantries is absent. The primitive (tribal) agriculturalists were the prefigurations of a peasant class yet it has been argued that:

It is more fruitful to view both the creation of an African peasantry, as well as the creation of the present differentiation among African peasantries, as being primarily the result of the interaction between an international capitalist economic system and traditional socio-economic systems. Within the context of territorially-defined colonial political systems.⁵⁰

In general, the whole of sub-Saharan Africa is still predominantly rural in its population:

But the ubiquitous reach of colonialism has ensured that no significant numbers of the primitive agriculturalist who previously comprised the vast majority of the population have remained outside the framework of a wider economic system. Under our usage most of this rural population has thus been transformed into a peasantry.⁵¹

⁴⁹C. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 329-330.

⁵⁰J. Saul and R. Woods, "African Peasantries" in T. Shanin (ed.), *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, New York, Penguin, 1975, p. 106.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 107.

In Kenya, in particular, the bulk of the peasants lost their land rights and have been proletarianized either in the rural or industrial sectors of the economy. The concept of peasantry in the context of sub-Saharan Africa is to be understood in its wider sense which includes both owners of small holdings and the so-called landless agricultural wage labourers.

Arrighi and Saul tend to argue that a part of the 'wage-working class' belongs to the peasantry in sub-Saharan Africa.

The wage-working class is polarized into two strata. Wage workers in the lower stratum are only marginally or partially proletarianized as, over their life-cycle, they derive the bulk of means of subsistence for their families from outside the wage economy. Wage workers in the upper stratum, generally a very small minority, receive incomes sufficiently high to justify a total break of their links with the peasantry. This is a type of 'optional proletarianization' which has little in common with process of proletarianization resulting from the steady impoverishment of the peasantry. We feel, therefore, justified in considering wage-workers in the lower stratum as part of the peasantry and in including the upper stratum with the much more important 'elites and 'sub-elites' in bureaucratic employment in what we have called the 'Labour Aristocracy....'⁵²

The exploitation of the peasants and their steady marginalization led to uprisings where peasantry and the urban lumpen proletariats joined hands to fight the colonial settlers. The so-called Mau Mau insurrection of 1952 was the most significant expression of the growing discontent which was at once anti-colonial and anti-settlers (planters). According to Cliffe:

The so-called Mau Mau was a political movement spearheaded by a landless minority with some organizational links with more radical urban workers, relying in guerilla fashion on the support of the mass of small-holding peasants who made up the bulk of the population. The class dimension of the conflict is underlined by the social origins of their opponents, the settlers and the Kikuyu gentry, and also by the counter measures which the colonial authorities took once the revolt was contained militarily.⁵³

Ali A. Mazrui also holds:

Much of the agitation behind the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya was

⁵²G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Socialist Register*, 1969, pp. 158-9.

⁵³L. Cliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

by people who were landless, living as squatters on European estates, and observing hungrily large tracts of land, either prosperously fertile or totally unused, all reserved exclusively for whites.

Commenting on the consequence of this revolt, Mazrui continues:

The Mau Mau movement was militarily defeated by the British, but it was clearly a victory of the vanquished. The political triumph went to the African people... The Mau Mau movement was also the first great African liberation movement of the modern period.⁵⁴

After the revolt was suppressed, electoral politics were opened up for Africans. The new political leaders who were able to take full advantage of this style of politics were naturally men who had good education and who had not been in detention. This African elite was the direct product of the changes induced by the colonial system. Brett has observed:

The classic colonial system created not only the group which was to be responsible for the organization of the movement which led to its replacement, but also for the popular hostility to its presence which enabled the elite to mobilize a wide range of the population behind nationalist demands....⁵⁵

Marxist assumptions about the dialectical nature of the evolution of opposition movements through direct exposure to the contradictions created by processes of capitalistic exploitation come quite close to the African situation. Brett says that Frank and Fanon are, however:

Certainly right to point out the limited nature of the demands made by the national bourgeoisie class, and their inability in the post-colonial situation to provide an effective basis for an autonomous rather than a neocolonial developmental strategy. This suggests that although Marx's general assumptions about the necessary connection between colonial exploitation and the ultimate emergence of a regenerated local society are basically correct, the obstacles to full realization of this local potential are much larger than he assumed.⁵⁶

With the formal independence from the colonial powers, the new elites of the peripheral countries failed to initiate any radical break with the core countries because of the dependent status of these countries in the

⁵⁴A. Mazrui, 'Foreword' in R. Buijtenhuijs' *Mau Mau; Twenty Years After*, The Hague, Mouton, 1973, pp. 10-13.

⁵⁵E. A. Brett, *op. cit.* p. 308.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 309.

world capitalist system. It has been aptly pointed out by Steve Langdon that:

As the new African nationalist elite emerged, the benefits open to it from maintaining that exchange structure encouraged a neo-colonial option which has changed Kenya's metropolis-satellite relationships only relatively marginally. By remaining in a position of dependence on world capitalism, the political-bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been able to exercise lucrative dominance in Kenya—accumulating wealth to solidify its own bourgeois clients, through control and manipulation of the metropolis-periphery exchange structure. This system of state-centered, metropolis-oriented exchange has polarized the African community inside Kenya. As a result, staggering inequalities have emerged.⁵⁷

Since the independence of Kenya from the British colonial rule in 1963, "its economy has certainly remained exposed to external influences. Expenditure on imports, for example, as a proportion of GDP rose from 27 per cent in 1964 to 35 per cent in 1971 and remained at 30 per cent in 1973 even after the government imposed direct control on imports". This economic pattern of underdevelopment was fostered and is maintained by a state which was created by colonialism. One of the most basic characteristics common to most African politics, according to Cliffe, is "the domination of government and other institutions by a tiny, western-educated, highly privileged elite, largely unhampered by popular political influence."⁵⁸ The political party in power in Kenya since its independence in 1963, namely, the Kenyan African National Union, was a loose party of patrons, not a mass organization, and Kenyatta dominated it from the moment that he accepted the leadership. "His steady insistence that private property should be respected, that the settlers should stay, and that the colonial government's consolidation of land and wealth... should be left undisturbed quickly became the official line".⁵⁹ Even before formal independence, Kenyatta said in 1961:

The Government of an independent Kenya will not be a gangster government. Those who have been panicky about their property—whether land or buildings or houses—can now rest assured that the future African government, the Kenya government, will not deprive them of their property or rights of ownership. We will encourage investors in various projects to come to Kenya and carry on their

⁵⁷S. Langdon, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁵⁸L. Cliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁵⁹C. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, London, Heinmann, 1975, p. 62.

business peacefully, in order to bring prosperity to this country.⁶⁰

In the independent Kenya, there is parliamentary democracy, at least, formally and although theoretically there is no restriction on multiparty system, in reality there is only one party—KANU (Kenyan African National Union). But here again the actual power rests with the bureaucracy which subordinates the political system. Holtham and Hazlewood have stated:

This formal political system is in fact subordinate to the bureaucracy in Kenya. Governmental control is exercised and policy executed through the provincial administrations, directly responsible to the office of the President. The influence of the political party, KANU, and its functionaries is not great... the bureaucracy as a class being most influential in the running of the country....⁶¹

Colin Leys has drawn an interesting parallel between the state and bureaucracy in Marx's discussion of 1850 France and that obtained in most sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960's. Obviously there are differences between these two situations but the similarities are drawn in the fact that something fundamental is common: a complex and fluid class structure corresponding to the still incompletely evolved interrelationship of the capitalist and non-capitalist (rather precapitalist) modes of production. In discussing the French politics of 1850, Marx saw the basic contradiction in Louis Napoleon's situation that the government, the state apparatus, was independent of any single class, yet in practice it could not do without class support, and could not prevent its policies fostering the interests of certain classes, even if it wished to. Yet this enhanced the political power of these classes, and so undermined its own independence of action; therefore, it also worked constantly to counteract the political power of the classes whose economic power it was simultaneously building up. The state apparatus continues to break the political power of the middle class and as against it even they tend to represent the peasants and of the people in general claiming themselves 'True Socialists', etc.

The parallel with Kenya, however, is not exact. The 'middle class' whose economic interests the Kenyan government defends and at the same time curtails its political power is not as indigenous as in Marx's analysis. The real economic and political power of this middle class lay abroad. Nevertheless, the 'political-bureaucratic bourgeoisie' or what

⁶⁰C. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁶¹G. Holtham and Hazlewood, *Aid and Inequality in Kenya*, London, Croom Helm, 1976, p. 217.

Fanon has termed 'bourgeoisie of the civil service' has been maintaining a subservient relationship with the foreign interests. Leys has stated:

The development of a rhetoric of economic nationalism to complement the earlier political nationalism of the ruling elite, coupled in practice with the elaboration of a system of partnership with foreign capital which actually implied a steady expansion of foreign ownership of modern productive assets in Kenya, and thus of the political power of the foreign capital. The populist rhetoric of bonapartist government was even more pronounced in Kenya than it had been in France ('African Socialism', 'rural development', and so on), but in very similar fashion the political power of the peasants and urban workers was progressively curtailed and neutralized.⁶²

As a matter of fact, what was for Marx a purely transitional and relatively short-term phenomenon has become an almost generic form of government in the peripheral societies in the present world capitalist system. And Kenya is a good example. The post-colonial state in Kenya and its apparatus has tried to blur the class-structure in order to cover up its exploitative role as a ruling class in alliance with the bourgeoisie backed by multi-national corporations. The slogans of 'classlessness' and 'African Socialism' only serve the interest of the ruling class in Kenya. The Kenyan Government white paper stated, "Marx's criticism of the society of his time and place was a valid one... valid as the historical setting that inspired Marx has no counterpart in independent Kenya." Again:

The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African Socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in traditional African society and one exists today among Africans. The class problem in Africa, therefore, is largely one of prevention, in particular: (i) to eliminate the risk of foreign economic domination; and (ii) to plan development so as to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes.⁶³

Such an attempt on the part of the state apparatuses to maintain the *status quo* in respect of class-structure, developed during the colonial rule and which was quite instrumental in the neo-colonial relationship as well, is characteristic of the post-colonial peripheral societies in today's world.

⁶²C. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁶³J. Mohan, "Varieties of African Socialism", *Socialist Register*, 1966, p. 237.

BANGLADESH AND KENYA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PERIPHERAL SOCIETIES

In this concluding section, we will try to locate the similarities *vis-a-vis* the differences between Bangladesh and Kenya. Our focus of interest has been the changing class structure and the emergence of new elites in these societies mainly as a result of their contact with the exogenous relationships to which all peripheral societies are subjected. As stated earlier, colonialism and neo-colonialism are the two main forms of such exogenous relationships and our attention has been centered on the colonial relationships in particular and its contributing effect on the emergence of new elite and on shaping the class-structure in the peripheral societies.

Bangladesh had a fairly long history of colonial domination lasting for over two hundred years. On the other hand, Kenya was under colonial rule for about sixty years. Both these societies were, however, under British colonial rule. Bangladesh also found herself in a status of an internal colony under Pakistan since the British left in 1947 for a period of about 25 years. In 1971, Bangladesh became independent through a violent liberation struggle against the Pakistani rulers.

The pre-British Bengal was under the suzerainty of Mughal empire with central capital in Delhi. One might be tempted to consider this period as an early phase of colonialism, but we would join issue with such a view because we would hold that colonialism is an outgrowth of capitalist mode of production which was obviously absent in Mughal India. The pre-capitalist Mughal India, however, was successful in creating a more or less unified India where Bengal had a provincial status with the characteristics of a feudal administration.

Kenya, prior to British takeover, was an admixture of pastoral and agricultural economies and the conception of statehood was foreign to such a tribal society. It was only during the British colonial rule that Kenya was unified into a state.

In Bengal, there was an old order, a feudal bureaucracy, and an agricultural economy coupled with a significant indigenous cottage industry. Other than the division of labour, class structure was also rooted in the age-old caste system. The British imported capitalist production relations, enmeshed it with the existing classes, and created a rather complex class-structure.

In Kenya, as in other tribal societies, the phenomenon of class, at least as understood in Marxian analysis, was absent. There was, however, social ranking and in Kenyan tribes, especially in the Masai tribe, the medicine man was the ruler, a post not always hereditary, and a particular age-group, namely, warriors exercised considerable control in the tribal affairs. It is only with the onset of British colonialism and

capitalist relations of production that social classes—placed in opposition to one another—emerged. As a matter of fact, there was no old order in Kenya as there was in Bengal (Bangladesh); a new social order was created.

The other important difference between these societies could be found in the strong tribal feelings in Kenya as opposed to the important role played by religion in Bengal society.

Indeed, there are a number of dissimilarities between these two societies, insofar as their development of social classes is concerned mainly as a consequence of colonial contact from very different original situations. Nevertheless, similarities are there in the fact that in both these societies a new western elite was at the spearhead of nationalist movements. This elite in both the societies represented the petit-bourgeoisie class. The petit-bourgeoisie class in both these societies played a revolutionary role mobilizing the whole nation in alliance with the peasantry in its struggle against the colonial power. The absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie in Kenya during the colonial period is matched by a similar situation in Bangladesh. And the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie made room for the petit-bourgeoisie class to play a revolutionary role in the national struggle.

The evolution of nationalist movements in Kenya was linked with the growth of the educated section of the petit-bourgeoisie class. The more nationalist movement gathered momentum, the more the leadership was assumed by more educated sections of the population. The first transtribal East African Association in the early 1920's was given "direction and life by Harry Thuku, a young clerk working in the treasury...he was one of the first Kikuyu to read and write English".⁶⁴

One of the important features of the various protest movements in Kenya, which culminated into a nationalist movement, is that "very few of the elite of these movement, ever received a higher education and many had only an elementary schooling".⁶⁵ The nationalist movement in Bangladesh was led by the Awami League which was formed in 1948. Its first President was "a peasant leader...with little formal education".⁶⁶ As the movement developed, more educated sections of the population came to the forefront of this movement. The growth of nationalist movement in Kenya as well as in Bangladesh gathered momentum with the development of the petit-bourgeoisie class, especially its educated section, who gave leadership to these movements. In the final stage of the nationalist struggle in both these societies, a western-educated elite

⁶⁴Roseburg and Nottingham, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁶⁶A. Abdullah, "Class Basis of Nationalism: Bangladesh and Pakistan", in B. Thomas and S. Lavan (eds.), *West Bengal and Bangladesh: Perspectives from 1972* (mimeo), Michigan State University, Asian Studies Center, 1972, p. 273.

was well entrenched in the leadership and it became the new elite in the post-independent situation.

The first sixteen-member cabinet of the independent Kenya in 1963 comprised at least six former teachers. At least, five of the ministers, including the Prime Minister Kenyatta, who had a post-graduate diploma in Anthropology from London School of Economics, were educated abroad.⁶⁷

The cabinet in Bangladesh following the independence in 1971 comprised a number of ex-college and University teachers of which at least four had doctorate degrees.

The introduction of education by the colonial rulers in both Bangladesh and Kenya was a significant step in the creation of new classes in these societies. In Kenya, "missionaries played the leading educational role";⁶⁸ but in Bangladesh the colonial government played the major role in introducing western education in the society. The role of missionaries in the Muslim dominated parts of Bengal society was not very significant in terms of disseminating knowledge or religion. In Kenya, the missionaries were "inclined to accept the prevailing educational philosophy in colonial Africa that Africans should be trained mainly for subordinate roles as clerks, teachers, evangelists, and artisans, always working under European supervision".⁶⁹ Mutiso has underscored the importance of the influence of missionaries in educating the people of Kenya, who in the long run gave leadership to the nationalist movement. Those Africans who were converted and educated by the missionaries have been termed as 'asomi'. The section of 'asomi', which maintained the link between the European rulers and the ruled as functionaries, are known as 'associative asomi', whereas the 'disassociative asomi' were those who were educated, not integrated with the colonial government and gave leadership to the nationalist movement. The mass of the non-asomi Africans were the followers of the movement for national independence.⁷⁰

In Bangladesh, as in India, the colonial rulers introduced western education mainly to reduce administrative costs by creating a class which would be Indian in blood and colour, but European in taste and opinion. The Indian civil service was gradually manned by the educated Indians excepting the higher echelons which were reserved for the British. Other educated Indians joined various liberal professions, like law, medicine, teaching, etc. This section of the petit bourgeoisie played a major role in the nationalist movement in India. In India, however,

⁶⁷Reporter, Nairobi, Kenya, December 14, 1963.

⁶⁸R.L. Tignor, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 5-6.

⁷⁰G.C.M. Mutiso, "Cleavage and Organizational Base of Politics in Kenya", *Journal of East African Research and Development*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1973, pp. 39-64.

there was already a quite stable bourgeoisie which would effectively collaborate with the petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry in forging the struggle against the British rule. In Bangladesh, there was no such bourgeoisie and the nationalist movements were led by the educated section of the petit bourgeoisie. The educated section of the Bengali petit bourgeoisie were allowed in the bureaucracy and military establishments in Pakistan and could get a promotion to a certain level but were deliberately discriminated against. In the field of business and commerce, the scene was dominated by the non-Bengali businessmen who were either Pakistanis or migrants from India. Under such circumstances, the process of embourgeoisement among the Bengalis could not take place which contributed to the rise of the nationalist movement in Bangladesh. A similar situation occurred in Kenya. The Kenyan native petit bourgeoisie were also conditioned to a certain level of development and the higher strata in bureaucracy as well as in business and trade were dominated by the British or the settler Indians. The Kenyans were racially discriminated against in terms of promotion in the bureaucracy, etc. Similarly, the Bengalis were also ethnically discriminated against in terms of promotion in the bureaucracy and military which constituted the power elite in Pakistan. So the Bengalis were deliberately kept out of the corridors of power in Pakistan. Beneath these racial or ethnic discriminations lay the class domination. In both Kenya and Bangladesh, the conflicting classes were the petit bourgeoisie versus the ruling colonial elites which consisted of the propertied classes and were represented by the bureaucracy (and also military). The national struggles of both Kenya and Bangladesh were led by the educated section of the petit bourgeoisie or 'the intellectual elite' in Bottomore's terminology but there are certain differences in respect of the *modus operandi* of the struggles. The differences can be understood by looking into the relationships these peripheral societies had with their colonial masters.

The nationalist movement in Kenya began in the early 1920s with the activities of the organizations like the East African Association. "African resentment gradually mounted and the first truly African political party emerged in 1928, with the creation of the Kikuyu Central Association, based in the Kikuyu country on the outskirts of Nairobi."⁷¹ The increasing participation of the peasantry, who were robbed of their land by the colonial rulers, created a potentially militant nationalist movement. The alienation of land to European settlers was a dominant and unifying theme of the nationalist politics. "Underlying all rural politics was the land issue, in its initial stages not so much a question of covering lost property as of ensuring the security of tenure on that which remained."⁷²

⁷¹Reporter, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁷²Roseburg and Nottingham, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

The militant nature of the nationalist movement in Kenya became exposed in the 'Mau Mau' revolt in early 1950's. The colonial rulers clamped down a national emergency in 1952, a moment considered to be the high tide of the revolution. Mau Mau revolt was basically a struggle for national independence by the rural proletariats (landless peasants etc.) and the lumpen proletariats of the urban centers whose existence featured in the 1950's with some degree of industrialization that took place in Kenya under colonial patronization. Although Mau Mau revolt was militarily suppressed by the superior military power of the colonial rulers, it was a political victory in the process of Kenyan liberation. In the wake of Mau Mau violence, parliamentary type of politics under petit bourgeoisie leadership gathered momentum. Various constitutional reforms and increasing participation by the Kenyans in the colonial politics and many concessions on the part of the colonial rulers envisaged the policy of the so-called 'winds of change' by the British colonial power. Kenya gained formal independence in 1963 which in itself was not the product of a violent revolution though the violent Mau Mau revolution laid the basis of Kenya's independence. The political and constitutional concessions of the colonial rulers may be explained by their stable mature status as core power and their acknowledgement of the policy of 'the winds of change' was but a ploy to initiate a peaceful transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism. Such a plan also allowed the native petit-bourgeoisie class to remain the power elite in the post-colonial situation which would not vitally challenge the neo-colonial relationship pattern. The revolutionary role of the petit-bourgeoisie class is limited to its fight against the colonial rulers and once independence, at least politically, is attained, they indulge themselves in the process of embourgeoisement which is not autonomous and subservient to the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Hence contradictions in the post-colonial situation assume new dimensions. The unified petit bourgeoisie in Kenya, as in many other African countries constituted the new elite and placed itself against the peasantry and other working classes. The unity of the petit-bourgeoisie rule in African countries is often expressed by one-party rule. Subramaniam has pointed out that in countries like Zambia and others, in the absence of a large number of educated 'middle class' (educated section of the petit bourgeoisie) bureaucracy has been politicized.⁷³ In other words, there are no apparent contradictions between the bureaucracy and the political party in such countries because they represent a more or less homogeneous and small petit-bourgeoisie class.

In Bangladesh, the petit-bourgeoisie class was at the forefront of

⁷³V. Subramaniam, "Politicized Administration in Africa and Elsewhere", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, 1977, p. 302.

national struggles. The politics of this petit-bourgeoisie leadership had always been that of negotiations and increasing representations within the framework of an united Pakistan state. The movement took a militant turn only when the Pakistan Military's bureaucratic oligarchy cracked down on the unarmed people of Bangladesh in 1971 which marked the climax of a long struggle. Alavi rightly observes: "The leaders of the Awami League who were the spokesmen of Bengali Nationalism, had neither planned nor anticipated and prepared themselves for any kind of armed liberation struggle."⁷⁴ The educated section of the petit bourgeoisie in Bangladesh, especially those in the liberal professions, like teaching, law, etc., were spearheading the nationalist struggle. Hamza Alavi has commented:

The action of the Pakistan Army in East Bengal ... was premised on the elimination of the entire Bengali intelligentsia, in a desperate bid to silence the voice of the Bengali people. When, in the dark hours of the night of 25 March, the army moved into bloody action, by all accounts it did so systematically, searching out marked houses of political cadres, intellectuals and members of the University community. They acted, evidently, on the hypothesis that the voice of Bengali nationalism was no more than the rhetoric of a small band of intellectuals and politicians, whose elimination would, therefore, restore loyal obedience of the Bengali people to their own authority and remove all prospects of renewed challenge.⁷⁵

History proved this hypothesis wrong. The violent nature of the independence struggle of Bangladesh can be partly understood by the fact that Bangladesh, itself a peripheral society, was fighting against another peripheral society, namely, Pakistan for whom the break would be final with no scope left for a continued neo-colonial domination. This situation prompted the ruling military-bureaucratic oligarchy of Pakistan to be violent without any shred of diplomacy and civility. For them, the loss of Bengal was a loss for good—never to be recovered. During the liberation war, the entire Bengali nation was up in arms to form what Cabral would call 'nation class'⁷⁶—but in the post-colonial Bangladesh new contradictions surfaced. Unlike many African countries, Bangladesh had a fairly large number of educated petit bourgeoisie, one section entrenched in the civil service and the other in various liberal professions who formed the hardcore of Awami League leadership. In the post-colonial Bangladesh, contradictions

⁷⁴H. Alavi, "Bangladesh and the Crisis of Pakistan", *Socialist Register*, 1971, p. 290.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 289-90.

⁷⁶I. Wallerstein, "Class and Class Conflict in Africa", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 26, No. 9, 1975, p. 41.

developed and sharpened between the military-bureaucratic oligarchy on the one hand and the petit-bourgeoisie leadership on the other. The military takeover of political power in the late 1975 by a series of coups and counter coups was the culmination of post-colonial social contradictions in Bangladesh.

The phenomena of increasing domination and enlargement of bureaucracy (and military) in the post-colonial situation are present in both Bangladesh and Kenya. In Bangladesh today the military-bureaucratic oligarchy is in the forefront of state power while in Kenya, though a one-party democracy, the bureaucracy is in effective control of state power. Holtham and Hazelwood observed:

There is an identifiable power elite in Kenya. It is grouped around the person and authority of the President... The President enjoys widespread authority in Kenya both for his symbolic role in the independence struggle, and because subsequently he has come to present national unity.⁷⁷

The leader of the nationalist movements in both these societies, as stated earlier, represented petit bourgeoisie although they tended to look at themselves as 'the patriarchal benefactor of all classes'. What was true of Jomo Kenyatta (the old man), the arch-type nationalist leader of Kenya, was largely true of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the friend of Bengal), the author of the Bengali nationalist movement. Fanon's analysis of the post-colonial politics is quite applicable for both Kenya and Bangladesh. The institutions of the state are progressively reduced to those of the President and his circle. The party becomes a mere shell, and actually 'an implement of coercion'. The leading posts in the bureaucracy are entrusted to men from the leaders's tribe, 'sometimes directly from his own family.'⁷⁸ Parliament becomes little more than an adjunct of the Presidency. In certain post-colonial societies, the parliamentary game is faked from the beginning as in Bangladesh and Kenya.

Powerless economically, unable to bring about the existence of coherent social relations, and standing on the principle of its domination as a class, the bourgeoisie chooses the solution that seems to it the easiest, that of the single party.⁷⁹

Such a prognosis by Fanon was translated into reality in both Bangladesh and Kenya. The post-colonial attempt of practicing democracy in

⁷⁷G. Holtham and Hazlewood, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁷⁸F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Grove Press, 1968, p. 183.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 164.

Bangladesh by the petit-bourgeoisie leadership was mere sham and eventually led to a one-party dictatorship. In Kenya, similar one-party rule is in operation. Such similarities are not just coincidental and the causes of these similarities may be looked for in the underlying socio-economic formations and the class-structures. The similarities in these societies may be attributed to their peripheral status in the present world capitalist system.

The post-colonial social change in Bangladesh and Kenya in the light of the changes in the class-structure has been confined to the changes in the structure of the ruling elite. The enactment of Paretian circulation of elite is more of an intra-class phenomenon than an inter-class conflict. We assume that the ruling elite in the peripheral societies continue to play a conservative role mediating between the conflicting interests of the exploited masses of the peripheral countries. Further investigations in establishing the relationship between the ruling elites in the peripheral countries and the metropolitan bourgeoisie of the core countries may substantiate our assumption.

The Recruitment and Training of Administrative Elites in Bangladesh

HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH
and
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Higher echelons of the civil services in many countries of the world are overwhelmingly dominated by a select band of individuals who significantly influence the administration of public affairs. Indeed, higher civil servants are no longer mere instruments of the political will, rather they enjoy a wide latitude within the governmental decision-making structures. Today, their sphere of dominance extends to the area of public policy formulation and implementation.

Higher civil servants in almost all countries—developed as well as developing—share a number of characteristics which clearly set them apart from the vast array of individuals who are on the payroll of the public exchequer and labelled, generally, as civil servants. First, the size of the higher civil service is always, almost as a rule, microscopically small compared to the total size of governmental personnel. Positions near the top of the hierarchy are few and far between. Secondly, most civil servants possess a generalist-liberal education which allow them to display expertise and deliver sermons on almost any issue which comes before their attention. Conversely, they lack sophisticated and advanced scientific or technical knowledge about any discipline. Thirdly, majority of them join the civil service at an early age and become part of a lifelong career pattern. This has been the case in many European, Asian and African countries. In some countries, like the United States, where there are clear provisions for qualified individuals to enter the civil service at the top level, there also members of the 'super grade' have a special status and are quite distinct from the rest of public personnel. Fourthly, these higher civil servants demonstrate a patronizing attitude towards the common man. This is especially common in the developing countries. Servants of the people are indoctrinated

and accustomed to preponderate over them. Fifthly, there is a tendency to outfox, outmanoeuvre and befool political executives in power. This takes many forms. Senior civil servants can withhold information, mislead ministers and can abuse power in the name of their political masters. This unbraced relationship between political functionaries and top civil servants result from a sense of superiority on the part of the latter in terms of education, social background, upbringing and indoctrination. And sixthly, generalist civil servants hardly make any attempt to hide their dislike for those with proven expertise in science and technology and serving as professionals in government.

Higher civil servants are termed here as administrative elites. Designating them as such, however, usually presents a couple of problems¹ which need to be cleared at the outset of the discussion. One concerns the delineation of boundaries within the civil service, *i.e.*, determining the point which separates the elites from the non-elites. The other is whether to include within the category of administrative elites those public personnel who have a high potential for participation in decisions significantly affecting the public policy process. Regarding the first problem a number of solutions have been offered. Reliance can be placed on official definitions as hierarchical distinctions are relatively stable and are salient in the civil servants' perceptions. Formal designations enable one to begin the process of correctly segregating the administrative elites from other groups of public personnel. The other problem concerns mostly with the extent and nature of influence of civil servants. Here, their self-perception of roles is important. This enables one to exclude many other categories of civil servants from the rank of the elite. Officers belonging to the diplomatic corps (non-careerists), judiciary and the military can be excluded from the category of administrative elites for conceptual clarity. Also, elected political officials can be excluded for obvious reasons.

Dominance by a small band of generalist civil servants over the bureaucratic apparatus has been a salient feature for almost two centuries in the Indian subcontinent. This tradition was created with the establishment of the Indian Civil Service (ICS)² during the middle of the nineteenth century. The members of this Service, generally speaking, administered all aspects of public life. Elitist as they were, they were insulated from society, were apathetic towards social forces and responsible only to the British Government. The imperial tradition was continued after 1947 in Pakistan which emerged as an independent state

¹Here we draw rather heavily from J.A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 23-5.

²M.M. Khan, *Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan*, Dhaka, University of Dhaka, 1980, pp. 71-89.

upon separation from India. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)³ was designed on ICS lines; indeed, it was an exact replica of the ICS prototype. The only difference was in the nomenclature. The members of the CSP exercised considerable power and influence over state affairs. Accountability became an anathema to them and both politicians and ordinary citizens were diffident in controlling them. Within the Service, discipline and *esprit de corps* were maintained by deliberately keeping its size small and successfully resisting the entry of other public personnel into its fold. Its closed nature guaranteed its members security of tenure and scope for accelerated advancement to senior key policy-making and implementing positions within the civil service system of the country.

This bureaucratic dominance over state affairs continued until 1971 when the eastern wing of Pakistan seceded to form an independent nation—Bangladesh. The bureaucracy, particularly the CSP, was considered as a potent force that had thwarted the working of democracy in former Pakistan (1947-71). It was identified as one of the instruments in the economic and political exploitation of the eastern wing (Bangladesh) by the west (now Pakistan). The political leadership which came to power in independent Bangladesh was resolute in its stand to wipe out elitism from the bureaucracy and make it subservient to political control.⁴ It initiated a number of measures to keep civil servants under check but these proved futile, in the long run, in changing their attitude towards the common man or towards professionals in government. However, structural reform of the bureaucracy has been effected that, to a large measure, has freed the civil service from the domination of a single elite corps.

In erstwhile Pakistan, there were three categories of regularly constituted civil services: all-Pakistan services that included the CSP; central services like audit and accounts, diplomatic and taxation; and provincial service. On the basis of levels of responsibility, educational requirements and admissible pay range, the services were divided into four classes. Those occupying positions in class I were known as higher civil servants and their recruitment and training were different from those of the members of the other classes. The CSP and the provincial service were generalist-administrative and their members performed a variety of duties including those meant for the functional services. This way they permeated the entire civil service structure. Key positions in both central and provincial governments were the preserve of the

³M.M. Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-137.

⁴M.M. Khan and H.M. Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh" in K.K. Tummala (ed.), *Administrative Systems Abroad*, Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1982, p. 160.

members of the CSP, and they kept a close watch on any move to injure their pre-eminence.

In Bangladesh today, the exclusiveness of an elite corps has been ostensibly eliminated with the unification of all services—generalist, functional and professional—into a single structure. Composed of thirty functional cadres,⁵ recruitment to which is made through a single open competitive examination, the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) has been somewhat freed from the undue domination of one group of bureaucrats over the rest. However, for all practical purposes, a new trend of group dominance has set in with the creation of a super-cadre—the Senior Services Pool (SSP)—an open cadre at the highest level composed of civil servants to be drawn from all the functional cadres. Due to the peculiar policy of encadring the SSP,⁶ only generalists civil servants, who previously belonged to the CSP or the provincial civil service have been able to enter the super cadre and continue unabated their suzerainty over the administrative apparatus. The members of the other functional cadres and specialists feel aggrieved and believe that the SSP has been deliberately designed to protect and promote the generalists.

While within the bureaucracy, the generalists still continue to reign supreme by manning key positions in the decision-making structure *vis-a-vis* the other cadres, overall the members of the BCS with their distinctive recruitment pattern and training system have, in effect, become elitist. They represent only six per cent of the total strength of the civil service personnel in the country.⁷ And in terms of the total population, they are only 0.05 per cent. Compared to the general population, a major segment of which subsists below the poverty line and its under-privileged and disadvantaged, higher civil servants constitute a definite social elite given their socio-economic background, education and upbringing. Most, if not all, civil servants spent their early years in the urban areas and had their education at the tertiary level at one of the general universities. Many come from well-to-do families, their

⁵The Bangladesh Civil Service is composed of the following cadres: Administration, Food, Cooperatives, Agriculture, Forest, Fisheries, Livestock, General Education, Technical Education, Economic, Trade, Statistical, Public Works, Public Health Engineering, Roads and Highways Engineering, Telecommunications Engineering, Audit and Accounts, Customs and Excise, Taxation, Foreign Affairs, Health, Family Planning, Information, Judicial, Postal, Police, Ansar, Railway Transportation and Commercial, Railway Engineering, and Secretariat. In addition, there is a Senior Service Pool.

⁶The initial strength of the SSD was fixed at 625 but subject to variation by the government. Government of Bangladesh, Establishment Division, *Senior Services Pool Order*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1979, sec. 8.

⁷Statistics obtained from Government of Bangladesh, Establishment Division, O&M Wing, Statistics and Research Branch.

parents having a stake in business and industry. Those who claim to 'represent' the rural areas appear to be connected with the rich peasantry or have direct family ties with the urban middle class. A large number has or had as their parents civil servants, public or private enterprise personnel, small businessmen or teachers. Prior to independence, a major segment of the generalist/administrative corps (CSP and provincial service) represented only four 'advanced' districts—Dhaka, Comilla, Noakhali and Sylhet. This, however, has been gradually changing with the introduction of the affirmative action policy of the government.⁸

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the recruitment and training systems in the Bangladesh civil service. The pattern of recruitment and selection determines who is eligible or not eligible to enter the civil service. What are the different phases of the selection process and whether there are special opportunities for disadvantaged sections of the community to make a career in the civil service. Public administration training plays a significant role in indoctrinating a civil servant, throughout his career, in the art of administration and, in particular, in moulding him to serve the people. The objectives, methods and impact of training are important elements in suggesting whether training is oriented towards elitism. Actually, the very nature of the recruitment and selection process can determine whether a civil service is or would be elitist or not. Similarly, the purpose and form of training ascertains whether that elitist character would be sustained or even further entrenched.

We consider the higher civil servants as the administrative elite in Bangladesh. They include members of all the thirty cadres and the SSP. We do this because, for all practical purposes, they all perform, in varying degrees, administrative duties even though some are considered professionals and recruited to undertake technical jobs (members of the BCS-Engineering, for instance). They are selected under an examination system that utilizes a general framework and are later trained on the basis of a common training fabric.

RECRUITMENT

The BCS is based on the rank-in-corps career concept which displays most attributes of a closed personnel system. Like other countries with a British colonial past, young individuals with a general educational background become members of a corps upon joining the service at the base level. Throughout his career, a civil servant's tenure is guaranteed

⁸See H.M. Zafarullah and M.M. Khan, "Towards Equity in Public Service Employment: the Bangladesh Experience" in K.K. Tummala (ed.), *Equity in Public Employment Across Nations* (forthcoming).

and he serves within a differentiated structure with prospects for his advancement more or less assured as promotions invariably are made on the basis of seniority rather than strict competence.

The recruitment system in Bangladesh, as it is operational today, had its beginnings in the British colonial days precisely with the reforms of the 1850s when the merit principle was introduced as *the* criterion in the induction of new recruits to the ICS. That recruitment system, however, was geared to induct young university graduates, initially from Britain only and later from both Britain and India, belonging to the rich upper class. This pattern continued during the existence of one Pakistan (1947-71) when special effort was made by the ruling coterie to raise an elite corps of civil servants segregated from the people at large and indoctrinated to serve vested interests.

Generally, most members of this civil service (CSP) were disdainful of politicians and dismissed them as unworthy of serving the nation. Through their "paternalistic controls they unwittingly stifled the development of a healthy political environment and encouraged political instability".⁹ By and large, there was widespread scepticism about their integrity; they were found to be apathetic to public sentiment and thus unresponsive to societal demands; and were highly possessive of the power and authority they derived from rules and regulations they themselves devised. Aiming at self-preservation, the elite civil service took advantage of their authority and designed a well-organized recruitment and selection system through which a regular flow of university graduates was ensured.

The first regime in independent Bangladesh openly downgraded the role of civil servants in nation-building by suggesting that "they can be neither innovators nor catalytic agents for social change": on the other hand, it was argued that "it is only the political cadre which can mobilize the masses and transform their pattern of behaviour".¹⁰ Obviously, the regime abhorred the idea of continuing an elitist civil service; on the contrary, there was a clear indication for the creation of a representative bureaucracy.¹¹ Equality of opportunity has been the guiding principle in the recruitment process and, as the Constitution explicitly states, "no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth be ineligible for or discriminated against in respect of any

⁹H.F. Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 3.

¹⁰Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, *First Five Year Plan, 1973-78*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1973.

¹¹M.M. Khan and H.M. Zafarullah, *The Recruitment and Selection in the Higher Civil Services of Bangladesh: An Overview*, STCA Occasional Papers Series (Second Series), No. 6, Austin, The University of Texas; and the Section on International and Comparative Administration, American Society for Public Administration, 1984, p. 4.

employment or office.”¹² More and more, the government is obliged to create special opportunities for ensuring distributive justice in public employment by permitting the input of different disadvantaged groups in the community.¹³

However, from the very beginning there arose significant disagreement over the issue of modifying the merit principle in the interests of equity. While successive governments have adhered to a policy that recognizes the principle of equity and gives a privileged status to various interests in recruitment, the actual administration of the policy by bureaucrats who once were members of the elite in former Pakistan has, in effect, proved ill-conducive in the creation of a truly representative bureaucracy. Indeed, the irrational handling of the recruitment and selection process has undermined confidence in the equity principle.

During the first five years of independence, the recruitment system was unplanned, cumbersome and lacked serious commitment on the part of those at the helm of state affairs. The absence of a clear recruitment policy led to capricious and incremental decisions on appointments. Public employment planning was not undertaken and *ad hoc* arrangements were made to induct personnel at the base level of the higher civil service. More often than not, failing candidates in civil service examinations were provided appointments while, quite intriguingly, successful ones found themselves ignored on political ground or false reasoning.

Efforts at improving the recruitment situation as part of an overall process of reform were made soon after independence but these were wasted. The Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (1972-73) proposed a recruitment strategy that, in essence, aimed at bolstering an elitist-oriented service. The concept of a higher civil service was retained to be filled, as before, by fresh university graduates having received “the best, the most liberal, the most finished education that the country can afford”.¹⁴ The open competitive examination to select them should be structured “to test intellectual ability and breadth of outlook as well as personality”. Moreover, special arrangements were to be made to attract into the service “the best of the brightest” by recruiting first class graduates for a limited number of vacancies.

Four years later, another reform body, the Pay and Services Commission (1976-77), spoke of a recruitment system on similar lines. Candidates for the higher civil service must manifest proven qualities of

¹²Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1979, Art. 29.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee*, Part I, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1973, p. 56.

“higher all-around intellectual ability” with good tertiary and post-graduate degrees.¹⁵ The highly selective basis of the recruitment system proposed by the two bodies would have preserved the elitist character of the service. Nevertheless, both bodies did recommend the abolition of the various functional services that had existed in former Pakistan and, in their stead, proposed the creation of a single service and elimination of the monopoly hitherto exercised by a small group of civil servants—the CSP.

Recruitment and Selection Process

After more than seven years of *ad hoc*cery,¹⁶ the first attempt at systematizing the process to recruit higher civil servants was made at the behest of the military regime of Ziaur Rahman. The Public Service Commission (PSC), a constitutional body, conducted two Superior Posts Examinations in 1977 and 1979. The examinations were organized to recruit candidates for specific posts through open competition rather than for organized cadres within a single service. The first Parliament (1972-75) did not move to enact legislation regarding the organization and management of the civil service of the country. The military regime filled the void through an executive order issued in 1976. This was revised in 1982 when the third examination was held.

Today, admission to the different cadres of the BCS is open to candidates with at least a first degree from a university of Bangladesh or abroad. The minimum age limit has been set at 21 and the maximum at 25 years. However, for some cadres, such as education, health and family planning, and judicial, the maximum limit has been relaxed by five more years. A non-citizen or one who is married to a foreigner is debarred from applying for a position in the civil service. A candidate has to specify in his/her application blank the names of the functional cadres he/she desires to be considered for in order of preference. There is one examination for the ‘non-technical’ and one for the technical cadres.¹⁷

In selecting candidates for specific services, heavy reliance is placed on tests and interviews and little is made of other selection devices like review of biographical data, references and probationary periods. Although candidates are asked to complete a detailed application blank, these are not utilized fully as an aid in the selection process, particularly

¹⁵*Report of the Pay and Services Commission*, Vol. 1, Part 1, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1977, p. 206.

¹⁶H.M. Zafarullah and M.M. Khan, “Staffing the Higher Civil Services in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Recruitment and Selection Processes”, *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April-June 1983, pp. 121-33.

¹⁷*Bangladesh Civil Service Rules, 1982*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1982, Sec. 8 (2-3).

during interviews. Letters of reference are not sought from persons listed by applicants as referees. Nevertheless, letters of references have very low validity and reliability as selection criteria because of their subjectivity and positive bias and therefore they have limited effectiveness as a selection tool. Rarely, if ever, such letters genuinely speak of the actual qualities of applicants.

In the BCS, probationary periods hardly play any effective role as a selection method, for candidates are placed on probation only after they are actually selected and placed in specific positions. Thus, it does not affect the selection process in spite of the fact that it has the highest possible validity and reliability as it measures actual performance on the job.

Since the British colonial days, written tests have been the mainstay in evaluating candidates for civil service positions. For the most part, the structure has been patterned on the English model used to recruit the administrative class. There are two sections—compulsory and optional elective. The compulsory papers are: Bengali and English designed to test a candidate's knowledge of the languages and his ability to use them with skill, general knowledge to assess his awareness and understanding of historical and contemporary events, and mathematics (arithmetic, algebra and geometry). The optional subjects encompass a variety of disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, biological sciences, physical sciences, commerce and engineering. These are categorized into 10 groups and candidates are required to choose six papers. These written papers, except for the one on general knowledge, mathematics and some parts of English and Bengali, are based on the essay-type method. This sort of method offers little opportunity for original thinking and critical ability. In many cases, it has led to cramming. Relying on text books of low standard, most candidates smell of success by memorizing only limited number of 'common' topics. What most candidates generally produce are ideas that are vague, lacking in maturity, and superficial in content. There is scope for little analysis because of the poor structuring of questions which, more often than not, simply ask for descriptive answers rather than critical analysis of a problem.¹⁸ The performance of a majority of candidates in the last two BCS examinations reveals an unsatisfactory standard as far as their intellect and knowledge are concerned. This was largely because most candidates selected optional subjects for which they were ill-prepared not having systematically studied them at the university as part of their regular courses. The structure of the examination has been such that it primarily aims at obtaining university graduates, irrespective of the subjects

¹⁸Interview with examiners.

they study. This is particularly true for those cadres which are generalist-oriented and for which no specialization is necessary.

The existing structure and nature of the BCS examination tend to favour the impetuous and the superficial type of candidates rather than those who are unruffled but more thorough. Essay-type examinations have greater degree of subjectivity as different readers grade answers differently. Thus, as an examination criterion, it is less reliable.

The written tests are followed by interviews or *viva voce* tests as it is called in this country and only those who qualify in the former are called before a specially constituted board consisting of senior civil servants, professionals and university professors. For most part of the interviews, the unstructured format with a variety of themes is used. The interview seeks to "gain insight into the candidates' poise, self-confidence, and communication skills".¹⁹ However, candidates are also asked questions about their academic backgrounds, previous work experience (if any) and career objectives. According to the BCS rules, the interview is designed to measure 'intelligence, alertness of mind, vigour, strength of character and potential qualities of leadership of candidates'.²⁰ One limitation of the interview system in Bangladesh is that not one but different boards assess different candidates for the same cadre or type of positions. Basically following an unstructured format, the different boards composed of a variety of interviewers generally come up with quite different ratings for candidates for comparable positions. Thus, it tends to cause low interrater reliability.

The psychological test is the penultimate phase of the selection process, the medical examination being the last. It has been constructed "to assess intelligence, personal qualities and traits of character with special regard to (candidates') aptitude for the post".²¹ This is a general mental ability or intelligence test as well as a test to measure personality. Psychological tests, generally speaking, are designed to evaluate verbal comprehension, word fluency, memory, inductive reasoning, number facility, speed of perception and spatial visualization.²² But the type of test used to assess such aspects is yet to be fully devised for the BCS. Lack of psychologists trained in the techniques to evaluate mental abilities has served as a deterrent in the selection process.²³

¹⁹D.E. Klinger, *Public Personnel Management*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1980, p. 166.

²⁰Bangladesh Civil Service Rules, sec. 22 (2).

²¹*Ibid.*, sec 22(3).

²²L.L. Thurstone, "Primary Mental Abilities", *The Psychometric Laboratory*, University of Chicago, September 1948 reported in D.S. Beach, *Personnel* (4th Ed.), New York, Macmillan, 1980, p. 240.

²³There are at present only two trained psychologists in the Bangladesh Public Service Commission.

*Merit or Affirmative Action?*²⁴

As in many countries of the world, demands for eliminating 'elitism' from the civil service and making it representative of the population have been made since independence in Bangladesh. Advocates of 'representative bureaucracy' contend that strict meritocracy leads to 'elitism' in the civil service which, in turn, precludes the cohesion of the social fabric. They argue that, for the sake of integrating the various social forces, it is important to do away with discrimination and prejudice perpetrated in the past against the under-privileged sections of the society; rather, concerted moves should be made to provide them greater opportunities to enter and advance in the civil service.

In Bangladesh, women, religious and ethnic minorities and those who hailed from 'backward' regions were denied real opportunities of making a career in the civil service because of strict adherence to merit as the selection criterion. Although the Constitution of the country emphasizes 'equality of opportunity' for all citizens as far as public employment is concerned, the open competitive principle has, in effect, gone against those who fall short of the required education standard—a standard considered 'high' in the context of the extent of educational opportunities or resources in the country. To straighten such a discriminatory situation, the government is constitutionally committed to take affirmative action in providing greater scope for the under-represented sections or backward regions.²⁵ Quotas have been allocated for different categories of recruits to the higher civil service in the following manner: 40 per cent of the positions are to be filled on the basis of pure merit while 10 per cent of the positions are reserved for women, 5 per cent for affected women²⁶, 5 per cent for the tribal population, 30 per cent for war veterans and 10 per cent for the backward regions.²⁷

This affirmative action policy of the government, however, has its pitfalls due to the way it is implemented and its unforeseen implications. Quotas are not strictly followed and capriciously applied in the selection process. Indeed, it has failed in its objective to instil the representative element into the civil service. The gap between the degree of representation of the backward and the privileged regions has not been narrowing. The short supply of interested and qualified women has left many positions reserved for them either vacant or filled by others. The tribal population, despite their desire to serve the government, has not

²⁴This section is based on Zafarullah and Khan, "Towards Equity in Public Service Employment: The Bangladesh Experience" in K.K. Tummala (ed.), *op. cit.*

²⁵*The Constitution*, Art. 29, cl. 1-3.

²⁶During the war of liberation in 1971, a large number of women were adversely affected in that they lost either a husband, father or guardian.

²⁷Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1982*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1983, p. 4.

been provided adequate educational facilities to improve their standards in order to take the civil service examinations. In effect, due to the irrational administration of the policy, the civil service continues to remain elitist and there is no indication of it becoming more representative.

TRAINING

In development administration, the training of civil servants is imperative for the positive role they have to play in the development process. It is training lag that stifles development policy implementation. On the other hand, the influence of training in improving administrative performance and infusing rationality in administrative action is vital. As Simon points out, "training prepares the organization member to reach satisfactory decisions himself, without the need for constant exercise of authority or advice".²⁸ More importantly, as a crucial input in development administration, it can help "improve administrative performance and strengthen the planning and execution of development programs" as well as achieve "improvements in the quality and quantity of societal products".²⁹ Thus, training of civil servants is required for two basic reasons: to raise the level of efficiency in administration and thereby render effective the delivery of public service; and to promote and ensure 'professionalism' in public administration.

However, training should not be construed merely to connote changes in knowledge and skills. It should also include change of attitudes. It should aim to create a band of dedicated public personnel committed to the attainment of national goals and responsive to the demands of the society. Civil servants must have "an understanding of the complexity of the national environment to which the specific skills must be adapted".³⁰ But the attitudinal aspect of training is related to motivation. The latter together with ability influences the individual performance of civil servants and their commitment towards service to the people. Nonetheless, low motivation does not produce high performance even if ability tends to be high. In developing countries, because of its peculiarity, public administration training primarily increases ability but, as it does not influence motivation, has no perceptible impact in improving performance.

There appears to be linkages between training, career aspiration and

²⁸H. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (3rd ed.), New York Free Press, 1976, p. 15.

²⁹G.E. Caiden, *The Dynamics of Public Administration*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 264.

³⁰S. Paul, *Training for Public Administration and Management in Developing Countries: A Review*, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1983, p. 10.

motivation. An individual civil servant's level of aspiration is dominated by parental influences. The background, education and experience of parents tend to influence the aspirational level of civil servants. Sons and daughters of most parents who were successful in their own careers or professions are generally status conscious and exhibit a tendency towards similar accomplishments. Therefore, what form training will take and what objectives it actually would serve would depend on the idiosyncracies of those who design training programmes. If members of an elitist civil service undertake that task (this is normally the case in developing countries), it would not unmatch their frame of mind and would obviously reflect their elitist orientation. In their bid to preserve the character of the service and their dominance over the administrative system, training would be strongly inclined to the development and sustenance of administrative elites whose influence would pervade the public sector and ultimately the political system.

As in many developing countries, Bangladesh, after independence, faced an acute shortage of qualified and experienced public personnel to undertake a broad range of development tasks. Seldom training has been designed to foster innovation in transforming ideas into action and in serving as a link between the government and the common people. Seldom has training been able to achieve its objective of increasing efficiency by strengthening civil servants' administrative capabilities and by changing their attitudes *vis-a-vis* the people to meet changes in the economic and social systems.

A number of constraints impede the development of an effective public administration training programme in Bangladesh, a new nation striving to attain the goals of development. First, training traditionally has not been conceived as an integral part of the administrative system, roles, functions and output of training have not been clearly defined. Secondly, by until only recently, institutions to train higher civil servants were not functionally integrated and training programmes offered by them were not directly related to needs. Thirdly, keeping in view the changing focus on development administration, appropriate training techniques and materials were not developed. Fourthly, no effort was made to evaluate the effectiveness of existing programmes.³¹

Status of Training in the Past

Until 1984, the training of higher civil servants in Bangladesh was characterized by fragmentation, parochialism and mal-coordination. This was largely due to the lack of a national training policy, recognizing training as a separate and distinct aspect rather than linking it with

³¹A. Mogford, *Administrative Training in Bangladesh*, London, Overseas Services Unit, Royal Institute of Public Administration, 1978, p. 2.

other areas of public personnel management, and excessive governmental control over the training exercise.³² Despite the recommendations of two five-year and a two-year plans for national development and the reports of two administrative reform bodies (the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee and the Pay and Services Commission), the training system failed to serve its purpose and inoculate the civil service with professionalism and a sense of service to the people. Unnecessary experimentation with institutional mechanisms for training hampered the training exercise. Training was provided by three different institutions for three different categories of civil servants. The Civil Officers' Training Academy (COTA) trained new entrants to the higher civil service, National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) provided training to mid-level officers while the Bangladesh Administrative Staff College (BASC) imparted training to senior civil servants. Among these three institutions, COTA proved to be the most effective although initially it encountered difficulty in securing trainees.³³ Its relative success was due to the dedication and commitment of those who ran it as well as the enthusiasm of trainees who, being newly recruited civil servants, were keen to prove their worth at the initial stage of their career. The performance of NIPA and BASC, on the other hand, was affected by an unsound approach towards training, particularly in assessing training needs and in evaluating outcome. Hardly any standardized and objective approach was followed to select trainees or monitoring their post-training performance.³⁴

Towards Integrated Training

The organizational and administrative problems of public administration training in Bangladesh were many during the first decade of independence. The most crucial factor in the creation and sustenance of these problems was the lack of a clearly defined national training policy. Indeed, the training of higher civil servants was characterised by excessive bureaucratic controls over the operational and financial aspects of the training institutes leading to an ebb in innovation and creativity. Lack of coordination and somewhat estranged relationship between COTA, NIPA and BASC increased costs of training, caused duplication

³²M.M. Khan and H.M. Zafarullah, "Public Administration Training in Bangladesh: An Overview", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1980; M.M. Khan, "Public Administration Training Centre: A Critical Overview" in M.M. Khan and S.A. Husain (eds.), *Bangladesh Studies*, Dhaka, Center for Administrative Studies, 1985.

³³A.A. Khan and M. Hussain, *Post Entry Training in Bangladesh Civil Service: A Survey of the Problems and Potentials*, Dhaka, Public Administration Training Centre, 1985.

³⁴Khan and Zafarullah, *Public Administration Training in Bangladesh: An Overview*, *International Review of Administrative Services*, op. cit., p. 372.

of programmes and prevented the free flow of expertise and exchange of ideas among them.

In 1978, in recognition of these problems, some thought was given to the idea of relocating the three institutions in one campus where common facilities (like library, faculty, training aids, dormitories and playing fields) would be shared without disturbing each institute's academic and organizational identities. In 1980, a '(Pre-Investment Study for Public Administration Training and Management' was undertaken with United Nations Development Programme and World Bank assistance to consider the case for integration and it was suggested that such a move would be beneficial. This was supported later by a Martial Law Committee on administrative reorganization which called for the merger of the three institutes into a single training organization for higher training of civil servants. It would enable, it was observed in its report, greater flexibility in the designing of programmes, maintain compartmentation and integration between different categories of civil servants, ensure frequent interaction between different groups of trainees and substantially reduce costs.³⁵ The government accepted the idea of integration and the Public Administration Training Centre (PATC) was established in May 1984.

The PATC is governed by a Board providing policy directives and guidelines for its operations. It discharges its responsibilities through a number of committees which it itself appoints. The routine affairs of the Centre are managed by a Rector and a directing staff consisting of members (each heading a department), directors, deputy directors, instructors, assistant directors, and research officers.³⁶ Overall control, however, is retained by the government through the Ministry of Establishment. The composition of the Board of Governors and the Executive body of the Centre clearly suggests that the training of higher civil servants in Bangladesh is directly under the control of bureaucrats.

In addition to imparting foundational and in-service training to civil servants, PATC is designed to conduct research, publish books and periodicals on public/development administration, maintain libraries, and organize seminars and workshops.³⁷ The courses offered are a foundation course for new entrants to the civil service, a senior officers' long course (known as Executive Seminar), management course for mid-level officers, and special courses on project management, human resources management, systems analysis, human relations, computer applications,

³⁵ *Report of the Martial Law Committee on Organizational Set-up Phase II (Departments/Directorates and other Organizations under them)*, Vol. II, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1982, Ch. III, p. 8.

³⁶ Khan, 'Public Administration Training Centre: A Critical Overview,' in M.M. Khan and S.A. Husain (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³⁷ *Table of Organization and Equipment—Ministries, Divisions Constitutional Bodies, Commissions, etc.*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1982, Ch. III, p. 8.

policy analysis, budgeting, accounting and financial analysis.³⁸ Except for the foundation course, the other courses hardly serve any useful purpose. These only have catchy titles but in terms of their contents there is little trainees can learn. Each of these courses features a clear lack of focus and is of short duration. By the time trainees begin to pick up the subject matter, they find themselves at the end of the programme ready to be awarded a certificate. However, a longer course for mid-level civil servants is an important segment of PATC's training schedule. This course used to be offered by NIPA before PATC's establishment and was known as an Advanced Course in Administration and Development (ACAD). It was designed to review and assess methods, techniques and problems of public administration in the context of socio-economic development of Bangladesh. Furthermore, participants were to be given an opportunity to share their ideas, experiences and insights with others and review the problems of national development with emphasis on rural advancement.³⁹ The PATC has adopted the basic idea of ACAD; only a few modifications have been made in its content and structure. But, as with other courses, it has been 'intuitively designed' without taking into cognizance the training needs of its clientele who 'are expected to take (it) regardless of the relevancy of most of the subjects to their job assignments'.⁴⁰

The foundation course appears to be relatively the best designed course. Covering a four month period, it emphasizes group living and collective discipline beside relevant academic and field training. It is purported to build an *esprit de corps* among fresh entrants to the civil service and enhance their theoretical and practical knowledge of administration. It seeks to familiarize them with bureaucratic ethics and administrative norms.⁴¹ Academic training is given in such areas as politics and government, public administration, law and the constitution, micro and macro economics, economic planning, and history and culture of Bangladesh. Trainees are also exposed, to a limited extent, to rural life and its problems. Extra-curricular activities also form part of the programme.

Considering the areas covered, the adequacy of the duration of the foundation course is questioned. Too much appears to be thrust upon trainees within a short time. More and more, members of all cadres are given training at the same time with no scope for specialization for each of the functional groups. Thus, on assumption of their duties, they are

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹*Prospectus, Advanced Course in Administration and Development*, Dhaka, National Institute of Public Administration, 1979, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁰*Pre-Investment Study of a Public Administration Training and Management Improvement Project in Bangladesh: Final Report*, Washington, D.C., Institute of Public Administration, 1981, p. 35.

⁴¹Khan and Hossain, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

unable to apply themselves apace, precisely and imaginatively to their jobs.

While the "western-style social grace, formal attire and sartorial splendour"⁴² of the training of higher civil servants in former Pakistan have been rightly discarded, the training system in Bangladesh still remains divorced from social realities. The main emphasis is on the understanding of administrative techniques rather than on the improvement of human relations skills and the broadening of the outlook of civil servants. They are not indoctrinated with the idea that their primary obligation is towards the people. It is, thus, important to make them realize that they have a role to play in bridging the gap between government and society and that their pursuit for attaining administrative excellence should be related to the ultimate goal of public administration—nation-building and socio-economic progress. Civil servants should be inculcated with the notion that they are agents of social change and, therefore, there should be frequent interaction between them and the public for them to perceive the latter's problems and needs.

The training methods utilized in PATC are still archaic and most of these have become obsolete elsewhere. The lecture is the most common method with discussions, workshops and case studies used sparingly. The COTA, during its existence, did try modern-techniques, like problem-solving exercises, syndicate activities and role playing. These are still used in the foundation training programme at PACT but these are not as sophisticated as necessary. Training of senior civil servants is still largely lecture-based with little participation by trainees during the time set out for discussion. If they at all participate, they usually make impertinent observations or comments trying illogically to prove their points. Indeed, they manifest a propensity to heckle and molest instructors rather than creating a congenial academic atmosphere.⁴³

The curricula of PATC are, in the main, based on western ideas and precepts and no effort is made to develop indigenous course materials drawing upon the resources of universities or learned societies. As a matter of fact, the bureaucrats who control civil service training in Bangladesh seem to be unwilling to involve academics in the development of training programmes, in giving lectures or in undertaking research. Only occasionally are they involved in PATC activities. A vacuum already exists in the quality and quantity of trainers. There is very limited scope for the development of a training staff. It is erroneously assumed that trainers would automatically develop their training capabilities all by themselves by being merely attached to an institute or a programme. One

⁴²M. Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan*, Karachi, National Institute of Public Administration, 1974, p. 69.

⁴³Interview with Instructors of PATC, particularly those invited from outside to give occasional lectures.

reason for the poor performance of training institutes in the country has been the low calibre of trainers and the lack of professionalism and expertise among them.⁴⁴ In place of developing a corps of professionally trained instructors, the government has adhered to a 'policy' of assigning civil servants with the duty of instructing trainees although their background or experience do not warrant them to do so. Consequently, their performance has been most unsatisfactory with baneful implications for training.

The merger of COTA, NIPA and BASC into a single training institution has had a telling effect on the capacity of PATC. The existing physical facilities as well as the number of trainers are not adequate to handle the training of a large number of trainees each year.⁴⁵ PATC has been over-ambitious in scheduling so many divergent programmes for a single year. Moreover, the simultaneous training of different categories of civil servants has not achieved one objective of integration—the socialization process among civil servants. Different groups still maintain their separate identity and do not interact with one another even when residing in the same dormitory at the same time. Senior bureaucrats undergoing training, if they ever stay in campus, are found to segregate themselves from the rest of the trainees. Thus, within the bureaucracy, a kind of super-elitism is evident.

Dimensions of a Training Policy

A National Training Council (NTC) was established in 1981 with the objective of preparing policy guidelines for national training. It was also to formulate a National Training Policy (NTP) and periodically review its implementation in terms of its linkages with the education system, economic development and public personnel administration.⁴⁶ The NTP was adopted in June 1984 not by the NTC but by its Executive Committee which was heavily bureaucratic in composition. It was not drafted by a sub-committee of the NTC as was previously decided but by a lone bureaucrat, the administrative head of the Ministry of Establishment. Members of the NTC were not given the opportunity to deliberate upon its contents and suggest modifications. This has been another instance of civil service training being unwarrantedly regulated by the bureaucracy.

Developing civil service training as a crucial input in the country's development process is the *raison d'être* of the NTP. The career needs of civil servants and the preferences and priorities of the government would be important variables in the design of training programmes. The policy

⁴⁴Khan and Zafarullah, *Public Administration Training in Bangladesh*, p. 371.

⁴⁵Khan and Hossain, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴⁶Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Establishment, *Training Policy for Government Officials*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1984, p. 1.

seeks to increase administrative efficiency by linking training with career planning. A systematic monitoring process to periodically evaluate training effectiveness would help attain the objective of the policy.⁴⁷

This policy, however, was not formulated on the basis of any assessment of future tasks of the government or the public sector manpower needs. It is important to do so to assign appropriate training tasks to different training institutions. According to a World Bank review, a number of techniques and methods can be objectively used in assessing training needs. These are: contextual analysis which relates needs to the gaps in specific administrative deficiencies; consultations with client organizations; feedback from former trainees; systematic field surveys of training needs; experimental programme as a learning device; and critical incident technique.⁴⁸ But until now none of these methods has been applied in assessing the training needs of the Bangladesh civil service. It is doubted whether the PATC or the Ministry of Establishment has the expertise of undertaking training assessment using such methods. In fact, the operational staff of PATC or other training institutes are not adequately trained to undertake such a work. Yet, the bureaucrats controlling civil service training in the country are simply loth to involve academics of the universities with proven expertise in the techniques and methods of public administration. Nor are they willing to give any importance to their research findings on the inadequacies of the existing administrative system to perceive their relevance to training.

Another problem with civil service training in Bangladesh is that it is not related to personnel administration in its entirety although it is widely recognized that it should be tied with the broader perspectives of human resources management. Job analysis, performance appraisal and job evaluation have not been systematically applied in classifying positions, determining promotions and devising a pay plan.

Monitoring and evaluation of training have not been institutionalized: no exercise is undertaken to evaluate the impact of training on job performance. Evaluation criteria have not been fully developed although some efforts have been made to record the immediate reactions of trainees after the completion of a programme. However, only questionnaire surveys are used and these generally turn out to be subjective and do not measure performance validity. What results is recording of 'emotional reactions rather than decisions to use the information to improve programs'.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Establishment, *Training Policy for Government Officials*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁴⁸Paul, op. cit., p. 31.

⁴⁹I.L. Goldstein, "The Pursuit of Internal and External Validity in the Evaluation of Training Programs", *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 8, November-December, 1979, p. 419.

The NTP clearly admits of the lack of training incentive for career development of civil servants but stresses the import of training performance as a factor. Trainees, particularly those belonging to the senior echelons of the civil service, take little interest in training. And when they attend a training programme, they do so reluctantly adopting it as a part-time exercise. Their attendance during courses is irregular, their participation apathetic. Mid-level officers, as a rule, are required to successfully complete a regular 'career development course' at PATC if they wish to be considered for promotion but in practice this rule is not followed. Obviously, their training is not linked to their career progression.⁵⁰ The new entrants, however, are compelled to take serious interest in the foundation course. This is because their *inter se* seniority is, in part, determined by their performance in the final passing out examination at the end of the course.

As in many developing countries of the world, civil service training in Bangladesh 'is often seen as luxury and an activity that has little or no effect. Public servants seldom demand training, unless they want to have a break from their daily routines, as the outcomes they expect from it are not of high value to them...the situation...is a vicious circle of poor performance, poor status and poor demand'.⁵¹

CONCLUSION

The administrative elites in Bangladesh are entrenched in the governmental system through their pervasive influence in the public policy process. The political leadership, in whatever form or garb, continues to be dependent on them for their support not only in the administration of public affairs but also in lending credence to its policies.

The recruitment and selection system enables the privileged sections of the society to compete for positions in the civil service. The academic qualifications required, the educational institutions attended, and belonging to certain regions reflect one's chances of success in entering the civil service. Due to the peculiarity of the system, the success of candidates belonging to the poor class in the rural areas has been insignificant. Most of them are precluded from attending standard academic institutions. Only those meritorious few who make to one of the universities have some opportunities to compete on equal terms with the rest. The ineffective implementation of the affirmative action policy of the government has deterred the process of making the bureaucracy more representative and less elitist.

⁵⁰ *Bangladesh Civil Service (Composition and Cadre) Rules 1980*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1980.

⁵¹ S. Ozgediz, *Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects*, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1983, p. 33.

The training system makes the administrative elites more elitist. The scope of training is too narrow to influence civil servants in changing their outlook and attitude *vis-a-vis* the common man. As a result, training tends to be perfunctory and futile in terms of making civil servants responsive to social demands and acting a catalysts of social change and economic development. The single most important factor, which has tended to influence the growth and sustenance of elitism in the civil service, is the *carte blanche* that the bureaucracy adroitly employs in controlling and regulating the recruitment and training of higher civil servants in Bangladesh. Even though a constitutional body, the Public Service Commission is unable to perform its functions and discharge its responsibilities impartially. In one way or other, it is under the control of the Ministry of Establishment which has always been under the tight reins of generalist civil servants belonging to an elite corps. In a similar vein, the training institutions are organizationally under this Ministry and they do not enjoy any operational or financial autonomy.

Elitism in civil service will remain as long as civil servants themselves are in charge of their recruitment and training without surveillance from the political leadership and institutions. In their bid to preserve the *status quo*, bureaucrats will go all the way to resist any move to debase them. They strongly believe that only through strong *esprit de corps* among civil servants can they influence the working of the government and remain indomitable as a social force. This has been clearly evidenced in Bangladesh.

III. Elites in India: Perspective and Development

Social Structure and Power in India: Emerging Elite

S.S. SHARMA

Bottomore examined Marx's and Tocqueville's theories of power. Marx conceived state as a dependent element of a total social process in which principal moving forces are those which arise from a particular mode of production. Tocqueville, on the other hand, argued that the main tendency of democratic movement was to produce social equality, by abolishing hereditary distinctions of rank, and by making all occupations, rewards and honours accessible to every member of society.¹ He found more evidence in European and US societies in support of Tocqueville's thesis. There is little understanding about the trends of power in developing societies, including India.

This paper relates to a specific question: what is the relationship between social structure and power? Bottomore defined social structure as the complex of the major institutions and groups in society.² Weber defined "power as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."³

In case of India, caste is a major element of social structure. Hence an examination of the participation of different castes in the political system will perhaps be sufficient indicator of relationship between social structure and power in India. Let us examine the question at different levels of Indian society.

I

Studies conducted at grassroot level indicate that on account of

¹Tom Bottomore, *Political Sociology*, New Delhi, BI Publishing, 1979, p. 9.

²Tom Bottomore, *Sociology*, New Delhi, Blackie, 1979, p. 115.

³Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York, The Free Press, 1947, p. 151.

universal suffrage and the introduction of Panchayati Raj which have provided an opportunity for each person or group to enter into political arena, more and more caste groups are competing for power. To mention a few, Brij Raj Chauhan, agreeing with M.N. Srinivas, observed that caste would play a significant role in any arrangement of a social organization, or, beyond a village the organizational set-up along traditional lines will tend to consider caste organizations.⁴ He anticipated the possibility of increased caste consciousness when the area is larger than a village. In a study conducted in villages—as well as at a Block level, it was noted that in 1955 panchayat elections, of the 37 castes in a Block, all castes contested for power, 13 castes contested in 1961 and 10 castes in 1972 elections. In respect of winning the elections, the low castes which were absent in 1955 and 1961 elections, could win in 1972 elections.⁵ G.R. Madan reported that most of the village panchayat leaders come from upper castes.⁶ The extension leaders too come from the upper strata.

In Bihar, the situation is not different. Sharad Kumar analysed the panchayat elections in Bihar and found that though there were intercaste contests but the upper caste candidate managed to win and invariably the majority caste in the area decided the elections.⁷ At the same time, he noted that the elections were not the handmaid of the rural rich. Mishra examined the proposition that the provisions of free and direct elections to panchayats provide an opportunity to backward castes to emerge as panchayat's formal elite and found that the panchayat elite position is mainly dominated (83.44%) by traditionally dominant caste elites and the percentage of backward and scheduled castes is quite negligible; for 5.52 per cent backward castes and 11.04 per cent scheduled castes elites represent their castes in the panchayat.⁸

In Tamil Nadu, Andre Beteille studied the relationship between caste, class and power in a village and found that non-Brahmins who did not enjoy power earlier are now powerful.⁹

In Haryana, Aggarwal noted similar changes as the Meos who enjoyed monopoly of power in the past had to share political power with the lower castes, namely, the Chamar.¹⁰ The Chamar caste elected a

⁴Brij Raj Chauhan, "The Panchayat Raj and the Democratic Polity", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, March, 1968, pp. 51-52.

⁵S.S. Sharma, *Rural Elites in India*, New Delhi, Sterling, 1979.

⁶G.R. Madan, *India's Developing Villages*, Lucknow, Print House, 1983.

⁷Sharad Kumar, "Bihar: Panchayat Elections", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XIII, No. 30, July, 1978.

⁸S.N. Mishra, *Politics and Society in Rural India*, Delhi, Inter-India Publications, 1979, pp. 115-17.

⁹Andre Beteille, *Caste, Class and Power*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1969.

¹⁰P.C. Aggarwal, *Caste Religion and Power*, New Delhi, Srimam Centre for Industrial Relations, 1971, p. 221.

Brahmin from their ward in the village who in turn nominated a Chamar under the guarantee clause. Thus, the low castes as well have entered into the political domain.

S.K. Chauhan chose to study the emerging pattern of power in villages in Assam and concluded that now no caste or tribe enjoys absolute dominance. On the other hand, several castes and tribes exercise relative dominance in different areas of village social life.¹¹

In Orissa, Bailey found in a village that Boad distillers now have a greater say in the management of the village and they are able to combine effectively for political action.¹²

M.S.A. Rao observed in a village near Delhi that panchayat elections are fought not on the basis of political parties but on that of factions or caste groups.¹³

Madhya Pradesh follows the pattern emerging in other states. P.V. John studied the changing pattern of leadership in a village and found that the traditional and the new leaders are from the same caste of Brahmins.¹⁴ L.C. Gupta¹⁵ found the same pattern of dominance in another village in Madhya Pradesh. S.C. Dube¹⁶ made the observations in four villages in Madhya Pradesh that each faction recruited its members from several castes.

In Mysore (now Karnataka) state, Beals conducted an empirical study in a village near Bangalore and commented "Perfect democracy had not arrived at Hattarchalli in 1952 nor was the caste system dead, but there was a movement among them from traditional authoritarianism and social hierarchy, a movement opposed by those individuals who stood to profit from a return to the old way of doing things."¹⁷ Miller (1960) found the same tendency in a village in North Kerala.¹⁸

T.M. Dak¹⁹ found in a village in Haryana that lower castes figured in high power positions and upper castes were left with less power.

¹¹S.K. Chauhan, *Caste, Status and Power*, New Delhi, Classical Publishing Company, 1980, p. 157.

¹²F.G. Bailey, *Caste and Economic Frontier: A Village in Highland Orissa*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1957, p. 191.

¹³M.S.A. Rao, "The Mid-term Poll in a Village in Outer Delhi Constituency", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 21, No. 1 March, 1972, pp. 31-32.

¹⁴P.V. John, "Changing Pattern of Leadership in a Village in Madhya Pradesh", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XII, No. 1, March, 1963, p. 36.

¹⁵L.C. Gupta, "Changing Pattern of Rural Leadership", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XV, No. 2, September, 1966, p. 34.

¹⁶S.C. Dube, "Caste Dominance and Factionalism", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, December 1968.

¹⁷R. Alan Beals, "Change in the Leadership of Mysore Village" in M.N. Srinivas (ed.), *India's Villages*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1955, pp. 147-60.

¹⁸Eric J. Miller, "Village Structure in North Kerala" in M.N. Srinivas (ed.), *India's Villages*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960.

¹⁹T.M. Dak, "Caste, Class and Power" in M.L. Sharma and T.M. Dak (eds.), *Caste and Class in Agrarian Society*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1985.

II

What is happening in urban communities has also attracted the attention of scholars. C.P. Bhambhri²⁰ collected the social background of Municipal leaders of Jaipur elected in 1970 and observed that 47.3 per cent, 14.5 per cent, 15.1 per cent and 23.1 per cent leaders belonged to higher, middle, lower and other castes respectively.

III

Let us now consider the trends beyond the village. While focussing on the factionalism in UP politics, Paul Brass²¹ presents the social background of leaders of the Block Development Committees, District Cane Committee, Cooperative Cane Unions and District Board. Ten of the 26 Block Development Committee Presidents are Jats, compared to only 4 Tyagis. On the District Board, of 108 members, 35 are Jats and only 11 are Tyagis. The Executive Committee of the District Cane Committee, which has 9 members, has 7 Jats but no Tyage. Six of the Chairmen of the eight Cooperative Cane Unions in Meerut are Jats, the remaining two are Tyagis. In case of Conda, Deoria and Aligarh also Brahmins and Rajputs dominate the political scene. Further he noted that now casteism is so prevalent that there is hatred and the castes are quarrelling with each other. H.R. Chaturvedi²² found in a district in Rajasthan that Jats had entered the political arena and had challenged the Rajput aristocracy. The Jats have become politically more conscious.

S.P. Jain²³, on the basis of his analysis of socio-economic particulars of the Councillors of the District Panchayat in Assam, found that upper castes are more represented than lower castes. Gaikwad²⁴ analysed the social profile of elected members of Zila Parishads in Maharashtra and found that 72 per cent belonged to Maratha, 14 per cent belong to low castes, less than 2 per cent to Brahmins and 12 per cent to other communities.

IV

Studies made at the state level also indicate more and more participation of different caste groups in the political system. J.L. Pandey

²⁰C.P. Bhambhri, *The Urban Voter*, Delhi, National Press, 1973.

²¹Paul, Brass. *Factional Politics in an Indian State*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 182.

²²H.R. Chaturvedi, *Bureaucracy and Local Community*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1977, p. 60.

²³S.P. Jain, *Panchayati Raj in Assam*, Hyderabad, NICD, 1976, p. 29.

²⁴V.R. Gaikwad, *Panchayati Raj and Bureaucracy*, Hyderabad, NICD, 1969, p. 22,

studied the coalitional political process in Bihar and noted that it was for the first time that the social diversities could get an opportunity of having represented in the power structure on a considerable scale. The backward, middle and lower castes of the state are equally seeking their due share in the power structure.²⁵

M. Shatrugna and C. Narayana focussed upon social background of Telugu Desam Legislators and noted predominant role of caste. Kammas and Reddis share 50 per cent seats in the Legislature. The Kapus have 13 representatives. One third are drawn from backward castes. Interestingly, the authors noted the absence of upper castes in the Assembly. The Telugu Desam Party has maintained a balance between various caste groups. The Congress(I) relied upon upper/middle castes, and scheduled castes and tribes. Telugu Desam has mobilized the backward castes.²⁶

In UP, Paul Brass (1966) analysed the social background of 21 leaders of Kanpur city Congress and found that 13 were Brahmins, 3 were Banias, 3 were Kayasthas, one Khatri and one chamar. Even in case of active members of Kanpur Congress, the participation of Banias, Kayasthas, chamars, Ahirs and Rajputs was obvious.

The scheduled caste legislators in Haryana Assembly were studied by P.N. Pimpley and K.S. Sangwan²⁷ and it was found that the chamar caste among the Harijans dominated the political scene. The other Harijan castes, like Balmikis, Dhanaks, Khatiks, Mazabis, etc., were also found to have made a place for themselves in the state politics. They have become politically more conscious.

In Gujarat Assembly, an analysis of social profile of legislators (1960-1980) by Nagindas Sanghavi²⁸ revealed that the Gujarat Assembly was over-represented by the upper castes and there was a sprinkling representation of socially and economically backward classes (castes) on account of statutory reservation of seats.

Myron Weiner²⁹ examined the political development in the Indian states and observed the phenomenon of rising castes—of the Reddis and Kammas in Andhra; the Nadars and other non-Brahmins in Madras and the Jats in Rajasthan, in the political system. He further noted that lower, upper and the middle castes were equally oriented toward power.

²⁵J.L. Pandey, *State Politics in India*, New Delhi, Uppal Publishing House, 1982, p. 174.

²⁶M. Shatrugna and G. Narayana, "Andhra Pradesh and Social Background of Telugu Desam Legislators", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 52 and 53, 1983, p. 2203-4.

²⁷P.N. Pimpley and K.S. Sangwan, "Reservation for Scheduled Castes in Legislatures" in M.L. Sharma and T.M. Dak (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 80-83.

²⁸Nagin Dass Sanghavi, "Vidhan Sabha Profile", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XV, No. 19, May 10, 1980.

Congress Party in the Bihar was studied by Ramashray Roy³⁰ and it was found that the leader of the Jha caste led a coalition of Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, majority of lower castes, scheduled castes and muslim. Kini³¹ analysed the integration of Kistis in Nagpur city into a community and explained it in terms of their involvement in politics. G.N. Sharma³² examined Andhra Politics and concluded that caste alignments and caste feelings continue to be force to be reckoned with in the politics of the state.

Chetkar Jha³³ studied caste in Bihar Congress politics and noted that caste is an important determinant of political behaviour. Iqbal Narain³⁴ found that untouchables have become discreet voters. Sanwal and Sanwal³⁵ studied voting behaviour in an Assembly Constituency in Kumaon and found that caste of the candidate as well that of the regional leaders of a party are relevant.

Panjala Narasaiah³⁶ analysed the social background of state Chief Ministers and found that one of nine Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh came from modern forward caste (Reddis), and another from traditional forward caste (Brahmins). Of the rest, 11.1 per cent came from scheduled castes and another 11.1 per cent from Velama caste. In Karnataka, 57 per cent came from Lingayats, 28.5 per cent from Vokkaligas and the rest from backward classes. In a study of the social background of members of UP Legislative Assembly from Meerut district from 1952 to 1980 elections, it has been found that Jat, Brahmin, Tyagi and Rajput castes are overrepresented. Among the backward castes, the Gujar caste has made a place for itself. Among the scheduled castes, the Jatav caste has been successful in politics.³⁷

³⁰Myron Weiner, "Political Development in the Indian States" in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967, p. 351.

³⁰Ramashray Roy, "Politics of Fragmentation" in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 424-26.

³¹N.G.S. Kini, "Caste as a Factor in State Politics" in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 569.

³²G.N. Sharma, "Aspects of Andhra Politics" in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 99.

³³Chetkar Jha, "Caste in Bihar Congress Politics", in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 580-87.

³⁴Iqbal Narain, "Continuity and Change in State Politics" in Iqbal Narain (ed.), *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 650.

³⁵R.D. Sanwal and Sushil Sanwal, "The Electoral Process in an Assembly Constituency in Kumaon", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XX, No. 2, September 1971, p. 199.

³⁶Panjala Narasaiah, "Social Background of State Chief Ministers", *Political Science Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1979, pp. 125-26.

³⁷S.S. Sharma, "Rajnaitic Abhiyan Evam Samajik Sanrachna", in *Samajiki*, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 85-87.

V

Attention has been focussed at the national level as well. Social background of Members of Parliament has attracted the attention of a few scholars. G. Narayana³⁸ analysed the social background of scheduled caste Lok Sabha Members from 1962-71 and found that the scheduled caste MPs. tend to acquire the characteristics of general members. Balraj Puri³⁹ noted, besides other characteristics, casteism had its role in elections of Parliament held in January 1980. Since data on caste are not available in documents, Satish K. Arora⁴⁰ did not attempt an analysis of caste of the Lok Sabha Members. Dhanagare⁴¹ analysed the Sixth Lok Sabha Elections in Uttar Pradesh held in 1977 and observed Jat-Ahir (castes) revolt against Brahmin-Bania (castes) within the UP Congress.

VI

Interactions between local communities and national politics have also attracted attention of Atal⁴² who warns that a careful analysis of the contribution that castes make to the political process may be made. He noted that various smaller endogamous divisions are brought together for political reasons. He significantly sees national integration in the merger of several thousand castes into the old traditional four varna categories.

VII

This survey of studies indicates that caste system which was considered to be non-antagonistic to each other is changing as is reflected in the struggle for power in upper, middle, lower and the lowest castes. However, it remains a fact that the change is not revolutionary, rather it is gradual. This capacity of caste system to change according to changes in the other constituents of the social system indicates its strength to sustain itself. This is a unique pattern of relationship between social structure and power in Indian context. Various caste groups having entered into the political arena have demonstrated the peaceful and constitutional

³⁸G. Narayana, "Social Background of Scheduled Castes Lok Sabha Members", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XIII, No. 37, 1978, pp. 1603-08.

³⁹Balraj Puri, "Caste, Charisma and Regionalism", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1980, p. 501.

⁴⁰S.K. Arora, "Social Background of Fifth Lok Sabha Members", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Number, 1973, pp. 1433-39.

⁴¹D.N. Dhanagare, "Sixth Lok Sabha Elections in Uttar Pradesh 1977", *Political Science Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1979, p. 46.

⁴²Yogesh Atal, *Local Communities and National Politics*, Delhi, National, 1971, p. 362.

approach for social transformation. In this is reflected the strong roots of caste system in Indian society. Castes remain castes even if they compete against each other for their political share. The backward and low castes see their emancipation through political participation. An educated scheduled caste boy says that a powerful person is more respected than a wealthy person. This political participation is creating a social environment characterized by equality though not in absolute terms and each caste group tends to generate a feeling in itself that if one's caste gets due share in politics, there is a greater hope of status elevation. Rajni Kothari, seems to be correct when he states:

Altogether then, the secular, integrative and ideological aspects of caste have provided a sophisticated and differentiated cultural background for receiving the modernising impacts and responding to them without either great disruption or great withdrawal or hostility.⁴³

The only problem now is to examine how the loyalties of caste can be changed to national loyalties. This is a task for social scientists to critically examine the existing political institutions and social institutions and their relevance for bringing various castes together and to consider these issues at grassroot, regional and national levels. Caste is characterized by continuity and change.

It may also be concluded that Tocqueville's thesis mentioned in the beginning of the essay is supported by the studies presented here. Politics is independent and the studies indicate a democratic movement in India aiming at producing social equality and abolishing hereditary distinctions of rank. Thus, it is a path to socialism different from communist and capitalistic societies of today.

⁴³Rajni Kothari, *Caste in Indian Politics*, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970, p. 13.

Entrepreneurship, Economic Elites and Classes: The Indian Context

KAMINI ADHIKARI

THE PROBLEM

Writing two decades ago on the principal groups shaping the transition from one form of social organisation to another, Bottomore summarised an essential contrast as follows: "The industrialisation and modernisation of the countries of Western Europe and North America in the 19th century was undertaken by a national bourgeoisie, which brought into existence the capitalist form of industrial society. Among the present developing countries, a number of different elite groups are seeking to create a modern industrial society, in a variety of other forms; and the relative importance of these different elites, as well as their degree of success, is influenced by the traditional social structure and culture of each particular country, and by the nature of the country's past and present relationships with the existing industrial societies".¹ India, in particular, was singled out to demonstrate the change-inducing role, via ideology and national liberation movements, of the early nationalist political elites and elite intelligentsia resting on the middle classes.

Focussing on India, it is the intention of this paper to consider the significance of bourgeois ascendancy within the country's social structure—the direct result of Independence—for the disposition of entrepreneurship and economic elites. Our problem will be, firstly, to identify some major changes in the social location and function of elites and in the place and role of entrepreneurship in the post-Independence developments termed *bourgeois ascendancy*; secondly, to see more precisely their present-day distinctiveness, generative mechanisms, interconditionality and interrelations; and thirdly, to situate these social forms within more

¹T.B. Bottomore, "Modern Elites in India" in T.K.N. Unnithan *et. al.* (eds.), *Towards a Sociology of Culture in India*, New Delhi, Prentice Hall, 1965, pp. 180-181.

comprehensive transformative processes of Indian society. While detailed reference to empirical material is not possible here, a conceptual analysis and illustrations from contemporary India may help to make explicit some relevant dimensions of the course of this change.

My point of departure is constituted by the questions: in what lies the specificity of the bourgeois societal context of the relationship between entrepreneurship (historically variable socio-economic functions) and elites (historically variable social groupings); in this respect, how have the specific features of colonial experience and process of Independence worked out in the Indian case; and does the characterisation of some entrepreneurial entities as economic elites, expressed frequently in the composite notion 'entrepreneurial elite', restrict the range of hypotheses available for the study of social transformation by obscuring the characteristic social locations, functions and power of each.

Entrepreneurship is a concept which is usually put forward to identify some features of socio-economic action and associated valuations which have been manifested in extensive periods of history, in different types of society. It is only in a period of capitalist development, however, that entrepreneurship assumes critical importance as component of expansion and consolidation of this process. Its relevance for developing countries must be seen, therefore, within the problematics of the emergence of new classes and components of the class-configuration, the bourgeoisie.

As essential constitutive process of capitalist class formation, entrepreneurship in mainstream sociology generally denotes certain socio-economic functions for which the European and American industrial transitions have provided the paradigmatic definitions: coordination of production, supply of capital, risk-taking, creation of new production functions, innovation, uncertainty-bearing and, more recently, the supply of information. Historically considered, entrepreneurship has been recognised, both as idea and as action, in the genesis and development of merchants, financiers and, more importantly, of industrialists in capitalistic forms of socio-economic organisation.

This paper sees *entrepreneurship* as one component, among many, of capitalist class formation which may work through a range of other socio-economic devices: state intervention, piracy, plunder, and even sheer repression in its crudest forms. As constitutive process of class formation, it has occurred throughout commercial and industrial history but acquires centrality in social change only at a certain stage of the process of capitalist class formation, i.e., when it becomes a social mechanism for the emergence of new classes and social relations between classes, and a source of fresh socio-cultural influences in a society.

Elites characteristically refer to social groupings involving a limited number of people in possession of decisive attributes, skills and resources

of a society. If identified by certain socio-cultural attributes, such as a continuing social base in religion or caste, they may appear as trans-societal phenomena, persisting over the long waves of history. The morphology of different kinds of elite has been widely employed to bring out crucial differences among societies within the general idea of rule by superior groups. C. Wright Mills' conception of a power-elite has drawn attention to the hierarchies of state, corporation and army as means of power in American society.² As to Asian and other post-colonial societies, scholars of different theoretical orientations seem agreed on the cultural-ideological significance of elites in social development.³ It has also been usual, in political perspective, to treat the larger entrepreneurs and economic elite as commensurable concepts, and to look for their kindred linkages in the structure of economic power.⁴ The difference in the two concepts, rendered non-problematic in their composite usage, is legitimate if the focus is on the distribution of power, status or economic leadership in a society. Considering them in their separateness may better permit an exploration of the ways in which one is tied to the other, and so yield a fuller understanding of social change in present day India.

To approach the problem, a fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between the place and role of entrepreneurship and elites in the bourgeois as precursor of societal contexts in which these forms are found. Entrepreneurship in feudal social organisation is mainly consequential to the pattern of agrarian relations, commerce and associated industry based on low technological forces whose expansion arises as much from organisational as from technical innovations. Its role as initiator of change grows as industrialisation advances. Feudal formations characteristically exhibit basic tendencies towards ruling class-elite identity, stability-maintaining social hierarchies, and multidimensional significance of the elite, reinforced by status-congruence. Entrepreneurial forms and elites in bourgeois formations have, however, manifested considerable variations in space and time and are, thus, difficult to specify.

In the bourgeois societal context, *economic elites* seem to exist as *ancillary power structure* in relation to the system as a whole, and not only in relation to the capitalist classes. So considered, they may evolve as much around the dominated classes (labour, lower strata of peasantry, petit-bourgeoisie) as through the dominant: capitalists, land-

²C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959.

³Besides Bottomore, other contributors to this view have been M.N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Bombay, Orient Longman, 1972 (1966); M. Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes*, New York, Praeger, 1972.

⁴S.A. Kochanek, *Business and Politics in India*, Berkeley, University of California, 1974.

ed proprietors and financiers. They appear, also, in and through forms that may not rest on a class basis, such as agrarian interests taken as a whole, legislatures, political parties, and social movements over a wider field. They are ancillary in that their emergence is tied to the impulses of growth, expansion and alterations characteristic of this social formation. Elites in bourgeois society are, therefore, associated with power in its various manifestations, not importantly in the processes or relations of production. Of considerable significance in the transition to bourgeois ascendancy have been the specialised elites in the spheres of finance, banking, science and technology and the representatives of federated industrial interests. Accompanying the coordination needs of the advancing structure has been the growing consequence of upper bureaucracy of careers and political patrons. These elites, as ancillary power structures, are distinguishable from the precursor forms less by their ideological claims than by their specialised rationality, to the extent to which it propels such advance.⁵

The argument developed here is that elites in bourgeois society progressively denote the ancillary power structures required for the reproduction and expansion of an intrinsically advancing, spreading capitalistic social order, but express the prior structures of social influence, institutions and tensions of the older society. Some universal attributes of bourgeois ascendancy that determine the generation, adaptation and *ex-aptation* (a concept proposed by Gould and Verba to denote biological features "evolved for other usages (or for no function at all), and later *coopted* for their current role",⁶ of ancillary power structures required for its reproduction and expansion are: (a) its organisation-creating and appropriating mechanisms, salient among which are law, use of state-apparata and systems of standardisation; (b) its inherent movements for advance which entail restructuring of education, science, political forms and economic devices, among other social institutions, in new directions; and (c) the diversity it produces by the increasing range of societal components it affects.

The similarities between class-divided, pre-capitalist societies and capitalist formations in the organisation of power should not, however, be underrated. They are similar, firstly, in the control exercised by the dominant classes of each over the *maintenance* of the societal form and, secondly, in application of a society's varied socio-cultural

⁵This emphaasis on relating elites to the social order as a whole and their specific rationality owes much to Claude Meillassoux's conception of 'social corps' generated by the main classes of the bourgeois order which he presented in a lecture on 'Social Classes and Social Corps' at the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta in November, 1982.

⁶S.J. Gould and E.S. Verba, "Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form", *Paleobiology*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1982, p. 6.

technical, scientific and material capacities for this process. They differ in the centrality of economic mechanism by which societal integration takes place in capitalist development, in the necessity for socio-economic advance, and in the diversity-producing tendencies inherent in bourgeois development. The passage of science into industrial-institutional complexes from the cultural domain and the conversion of education into a marketable commodity illustrate the advent of some new socio-economic processes integral to this development. Again, the land-anchored feudal elites seem not to attempt to alter the relations of production at a global level. For the expansion of capitalism, however, such global interventions may become crucial elements.

In the existing literature, the specific place occupied by entrepreneurship in different types of social organisations has been recognised and seems obvious enough. The significance of the early nationalist and intellectual elites in economically subject societies, in the formative stages of their modernisation, has been particularly well investigated and found crucial.⁷ Less examined theoretically and empirically, the relationship between entrepreneurship and elites (including economic elites) remains implicit and unclear. An analysis of this relationship, in stressing the distinctiveness of the two terms may, therefore, help to clarify the *contextual* conditions and consequences accompanying a social organisation and its restructuring, such as has been occurring in India these four decades past.

The central analytic basis of the notion of *context*, as treated here, is the concept of socio-economic structure, with its core the social forms in which production is organised and the resultant classes or, more appropriately, the relation between classes. The description of a society as bourgeois, capitalist, feudal or semifederal is essentially a way of pointing to the dominant class-configurations of the society. In any actual society, these dominant class-configurations and relations can prevail as sets of contending or associating forces, alongside some minor systems of relations or new ascendant forms growing in the social structure, as is the case in post-colonial societies. Successive differences of social context imply essential differences in entrepreneurship and elites as social form, *i.e.*, their differentiations, overlaps, common elements, inter-conditionality, interrelationships, effects on social processes and functions in relation to the class-structure.

As a synthesis-emphasising nation, the *context* of entrepreneurship and economic elite can also more comprehensively denote the totality of processes, social relations, mental forms and social entities that distinguish a society's modes of perpetuation, dominance and rule, and the

⁷For example, F. Mansur, *Process of Independence*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962; T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966 (1964).

significance that attaches within it to these two social forms as forces of the class-configuration of which they are a part.

Considered at a particular moment in time, a context points to the conjunctures of social that are unique for a particular society, in a stage of its evolution. It refers, simultaneously, to the presence of irreversible world-historical processes, a basic tendency of which today is the spread of global and world-regional influences. In this sense, present day entrepreneurship and economic elite in developing societies, that exhibit wide-ranging differences in society principles and structures, must also be considered aspects of certain common world processes.

Acting in manifold complex ways, at various levels of interplay of forces, are processes that are *cognitive* (generating conceptions, knowledge and theoretical inventories for particular types of action); *ideological* (generating leading conceptions, ideas and beliefs); and *practical* (generating structures and actual conjunctions between action, knowledge and ideologies). A prime characteristic of the contemporary contexts of entrepreneurship and economic elites is the complex interplay of theoretical, ideological and practical processes that may occur within the micro-structures of a single society or follow international pathways and contours.

The role of entrepreneurship and economic elites as components of social development in the diversity of societies described as the present day 'developing countries', 'third-world', or 'non-aligned nations' thus appears to have become untractable and unclear. Attention to the distinctions and context-relative character and consequences of these social forms may facilitate understanding of some of the *status quo* preserving or transformative processes of these heterogeneous societies. In what follows, my attempt will be to identify some major trends and illustrative occurrences in the current Indian context, in order to show how viewing post-Independence bourgeois ascendancy in Indian society at this historical moment, and in a certain conjuncture of social forces and global influences, may help more adequately to situate entrepreneurship and elite among the processes of social change.

THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Entrepreneurship and economic elite are not new concepts in the study of social change in modern India.⁸ What, however, is new is the current context of their existences as social forms in the society. This context shows as *bourgeois ascendancy*, a construct that has a particular evolving class-configuration as its core. Several important features of the actuality

⁸For a valuable historical review see, Y. Singh, *Social Stratification and Change in India*, New Delhi, Manohar, 1977.

of societal processes during the last four decades since Independence can be identified as the growing course of bourgeois ascendancy in Indian society. For this discussion, it will be useful to specify some of its central tendencies as they bear on the phenomena of entrepreneurship and economic elite.

A major generic condition for alterations in the socio-economic structures and processes of a colonial country is obviously the regaining of sovereignty. The crucial political turn by which India was constituted an independent State made possible, indeed necessary, the appearance of fundamentally new economic and societal processes at various levels. Quantitative and relational changes in the constituents of the bourgeoisie were set in motion. The expansion of the productive sectors of the economy that followed the return to sovereignty induced several changes in the relations between the principal historical elements constituting the Indian bourgeoisie: capitalists in different branches of the economy and the middle classes from which had mainly arisen the pre-independence nationalist political elite, elite intelligentsia and the civil service of careers. The role and interrelations of these two segments of the fast-evolving bourgeois class-configuration, differentiated in social base and orientations began to change, reinforced by the persisting separation of their social origin and interests. As commercial, industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs gained control over the producing sectors of the economy, influences began to emanate from the Indian State and from the corporate and agriculture spheres, to shape, the direction and content of the development of science, technology, management and other economy-related professions. Changing conditions of production in manufacturing industry and agriculture now entailed greater dependence on education-based differentiated skills and technical capacities of the middle classes, generating new possibilities of elites among them for production-related economic functions. Scientists, managers, a technobureaucracy and a variety of banking and finance-related administrators appeared specially in the public sphere, with the older element of the civil bureaucracy and intelligentsia remaining in existence in the continuing institution of public administration and urban universities.

In the rural society, the concepts of 'dominant caste', regional political elites and peasant leaders capture particularly well the socio-political consequences of land reforms (the more salient among which are the abolition of landlordism through land-ceiling laws) and a variety of comprehensive and micro-level social movements and organisational crystallisations shaping economic and cultural consciousness from the turn of the century throughout the land. The phenomenon of the agricultural Green Revolution, achieved by the combination of technological change, economic policy and agricultural science, reveals yet other dimension of recent social changes in agrarian social structure. Today,

in several parts of the country a stable basis exists for a landless agricultural proletariat tied to capitalist land-holding class-elements. Private property in landownership and inheritance rules having changed little in their underlying principles, may be reinforcing these emerging features of the development process. Peasant organisations that are territorially, politically and ideologically fragmented, are also acting upon sharpening socio-economic differentiations in rural social systems in different regions.

These developments were accompanied by a quantitative growth of private and state industrial entrepreneurship. Strategic motives of industrial self-reliance and control by the State of the steel and basic machinery industries, sometimes termed the Nehru-Mahalanobis planning model, had propelled the initial advance. The Public Sector, specially in industry, finance and banking, became its organisational instrument. Simultaneously, private industrial enterprise, already characterised by a marked concentration of economic power, was strengthened as a consequence of growing state attention to industrial development. Thus state industrial entrepreneurship over the years became subject to an increasing range of socio-economic processes, such as market forces and, later, incursions by private enterprise into its monopoly role, for example, in steel and power, as well as to attacks by several groups upon its originating public ideology and rationale.

A second generic trend is that of alterations in the place occupied by the capitalist and middle classes in the bourgeois class-configuration and in the institutions of dominance and rule. In the post-independence years, the capitalist classes in commerce and industry showed a progressive mastery over state-apparatuses, political realities and world economic processes. The richer rungs of the peasantry became more articulate, commercially oriented and organised. These capitalist classes grew quantitatively and entered different branches of the economy. The organisation of business associations and other collectivities by the now class-conscious entrepreneurial groupings also advanced. At the same time, changes became discernible in the structure, organisation and social influence of the middle classes. There was a further nucleating of the middle classes around numerous secondary occupations being generated both by changes in the conditions of production and by their own mobilisation around various social goals. Thus, new elites associated with the diversifying and expanding functions of production and the State became necessary and were, again, largely drawn from a middle class social base. To the main plank of political elite that had already taken command over the means of government and administration, was now added a much more diversified ancillary power structure, resting on training and knowledge and serving as an adjunct to the running of the production and state-institutional spheres.

An illustration of the intricacy and complexity of how the pattern evolved is provided by the interrelations between State, Planning, Public Sector and private industry. The place of private enterprise in Indian social development had always been questioned. In public ideology, the socialistic frames for the society as a whole, combined with a 'mixed economy' ideal for its economic organisation, introduced further complexities. Moreover, it had been the so-called Bombay Plan, a document of leading Indian capitalists in the forties, that had sought a special role after Independence for the State sector, in the introduction of the steel industry. For the functioning of the mixed economy as the socio-economic premise of production, the Planning Commission, a post-Independence device which brought together political elites and specialist intellectuals, was expected to find ways to eradicate economic dependence, poverty and stagnation along paths of 'growth, social justice' and 'self-reliance'. The new State, under the leadership of the political elites and elite intelligentsia, had elaborated the Five Year Plans. The regulatory, administrative and economic form through which the mixed economy would work was to require new ancillary elites and a still more differentiated ancillary power structure.

For the Congress Party, which was directing industrialisation on behalf of the whole range of a sharply stratified class of industrial owners, keeping the interests of national sovereignty in view, there was no conflict between the presence of a Public Sector in state enterprise, with the heavy investments it required, and the growth of private entrepreneurship. The issue before it was, primarily, one of the specific *content* of industrial planning and choice of the tiers of the ownership-segment it should serve. Accompanying these early developments was the controversy termed the Planning models debate which concerned the role of the Public Sector and State creation and ownership of the 'commanding heights of the economy', in a manner not inconsistent with the Bombay Plan. Underlying the Indian State was the Congress Party, combining industrial, agricultural and middle class interests with mass support. Diverse social groupings, therefore, were drawn into controversies surrounding the many aspects of public investment in the steel industry; choice of foreign collaborators, significance of demand, choice of technology, etc. Economic analysts, officials within government regulatory bodies, elites of the public bureaucracy, and ministerial managers of public enterprises examined the workability of options and choices on behalf of the Government, bringing into their decisions longer-term perspectives and an informed perception of the chain of effects of a given decision, rather than take any fundamental positions as such. Various claims of the expanding commercialised agricultural interests were also articulated and brought into these debates, attaching often to Gandhian rural ideals or to new functional goals, and so producing new nuclei of

power, such as regional farmers' lobbies and farmers' parties. Some support was also lent to these contending claims by sections of the knowledge elite, commonly expressed as attacks on public investment in heavy industry and the Public Sector.

The actuality of industrial development till the present shows extensive industrial expansion but with little decrease in foreign collaboration and monopolistic practices by private enterprise. The inadequacy of entrepreneurial spread at the base of the system is evident as judged by the host of 'entrepreneurship development' interventions recurrently announced by the State. Simultaneously, the investment interests of the larger business-industrial conglomerates have not been sacrificed and a multifaceted development of capitalist industry has taken place. Industrial research, engineering education, and later management education have been introduced within the public system, and are producing new kinds of education-based influences both inside and outside the ancillary power structures of government and business. Since influences from the power-holding elites and counter-influences both grow as these centres expand and diversify, the distinction between rule (power operating through control of laws, regulations, economic and administrative devices) and domination (power from any source operating with control over and through the mind) becomes more transparent. An uneasy two-way dependence between the knowledge-elite and entrepreneurs has grown, following as it does a historical and cultural tradition of social distance and mistrust.

Agricultural entrepreneurship and the Green Revolution in wheat and rice cultivation through the use of new high-yielding varieties of seeds and chemical fertilisers, reveal other effects of the changing conditions of production on the organisation of power over the economy. Induced by the socio-economic action of the larger farmers in certain parts of the country with support from the state, have appeared farmers' cooperatives, a host of governmental projects and schemes and many agricultural universities. In States like, Maharashtra, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, can be observed significant continuities with change, as the traditional cultivating castes gain in economic strength. Electoral mechanics, and the political system generally, have added a political dimension to these socio-economic changes. Scientific, administrative and social science knowledge-based interventions servicing the Green Revolution has helped to enhance the ruling class segments' share of the agricultural product and, indirectly, its heightened politicisation.

Relevant to the theme of this paper, among the central tendencies of bourgeois ascendancy in India are not only some basic alterations in the class-configurations of the bourgeoisie and in some core socio-economic processes associated with production, there are also several complex shifts and adjustments in the conceptual, theoretical, para-theoretical

and ideological settings within which its principal economic agents—capitalist entrepreneurs and economic elite—are situated. Pre-Independence conditions had not produced any consistent notion of entrepreneurship. It was possible both to locate 'entrepreneurship' in a direct path of continuity of critical conceptions of foreign economic agents, their emulators, partners and analogues in India, as well as to place the concept within ideological frameworks stressing racial equality and cultural and economic nationalism, invoking the values of *Swadeshi*, self-reliance and independent industrialisation. Positive images of industrial entrepreneurship, that had existed in tiny segments of the upper orders of nineteenth century Indian colonial society, spread more widely with the sharpening of national consciousness, resurgence of economic nationalism during the national liberation movement, and with increasing openness of the Indian intelligentsia to world influences, specially after the First World War. But in their inextricable connections with the thought structures of imperialist economic rule, concepts of entrepreneurial economic agents and action became endowed with ethical meanings and political significance. The entrepreneurial ethic, as ethic for the society as a whole, had been proclaimed only at certain stages of an advancing capitalism in European and American society. But in India, and this follows from an appreciation of the social organisation and nature of social classes underlying the country's entrepreneurial processes, entrepreneurship as ethic was never forcefully presented as ideology of any group before or after Independence. Scientific-technical advance became only haltingly an attribute of the concept. The idea of enterprise appeared mainly within nationalist interpretative conceptions about economic change in India on the part of Indian capitalists and some sections of the intelligentsia. Thus, as already seen, the Bombay Plan had sought an important role for state enterprise after Independence for the introduction of the steel industry in the general industrial interest. The economic responses of the intelligentsia, evolving as parts of a composite intellectual development and social thought, proclaimed the industrial system a significant component of the future Indian state. But again, the socialist ideological framework with a 'mixed economy' that was put forward for Indian social development by the political leadership of the newly independent State, resulted in fundamental conflicts in the intellectuals' response. The place of private entrepreneurship and the proper role of state enterprise and state initiatives remain important objects of contending intellectual and political claims about economic action in India.

A new complexity appeared, on the morrow of Independence, when the concepts of elite and entrepreneurship began to be widely diffused in India and in other Third World countries through the literature on modernisation and economic development. Now structured as core com-

ponents of social science-grounded theories of modernisation and development, their importance for economic action was made imperative to professionals drawn into the tasks of economic management. They furnished conceptions for a particular kind of economic ethic and economy-related institution-building, and even simple models of Indian society as a whole, in terms of competing elites and tradition-modernity dichotomies.⁹ Yet, even in these simplified images of Indian society that resulted from the interplay of functionalist social theory, governmental-administrative thought and Indian social reality, no place could exist for state and private entrepreneurship as purely economic social forms, bound as they were with value-laden colonial experiences from the past. As aim of economic action, entrepreneurship continues to oscillate between its definition as progressive instrument and one that subserves, in the end, colonial or neo-colonial alien interest.

The idea of *elite* in the shaping of social action in modern Indian society has also been subject to a series of cognitive-theoretical and ideological shifts. Even the briefest retrospect reveals that the attribution of positive change-inducing role to the concept, elite, associable first with the rise of nationalism in the process of Independence and then with the institution and development of the independent State, has been giving way to the critique of power-elites and of elite-power. The initial adoption of progressive conceptions of elites can, perhaps, be seen as an element in the confrontation by the intelligentsia of the conceptual structures of western thought that missed 'the constant process of mobility and transformation' in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in India.¹⁰ When, during the fifties and sixties, nationalist elites came to be posited in the modernisation literature as the principal agency of social development in India, the earlier discrepant perceptions tended to get minimized. The prevailing optimism of the intellectuals about future progress and belief in the manipulability of institutions, such as public bureaucracy, industry, science and technology, were also not inconsistent with the idea of elites as consensus-builders and elitist theories of social change. Thus, studies of caste, community, politics and stratification in India readily absorbed elite conceptions, on the basis of which a fertile anthropological and sociological literature was produced. The various versions of competitor-predator models of social change in Indian society also incorporated the elite-notion as a nominal category with which to describe the social organisation of power and power-holders.

⁹In R.G. Fox (ed.), *Realm and Region in Traditional India*, New Delhi, Vikas, 1977, there are two interesting discussions of these themes: B.S. Cohn, "African Models and Indian Histories", pp. 90-113; E.M. Lavalle, "Pre-Industrial and Industrial Elite Accommodation: Seraikela and Jamshedpur", pp. 166-193,

¹⁰Y. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

By the seventies, however, the logic of 'take-off', *i.e.*, attainment of rapid, general economic growth spurred by rationality of action and technical control, had been fundamentally shaken. Other concepts now were needed for reconciling the inequality of economic development and the social definition of equality arising from actual mass tendencies. Ideas such as the 'shock-absorbing role' of the middle-classes were proving inadequate towards this end.¹¹ Nor could the complexities of ethnic processes and regional forces be grasped within the frameworks of occupational mobility and institutional change alone. The proposition of the continuity of social progress resting mainly on elites as autonomous agencies of change, was itself becoming untenable. In history-writing, in particular, the issue of the necessity for paradigm-change had been sharply posed. Social science writings from Latin America began to enter academic syllabi and discussion in the public domain. Very little of this recent new literature and its conceptual efforts has touched the mainstream theories of entrepreneurship and elite, which continue to rest on modified modernisation paradigms.

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The preceding illustrative analysis makes it possible to pull together some analytical conceptions about the changes which are seen in the relations between entrepreneurship, economic elites and classes with bourgeois ascendancy. These include new *methods of elite-generation*; class-relative *polarisation of elites*; blurring of *distinctions between economic and non-economic elites*; accretion of specialised kinds of *elite-rationality* to elite-ideologies of social direction, *status quo*—maintenance and change; and variations in *different elite-capacities* for inducing social changes as their primary and secondary agents.

Indian experience shows that the diversification of ancillary power-structures of the core system of social classes has taken place through several social mechanisms of elite-generation, among which are *direct generation* and *co-optation* of elites by entrepreneurs, as also the adoption by entrepreneurial units of *family-strategies* for the induction of ancillary capacities into the domain of their resources. Elite-generation also occurs by *state-mediation* and some *autonomous development* of elites. Direct generation of economic elites through entrepreneurial action is readily exemplified by the genesis of the social category, managers, as a consequence of the growing size and complexity of enterprises, changes in conditions of production, extended use of trained capacities and increasing conflicts with workers. Not quantitative growth alone but the professionalisation and functionalisation of managers are induced. Once

¹¹Y. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

generated, the managerial elite acts as a secondary source of societal influence and culture change.¹² The managerial component exercises influence by the particular kind of reasoning, time-frames, legitimating ideas, and criteria for formulation of decisions (its distinctive rationality); by steering organisational innovation in the firm; by giving rise to new associations and collectivities in the society; and by its influence on 'private-milieux' (C.W. Mills) as well as on life-styles, consumption patterns and personal ethics in industry.

Cooptation can be illustrated by the inclusion of the agricultural scientist in the socio-economic processes of the Green Revolution. The laboratory and field roles of Indian scientists were critical in the adaptation and development of genetic and other inputs for Indian agriculture. What created conditions for their economic performance, however, was the adoption, in certain parts of the country, of several agricultural innovations by the richer and larger farmers, with support from the State. Without the growth of such an active, cultivating class-segment and start of a mutually reinforcing interaction between science and agriculture, the participation of the agricultural scientist in economic action for higher yields, etc., would not have been achieved.

A significant, specific form of economic elite-generation in India is state-mediation, and one which is much less obvious than direct-generation and co-optation tied to the advance of entrepreneurial groupings as regional and all-India leading classes, with command over the productive sectors of the economy and some of the enterprise-linked means to set limits on the development of the professions and working classes. State-mediation may be decoded by a closer view of the institution of ancillary power structures attached to the industrial sphere: Planning Commission, diverse regulatory bodies, economic analysts, top ministerial managers, and an administrative elite of the public bureaucracy and other administrative corps who can influence decisions that relate to industry. While exhibiting independence of action and functioning, such elites depend for the social form in which they have existence on the present nature, supports and political aims of the Indian State, their continuing hold on political institutions, and maintenance of positions in the structures by which power is achieved. Through the mediation of the State, the institutions of economic planning and a techno-bureaucracy, among others, have become new modes of perpetuating the power of the middle-classes in the class-configuration of which they were the leading historical elements.

Economic elite-generation also occurs in relative autonomy from industrial capitalist class-formation and the entrepreneurial sphere in other ways, as seen in the post-Independence expansion of industrial

¹²S. Pollard, *The Genesis of Modern Management*, Harmondsworth, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 (1965), p. 314.

science and of technical and management education. India's colonial history had produced a situation in which traders obtained early and wide access to industrial-ownership positions, industrial science and technical education of some depth had a late start, and state industrial decisions were subject to direction from a generalist, if not an anti-technical, administrative corps. Not the technological requirements of capitalist production but the goals of equality among nations and the profession of science itself supplied some the decisions for the creation of institutions for education and research in science and technology: a chain of scientific and industrial research laboratories established in the public sphere, and special centres for research, advanced technical education and application in the universities and else where. The expansion of the zone of recruitment and social base of the intelligentsia was, thus, made possible. As these new sources for the reproduction of advanced knowledge were instituted and grew in response to manifold pressures emanating from a variety of social forces only indirectly connected with the political economy, the basis was laid for a new kind of economic elite: a knowledge elite acting upon the economy. The processes interlinking the two parallel growths, which would make of the knowledge elite an economic elite at the same time, would now depend as much upon the internal growth of the sciences and engineering disciplines as upon their attachment to the industrial economy and political institutions. Due to the presence of several important forces arising from the organisational locations of the scientific community, its present and past relationships with international science, and from continuities in some pre-Independence ideological trends, a scientific-technical knowledge elite continues to exist in relative autonomy from industrial and political arenas. Persistence of technological dependency in certain growth industries and inadequacy of integrative mechanisms required for innovation are reinforcing the main divides. Paradoxically, the management of technical and commercial linkages has become a potential source of economic elite-generation from among administrative intermediaries, science and technology brokers and leaders of critical science movements.

Family strategy, as form of economic elite-generation, refers to the incorporation of selected elements of economic capability within the family—the domestication of sources of power—by explicit direction of the education and occupation of the young, marriage to relevant professionals, such as lawyers, trained managers and political patrons. More data are needed on the spread and significance of conscious methods of elite-absorption within the family. These must await more field studies of business and industrial families in India.

Change in methods of elite-generation is one of several analytically discernible features of entrepreneurship-elite relationships in bourgeois

ascendancy. Class-relative polarisation of elites is another. Elite-polarisation is the result of two interdependent consequences of entrepreneurial advance, *i.e.*, constitution of capitalist classes in industry and agriculture; and numerical increases and organisation of industrial workers, hired agricultural workers and subsistence peasantry working on their own account. Such societal divisions have led to the constitution of elites attached to the subordinate and dominant classes. While the former rest on the social-institutional base of trade unions, popular social movements and worker and peasant-oriented political parties, the latter are located in the institutions of rule. The concept of elite-polarisation also underlines another specific feature of the existing social organisation: changes in the location of middle-class generated elites, and their polarisation, as elites, by their attachment, on the one hand, to the institutions of rule and, on the other, to the power-bases of the subordinate elements, in different degrees of formalisation.

Perhaps one of the most interesting sociological implications of the situations analysed is the blurring of the distinction between economic and one or more non-economic elites from the standpoint of actual performance. The particular political, cultural, intellectual, or even religious capacity to be brought into the social organisation-in-motion, will depend on the particular aims, paths and transitions of the main process in a given country, making such mechanisms a characteristic feature of an order that tends to penetrate and incorporate an ever-increasing range of social groupings and institutions into its functioning. Yet, this summation of economic and other attributes (religious, administrative, cognitive, etc.) is not a simple union of elements, as might be the 'ideal-typical' case in a hierarchical order. The ancillary power structure of the bourgeois order, and even more of one that has emerged from a colonial past, is a complex, composite growth in which may remain the persistent demarcations and conflict-impregnated elements associated with differences in rationality, ideologies, cultures and interests brought to bear on economic action in common.

The distinction between elite ideologies stressed in the early literature and elite-rationality (type of reasoning, time-horizons and conceptions) becomes relevant here. Types of rationality refer to scientific, technical bureaucratic, religious, humanistic or other arguments and premises that enter into economic practice. Ideologies refer to leading ideas for the direction, maintenance and restructuring of society, *i.e.*, nationalism tied to anti-colonial world views, communism based on Marxian philosophy, and the ideologies of dependent capitalism, etc. Several consequences ensue as the basic distinction, itself socially constructed, gets crystallised. The basis of claim to influence over policy decisions can shift from ideology to superior rationality. Some ideologies, such as caste ideologies asking for power for castes as a whole, are not

assimilable in the thought structures of public bureaucracy. Emphasis in public policy of rationality-premises rather than ideological directions, imbues the State with the attributes of social objectivity and neutrality; and so on. A reintegration of ideological contentions within the internal logic of elite-rationality could eventuate as the neutral image breaks down with the accentuation of class actions of the State. In the meanwhile, as elite polarisation advances, the future of bourgeois ascendancy becomes uncertain. At the same time, since the economic elites are partly generated and sustained by entrepreneurial processes, in direct or indirect ways, future of the different varieties of such elite is equally uncertain.

Elites differ in the ways in which they influence social development. Financial elite by virtue of their proximity to the capitalist classes and state apparatus, must act under the policy-framework of these directing influences. Managerial elite are a consequence of prior changes in industrial enterprise. They are influential, as mentioned before, mainly as secondary agencies of change in the socio-cultural sphere. Scientists and technologists possess critical resources for introduction of innovation but their impact, as originators of change, depends on the conjunction-inducing processes between scientific and technical knowledge and critical felt-needs of the people, and production in agriculture and industry. Further study of the existing conjunction-inducing processes between societal capacities and its trends of development may throw more light on the future of bourgeois ascendancy in India.

In emphasising the class-configurations for the existence of entrepreneurship and economic elite, attention is drawn to the altered basis for the distinctions and interrelationship between two social forms. Common to both is an attempt to influence the productive sectors of the economy, which is reflected in the composite notion 'entrepreneurial elite'. But if the foregoing illustrations of the interrelationship between entrepreneurial agency and ancillary power structures of bourgeois ascendancy in India indicate significant changes in the nature of their growth, functions and interdependence, then study of the class-structured context of entrepreneurship and economic elite in any concrete society should help to form a clearer view of the place and role of these phenomena within it.

A study of the class-configuration and societal context for the existence of entrepreneurship and economic elite may also provide some insights into the process of social change. In particular, the relation between ruling ideologies and thought structures of elites as an aspect of change needs to be clarified. Various reasons for the pattern of the absorption of science and technology and the pace of transformation in a society's institutions and organisation need equally urgently to be brought to light. Primary and secondary forces for developmental change need to

be distinguished, which are obscured by the general term elite.

This analysis suggests the crucial importance of *context* in treatments of entrepreneurship and economic elite, as well as the class-structured basis of elite power and significance from one society to another. Such a perspective would lead to focusing attention upon their being components of productive classes or not; their being tied to the subordinated or to the controlling classes; their position in relation to market forces and in the labour process; and the conditions in which their political, ideological or economic functions acquire particular importance.

Elitist Approach to Development in India: Impact on Tribal Communities

JAYTILAK GUHA ROY

Although the main impulse behind the creation of society was the protection of the weak against the oppression of the strong, the history of human civilization reveals that in all ages the ruling elites everywhere have tried to exploit the weaker sections of the society through administrative machineries of the state and various other devices for perpetuating their privileges. With the advancement of civilization, the process of socio-economic exploitation has only become increasingly complicated. The division of society into stronger and weaker or privileged and deprived sections is still more menacingly prevalent in contemporary developing societies. As one conscientious Indian scholar¹ has very aptly observed: "The phenomenon of national independence in the erstwhile societies of the Afro-Asian world has heightened this hiatus and the developmental exercise by the (westernized) elite leadership have generally rendered the strong as stronger and the weak as still more weaker than their counterparts in the past. . . . and its consequent impact has badly shattered the traditional norms which were keeping the society (despite class distinctions and exploitation) in the bounds of legal justice and social harmony". This is perhaps more so in the case of tribal communities of the Indian society.

The present paper is a modest endeavour to evaluate and analyse the elitist approach to development and its consequent impact on tribal economy and social life in Independent India. It also deals with such pertinent issues as the transfer and adoption of modern science and technology for tribal welfare and development.

POLITICAL ELITE AND DEVELOPMENT

In developing countries as ours, the political elite, by virtue of their position as planners and decision-makers, play a very dominant role in

¹P.D. Sharma, *Police Polity and People in India*, Delhi, Uppal, 1981, p. 195.

the process of social change and development. It is unfortunate that the political elite in free India belong (according to David Apter's² model) more to 'maintenance system' than to 'development system.' This implies that they are committed more to maintenance and preservation of the existing exploitative political, economic and social systems than to reconstruction of the society by attempting to mobilise and use available resources and political energies for the upliftment of the poor and downtrodden people. In other words, they are, by and large, in favour of the *status quo* and opposed to any programme that aims at equalization, for they fear that once such programmes begin to yield, the masses would free themselves from their exploitative clutches and demand a voice in the governance of the country.³

The English-educated political elite in India also suffer from contradictions of what Prof. S.H. Alatas called *dualism*. These *dualistic* elites who dominate the scene in the developing Asian societies, are those persons "in whose mental make-up two systems of thought and attitudes exist side by side, the modern and the traditional. . . . A cabinet minister may talk about scientific development and modernization because it is the fashion to do so. In his private life he accepts and uses science, for repairing his television set, for his dental treatment, for the maintenance of his car, and so forth. But inwardly he himself is not very interested in science and cares little for it. He does not read about it or spend time talking and thinking about it. He does not allow science to dominate his thinking and living. . . . He also believes in magic, in charms, in animism, in superstition, and is more or less interested in these than in science. Both happen to be there for him to use whenever the occasion demands it."⁴ A dualistic elite like this is also what Raymond Aron called *bankrupt elite*. To him, "an elite which fails to make use of technical resources to raise the standard of life and increase the wealth of the community is indeed a bankrupt elite."⁵

As in most of the developing Asian countries, modernization has been initiated in India by these westernized bankrupt political elites. They look towards the west for modernizing the country. They lack innovative or creative thinking to use science and technology for

²David Apter, "System, Process and the Politics of Economic Development", in J.L. Finkle and R.W. Gamble (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change*, New York, John Wiley, 1966, pp. 441-57; See also Ram Ahuja, "Political Elite: Recruitment and Role in Modernisation", in Sachchidananda and A.K. Lal (eds.), *Elite and Development*, Delhi, Concept, 1980.

³Sachchidananda and A.K. Lal (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴S.H. Alatas, *Intellectuals in Developing Societies*, London, Frank Cass, 1977, p. 85.

⁵Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2, 1950, p. 135; See also S.H. Alatas, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

bringing about an 'overall' progress of the country. They are subservient to western intellectual leadership and are keen on 'uncritical' transfer and adoption of western development strategy, technology and practices. An approach like this, according to Joon-Chien's⁶ study, has resulted in: (a) the growth in GNP or in per capita income which has been of little benefit to the poor, who constitute the majority of the people; (b) the lack of positive impact on their part because of the differences in the environmental realities between the West and their own country; and (c) the playing of games with them. The results are rather worse insofar as the tribal communities in India are concerned.

COLONIAL AND THE NATIONAL FOREST POLICY

Although forests are a vital source of national wealth and their conservation as well as proper utilization are of utmost importance for a nation's economic growth, the 'symbiotic' relationship of the tribal communities with forests cannot be denied too. The United Nations Report⁷ aptly illustrates this relationship in the following statement:

Tribal people in general, derive either directly or indirectly a substantial amount of their livelihood from the forests. They subsist on edible leaves and roots, honey, wild game and fish. They build their homes with timber and bamboo and practice cottage crafts with the help of local raw materials. They use herb and medicine plants to cure their diseases and even their religion and folk-lore are woven round the spirits of the forests.

In India, 50 per cent of the tribals are now directly dependent on the forests which cover a substantial portion of the geographical area in our tribal regions. Unfortunately, there is a growing tendency on the part of our elite planners and administrators to ignore this traditional relationship of the tribals with the forests. No wonder then, while the 1894 Forest Policy of the colonial British Government sought to regulate and restrict the hitherto unfettered rights and privileges of the tribals, the National Forest Policy of 1952 converted the remaining rights and privileges into *concessions* at the mercy of the forest authority. This new policy of outright commercialism under State management of forestry has ultimately led to the exploitation of forest resources with total disregard for the needs of forestry-based tribal economy. As an extreme example of such commercialization of forests at the expense of

⁶Don Joon-Chien, *Eastern Intellectuals and Western Solutions*, Ghaziabad, Vikas, 1980, p. 129.

⁷United Nations, *Report on Development of Tribes and Hill Tribe People in ECAFE Region*, Bangkok, Thailand, 1973.

the local tribal population, an eminent foreign anthropologist⁸ referred to a project undertaken in the State of Madhya Pradesh a few years ago where Rupees 4.6 crores had to be spent on converting 8,000 hectares of forest in Bastar Hills to pine forests to feed the paper pulp industry. Dr. B.D. Sharma, a distinguished civil servant with wide experience in the field of tribal development, analysed the position very clearly when he observed:

As the ownership of the State gets consolidated and formalized and the decision-making recedes further away from the field, the special relationship of the tribals with the forest is not appreciated. Their rights are viewed as a 'burden' on the forests, and an impediment in their scientific and economic exploitation. . . . Since the forest produce is treated as nature's gift, State stakes its full claim over it. At the best, the tribal may be allowed a reasonable wage for the labour which he may put in for collection of minor forest produce or extraction of major produce.⁹

This is how the one-time 'lord' of the forest has been reduced to the status of a 'casual wage-earner' at the mercy of forest departments and forest contractors. According to the Government of India's Working Group (1984) on Development of Scheduled Tribes,¹⁰ there have been cases in the country where forest contractors have heavily put their axe on reserve forests under the fictitious cover of permits for collection of timber from the tribal's tenanted lands. Consequently, both the tribals and the community as a whole have been losers, the tribals not getting their fair price while the community losing precious forest wealth. Over the years, illegal timber felling has become, what the director of the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi says forthrightly, "a major activity in the country undertaken with full support of political interests". "Stealing a few dozen trucks of timber", as he says further, "is the surest and easiest way to become rich. No less than a Chief Minister recently had to resign because of his family's involvement in timber smuggling".¹¹

The ruling elites, even while framing the Indian Forest Act (1981), made no endeavour to protect the traditional rights and interests of the

⁸C.V. Furer-Haimendorf, *Tribes of India: The Struggle for Survival*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 80.

⁹B.D. Sharma, *Tribal Development: The Concept and the Frame*, Delhi, Prachi Prakashan, 1978, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰*Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes During the Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90*, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, December 1984, p. 65.

¹¹Quoted by Sunil K. Munshi, "Engineers and Society: Total Approach to Planning Needed", *The Statesman*, April 11, 1987.

forest-dwelling tribals on forests. On the contrary, they preferred to seek legal support for the eviction of these weaker communities from forests. The anti-tribal attitude of these elites has been more clearly expressed perhaps in the very definition of 'forest' contained in the new Act. A 'forest', according to this Act, includes "any land whatsoever which the State Government declares to be forest". It simply implies that the government can acquire any private land or household land of the forest-dwellers by virtue of this Act.

The Act also gives unfettered rights to the forest authority on 'forest produce' which includes everything except vegetables. This means denial of tribals' traditional rights even on minor forest produce (MFP), like grass, trees, fruits, honey, etc. These MFP items have an important role in forestry-based tribal economy and, even in the contemporary context of changing consumption pattern of the tribals consequent to the opening of forest areas, a large segment of the tribal population is still dependent on MFP as an important source for meeting his cash requirement, which has been increasing with the diversification of his wants.¹² Recent studies show that 10 to 50 per cent of the income budget of an average tribal family in major tribal concentration states of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh is obtained through sale of MFP, the rest being derived from agriculture.¹³ According to the Working Group (1980) on Tribal Development, during the Sixth Plan, "MFP items are important raw materials for cottage, small and village industries and contribute to national economy through export and import substitution. Notwithstanding these factors, the tribals have not been conceded full rights of collection of MFP by all states".¹⁴ The group, therefore, suggested that the states lagging behind should take steps necessary for conferring the right. It also suggested that the marketing of MFP should be channelled through cooperatives so that the tribals are paid the price commensurate with the market value for their produce.

The next Working Group (1984) likewise emphasized the need for cooperativization of forest labour for collection, processing and marketing of forest produce.¹⁵ It may be pertinent to mention that cooperativization of forest labour will not prove to be a worthwhile step unless and until the cooperatives—primary, secondary or apex, whatsoever—perform their role effectively for the fulfilment of the basic objective for which these are established, i.e., the elimination of exploitation of tribals

¹²B.D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹³See *Report of the Working Group on Tribal Development During Sixth Plan 1980-85*, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, October 1980, p. 84.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵See *Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes During the Seventh Five Year Plan 1985-90*, *op. cit.*, p. 124,

by non-tribals. A recent study of tribal unrest,¹⁶ for instance, reveals that in States like Andhra Pradesh, lot of dissatisfaction among the tribals prevails due to the *ineffective* role of the Girijan Corporation which enjoys the monopoly in the purchase of MFP from the tribals. This Corporation, according to the study, has become a sort of *white elephant*, always in the red, neither doing justice to the tribals nor to itself. The study also corroborates, on the basis of the field work, the tribals' allegation that the Corporation always pays less than the market price for their forest produce and its salesmen who purchase the commodities and also sell daily necessities, cheat them in weights and measures.

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing scrutiny of our National Forest Policy that there is a growing need for evolving a new system of forest exploitation compatible with tribal welfare and development. As the Working Group (1980) very pertinently observed, "There has to be a judicious balance between the national needs, such as defence, communications, industries, etc., and the local, particularly, tribal needs. Forest economy and tribal economy should be two *co-equal* goals. A strong forest economy should be geared to the requirements of employment and economic progress of the scheduled tribe communities living in the area. In any event, the two should not be antithetical to each other".¹⁷

IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Certain areas which have been the very centre of tribals' homeland in the central belt of India and a portion of the southern and western belts have undergone rapid transformation during the last three to four decades as a result of gigantic industrial development programme undertaken after freedom. The drive for such large-scale industrialization pursued by the governments ought to have a negative impact on tribal communities in terms of:

1. influx of non-tribal migrants;
2. moral degradation of the tribals, particularly immoral traffic in tribal women;
3. destruction and alienation of tribal land;
4. large-scale displacement of tribal population;
5. disruption of self-sufficient rural economy of tribal communities; and
6. destruction of tribal culture.

¹⁶G. Prakash Reddy, *Politics of Tribal Exploitation* (A Study of Tribal Unrest in Adilabad District of Andhra Pradesh), Delhi, Mittal, 1987, pp. 137-38.

¹⁷Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes During the Seventh Five Year Plan 1985-90, *op. cit.*, p. 80. (emphasis added).

As far back as the early 60's an official commission made the following illuminating observation on the impact of industrialization on tribal communities:

The tribals were dislodged from their traditional source of livelihood and places of habitation. Not conversant with the details of acquisition proceedings they accepted whatever cash compensation was given to them and became emigrants. With cash in hand and many attractions in the nearby industrial towns, their funds more rapidly depleted and in course of time they were without money as well as without land. They joined the ranks of landless labourers but without any training, equipment or aptitude for any skilled or semi-skilled job.¹⁸

The Dhebar Commission (1960-61) referred to the enquiries made by the Assistant Commissioners for Scheduled Castes and Tribes of Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa which revealed that out of the 14,651 tribal families displaced from an area of 62,494 acres, only 3,479 were allotted alternative land. The situation, according to this Commission, was far from happy for the following reasons:

1. Very few tribals had taken advantage of the agricultural facilities offered in the reclamation camps. The attraction of easy money and industrial employment had been too strong, especially, for the younger generation.
2. The alternative land offered by the authorities for cultivation was not *irrigable* and could not offer adequate return to maintain the families living on it.
3. The cash compensation given was seldom utilized for productive purposes. It was almost invariably used up on daily living expenses until alternative employment could be found.¹⁹

Over the years, it had been observed that despite constitutional guarantee as well as governments' repeated assurance for protection of tribal interests, "little was done to rehabilitate the displaced tribesmen and to train them for work in the new industries. Their eventual proletarianization seems inevitable, and in the streets of Ranchi one can still see Munda or Oraon riksha pullers who not long ago were independent cultivators farming their own land".²⁰ Hence, "the expectation that the industrialization of tribal areas would help in improving the

¹⁸Report of the Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the Year 1962-63, Government of India, 1963, p. 271.

¹⁹Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission 1960-61, Government of India, 1961, Vol. I, para 22.7.

²⁰C.V. Furer-Haimendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

economic condition of the tribal communities", observed the Planning Commission's Study Team on Tribal Development Programmes Committee on Plan Projects²¹ in their report (1969), "has proved to be largely illusory. Major industrial projects like the mammoth steel plants located in tribal territory, far from providing employment opportunities to the tribals, have operated to their detriment by uprooting them from their hearths and homes and offering them no satisfactory alternative to the traditional methods by which they eked out a living in their own environment".

It would, therefore, be no exaggeration to say that the pattern of industrial development in tribal areas has not been in the interest of the tribal communities. On the contrary, "as the tempo of economic development in the country becomes faster", observes Dr. Sharma very aptly, "there will be a keener search for available resources in all nooks and corners, not only to satisfy the basic needs of the average citizen but also to satisfy the greed of the small *elite* whose capacity to devour anything which comes its way seems to be unlimited. Since the process of change, spearheaded by the fast industrial development, has been accorded the aura of inevitability, the interplay of socio-economic forces resulting in over-running of the weaker groups is, to say the least, overlooked, if not positively helped".²² In view of growing unrest and discontentment among the tribals it becomes exceedingly necessary now to ensure that the basic rights and interests of the tribal communities are not jeopardized as a result of establishment of vast industrial enterprises in tribal hinterlands. "The architects of the Indian Constitution were determined that, while the age-old isolation of the scheduled tribes would have to be ended, they should be saved from exploitation and from the erosion of their rights to their ancestral land. It was clear that this aim could be achieved only by special legislation, but unfortunately for the tribals the original idealism of politicians and legislators is wearing thin, and while the laws for protecting tribals are still in existence, their implementation leaves much to be desired".²³

TECHNOLOGY FOR TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT

Despite various strategies and schemes undertaken by our elite planners for tribal welfare and development during the last four decades, wide disparities still exist in socio-economic level between the sophisticated urbanized sections of the society and the traditional forest-dwelling tribals. Even among the tribal communities themselves, there is wide

²¹Also known as the Shilu Ao Team.

²²B.D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

²³C.V. Furer-Haimendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

variation in the levels of socio-economic development. According to the Working Group (1980), there is now a tendency to recognize among scheduled tribes the following four broad categories:

1. Primitive Groups, approximately 50 in number, engaged in pre-agricultural economy, like food or fruit gathering or in primitive agriculture, e.g., the Onge, the Jarwas, the Shompen of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Juang and the Lanjia Saora of Orissa, the Birhor of Bihar, etc.
2. Shifting cultivators, somewhat more advanced than the groups in the foregoing class, engaged in slash-and-burn method of cultivation solely or in combination with food-gathering and/or settled cultivation.
3. Groups in transition who have taken to mostly settled agriculture and are in process of acculturation.
4. Acculturated tribal communities whose members are more or less indistinguishable from non-tribals.²⁴

The tribal groups in each of the above four categories are characterised by a distinct stage in technological advancement. "With differing cultural background", as this Working Group further observed, "each of the tribal communities has nurtured its own political and social ethos. The technological system of each tribal community is both a product as well as the prime mover of the socio-economic (and cultural) milieu".²⁵

The success of any plan for technology transfer to a tribal community, therefore, depends primarily on its relevance to the existing economic-socio-cultural milieu and the absorption or assimilative power of the respective community. This calls for appropriate use of upgraded technology in appropriate areas of economic activities of different tribal communities to further their economic interests. The Working Group (1980) suggested certain measures to achieve this end. The following are some of the important recommendations of this Group:

1. Consideration of the agricultural sector has to be on national, regional and micro levels. From the national point of view, dry-farming techniques have to be evolved, integration in the field of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and forestry effected and the policy of establishment in tribal areas of experimental and seed multiplication farms followed. At the regional level,

²⁴*Report of the Working Group on Tribal Development During Sixth Plan 1980-85, op. cit.*, p. 64. The number of Primitive Tribal Groups, according to a recent report, is 73.

²⁵*Ibid.*

the policy has to be given a concrete shape by both national and State agencies for promotion of dry-farming. At the local level, the ethos of each tribal community should govern the plan for technology transfer and the schemes have to be specific and relevant.

2. The horticultural potential of tribal areas should be fully exploited through upgraded technology, marketing and processing arrangements.
3. The traditional expertise of tribals in animal husbandry should be relied upon for development plans, particularly in respect of the small animal.
4. In the field of industries, upgradation of intermediate technology might be apt, examples being tassar, oil-seed extraction, and sabai grass treatment.
5. In forestry sector, training in logging, carpentry, and wood-work-should be organized and the tribals involved in advanced methods of working of forest.
6. In the plan for tribal technology, holding of training courses in the relevant field should be an integral part.
7. Like the Design Institute at Ahmedabad, regional institutes may be located in tribal areas for evolving relevant technological modules for the synergy, individual techniques and equipment in the tribal context.²⁶

It would be pertinent to mention that the expenditure on technology transfer to the tribal community would be a sheer wastage without adequate response and cooperation of the non-tribal elites acting as the change-agents. These change-agents must have clear perception of the local conditions operating in the tribal areas where they have to operate and total awareness of the specific needs, assimilative power, and financial, informational and other constraints of their target groups. As an extreme example of wastage of public money for spread of improved technology to the tribal community, we may refer to the animal husbandry programmes in the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh for which a sum of Rs. 235.11 lakh was spent during the period of three years ending 1978-79. Studies conducted regarding the performance of these programmes have shown how unwise and wasteful it is to introduce measures meant for more advanced communities without a full examination of the conditions obtaining in these areas. "Stationing of bulls of a heavy breed in hilly areas where the cows are generally small does not help in improving the breed. Nor is any useful purpose served by giving a breeding bull to a tribal on the condition that he should

²⁶ *Report of the Working Group on Tribal Development 1980-85, op. cit.*, pp. 131-32.

maintain it when his earnings are barely sufficient for his own maintenance".²⁷

IMPACT OF THE TRIBAL SUB-PLAN STRATEGY

The transformation of state from colonial autocracy to secular democracy implicitly enhanced the governmental concern for welfare of the tribals and other under-privileged sections of our society. However, a total and comprehensive view of the tribal problem was taken only on the eve of the Fifth Five-Year Plan when the latest strategy known as the Tribal Sub-Plan strategy was evolved.²⁸ This new strategy was based on the concept of tribal area development with focus on the development of tribal communities.²⁹ The Sixth Plan laid further emphasis on *family-oriented programmes* for alleviation of poverty amongst the tribals. Consequently, investments in the tribal sub-plan areas increased substantially from Rs. 75 crores during the Fourth Plan to Rs. 1,102 crore during the Fifth Plan and over Rs. 5,000 crore during the Sixth Plan. The flow from State Plans and Special Central Assistance Programme of the Home Ministry also showed a spectacular increase during the Sixth Plan.³⁰ Some members of the Working Group (1984) rightly opined that while such a catalysis of investment is welcome, it posed certain problems such as accentuation of exploitation of tribals by non-tribals as a consequence of the creation of certain items of infrastructure like roads and buildings attracting thereby external agents of exploitation like contractors in tribal areas. Again, acceleration of the process of industrialization resulting from such enormous investments is bound to have added to the sufferings of the tribals.³¹ This shows that formulation of a desirable strategy, even if supported by huge financial investment, cannot always yield concrete results.

CONCLUSION

The perceptive and empirical analyses lead to an inescapable conclusion that in Indian democratic system tribal development has increasingly

²⁷Ajit Raizada, *Tribal Development in Madhya Pradesh—A Planning Perspective*, Delhi, Inter-India, 1984, pp. 170-71.

²⁸See *Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes During the Seventh Plan, 1985-90*, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁹B.D. Sharma, *Planning for Tribal Development*, Delhi, Prachi Prakashan, 1984, p. 63.

³⁰For further details, see the *Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes during Seventh Five-Year Plan*, op. cit., pp. 2-3; and R.N. Thakur, *Himalayan Lepchas*, Delhi, Archives Publishers, 1988, pp. 153-171.

³¹See *Report of the Working Group on Development of Scheduled Tribes During the Seventh Plan, 1985-90*, op. cit., p. 10.

become a *political ritual* to manipulate and exploit tribal vote-banks rather than an imaginative and integrated exercise. Consequently, it has all the more suffered because of the gap between policy and performance. No wonder that as for other weaker sections, developmental exercises for the tribals by our ruling elites have only rendered them more and more poor than their counterparts in the past. A fresh drive towards modernisation for redesigning India for the 21st century is bound to have increased the hiatus between the sophisticated, privileged sections of our society and the downtrodden, deprived tribals. The perpetuity of exploitation has resulted in increasing involvement of tribal communities in armed political movements against non-tribal exploiters and thereby accentuating social tensions in tribal regions throughout the length and breadth of the country. Added to these problems of social order and peace, the growing strength of the extremist and destabilising forces in these areas are now posing a serious threat to our national security and solidarity. If the ruling elites in India still allow the situation to drift, the nation will have to pay a heavy price for it.

IV. Elites: Changing Perspective

Changing Perspective in the Sociology of Elite: From the Governing Elite to the Administrative Elite

R.N. THAKUR

I

J.B. Mekee, in his *Introduction to Sociology*, sets forth aptly the important role of the elite in the political control in a democratic society. "Not even the historic emergence of democratic society nor of equillitarian values", writes Mckee, "has disabused social thinkers of the idea that political control always rests in the hands of an elite."¹

The study of elites is one of the starting positions in the comparative analysis of government and politics. Sociologists often imagine that the theory of elites was first formulated by Mosca, Pareto and Michels at the turn of the twentieth century; Plato and Aristotle never entered the picture. This is basically a misconception. Plato's theory that the elite should govern society stimulated later aristocratic political theory and has been embraced by the fascist and 'managerial' philosophers in our own day. In Plato's ideal society, there is a hierarchy of rank, which included three classes of people: the rulers; the soldiers; and the artisans, or the industrial and agricultural workers. The rulers constituted the elites. Aristotle's advocacy of the rule of the best few is nothing short of the rule of the elite.

GOVERNING ELITE

Long before there was such a subject as sociology, Aristotle and Plato, More and Macchiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau, Hobbes and Hume had had important things to say about the place of elites in political life. Some of the Grand Old Men of Sociology—Saint Simon, Comte, Spencer, Pareto, and Marx concerned themselves with the subject much earlier. No doubt, in our time some new element is being introduced into the discussion.

¹J.B. Mckee, *Introduction to Sociology*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, p. 473.

It was with Pareto and Mosca that the concept of the elite entered into the realm of the scientific thought of the nineteenth century. The three political sociologists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels pursued the theme of elite power and its relations to liberal and democratic institutions.

There is perhaps no more persistent idea in the history of thought concerning political institutions than the concept of elite. Almost all social thinkers in all times and places have been able to identify elites who exercise power over masses. Indeed, that an elite exists even within a democratic structure has been one of the influential ideas of political sociology.

When Pareto introduced his elite-concept, he began by drawing distinctions according to 'branches of activity'. These branches, according to him, may be of various kinds and of a very diversified nature; 'stealing is a branch; abduction is a branch', and 'so is government'.² He called those an elite who excelled in their special branches. It was just an accident that Pareto became a social scientist. A man who had his initial training in Mathematics and Civil Engineering, settled in business after graduation, turned out to be an economist and sociologist. His graduation thesis—"The Fundamental Principles of Equilibrium in Solid Bodies—An Essay in Mechanical Equilibrium"—was to become the paradigm for his conception of economics and, after economics, of sociology. As managing director he found his work as increasingly handicapped by the necessity to negotiate 'deals' with the influential deputies and government departments, and began to long to retire. It was about this time that he started to conceive his notion of the Italian governing class as a great nexus of influence and pressure, using political power to win economic favours and economic favours to win political success.

The age in which Pareto grew up was dominated by belief in social and material progress, in human perfectibility, and in scientific-positivism. Lapouge and Ammon were demonstrating that ability and talent were unequally distributed in societies. The Darwinian struggle for existence could be made to justify the rule of the strong over the weak. Hegelianism and Marxism—both in alliance with nationalism were to help dig the grave of the liberal democratic state.

Though the phenomena of elite may be traced in the writings of early sociologists, the concept of elite received for the first time a scientific formulation in the writings of Pareto. Pareto, a major figure in the development of sociological theory of elite, took the existence of ruling class for granted and concentrated his study on the selection and change of elites. He characterised elites as open elites and closed elites.³ Elites

²J.A. Banks, *The Elite in the Welfare State*, London, Faber and Faber, 1966, p. 62.

³Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (4 Vols.), London, Jonathan Cape, 1935, (English translation of *Trattato di Sociologia Generale*, 1915-19).

are open when access to elite position is possible for men of non-elite origin; and they are closed when an elite class monopolises elite positions for those born into that class. When an elite becomes closed, aristocracy emerges. In the history of sociological thought, the concept of 'elites' has been closely bound up with the theory of the 'circulation of elites' which derives from Mosca and Pareto and which, in its historical origins, stands in polar opposition to the Marxist theory of struggle between fixed class of owners and producers, says Leach.⁴

Pareto's sense of elite means those who exercise influence within any specialised sector of society: in this sense there may be elites among artists, school masters, trade union officials quite regardless of their social class origins or their political status. The other meaning is concerned with a political elite as a decision-making segment of an economically powerful ruling class. Others have in mind Mosca's model of an open 'ruling class'—the 'power elite' of C.W. Mills—which recruits its members from many different sectional elites within the total society on a more or less transient basis. Pareto linked the elite concept to a restricted and circumscribed set of qualities. In western society, there has been a certain criterion of great importance in elite formation—that of intelligence. There is the idea of the natural superiority of the intelligent, the supposedly natural elites who hold sway over the positions of leadership. The actual criticism is directed towards a state of affairs such as the holding of privileged positions by virtue of heritage or wealth.⁵ But this can be defended on the ground that in certain situations the possessions and inheritance of those who are invested with privilege can serve as a guarantee for intelligence. The theory of the 'Intelligentsia to the top'⁶ very well explains the selection to the administrative posts by means of competitive examination.

Social origin cannot be completely abstracted from elite concept. There are certain members of a society who derive their importance from their station in life. In a caste-society, certain groups owed superiority to the fact that they belonged to a certain station in life. But the emphasis has gradually shifted from ascription to achievement. Burnham, in *The Managerial Revolution*, discusses that the merchant and clergyman have given up their position as an elite in favour of the engineer and the economist.

In the first part of his treatise, Pareto raises the subject of the elite. "Every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element in the population. . ."⁷ He along with Mosca divided society into two strata: (i) a

⁴Edmund Leach and S.N. Mukherjee, *Elites in South Asia*, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. ix.

⁵W.D. Furneaux, *The Chosen Few*, New York, OUP, 1961.

⁶M. Young, *The Rise of Meritocracy*, Thames and Hudson, 1956.

⁷I.M. Zeitlin, *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*, New Delhi, Prentice Hall, 1969, p. 168.

higher stratum which contains the rulers, and (ii) a lower stratum which contains the ruled. Elite can further be sub-divided as a ruling elite, and a non-ruling elite. There is a universal elite cycle. Elites always circulate. Those in the position of non-elite change into elite. After a few generations, the ruling class consists of less able people. Pareto's central theory is that of biologically-founded decadence which causes elites to topple. Pareto's concept of elite draws upon psychology which starts from the presumption that men are by no means all equal; in certain situations and conditions, some of them are more capable than others; therefore, these more capable ones take the lead. But members of the elite have, in fact, to defend themselves against other groups who also have pretensions to elite status. Elites degenerate and fall a prey to groups with more vitality. In history, great oscillations are more or less rhythmic: periods of faith alternate with periods of scepticism. Each individual occupies a determined position in the social pyramid and if one arranges individuals according to their degree of influence and political power, then in most societies those highest in influence and political power will also be the men with the greatest wealth. This is the elite.

Here, Paretian analysis is somewhat like Marxian. Like Marx, he indeed sees a correspondence between economic and political power; but while the economic power, for Marx, tended to determine the political, Pareto viewed both as determined by the presence in individuals of certain elite characteristics—elite sentiments.

Zeitlin examines the works of Pareto primarily in their relationship to Marxian thought. "History is the graveyard of aristocracy". The struggle and circulation of elites is the stuff of history. The various revolutions of history, the triumph of the bourgeoisie over the feudal aristocracy, have been seen in terms of the struggle and circulation of elites. Elites and aristocracies do not last. They degenerate rather rapidly. Every elite, therefore, has the need to reinvigorate itself with reinforcements from the lower classes—its best elements. The decadence of the elite expresses itself in an outburst of sickly humanitarianism, while a new elite, full of strength and vigour, forms in the midst of the lower classes. "Every elite that is not ready to fight to defend its position is in full decadence; there remains nothing for it to do but to vacate its place for another elite having the virile qualities which it lacks".

Society is very much differentiated. Social differentiation refers primarily to the fact that individuals are "physically, morally, and intellectually different". Pareto's theory of elite is founded upon the notion of differentiation where some individuals are found to be superior to others. Pareto argues that society is harmed not only by the accumulation of inferior elements in higher positions, but also by

the accumulation of superior elements in lower positions. This also becomes the potent cause of disturbance in the equilibrium. Like Kolabinska, Pareto uses the term elite to refer to superiority—in intelligence, character, skill, capacity, power, etc. According to Pareto, the degree of excellence can be measured in every human endeavour, in theft and prostitution as well as in medicine and law and he assigns to the individuals in each an index ranging from 0 to 10. A grade of 10 may be assigned to the very best in each field. The elite of a society consists of those with the highest indices in their branches of activity. Pareto divides this into two: a governing elite, *i.e.*, those “who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government, and a non-governing elite, comprising the rest”. Together these constitute the higher stratum, or class, of the society. Like Marx, Pareto, too, employs a two-class model, ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’, higher class and lower class, rulers and ruled. Pareto sees the predominance of class I residues in the higher stratum, and a predominance of class II in the lower. He considers use of force as necessary in retaining the elite position. The decaying elite shies away from the use of force; it becomes less the lion and more the fox, and, therefore, increasingly vulnerable to the new lions. The ‘right traits’ and the use of ‘force’ are the two necessary things, according to Pareto, to ensure the maintenance of the governing class. The governing class trying to offer effective resistance even by the use of force suggests Pareto’s attitude toward fascism.

In his graphic phrase ‘history is a graveyard of aristocracy’, Pareto formulates the theory of the ‘circulation of elites’, which is the main ideal of his political theory. While examining Pareto’s contribution, Bottomore says that in his major works the analysis of the phenomenon is less impressive than the glamour of his style. There are two principal difficulties to be confronted. In the first place, does the ‘circulation of elites’ refer to a process in which individuals circulate between the elite and the non-elite, or to a process in which one elite is replaced by another? Both conceptions are to be found in Pareto’s work, although the former predominates. In the course of his discussion of the decay and revival of aristocracies, Pareto makes an observation: “the governing class is restored not only in numbers but—in quality, by families rising from the lower classes. . . . Pareto makes a reference to this phenomenon, using the expression, ‘the circulation of individuals between the two strata (elite and non-elite)’; in the higher stratum of society, class II residues gradually lose in strength, until now and again they are reinforced by tides upwelling from the lower stratum”. Pareto also refers to another kind of social movement which he appears to connect with a failure of circulation in the first sense and which, perhaps, is also regarded as an ‘aspect of the circulation of elites in

general'. When this circulation slows down, there may be an increase of the degenerate elements in positions of power. In such a case, the social equilibrium becomes unstable. . . . and the slightest shock will destroy it. "... a revolution produces an upheaval, brings a new elite to power, and establishes a new equilibrium. . . ."

By the end of the nineteenth century, theories of progress, perfectibility and positivism were all under open attack. A number of laws came to operate in their respective fields of study—scientific laws, historical laws, economic or sociological laws. On the analogy of mid-nineteenth century physics, the laws of Euclidean geometry, Newton's laws of thermodynamics, Comte's law of the three 'Stages', Marx's dialectical law of social evolution—all claimed objectivity and impersonal quality. But there prevailed a doubt whether these were laws. Laws are statements about the external world; these statements are necessarily influenced to some degree by our own psychic make-up. By virtue of their psychic make-up, human beings are heterogeneous and unequal, and fall into different social strata. There is heterogeneity in society. The most important societal distinction is between the governing elite (a minority) and the governed (the majority). Irrespective of the 'form' of the regime, all societies are governed by minority elites. In society, there is a circulation of elites. Individuals move in and out of these categories. In certain cases, one elite displaces another en-bloc. Such movements constitute the 'circulation of elites'.

Pareto, at places, uses the expression 'dominant classes'. His 'aristocracy' and 'dominant class' are almost identical. He uses them in an almost interchangeable sense.⁸ Societies are always governed by a 'dominant class'. Pareto also acknowledges his debt to Marx and Loria. He took it for granted that societies are, at least in general, ruled by minority groups, and that such groups have a natural tendency to exploit the remainder. His circulation of elites is almost similar to the process of zoological selection: a form of social Darwinism. The alternation of elites means nothing, but, that one aristocracy or dominant class is simply succeeded by another. The form of social phenomena is cyclical rather than linear. Insofar as members of the non-elite part of the population accede to the governing elite, and members of the governing elite sink into the mass of the non-elite, there is a so-called 'circulation of the elites'. For Pareto, "every where there exists a governing class. . . . it is the forms under which it appears that differ". "In absolute governments, there is only one figure on the stage the sovereign; in so-called democratic governments it is the parliament". But behind the scenes all the time are people who have very important functions in the actual work of "government" . . . always it is an oligarchy that governs".

⁸S.E. Finer, *Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1966, p. 14.

II

RULING CLASS

In all societies—from societies which are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawns of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. “The first class always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings; whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first. . . .”⁹ Mosca is the first to put the ruling class as such at the centre of the scientific study of politics.¹⁰ He settles account with all the old theories which try to explain the structure of society by means of a single non-sociological principle. He points out the shortcomings of Spencer and biological evolution, Renan and his racial doctrine. Like Pareto, he conceives an effective repudiation of Marxism as his life’s work.

Mosca’s work is a landmark in the development of a sociological theory of elites. All the elements characterising later elite theories are to be found expressed in his writings. First, it is almost axiomatic that in every society a small group has the leadership over the remaining groups.

Secondly, as Mosca says, “leadership ensures for the leaders a livelihood and a means of leading the state.” This statement of Mosca implies two things: first, the leadership of a state as a way of earning a living; secondly, the self-manifestation of an inborn longing for power on the part of the group which leads. But the lack of awareness of responsibility on the part of the leading group towards those who are led is a very striking phenomenon. If the ruling class is simply composed of a whole lot of self-seekers, how does their rule persist? Why do those who are ruled allow them to rule over? Mosca’s reply would be that the unorganised are unable to stand up against the organised. Whether Mosca’s ruling class is a homogeneously organised group is a matter of speculation. He did not explicitly define the ruling class. But, as a political sociologist, he sees the ruling class manifesting itself in the machinery of state. His ruling class is very much akin to the concept of *elite*. To him, elite means a morally and intellectually superior group. It is only the political class that is thoroughly qualified to rule.

⁹Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, [Trans. H.D. Kahn, A. Livingston (ed.)] New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 50.

¹⁰Alessandro Pizzorno, *Political Sociology*, Penguin, 1971, p. 83. Gaetano Mosca was very much influenced by the way Taine had analysed monarchical France in the Ancien Régime.

MOSCA AND PARETO

Mosca's elite theory is essentially a critique of the doctrine of majority rule and is a generalisation of the method of Taine. There is no dialectical or historical connection between Pareto's theory of the elite and Mosca's theory of the ruling class. Mosca was the one writer to have given the concept of the ruling class the importance that the concept of the elite has in Pareto's systems. The specific points of contact between Mosca's theories and Pareto's are of a minor significance and have no bearing on the originality or intrinsic interest of Pareto's use of the concept of the elite. Similar as they are in method and spirit, the two researches (Mosca's Ruling class and Pareto's Elite theory) are vastly different in range and magnitude.

'Political class' or 'ruling class'—these two terms are interchangeable in Mosca. His political class consists of the people who actually and directly participate in government or influence it. Mosca's 'ruling class', therefore, covers a narrower field than Pareto's elite or the Marxian ruling class. Arthur Livingstone explains this by citing the case of the American Professor. Under some administration, he is in Mosca's ruling class; under other administration he is not in Mosca's ruling class. In Marxian theory, he would always be a member of the ruling class, and for Pareto, always a member of the elite. Mosca could scientifically demonstrate that the theories of equality, such as those propounded by Rousseau, are untenable. His main proposition is the inevitability of inequality. Whatever analysis he made about this contains all the fundamental ideas required for a more positively constructed theory, although he failed to rearrange these elements into a closely-knit, logical system.¹¹

Some of Mosca's propositions which deserve attention are: (i) that the society is ruled by a minority group which constitutes the ruling class or the actual government (the government and its officials); (ii) the majority that are ruled are unorganised; (iii) the ruling group claims superiority on the basis of the standards set up by the group itself; and (iv) alongside the ruling group there exists influential sub-group.

Both Pareto and Mosca offer what is in essence a conservative theory, in which the ruling class is the natural elite. Like Pareto, Mosca intended his 'ruling class' as a refutation of Marxism. According to him, there will always be a ruling class. Mosca and Pareto both depended upon the constant psychological tendencies determining the behaviour of the human masses. Pareto concentrates solely on the qualities of superiority-inferiority. He makes no effort to relate his

¹¹J.H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1958. Further see, H.S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*, Knoff 1958; and C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York Oxford University Press, 1959.

elites to social groupings and classes. He declines to relate his notion of governing elite to the concept of socio-economic class. In the 'course', he accepted Marx's socio-economic classes and his notion of class-struggle, but the 'treatise' extrudes the Marxist notion and replaces theory by a distinction between 'rentiers' and 'speculators'.

This intellectual evolution reflects Pareto's preoccupation with the ideas of Karl Marx. The doctrine that 'lions' alternate with 'foxes' is open to serious objections. A further criticism of Pareto's concept of a governing class is that it is too inclusive. The governing elite is a tightly organised and identifiable minority.

Mosca derived his concept of the 'political class' from the lessons of history and from extra-European examples, and then applied it to contemporary democracies; he then spent the rest of his life trying to adjust the over-narrow concept to fit the characteristics of democracy.

Pareto's notion of the 'governing class' is broad. The various pressure groups, the regional and sectional groupings, the opposing political parties are viewed as so many different clientele whose leaders collectively form the governing class.

III

CRITIQUE OF ELITE THEORY

The crucial difficulty in all elite theory is that the governing elite, as defined, is either too narrow or too broad. Mosca's conception of a closely knit and self-conscious organised minority is demonstrably too narrow to fit modern democracies; but Pareto's network of leading minorities is too broad to distinguish between them. Mosca's theory of the ruling class had no influence whatsoever when he first presented it. Only as a result of Pareto's writings, did the concept of a ruling minority take hold.

Michels was the only one who used Mosca's theory of the ruling class, chiefly, in his studies of the oligarchical structure of political parties. Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels served as central figures in stimulating empirical studies of elite. Their initial formulations were concerned with the bureaucratic features of party organisation. The organisation of the state needs a numerous and complicated bureaucracy.¹² This is an important factor in the complex of forces of which the politically dominant classes avail themselves to secure their dominion and to enable themselves to keep their hands upon the rudder.

The position of the middle class is being threatened by expropriative

¹²R. Michels, *The Political Parties*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949 (English translation).

capitalism on the one hand and the organised working classes on the other—both these "... combine to injure the middle classes. All those whose material existence is threatened by modern economic developments endeavour to find safe situations for their sons, to secure for these a social position which shall shelter them from the play of economic forces".

The party in which the circle of the elite is unduly restricted, or in which, the oligarchy is composed of too small a number of individuals, runs the risk of being swept away by the masses in a moment of democratic effervescence. Hence the modern party, like the modern state, endeavours to give to its own organisation the widest possible base, and to attach to itself in financial bonds the largest possible number of individuals. Thus arises the need for a strong bureaucracy and these tendencies are reinforced by the increase in the tasks imposed by modern organisations. Pareto stresses that political power is always exercised by minorities (elites), and Robert Michels' Law of the trend towards oligarchic rule in party organisations can also be accepted. It is Pareto's term 'elite' and not Mosca's 'political class' which has passed into general circulation (though the two conceptions are by no means identical). The notion, common to both Mosca and Pareto, that all societies have been and necessarily are governed by an oligarchy can neither be proved nor disproved. From the Paretian approach have, perhaps, sprung such radical reappraisals of democracy as that of Schumpeter for whom it is a system in which elites publicly compete for the authority to govern; the work of Raymond Aron, interrelating elites, government and social structure; the studies of community power structure of Floyd Hunter (arguing for the presence of an unidentifiable elite) and of Robert Dahl (arguing the contrary); the great programme of comparative elite studies of Harold Lasswell and his school; Anthony Giddens' elite integration and four ideal type of elites: 'solidary', 'uniform', 'abstract', and 'established'; and contributions of Burton-Higley (1984). Pareto had no direct or indirect influence upon his successors. He only pioneered propositions which have since become commonly accepted or widely influential.

IV

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

The study of power in the community has centred round the approach developed by Floyd Hunter, a sociologist; and criticised by Robert Dahl, a political scientist. In community power structure, Hunter describes, in detail, an economic elite—mostly corporation executives and bankers—who by informal communication and because of a similar social point of view agree on major decisions affecting the lives of

all the citizens of the community. Yet, this elite is not known to the community, for its members do not usually hold official positions and its decision-making activities are not publicly visible. Power seems to be centred at the very top of the social structure in the hands of the community's economic elite. This small elite is able to exercise social power because of its control of the community's economic resources. The elite decides, but others, whom the community thinks of as community leaders, then go about the task of carrying out the decision. These community leaders are not decision-makers. They are, rather, men of second and third rank in the power structure, whose function is to carry out decisions, not make them.

Hunter's method for discovering the power structure of community has been labelled the 'reputational method, which consists of creating a list of persons whom acknowledgeable individuals assert as the most powerful or influential ones in the community. This approach to the study of community power has become a source of controversy among social scientists, particularly between those who have followed Hunter's method in studying power; and others, such as Robert Dahl, who have offered alternative approaches. Robert Dahl and his followers asserted that there is not in fact, a small, cohesive decision-making elite in the community. They have criticised Hunter's 'reputational' method for centering on who the decision makers are but not on how decisions are made. In turn, they have insisted on the importance of observing the issues in the community over which decisions are made and observing the decision-making process that occurs. They note that the same people are not necessarily involved in the different areas of decision-making, education, city government, and community welfare, for example. From this perspective one gets a different image of community power structure—one much less monolithic, with a less close relation between power and status and a wider citizen participation in decision-making.

Sociologists have offered criticisms of Hunter's method conducting other studies of communities which reveal a less monolithic image of power. Such scientific criticisms give a much better idea of just how power is structured in the community. Yet, the question of whether social power is always exercised through an elite remains an unresolved issue.

V

POWER ELITE

Most sociological studies have been on the community level, a noted exception to this, however, was C.W. Mills' *The Power Elite*, a sociologically imaginative effort to delineate the power structure of modern

American society. In recent years, C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*, which is reckoned as a work of far-reaching consequences, shows the influences of Marx on the one side, and Pareto and Mosca on the other. Mills used the term 'power elite' in preference to 'ruling class' because in his view the 'ruling class' is a badly loaded phrase. 'Class' is an economic term; 'rule' a political term. The phrase 'ruling class' implies that an economic class rules politically. Mills defines the power elite in terms of the means of power. His definition of power elite is much the same as Pareto's definition of 'governing elite'. The power elite includes three major elites in the USA—the political leaders, the corporation heads and the military chiefs. These three groups form a single elite as they represent an upper class which is consequently regarded as a ruling class. The concept of power elite emphasises the unity of the elite as well as the homogeneity of its social origins. All this points to the consolidation of a ruling class.

But Mills' analysis has been controversial in social science. Many social scientists have insisted upon a more pluralistic view of social power in which a wide and diversified array of interest groups have access to places of authority and manage to bring pressure upon official decision-makers. Bottomore also holds this formulation, of Mills to criticism. According to him, Mills' formulation is quite vague and unconvincing. This really refers to "the often uneasy coincidence of political, economic and military power".¹³

However, Mills sees political, economic and military elites as a cohesive group on the score of the similarity of their social origins.

Mills in his study of the power elite attempts to explain the power position of the three principal elites taken separately, but the unity of the power elite as single group, and the basis of its power have not been explained. Why is there one power and not three?

C. Wright Mills perhaps views in the absence of a comprehensive career civil service an important factor in allowing the formation of a power elite in American society. Although this view seems to be untenable in the light of the experiences of the European societies, in which the closest association has existed between the high officials of a genuine bureaucracy and the upper class in society. Secondly, the formation of the power elite depends upon the relegation of the professional party politician to the middle levels of power. Thirdly, the increased official secrecy behind which great decisions are made is a factor on which rests the formation of a power elite.

Mills' *The Power Elite* is a discussion of the personal characteristics, backgrounds and morals of the men at the top. There is emphasis on persons rather than position. The power elite is the analysis of power in contemporary American society. Mills sees power elites not only in

¹³T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, Penguin, 1982 (reprint), p. 38.

terms of wealth, status and prestige but more especially, in terms of institution and institutional power which they hold. The elites are those with "access to the command of major institutions". The elites are simply those who have the most of what there is to have, which is is generally held to include money, power, and prestige—as well as all the ways of life to which these lead. But the elites are not simply those who have the most, for they could not "have the most" were it not for their positions in the great institutions—"such institutions are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige. . . . No one can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful". "Wealth does not centre in the person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions. . . ." ¹⁴

In criticising Mills' *The Power Elite*, Parsons' tendency is also generally to de-emphasise the importance of property and wealth as a source of power in society as even within economy itself. ¹⁵ Parsons adds that the elite in the economy is not identical with that in the society as a whole. One reason for this, according to Parsons, is that eliteness is not exclusively manifested in the power or influence of persons or groups.

VI

RULING ELITE AND POLITICAL ELITE

Robert A. Dahl, in his "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", presents a critique of the ruling elite theory. ¹⁶ First, he raises a doubt about the scientific base of this theory. "If the overt leaders of a community do not appear to constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do. If subsequent evidence shows that this covert group does not make a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the first covert group there is another, and so on".

Secondly, Dahl tries to clarify the meaning of the concept 'ruling elite' and then seeks to explain what a ruling elite system would mean.

According to him, "within some specific political system there exists a

¹⁴C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 9 and 11.

¹⁵A.W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology*, Basic Books, 1970, p. 313.

¹⁶Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, 1958, pp. 463-8.

group of people who to some degree exercise power or influence over other actors in the system." He makes some assumption about power:

- (i) In order to compare the relative influence of two actors, it is enecessary to state the scope of the responses upon which the actors have an effect. The statement, 'A has more power than B', is ambiguous if it does not specify the scope.
- (ii) One cannot compare the relative influence of two actors who always "perform identical actions with respect to the group influenced. . ." One can test for differences in influence only where there are cases of differences in initial preference. At one extreme, the difference may mean that one group prefers alternative A and another group prefers B, A and B being mutually exclusive. At the other extreme, it may mean that one group prefers one alternative to other alternatives, and another group is indifferent.

Consequently, to know whether or not we have a ruling elite, we must have a political system in which there is a difference in preferences, from time to time, among the individual human beings in the system.

In a democracy, the majority would constitute a controlling group. To constitute a ruling elite, a controlling group must not be a pure artifact of democratic rules. A ruling elite is a controlling group less than a majority in size, that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preference on key political issues.

Dahl presents a critique of both F. Hunter (1953) and C. Wright Mills (1956). According to him, none of them has seriously attempted to examine any array of specific cases to test his major hypothesis.

The hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if: (i) the hypothetical ruling elite is a well defined group, (ii) there is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group, (iii) in such cases, the preferences of the elite regularly prevail. Later studies of elites have followed Pareto and Mosca, especially the latter, closely in their concern with problems of political power. H.D. Lasswell, in his early writings and more recently in the Hoover Institute Studies on elites, has devoted himself particularly to the study of the political elite. According to him, the political elite comprises the power holders of a body politic. The power holders include the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come. Lasswell's approach is contextual.

Lasswell's conception of elite is different from that of Pareto and Mosca insofar as Lasswell's political elite is distinguished from other elites which are less closely associated with the exercise of power,

although they may have a considerable social influence. Lasswell reintroduces the idea of 'social formations' from which elites are typically recruited.¹⁷ Like Lasswell, Raymond Aron, too has been chiefly concerned with the elite in the sense of a governing minority. But he insists on the plurality of elites in modern societies and also attempts to establish relation between the elite and social classes.¹⁸ Unlike Lasswell, Aron examines the social influence of the intellectual elite which does not form part of the system of political power. Aron's use of the term 'Elite' is somewhat general which includes the size of the elites, the number of different elites, their relations with each other and with the groups that wield political power.

VII

ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE : DISCUSSION

From Pareto's governing elite, Mosca's ruling class and Michels' rule of the oligarchy we move on to Hunter's community power structure, Mills' power elite, Dahl's critique of the ruling elite, and Lasswell's political elite, and then discern the implications of Bottomore's administrative elite. The administrative elites appear to form essential counterparts of political elites in any political system.

Among the social groups which have risen to prominence in the tremendous social and political change of the twentieth century, three elites—the intellectuals, the managers of industry and the high government officials—have often been singled out as the inheritors of the functions of earlier ruling classes and as vital agents in the creation of new forms of society.

The third social group—the government officials—appears to many observers as an increasingly powerful elite in modern societies [see Bottomore (1954), Kelsall (1955), Bendix (1949), Palombara (1963), Riggs (1966,69), Taub (1969), and Subramaniam (1972)]. Although the growth of bureaucracy is recognised as one of the major social trends of our time, the sociological discussion of the bureaucratic elite started with the work of Max Weber. Weber held that, even in a democratic system, the power of bureaucracy could not be restricted by political authorities. In the words of Weber, "under normal conditions the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overwhelming".

The Weberian ideal of bureaucracy has also been fully applied to the Soviet Social system by Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslav critic in his book *The*

¹⁷H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, and C.E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Hoover Institute Studies, Series B: Elites, No. 1, Stanford, 1952.

¹⁸Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class", *British Journal of Sociology*, I (1), March 1950, pp. 1-16 and I (2), June 1950, pp. 126-43.

New Class. This new class refers to the bureaucracy or political bureaucracy having all the characteristics of its own.

In the western democracies, as in the Asian, attention has been drawn to the increasing power of bureaucracy in the wake of the increasing range of developmental and welfare activities undertaken by the state, and by the growing complexity of public administration. Bottomore in his *Elites and Society* quotes a critic of the French administrative elite: "they (the high officials) constitute a supreme and sovereign self-recruiting body, immune from political intervention, a rock against which all political storms beat ineffectively and in vain" In case of France, where the political authority is weak and unstable, the power of bureaucracy can stand out clearly. But in other western countries, the power of bureaucracy is always countered in one form or another. In the United States of America, the absence of a comprehensive career civil service, especially in the higher grades, has prevented the formation of an administrative elite.¹⁹ In India also, the bureaucratic structure moulded on the British pattern has given rise to an administrative elite of a comprehensive career civil service.

In all complex societies, high government officials form an important part of the governing elite—the minority which, at any time, effectively rules a society. The position of higher civil servants in modern industrial societies is especially influential, as a result of the great extension of state activities, the growing technical complexities of public administration, and the organisation of civil service as a professional career based upon educational diplomas and training.²⁰ No doubt, the administrative elite forms a relatively small, well-defined, homogeneous and cohesive group having social prestige and power; yet, their power is closely circumscribed in democratic societies where civil servants act under the authority of a political elite which is itself responsible to parliament and to the electorate. The decisions which have been made by legislature are only implemented by the officials, and in terms of interests and values which lie outside the sphere of influence of these officials. However, in practice, the higher civil servants may have a great deal of autonomy, at the policy-formulation stage they may have, by virtue of long experience and expert knowledge of the working of the departments, a considerable influence upon the ideas and decisions of the minister who is nominally their head; at the policy-implementation stage they may have the power to delay, obstruct or modify its working. The growing technical complexity of modern government also enhances the power of the permanent officials.

¹⁹R. Bendix, *Higher Civil Servants in American Society*, Boulder, University of Colorado Press, 1949.

²⁰I.L. Horowitz, *The New Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 357.

In fact, Max Weber regarded the growth of bureaucratic power in modern societies as inexorable.

Bottomore's conception of administrative elite is elaborated on the ground that the high government officials form a cohesive, homogeneous social category driven by their own social class interest having a definite pattern of recruitment, training and functional characteristics with high social prestige, power and influence. Bureaucracy can drive or hold the wheel of progress. As Bottomore observed, the policies of the popular front government of Leon Blum (1936-38) were obstructed by the higher civil servants. Lipset observed that the radical measures of the Canadian Socialist government were thwarted by the civil servants. The experience of Indian society shows how radical measures of land reforms could not yet be fully implemented in their true spirit even after decades of their formulation by the legislative machinery. On the other hand, modernisation of Japan could be possible largely on account of the efficient policy-executing function performed by the bureaucracy with a solid core of highly selected elites.²¹ There is, certainly, an increasing importance of the administrative elites' role in the planned, welfare state.

²¹R. Wilkinson (ed.), *Governing Elites*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 134.



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